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IN MEMORIAM 
"The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle againsz all 
odds. We learned again that this Amerka, which Abraham Lincoln called the [art, best 
hope of man on Earth, was built on heroinn and noble sacrfke. It war built by men and 
women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more 
than war expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly rewardd" 
-President Ronald Reagan Januarj 3 1,2886 
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Dear Mr. President: 
On behalf of the Commission, it is my privilege to present 
the report of the Presidential Commission on the Space S h u t t l e  
Challenger Accident. 
Since being sworn in on February 6, 1986, the Comission 
has been able to conduct a comprehensive investigation o f  the 
Challenger accident. This report documents our findings and 
makes recommendations for your consideration, 
Our objective has been not only to prevent any recurrence 
of the failure related to this accident, but to the extefit pos- 
sible to reduce other risks in future flights. However, the 
Commission did not construe its mandate to require a detailed 
evaluation of the entire Shuttle system. It fully recognizes 
that the risk associated with space flight cannot be totally 
eliminated. 
Each member of the Commission shared the pain and anguish 
the nation felt at the loss of seven brave Americans in the 
Challenger accident on January 28, 1986, 
The nation's task now is to move ahead to return to safe 
space flight and to its recognized position of leadership in 
space. There could be no more fitting tribute to the Challenger 
crew than to do so. 
Sincerely, 
William I?. Rogers 
Chairman 
The President of the United States 
The Khite House 
Washington, D, C. 20500 
m Maryland Avenue. S.W. washingion. D.C. 20024 
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Preface 
T he accident of Space Shuttle Challenger, mission 5 1 -L9 interrupt- ing for a time one of the most pro- ductive engineering, scientific and ex- 
ploratory programs in history, evoked a wide 
range of deeply felt public responses. There was 
grief and sadness for the loss of seven brave 
members of the crew; firm national resolve that 
those men and women be forever enshrined in 
the annals of American heroes, and a determina- 
tion, based on that resolve and in their memory, 
to strengthen the Space Shuttle program so that 
this tragic event will become a milestone on the 
way to achieving the full potential that space of- 
fers to mankind. 
The President, who was moved and troubled 
by this accident in a very personal way, appointed 
an independent Commission made up of persons 
not connected with the mission to investigate it. 
The mandate of the Commission was to: 
1. Review the circumstances surrounding the 
accident to establish the probable cause or causes 
of the accident; and 
2, Develop recommendations for corrective or 
other action based upon the Commission9s find- 
ings and determinations. 
Immediately after being appointed, the Com- 
mission moved forward with its investigation and, 
with the full support of the White House, held 
public hearings dealing with the facts leading up 
to the accident. In a closed society other options 
are available; in an open society - unless classified 
matters are involved -other options are not, 
either as matter of law or as a practical matter. 
In this case a vigorous investigation and full 
disclosure of the facts were necessary. The way 
to deal with a failure of this magnitude is to 
disclose all the facts fully and openly; to take im- 
mediate steps to correct mistakes that led to the 
failure; and to continue the program with re- 
newed confidence and determination. 
'The Commission construed its mandate 
somewhat broadly to include recommendations 
on safety matters not necessarily involved in this 
accident but which require attention to make 
future flights safer. Careful attention was given 
to concerns expressed by astronauts because the 
Space Shuttle program will only succeed if the 
highly qualified men and women who fly the 
Shuttle have confidence in the system. 
However, the Commission did not constme its 
mandate to require a detailed investigation of all 
aspects of the Space Shuttle prolgram; to revietv 
budgetary matters; or to interfere with or 
supersede Congress in any way in the perform- 
ance of its duties. Rather, the Commission 
focused its attention on the safety aspects of fumre 
flights based on the lessons learned from the in- 
vestigation with the objective being to return to 
safe flight. 
Congress recognized the desirakaity, in h e  first 
instance, of having a single investigation of this 
national tragedy. It very responsibly agreed to 
await the Commission's findings 'befox deciding 
what further action might be necessav to carry 
out its responsibilities. 
For the first several days after the accident- 
possibly because of the trauma resulting from the 
accident - NASA appeared to be withholding in- 
formation about the accident from the public, 
After the Commission began its wcolrk, and at its 
suggestion, NASA began releasing a great deal 
of information that helped to reassure the public 
that all aspects of the accident were being in- 
vestigated and that the full story was being told 
in an orderly and thorough manner. 
Following the suggestion of tlhe Commission, 
NASA established several teams of persons not 
involved in the mission 51-6, launch process; to 
support the Commission and ir:s panels. These 
NASA teams have cooperated with the Commis- 
sion in every aspect of its work. The result has 
been a comprehensive and complete investiga- 
tion. 
The Commission believes that its investigation 
and report have been responsive to the request 
of the President and hopes that they will serve 
the best interests of the nation in restoring the 
United States space program to its preeminent 
position in the world. s 
he Space Shuttle concept had its 
genesis in the 1960s, when the Apollo 
lunar landing spacecraft was in full 
deve%opment but had not yet flown. 
From the earliest days of the space program, it 
seemed logical that the go%% of frequent, 
ecsnsmica% access to space might best be served 
by a reusable llaiunch system. In February, 1967, 
the Presidents's Science Advisory Committee lent 
weight eo the idea of a reusable spacecraft by 
recommending that studies be made "of more 
ecanomicd ferqing systems, presumably involv- 
ing partid or total recovery and use." 
In September, f 969, two months after the in- 
itial lunar landing, a Space Task Group chaired 
by the Vice  President offered a choice of three 
long-range plans: 
rn A $$-$I 0 billion per year program involv- 
ing a manned Mars expedition, a space sta- 
tion in lunar orbit and a 50-person Earth- 
orbiting station serviced by a reusable ferry, 
or Space Shuttle. 
B An intermediate program, costing less than 
$8 billlion annudly, that would include the 
Mars mission. 
rn A relatively modest $4-$5.7 billion a year 
program that would embrace an Earth- 
orbiting space station and the Space Shut- 
tle as its link to Eanh, a 
In March, 1970, President Nkon made it clear 
that, while he favored a continuing active space 
program, funding on the order of Apollo was not 
in the cards. He opted for the shuttle-tended space 
base as a long-range goal but deferred going 
ahead with the space station pending develop- 
ment of the shuttie vehicle. Thus the reusable 
Space Shuttle, earlier considered only the 
transport element of a broad, multi-ob~ective 
space plan, became the focus of NASA's near- 
tern future. 
The S ~ a e e  Shuttle Design 
The embryo Shuttle program faced a number 
of evolutionary design changes before it would 
become a system in being. The first design was 
based on a "fly backv concept in which two stages. 
each manned, would fly back'to a horizontal, 
airplane-like landing. The first stage bras a huge. 
winged, rocket-powered vehicle that would car? 
the smaller second stage piggyback; the carrier 
would provide the thrust for liftoff and flight 
through the atmosphere, then release its  
passenger - the orbiting vehicle - and return to 
Earth. The Orbiter, containing the crew and 
payload, would continue into space under its own 
rocket power, complete its mission and then fly 
back to Earth. 
The second-stage craft, conceived prior to 1978 
as a space station ferry, was a vehicle considerably 
larger than h e  later Space Shuttle Orbiter. It car- 
ried its rocket propellants internally, had a flight 
deck sufficiently Barge to seat 1% space station- 
bound passengers and a cargo bay big enough 
to accommodate space station modules. The Or- 
biter's size put enormous weightlifting and thrust- 
generating demands on the first-stage design. 
This two-stage, fully reusable design 
represented the optimum Space Shuttle in terms 
of "routine, economical access to space,' the catch- 
phrase that was becoming the primary guidelline 
for development of Earth-to-orbit systems. St was, 
howe\per, less than optimum in terms of the 
development investment required: an estimated 
$10-13 billion, a figure that met with disfavor in 
both Congress and the Office of Management and 
Budget. 
In 1971, NASA went back to the drawing 
board, aware that development cost rather than 
system capability would probably be the deter- 
mining factor in getting a green light for Shuttle 
development. Government and industry studies 
sought developmental economies in the con- 
figuration. One proposal found acceptance: 
eliminate the Orbiter's internal tanks and carry 
the propellant in a single, disposable External 
Tank. Ir pro~ided a smaller. cheaper Orbiter 
without substantial performance loss. 
For the launch system, NASA examined a 
number of possibilities. One was a winged but 
unmanned recoverable liquid-fuel vehicle based 
on the eminently successful Saturn 5 rocket from 
the Apollo Program. Other plans envisislened 
simpler but also recoverable liquid-fuel systems. 
expendable solid rockets .and the reusable Solid 
Rocket Booster. NASA had been using solid-fuel 
vehicles for launching some small unmanned 
spacecraft, but solids as boosters for manned flight 
was a technology new to the agency. Mercury, 
Gemini and Apollo astronauts had a%] been 
rocketed into space by liquid-fuel systems. 
Nonetheless, the recoverable Solid Rocket 
Booster won the nod, even though the liquid 
rocket offered potentially lower aperaring costs 
Art~sa s drawing deplcts Space Shuttle stacked for launch In 
vlew from dorsal s~de of Orblter (left) and from the left slde 
of stack. 
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The overriding reason was that pricing estimates 
indicated a lower cost of development for the solid 
booster. 
Emerging from this round of design decision 
making was the Space Shuttle: a three-element 
system c~)mposed of the Orbiter, an expendable 
external fuel tank carrying liquid propellants for 
the Orbiter's engines, and two recoverable Solid 
Rocket Boosters. It wouId cost, NASA estimated 
early in 1972, $6.2 billion to develop and test a 
five-Orbiter Space Shuttle system, about half 
what the two-stage "fly back" design would Rave 
cost. To achieve that reduction, NASA had to 
accept somewhat higher system operating costs 
and sacrifice full reusability. The compromise 
des ip  retained recoverability and reuse of two 
of the three elements and still promised to trim 
substantiaP1y the cost of delivering payloads to 
orbit< 
The final configuration was selected in March, 
1972. 
The Space Shuttle 
Develo~ment 
In August, 11972, NASA awarded a contract 
to Rockwell International Corporation's Space 
Transpsfiarion Systems Division for design and 
development of the Space Shuttle Orbiter, Mar- 
tin Marietta Denver Aerospace was assigned 
development and fabrication df the External 
Tank, Morton Thiokol Corporation was award- 
ed the contract for-the Solid Rocket Boosters, and 
Rocketdyne, a division of Rockwell, was selected 
ra develop the Orbiter main engines. 
NASA divided managerial responsibility for 
the program among three of its field centers. 
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, was 
assiped management of the Orbiter. Marshall 
Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, was 
made responsible for the Orbiter9s main engines, 
the Ex-eemd Tank and the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Kennedy Space Center, Menritt Island, F%ox=ida, 
was Gven the job of' assembling the Space Shut- 
tle components, checking them out and conduet- 
ing launches. Because these three centers will be 
mentioned repeatedly in this report, they will 
hereafter be identified simply as Johnson, Mar- 
shdl and Kennedy. 
It was in an increasingly austere fiscal environ- 
ment that NASA struggled through the Shuttle 
development years of the 1970s. The planned 
five-Orbiter fleet was reduced to four. Budgetary 
difficulties were compounded by engineering 
problems and, inevitably in a major new system 
whose development pu'shes the frontiers of 
technology, there was cost growth. This cornbina- 
tion of factors induced schedule slippage. The ini- 
tid orbitd test flights were delayed by more than 
two years. 
The first Shuttle test flights were conducted at 
Dryden Flight Research Facility, California, in 
1977. The test craft was the Orbiter Enterprise, 
a full-size vehicle that lacked engines and other 
systems needed for orbital flight.-~he purpose of 
these tests was to check out the aerodynamic and 
flight control characteristics of the Orbiter in at- 
mospheric flight. Mounted piggyback atop a 
modified Boeing 747, the Enterprise was carried 
to dtitude and released for a gliding approach 
and landing at the Mojave Desert test center. Five 
such flights were made. They served to validate 
the Orbiter's computers and other systems. They 
also demonstrated the craft's subsonic handling 
qualities, in particular its performance in the 
precise unpowered landings that would be re- 
quired on all Shuttle flights. 
The Enterprise test flights were followed - in 
1977-80 -by extensive ground tests of Shuttle 
systems, including vibration tests of the entire 
assembly - Orbiter, Externd Tank and Solid 
Rocket Boosters - at Marshal%, Main engine test 
firings were conducted at Nationd Space 
Technology Laboratories at Bay St. Louis, 
Mississippi, and on the launch pad at Kennedy. 
By early 1981, the Space Shuttle was ready for 
an orbital flight test program. This was careful- 
ly crafted to include more than 1,000 tests and 
data collection procedures. All flights were to be 
launched from Kennedy and terminate at Ed- 
wards Air Force Base, where the Dryden Flight 
Research Facility is located (actually the third 
flight landed at White Sands Test Facility, New 
~ & i c o ,  because the normally dry lakebed at Ed- 
wards was flooded). Originally intended as a six- 
mission program, the orbitd test series was reduc- 
ed to four flights: 
STS-1 (Space Transportation System - l) ,  
April 12-14, 1981, Orbiter Columbia, was 
a iwo-day demonstration of the Orbiter's 
ability to $0 into orbit and return safely. Its 
main payload was a flight instrumentation 
pallet containing equipment for recording 
temperatures, pressures and acceleration 
levels at various points around the Orbiter. 
In addition, there were checkouts of the 
cargo bay doorsj attitude control system and 
orbital maneuvering system. 
m STS-2, November 12-14, 1981, Orbiter 
Columbia, marked the first test of the 
Remote Manipulator System and carried a 
payload of Earth survey instruments. This 
was the first time any spacecraft had flown 
twice. Failure of a fuel cell shortened the 
flight by about three days. 
STS-3, March 22-30, 1982, Orbiter Colum- 
bia, was the longest ofthe initial test series, 
staying aloft eight days. Activities included 
a special test of the manipulator in which 
the robot arm removed a package of in- 
struments from the payload bay but did not 
release it into space. The flight included ex- 
periments in materials processing. 
B STS-4, June 27-July 4, 1982, Orbiter Co- 
lumbia, featured another test of the robot 
arm, which extended a scientific payload 
over the side of the payload bay, then re- 
berthed it. Materials processing experiments 
were conducted, as were a number of scien- 
tific investigations. This flight carried the 
first Department of Defense payload. 
With the landing of STS-4, the orbital flight 
test program came to an end with 95 percent of 
its objectives accompllished. The interval between 
flights had been trimmed from seven months to 
four, then three. NASA declared the Space Shut- 
tle "operational," a term that has encountered 
some criticism because it erroneously suggests 
that the Shuttle had attained an airline-like degree 
of routine operation. In any event, NASA regard- 
ed all flights after STS-4 operational in the sense 
that payload requirements would take precedence 
over spacecraft testing, requiring larger crews. 
After completing the orbital test in mid- 1982, 
NASA began the "operational phase" of the Space 
Shuttle program, beginning with STS-5. The 
STS - for Space Transportation System - 
sequential numbering was still in effect at that 
time; after STS-9 NASA changed the method of 
numbering missions. Thereafter each flight was 
designated by two numbers and a letter, such as 
41-B. The first digit indicates the fiscal year of 
the scheduled launch (4 for 1984). The second 
digit identifies the launch site (1 is Kennedy, 2 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California). The lee- 
ter corresponds to the alphabetical sequence for 
the fiscal year, B being the second mission 
scheduled, Here is a brief summav of the 21 mis- 
sions launched from late !982 to January, 1986: 
m STS-5, November 11-16, 1982, Orbiter 
Columbia, launched two communications 
satellites, which later were boasted ro 
geosynchronous orbit by attached gropul- 
sion systems. 
STS-6, April 4-9, 1983, Orbiter Chdlenger, 
was highlighted by the first Shuttle-based 
spacewalk, or extravehicular activity. The 
crew successfully deployed tiin@ 5,000-pound 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, fissr of  
three planned NASA communieazions 
satellites. 
m STS-7, June 18-24, 1983, Orbiter 
Challenger, delivered a second pair sf csm- 
mercial communications satel%ites. The mis- 
sion also included additional payload rdease 
and recapture tests using the Remote 
Manipulator System. This nighs marked the 
first retrieval of an object from orbit. 
m STS-8, August 30-September 6, 1983, Or- . 
biter Challenger, included more robot arm 
tests plus deployment of a csmmer- 
ciallpublic service commun~icaf ions satellite. 
B STS-9, November 28-December 1983, 
Orbiter Columbia, camed the first Spacelab 
in the payload bay. The mission marked 
Columbia's return to service after a year"s 
hiatus, during which it had been extensive- 
ly modified. 
m Flight 10 (41-B), February 3- % 1, 1984, Or- 
biter Challenger, was highlighted by the in- 
troduction of the Manned Maneuvering 
Unit, a backpack propulsion unit chat al%a\~ s 
astronauts to maneuver in space independ- 
ent of the Orbiter. The mission also 
launched two communications satellites, but 
their boosters failed to put them into geosyn- 
chronous orbit. For the first time, the Shur- 
tle landed on the concrete runway at Ken- 
nedy Space Center. 
B Flight 11 (41 -@), April 6-13, 1984, Orbiter 
Challenger, featured am important  
demonstration of Shuttle ability: the 
retrieval, repair and redeployment of the 
malfunctioning Solar Maximum Mission 
spacecraft with the help1 of a Manned 
Maneuvering Unit. Other activity includ- 
ed deployment of the Long Duration Ex- 
posure Facility, a large cylinder containing 
materials samples to be retrieved and ex- 
amined after long exposure to the space 
environment. 
BIB Flight 12 (41-Dj, August 30-September 5, 
1984, Orbiter Discovery, was devoted 
p~mardily to launch of three communications 
satellites. The  mission demonstrated 
repeated deployment and retraction of a 
large, bldable solar array to investigate the 
practicability of using such solar wings as 
power sources for extended Shuttle mis- 
sions, space platforms or the space station. 
m Fnighr 13 (41-G), October 5-13, 1984, Or- 
biter Chalilenger, launched the NASA Earth 
Radiation Budget Explorer. A cargo bay 
pdlet carried instruments for Earth obser- 
vations, including an advanced imaging 
radar. 
B Flight $4 ( 5  8 -A), November 8- 16, 1984, Or- 
biter D~SCQV~V, launched two communiea- 
tions satellites and retrieved two others that 
had been sent into unusable orbits after 
deployment on Flight 10. 
m Flight 15 (51-C),Jarauary24-27, 1985, Or- 
biter Discovery, carried a Department of 
Defense payload. 
m Flight 16 (51-D), April 12-19, 1985, Orbiter 
DRscQ~v~F~,  deployed -two commercial 
sateaiters; owe, Leasat-3, remained in %ow or- 
bit when the upper stage booster failed to 
acri'wate. 
m Flight 1% (51-B), April 29-May 6, 1985, Qr- 
biter Chdlenger, carried a second Spacelab 
mission and materials processing 
experiments, 
a Flight 18 (5 1 -@), June 17-24, 1985, Orbiter 
Discovev, delivered three communications 
satbseliaiees, deployed a low-cost Spartan scien- 
tific satellite and retrieved it after a period 
of free flight. 
m Flight 19 (5%-F), July 29-August 6, 1985, 
Orbiter ChalBenger, carried the third 
Spacelab mission, which covered a broad 
range of experiments in plasma physics, 
astrophysics, solar astronomy and materials 
processing. 
rn Flight 20 (51-I), August 27-September 3, 
1985, Orbiter Discovery, deployed three 
communications satellites. The Leasat-3 
satellite which failed to activate after deploy- 
ment on Flight 16 was retrieved, repaired 
and successfully redeployed. 
m Flight 21 (51-J), October 3-10, 1985, Or- 
biter Atlantis was devoted to another 
Department of Defense mission. 
BI Flight 22 (61-A), October 30-November 6, 
1985, Orbiter Chdenger, carried the fourth 
Spacelab mission, devoted to materials proc- 
essing experimentationo 
Flight 23 (61-B), November 26-December 
3, 1985, Orbiter Atlantis, was highlighted 
by an experiment in astronaut assembly of 
structures in orbit and attendant study of 
extravehicular dylnamics and human factors. 
The mission also deployed three com- 
munications satellites. 
m Flight 24 (61-C), January 12-18, 1986, Or- 
biter Columbia, launched a comrnercia% 
communications satellite, deployed a Hitch- 
hiker secondary payload, conducted ex- 
periments in infrared imaging, acquired 
photos and spectral images of Comet 
Halle y . 
RI Flight 25 (51-L), January 28, -1986, Orbiter 
C hdlenger . The accident. 
Including the initial orbital tests, the Space 
Shuttle flew 24 successful missions over a 
57-month period, Columbia made seven trips into 
space, Discovery six and Atlantis two. Challenger 
flew most frequently-nine times prior to its 
fateful last flight. 
In those 24 Bights, the Shuttle demonstrated 
its ability to deliver a wide variety of payloads; 
its ability to serve as an orbital laboratory; its 
utility as a platform for erection of large struc- 
tures; and its use for retrieval and repair of or- 
biting satellites. 
Elements of the 
Space Shuttle 
The Space Shuttle is the principal component 
of a national Space Transportation System 
designed to accommodate not only NASA's 
predictable needs but also those of the Depart- 
ment of Defense and commercial payload spon- 
sors. Technically speaking, transportation system 
hardware embraces not only the Shuttle but its 
Spacelab laboratory component, the upper stage 
propulsion units, contemplated heavy lift vehicies 
and space tugs for moving payloads from one or- 
bit to another. To provide for the broadest possi- 
ble spectrum of civillmilitary missions, the Space 
Shuttle was designed to deliver 65,000 pounds of 
payload to an easterly low Earth orbit or 32,000 
pounds to polar orbit. The following sections 
describe the main elements of the Shuttle system. 
The Orbiter 
The Orbiter is as large as a mid-size airline 
transport and has a structure like that of an air- 
craft: an aluminum alloy skin stiffened with 
stringers to form a shell over frames and 
bulkheads of aluminum or aluminum alloy. The 
major structural sections of the Orbiter are the 
foward fuselage, which encompasses the 
pressurized crew compartment; the mid fuselage, 
which contains the payload bay; the payload bay 
doors; the aft fuselage, from which the main 
engine nozzles project; and the vertical tail, which 
splits open along the trailing edge to provide a 
speed brake used during entry and landing. 
The crew compartment is divided into two 
Ievels-the flight deck on top and the middeck 
below. Besides working space, the crew compart- 
ment contains the systems needed to provide a 
habitable environment (atmosphere, tempera- 
ture, food, water, the crew sleep facilities and 
waste management). It also houses the electronic, 
guidance and navigation systems. 
The Orbiter crew may include as many as eight 
people, although generally the limit is seven. The 
crew consists of the commander, the captain of 
the ship; the pilot, second in command; and two 
or more mission specialists. One or more payload 
specialists can also-be accommodated. A mission 
specialist coordinates activities of the Orbiter and 
crew in support of a given payload objective. A 
payload specialist may manage specific ex- 
periments. The commander, pilot and mission 
specialists are career astronauts assigned to the 
r~ission by NASA. Payload specialists do not 
come from the Astronaut Office. They are as- 
signed, by payload sponsors in coordination with 
NASA. 
Cargoes up to 24 tons have been carried in the 
payload bay. Clamshell doors on the top of the 
Orbiter meet along the craft's spine to enclose the 
bay, which is 15 feet wide and 60 feet long. 
The payload bay is designed to hold securely 
a wide range of objects. They may include one 
or more communications satellites to be launch- 
ed from orbit, an autonomous Spacelab for ex- 
periments in space, or cargo disposed on special 
pallets. To handle cargo in orbital flight, the 
payload bay has the 50-foot mechanicd arm that 
is controlled from within the crew compartment. 
A television camera and lights maunted near the 
end of the arm enable the operator to see what 
the "handn is doing. 
Just as important as delivering cargo to orbit 
is recovering a satellite and bringing it back to 
Earth- retrieving a satellite in need of refurbish- 
ment, for example. The Orbiter can ca- 16 eons 
of cargo back from space. 
The feasibility of a reusable Space Shuttle 
hinges on a particularly vital requirement: pro- 
tecting the Orbiter from the searing heat 
generated by friction with the atmosphere when 
the craft returns to Earth. Temperatures during 
entry may rise as high as 2,750 degrees 
Fahrenheit on the leading edge of the wing and 
600 degrees on the upper fuselage, the "coolest" 
area. The thermal protection system devised ($gar 
the Orbiter must prevent the temperature of the 
aluminum skin from rising above 350 degrees 
during either ascent or entry. 
The Orbiter has four kinds of external iinsulia- 
tion that are applied to various parts of the struc- 
ture according to the temperature each is likely 
to experience. The crsnft's nose cap m d  the leading 
edges of the wings are protected with an all- 
carbon composite consisting of layers of graphite 
cloth in a carbon matrix. The a~uter layers are 
converted chemically to silicon carbide, she same 
material that has long been used as an abrasih~e 
in grindstones. Are& subjected to the next 
greatest heat are shielded with high-temperature 
ceramic tiles about six inches square and v a v -  
ing in thickness from one to five inches, depen- 
ding on the protection needed. So-cd%ed "low- 
temperaturen tiles are of the same material- 
nearly pure glass, of which 90 percent of the 
volume is "airn-for use on areas requiring less 
protection. (Low-temperature is relative; tiles so 
designated can withstand a temperature of f ,200 
degrees Fahrenheit.) About 30,000 tiiles, each diat 
ferent, are installed on each Orbiter. 
Space Shuttle Main Engines 
The three high-performance rocket ew@nes in 
the aft section of the Orbiter fire for about the 
first 8 1/2 minutes of flight after liftoff. At sea level. 
each engine generates 375,000 pounds of thrust 
at 100 percent throttle. 
The propellants for the engines are the fuel (Biq- 
uid hydrogen) and the oxidizer (liquid oxygen) 
carried in the External Tank. Combustion takes 
place in [.avo stages. First. the propellants are mix- 
ed and partly burned in pre-burners. Hot gases 
Gom the pre-burners drive the high-pressure tur- 
bopumps which de l i~~er  p opellants to the main 
anjectesr. Combustion, once initiated by electrical 
igni~ers, is se%f-sustaining. Before firing: the very 
cold liquid prepel%ant is allowed to flow into the 
svstem as far as the pre-burners and combustion 
chamber to cool the pumps and ducts so that the 
h)ydrogen and oxygen in the system will remain 
iiquid when the engine is started. 
The main engines have been throttled over a 
range of 65 to 1104 percent of the thrust at sea 
level. Ar liftoff, they are thrusting at 100 percent. 
Computers command engine thrust to 104 per- 
cent as soon as the Shuttle clears the tower. They 
throttle to 65 percent to reduce the maximum 
aeacsdynamic Loads that occur at an altitude of 
about 34,000 feet. Thereafter, the thrust is again 
ancreased to provide an acceleration of three times 
that of gravity in the last minute or so of powered 
flighe, 
Ekternal Tank 
The External Tank carries the propellants for 
the Orbiter's main engines- 143.000 gallons of 
Liquid oxygen and 383,000 gallons of liquid 
hydrogen, which is much lighter than a com- 
parable v~lgln~e of oxygen. Together, the pro- 
peIlants ~aleigh a little more than 790 tons, Mar- 
tan Marietta Denver Aerospace, Michoud, Loui- 
siana, builds the tank, a welded a%uminum alloy 
cylinder with an ogive nose and a hemispherical 
tail. It is 854 feet Iong and 27 '/2 feet in diameter. 
Because the Orbiter and the two Solid Rocket 
Boosters are attached to it at liftoff, the External 
Tank absorbs the thrust of the combined propul- 
sion system. It withstands compIex load effects 
and pressures from the propellants. 
The liquid oxygen tank forms the nose of the 
External Tank. It contains oxidizer kept liquid 
at a temperature of - 297 degrees Fahrenheit. A 
removable conical nose cap acts as an 
aerodynamic fairing. Inside the tank, baffles 
reduce slashing and the associated control prob- 
lems. The liquid hydrogen tank does not need 
baffles because the fuel is so light that sloshing 
does not induce significant forces. The liquid 
hydrogen tank accounts for the greater part of 
the External 'Tank. Its contents are even colder 
than the LOX: - 423 degrees Fahrenheit. 
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The intertank structure or "intertank" connects 
the two propellant tanks. It is a cylindrical struc- 
tural section that houses instruments and receives 
and distributes most of the thrust load from the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. The front end of each 
booster is connected to the External Tank at the 
intenank midsection. 
A multilayered thermal coating covers the out- 
side of the External Tank to protect it from ex- 
treme temperature variations during pre-launch, 
launch, and the first 8 ?4 minutes of flight. That 
insulation reduces the boil-off rate of the pro- 
pellants, which must be kept at very %ow 
temperatures to remain liquid. It also is meant 
to minimize ice that might form from condensa- 
tion on the outside of the propellant tanks. 
In addition to the Solid Rocket Booster forward 
attachment points on either side of the interrank, 
three other attachment points link each booster 
to the aft major ring frame of the External Tank. 
The boosters are thus connected to the tank at 
four points, one forward and three aft. 
Three structural elements link the Orbiter to 
the External Tank. A "wishbo~e* attachment 
beneath the crew compartment connects the for- 
ward end of the Orbiter to the tank. The two aft 
connections are tripods at the base of the Exter- 
nal Tank. 
A command from the Orbiter eomputer jer- 
tisons the External Tank 18 seconds after main 
engine cutoff9 about 8 '/? minutes after liftoff. To  
ensure that it will travel a predictable path, a tum- 
ble system rotates the tank end-over-end at a 
minimum rate of two revolutions per minute. The 
tank breaks up upon atmospheric entry, falling 
into the planned area of the Indian or Pacific 
Ocean about an hour after liftoff. The External 
Tank is the only main component of the Space 
Shuttle that is not recovered and reused. 
Solid Rocket Boosters 
The two solid-propellant rocket boosters are 
almost as Bong as the External Tank and attached 
to each side of it. They contribute about $0 per- 
cent of the totd thrust at %iftoffi the rest comes 
from the Orbiter's three main engines, Roughly 
two minutes after liftoff and 24 miles down range, 
the solid rockets have exhausted their fuel. Ex- 
plosives separate the boosters from the External 
Tank. Small rocket motors move them away from 
the External Tank and the Orblter, which con- 
tinue toward orbit under thrust of the Shuttle's 
main engines. 
The Solid Rocket Booster is made up of several 
subassemblies: the nose cone, Solid Rocket Motor 
and the nozzle assembly. Marshall is responsi- 
ble for the Solid Rocket Booster; Morton Thiokol. 
Inc., Wasatch Di~~ision,  Brigham City, Utah, is 
the contractor for the Solid Rocket h4orors. Each 
Solid Rocket Moror case is made of 1 1 individual 
cylindrical weld free steel sections about 12 feet 
in diameter. When assembled, they form a tube 
allmost 116 feet long. The 1 %  sections are the for- 
ward dome section, six cylindrical sections, the 
aft External Tank-attach ring section, two stif- 
fener sections. and the aft dome section. 
The 11 sections of the motor case are joined 
by tang-and-clevis joints held together by 177 
steel pins around the circumference of each joint. 
After the sections have been machined to fine 
rolerancps and fitted, they are partly assembled 
at the factory into four casting segments. Those 
four cylindrical segments are the parts of the 
rnotor case into which the propellant is poured 
(or cast). They are shipped by rail'in separate 
pieces to Kennedy. 
Joints assembled before the booster is shipped 
are known as factory joints. Joints between the 
four casting segments are called field joints; they 
are connected at Kennedy when the booster 
segments are stacked for final assembly. 
Orbital Maneuvering System 
The two engine pods on the aft fuselage of the 
Orbiter contain maneuvering engines and their 
propellant - monomethyl hydrazine (the fuel) and 
nitrogen tetroxide (the oxidizer). Helium 
pressurizes the propellant tanks, and the fuel and 
the oxidizer ignite on contact. 
Forty-four small rocket motors in the Orbiter's 
nose and aft section maneuvering system pods 
allow adjustments of the vehicle's attitude in pitch, 
yaw, and roll axes. They also may be used to 
make small changes of velocity along one of the 
Orbiter's three axes. 
Fli&t of a Shuttle 
satellites deployed into orbit, rerriexved or 
repaired; observations made of the Earth and the 
solar system. The Shuttle makes one revolution 
of the Earth approximately every 90 minutes dur- 
ing the satellite mission. 
When it comes out of orbit. the Shuttle is rno\'- 
ing at about 17,500 miles an hour. Reaction 
engines position the Orbiter nose fornard again 
for entry into the atmosphere. Those thrusters 
continue to control the Orbiter's attitude until the 
atmosphere becomes dense enough for the 
aerodynamic surfaces to take effect. 
The Shuttle enters the ever-thickening blanket 
of atmosphere at 400,000 feet of altitude and a 
speed of more than 17,000 miles an hour (about 
Mach 25). The Orbiter's nose is positioned 40 
degrees above its flight path. That attitude in- 
creases aerodynamic drag, thus helping to 
dissipate the tremendous amount of e n e r p  that 
the spacecraft has when it enters the atmosphere. 
Friction heats the surface of the Orbiter, which 
is protected by thermal tiles, and ionizes the sur- 
rounding air, preventing radio communication 
with Earth for the next 13 minutes. 
The flight control system's computer program 
allows use of the reaction thrusters and 
aerodynamic surfaces in combination to control 
the spacecraft. At Mach 4.2, the rudder is ac- 
tivated, and the last reaction thrusters are deac- 
tivated at Mach 1. Thereafter, the craft is entirely 
maneuvered like an airplane by movement sf the 
aerodynamic control surfaces: elevens, rudder, 
speed brake, and body flap. 
In the landing approach, the Orbiter has no 
propulsion. It has only its velocity and altitude, 
Its energy must be carefully managed to 
maneuver the Shuttle aerodynamica8ly to a safe 
landing. Beginning this terminal phase, the glide 
slope is steep- 19 degrees- as the Orbiter 
descends toward the runway. Hdf a minute 
before touchdown and two miles from the run- 
way, the craft flares to a shallow, aPmost flat 1 . 5  
degree glide slope. Touchdown occurs at 22 3 
miles per hour. On  the runway, the Orbiter rolls 
PO a stop, and the mission is complete. 
Except for ascent and entry, all of the Shut- 
tle's typical seven-day mission is in orbit. That 
is where the goals of a given mission are ac- 
complished: scientific experiments carried out; 
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Events Leading 
U p  to the 
Q 
enger Mission 
reparations for the launch of mission 
$1-%, were not unusual, though they 
were complicated by changes in the 
launch schedule. The sequence of 
csmp%ex, interrelated steps involved in produc- 
ing the detailed scheduje and supporting logistics 
necessaq for a successful mission always requires 
intense effort and close coordination. 
Flight 5 1 -L of the Challenger was originally 
scheduled for July, 1985, but by the time the crew 
was assigned in January, 1985, launch had been 
pasponeel. to late November to accommodate 
changes in payloads. The launch was subsequent- 
ly delayed funher and finally rescheduled for late 
January, 1986. 
After the series of payload changes, the 
Challenger cargo included two satellites in the 
cargo bay and equipment in the crew compart- 
ment for experiments that would be carried out 
during the mission. The paylloads flown on mis- 
sion 51-$1, are Yisted in this table: 
Mission 51-L Payloads 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-B 
Spanan-Hdley Satellite 
Gomet Hdley Active Monitoring Program 
Fluid Dywannics Experiment 
Phase Paneticaning Experiment 
Teacher in Space Project 
Shuttle Student Pnvs%vement Program 
Radiation Monitoring Experiment 
The primary payloads were: the Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite (a NASA communications 
satellite) and the Spartan sateilite that would be 
deployed into orbit carrying special instruments 
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for the observation of Halley's Comet. 
The NASA communications satellite was to 
have been placed in a geosynchronous orbit with 
the aid of a booster called the Inertial Upper 
Stage. The satellite would have supported corn- 
municaeiosas with the Space Shuttle and up to 23 
other spacecraft. 
The Spartan satellite was to have been 
deployed into low Earth orbit using the remote 
manipulator system. The Spartan instruments 
would have watched Halley's Comet when it wins 
too close to the Sun for other observatories to do 
so. Subsequently, the satellite would have been 
retrieved and returned to Earth iri the Shuttle 
payload bay. 
Crew Assignments 
OnJanuary 27, 1985, one year before launch, 
NASA announced the names of the astronauts 
assigned to mission 51-L: 
Commander Francis R. Scobee 
Pilot Michael J. Smith 
Mission Specialist Ellison S. Onizuka 
One 
Mission Specialist Judith A. Resnik 
Two 
Mission Specialist Ronald E. McNair 
Three 
The mission commander, Francis R. (Dick) 
Scobee, first flew on the Space Shuttle as the pilot 
of mission 41-C in April, 1984. Mr. Scobee, a 
native of Auburn, Washington, received his 
bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering from 
the University of Arizona. A former Air Force 
Space Shuttle 51-L on Pad 398 of Kennedy Space Center's launch complex. 
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test pilot with 7,000 hours in 45 aircraft types, an astronaut in 1978 and flew on the first military 
he became an astronaut in 1978, mission (51-C) in January, 1985, aboard the 
The mission pilot, Captain Michael J. Smith, Space Shuttle Discovery. 
USN, was on his first Shuttle flight after being Mission specialist Judith A. Resnik. Ph+D.. 
selecreal, as an astronaut in 1980. A native of flew on the first flight of the Orbiter Discovery 
Beaufon, Nonh Garblina, Captain Smith, a 1967 on mission 411-D in August, 1984. Born in Akron, 
graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Ohio, Dr. Resnik received her doctorate in elec- 
received a rnasrePs degree from the Naval trical engineering from the University of 
Postgraduate School. He  was a Navy test pilot Maryland in 1976. After working for several in- 
with extensive experience in a variety of aircraft, dustrial firms, she became an astronaut in 1978. 
Mission specialist Lieutenant Colonel Ellison Mission specialist Ronald E. McNair, Ph.D. : . - 
S, Onizuka, TJSAF, from Kealakekua, Kona, a native of Lake City, South Carolina, received 
Hawaii, received his master's degree in aerospace his doctorate in physics from the Massachuserts 
engineering at the University of Colorado. A Institute of Technology in 1976. After working A 
flight test engineer in the Air Force, he became as a research physicist in civilian industry. he 
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became an astronaut in 1978 and first flew on 
mission 41-B in February, 1984, aboard the 
Space Shuttle Challenger. 
Payload specialists are members of a Space 
Shuttle crew who are-not career astronauts. Two 
such specialists, Christa McPluliffe and Gregory 
B. Jarvis, were added to the crew of mission 5 1 -L. 
Ms. McAuliffe was born in Boston and raised 
in Framingham, Massachusetts, where she 
graduated from Framingham State College. After 
teaching a variety of junior high and high school 
sub~ects in Maryland and New Hamphire, she 
was selected as the Teacher in Space. She was 
assigned to the St-L crew in July, 1985. 
Mr.  Jamis was a former Air Force engineer 
who specialized in satellite design. He was born 
in Detroit, Michigan, and received his master's 
degree in electrical engineering from North- 
eastern University in Boston. He was assigned 
to the 5 1-L crew in October, 1985, as a represent- 
ative of the Hughes Aircraft Company. 
The payload specialists each had respon- 
sibilities for mission 51-L. Ms. McAuliffe was to 
conduct a series of classroom lessons from orbit 
and conduct several basic classroom experiments. 
h4r. Jarvis was to perform a series of fluid 
dynamics experiments that would support satellite 
redesign. 
Pre~arations for Flight 
Planning for mission 5 1-L began in 1984, but 
10 major change documents adding or deleting 
payload items caused some disruption in the 
preparation process. Because the 12- to 18-month 
process is a series of repetitive cycles that define 
a flight design in progressivelly more specific 
detail, significant changes can require extensive 
time and effort to incorporate. The closer to the 
planned launch date the changes occur, the more 
difficult and disruptive it becomes to repeat the 
cycles necessary to complete a mission plan. (See 
the Mission 5 1 -L Milestone Summary chart .) 
Although there were several significant changes 
to the cargo manifest, most occurred early enough 
in the planning cycle to minimize their impact 
on the flight preparation. 
The cargo integration review is one of the 
crucial coordination meetings in the flight 
preparation process. At that meeting, re- 
quirements for all payloads are examined to en- 
sure that, collectively, they are within the 
capabilities of the vehicle and crew. 
For mission 51 -L, the cargo integration review 
was rescheduled six times, primarily because of 
payload changes. All major payload changes were 
made, however, before the review eventually rook 
place on June 18, 1985, seven months before the 
launch. Until the cargo integration review for a 
mission is complleted, the development of she find 
flight design products cannot really get undernay. 
Because the mission 51-E payload changes were 
made before the cargo integration revie~r, 
however, changes to the manifest did not sefigausly 
disrupt the preparatibn cycle. 
Once the principal payload items were deter- 
mined and the cargo integration review was com- 
pleted, the flight design process becme  relati\pelv 
straightforward. The flight design process i s  the 
central element in flight preparation. The proc- 
ess transforms the broad objectives of the Wight 
into a detailed sequence of events from launch 
to landing. For mission 5 1 -L, the objectives con- 
sisted of placing one satellite in orbit, deploying 
and retrieving Spartan, and conducting the six 
experiments. From that base, the Wight design 
process produced a detailed schedule of events, 
trajectory data, requirements for consumable 
items, communications requirements and the 
necessary computer programing for the Orbiter, 
the Mission Control Center, and the Shuttle 
simulator used to train the crew for this paniculaa 
mission. 
The launch minus five months Flight Plan- 
ning and Stowage Review was conducted on 
August 20, 1985, to address any unresolved issues 
and any changes to the plan that had developed 
to that point. Ideally, the mission events are firm- 
ly determined before the review takes place. Far 
mission 5 1-E, however, Mr. Jarvis was nest added 
to the crew until October 25, 1985, and his ac- 
tivities could not be incorporated into mission 
planning until that time. The crew activity plan, 
the formal flight requirements and the Wight 
design status were reviewed as well as the cus- 
rent status of the engineering ~neegration, the 
photo and TV requirements, and crew compart- 
ment stowage. The Flight Planning and Stowage 
Review did identify the need for further eon- 
sideration of the launch windova~ and of the then 
undefined requirements for the Teacher-in-Space 
program. 
There were changes to middeck payloads. 
resulting from the addition of -Ms. Jar\-is, rhar 
occurred less than three months before launch. 
The most negative result of the changes ivas a 
delay in publishing the crew activity plan. The 
crew activity plan specifies the in-flight schedule 
for all creav members, which in turn affects other 
aspects o f  Wighlt preparation. Because the NASA 
cammunicatio~as satellite training requirements 
were quite similar to those for a previous flight, 
the crew training began using that existing crew 
asaik~ity galan and associated checklists. Cow- 
siderable time was saved as a result. The re- 
quirements uni~que to Spartan did not involive ma- 
jor depanures from the standard satellite deploy- 
ment and rendezvous techniques that had been 
developed on mission 5 11 -G. the experiment 
packages did not require any new Orbiter pro- 
cedures, and thie ascent and entry techniques were 
Crew Workload B=;omparisom 
standard. Thus, mission 5 1 -L did not involve 
radical departures from previous flight patterns. 
The crew began training 37 weeks before 
launch. Preparation in the Shuttle Mission 
Simulator, a fully instrumented mock-up of the 
Shuttle interior, began at launch minus 36 weeks. 
Integrated training in the simulator, which alllows 
the crew to train with the flight controllers who 
will be controllling the flight in both the Mission 
Control Center and remote centers, began at 
launch minus nine weeks. For the crew, Shuttle 
simulator training included preparation for the 
use of the robot arm, a rendezvous in space, In- 
ertial Upper Stage deployment, ascent and en- 
try procedures, and a variety of other activities 
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that must be practiced repeatedly if a Shuttle mis- 
sion is to be carried out successfully. 
All NASA crew members exceeded the number 
of training hours required and were certified pro- 
ficient in all mission tasks. The two payload 
specialists also fulfilled their training re- 
quirements. All mission 51-L astronauts and 
flight controllers were certified ready for flight. 
From a flight design process point of view, mis- 
sion 51-L was a fairly typical mission. The most 
noticeable effect of the delays in the production 
process was a delay in the start of Shuttle Mis- 
sion Simulator training specific to the flight. That 
training began at launch minus nine weeks for 
the crew of 5 1 -L, two weeks later than the original 
schedule required. 
Compressed training time was becoming a con- 
cern in late 1985. The crew of mission 51 -L train- 
ed for an average of 48.7 hours per week during 
those nine weeks before launch, with peaks 
reaching 65 to 70 hours per week. Much more 
compression in their training schedule would not 
have been possible. (See the Crew Workload 
Comparisons graph. ) 
Launch date delays for mission 61-C also 
became a schedulling factor for the integrated 
simulations for mission 5 1 -L. Originally sched- 
uled for the third week in December, the 61-C 
launch was delayed until January 12, 1986, Dur- 
ing the last six weeks before the Challenger 
launch, the 5 1 -L schedule was changed several 
times as a result of launch delays of 61-C. The 
final impact on the Challenger crew training was 
reduced spacing between the ascent and entry 
simulations during the last two weeks before 
launch, but no training time was lost. 
Flight Readiness Review 
The Level I Flight Readiness Review for mis- 
sion 51 -L took place on January 15, 1986. The 
Eight Readiness Review should address all 
aspects of flight preparation about which any 
questions have arisen. In addition, attendees con- 
firm that all equipment and operational plans 
have been certified ready by the responsible 
manager within NASA. Solid Rocket Booster 
joints were not discussed during the review on 
January 15. 
The period during the day when a particular 
flight can be launched is determined by the re- 
quirements of the Orbiter and the payloads. The 
launch period for mission 51-L was limited in 
order to provide the best lighting conditions for 
Spartan's observations of Halley's Comet. T h e  
resulting "launch window" was a topic of some 
discussion at the Flight Readiness Review. The 
Challenger launch originally had%een scheduled 
for a morning lift off. When Sparaan was added 
to the mission, the launch window was changed 
to the afternoon. This change would have re- 
quired a landing at night if a transatlantic abort 
landing had become necessary. Because the deer- 
nate transatlantic site, Casablanca, was nor 
equipped for a night landing, rbe afternoon 
launch eliminated that back-up site. As January 
drew to a close, however, the conditions for op- 
timum telescopic viewing of the comet could not 
be met. The launch window was shifted bask to 
the morning hours so that the transatlantic abon 
site would be in daylight and a back-up site 
(Casablanca) would be available. 
The results of the flight design process were 
summarized at the flight Readiness Review. The 
predicted ascent performance, including expected 
trajectory, main engine throttling profile, ex- 
pected dynamic pressure and the amount of pro- 
pellant reserve expected at main engine cutoff, 
were presented and discussed. The expected land- 
ing parameters, weight and center sf gravity 
figures were also presented for a variety of con- 
tingencies. It should be noted that a waiver was 
required because the weight of the Orbites ex- 
ceeded the allowable limits for an abort landing. 
The flight design data presented at the Flight 
Readiness Review are available in the Appendix 
in the NASA Mission Planning and Operations 
Team Report. No outstanding concerns were 
identified in the discussion of flight design. 
The detailed flight plan and schedule of crew 
activities also were presented at she Flight 
Readiness Review. The Challenger was to cIrc%e 
the Earth for six days at an orbital dritude sf zip- 
proximately 153 nautical miles, landing early on 
the seventh day at Kennedy in Florida. 
The major activities were to include deploy- 
ment of the tracking and data relay s%ite%%ite $0
hours after launch, deployment: of the Spartan 
satellite on the third day of the flight and subse- 
quent retrieval of the Spartan two days later. A 
summary of the planned activities is pro\~i$ed in 
the table that follows. 
~Vissioa 5 1-L Orbital Activity Schedule 
Day One After arriving in orbit, the crew had two periods of scheduled high activity. First, 
they were to check the readiness of the NASA satellite prior to planned deploy- 
ment. After a lunch break, they were to deploy the satellite and Inertial Upper 
Stage and to perform a series of separation maneuvers. The first sleep period was 
scheduled to be eight hours long starting about 18 hours after crew wake-up on 
launch morning. 
Day Two The Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment was scheduled to begin 
on the second day. Also scheduled were the initiaI teacher-in-space video taping 
and a firing of the orbital maneuvering engines to place the Orbiter at the 152-mile 
orbital altitude from which the Spartan would be deployed. 
Day Three The third day was to start with the crew programing the.Spartan satellite with 
data sent from Johnson. The satellite was to be deployed using the remote 
manipulator system (the robot arm), and then the Orbiter would be maneuvered 
to produce, by day four, a 90-mile separation from Spartan. 
Day Four ' The Orbiter was to begin closing on Spartan while Jarvis continued the fluid 
dynamics experiments started on day two and day three. In addition, two lessons 
telecast live were to be conducted by Ms. McAulliffe. 
Day Five After rendezvous with Spartan, the crew was to use the robot arm to capture the 
satellite and re-stow it in the payload bay, 
Day Six Entry preparations were to dominate the last full day in space: flight control system 
checks, test firing of maneuvering jets needed for entry, and cabin stowage, A 
crew news conference also was scheduled fo~lowing the lunch period, if requested 
by the NASA Public Affairs Office. 
Day Seven - The seventh day would have been spent preparing the Space ShuttIe for deorbit 
and entry into the atmosphere. The Challenger was scheduled to land at Ken- 
nedy 144 hours and 34 minutes after launch. 
Launch Delays 
The launch of mission 51-L was postponed 
three times and scrubbed once from the planned 
date of January 22, 1986. The first postponement 
was announced on December 23, 1985. That 
change established the launch date asJanuary 23, 
11986. in order to accommodate the final in- 
tegrated simulation schedule that resulted from 
the slip in the launch date of mission 61-C. 
On  January 22, 1986, the Program Re- 
quirements Change Board first slipped the launch 
from January 23 to January 25. That date subse- 
quently was changed to January 26, 1986, 
primarily because of Kennedy work requirements 
produced by the late llaunch of mission 61-C. 
The third postponement of the launch date oc- 
curred during an evening management con- 
ference on Januar). 25, 1986, to review the 
weather forecast for the Kennedy area. Because 
the forecast was for unacceptable weather 
throughout the launch window on January 26, 
early countdown activities that had already 
started were terminated. 
The launch attempt of January 27 began the 
day before as the complex sequence of events 
leading to lift off commenced. Fueling of the Ex- 
ternal Tank began at 12:30 a.m. Eastern Stand- 
ard Time. The crew was awakened at 05:07 a.m., 
and events proceeded norm.ally with the crew 
strapped into the Shuttle at 07:56 a.m. At 09: 10, 
however, the countdown was halted when the 
ground crew reported a problem with an exterior 
hatch handle. By the time the hatch handle prob- 
lem was solved at 60:30 a.m., winds at the Ken- 
nedy runway designated for a return-to-launch- 
site abort had increased and exceeded the 
allowable velocity for crosswinds. The launch at- 
tempt for January 27 was canceled at 12:35 p.m. 
Eastern Standard Time; the Challenger count- 
down was rescheduled for January 28. 
The weather was forecast to be clear and very 
cold, with temperatures dropping into the low 
twenties overnight. The management team 
directed engineers to assess the possible effects of 
temperature on the launch. No critical issues were 
identified to management officials, and while 
evaluation continued. it was decided to proceed 
with the countdown and the fueling of the Ex- 
ternal Tank. 
Ice had accumulated in the launch pad area 
during the night and it caused considerable con- 
cern for the launch team. In reaction, the ice in- 
spection team was sent to the launch pad as 01 :35 
a.m., January 28, and returned to the Launch 
Control Center at 03:OO a.m. After a meeting to 
consider the team's report, the Space Shuttle pro- 
gram manager decided to continue the count- 
down. Another ice inspection was scheduled at 
launch minus three hours. 
Also, during the night, prior to fueling, a prob- 
lem developed with a fire detector in the ground 
liquid hydrogen storage tank. Though i r  was 
ultimately tracked to a hardware fault and 
repaired, fueling was delayed by two and one- 
half hours. By continuing past a planned hold ar 
launch minus three hours, however, the launch 
delay was reduced to one hour. Crew wake-up 
was rescheduled for 06: 18 a.m., January 28. but 
by that time the crew was ahead?- up.  
Because of forecast rain and low ceilings at 
Casabjanca, the alternate abort sire, that site was 
declared a "no-go" at 07~30 a.m. The change had 
no mission impact, however, because the weather 
at the primary transatlantic abort landing site at 
Dakar, Senegal, was acceptable. The abort-once- 
around site was Edwards Air Force Base, 
California. 
With an extra hour, the crew had more than 
sufficient time to eat breakfast, get a weather 
briefing and put on flight gear. At -the weather 
briefing, the temperature and ice on the pad were 
discussed, but neither then nor in earlier weather 
discussions was the crew told of any concern 
about the effects of low temperatuire on the Shuttle 
System. The seven crew members left the crew 
quarters and rode the astronaut van to launch pad 
B9 arriving at 08:03. They were in their sears in 
the Challenger at 08:36 a.m. 
At 08:44 a.m. the ice team completed its sec- 
ond inspection. After hearing the team0s report. 
the program manager decided to &Bow additional 
time for ice to melt on the pad. He also decided 
to send the ice team to perform one final ice 
assessment at launch minus 20 minutes. &%'hen 
the count was resumed, launch had been delayed 
a second hour beyond the original lift off enme of 
09:38 a.m., Eastern Standard Time. 
At 11: 15 the ice inspection was completed, and 
during the hold at launch minus nine minutes, 
the mission 51-L crew and all members of the 
launch team gave their "go" for launch. The final 
flight of the Challenger began at 1 1 :38:00.0 163 
a.m., Eastern Standard Time, January 28. 1986. 
5 7 
The Flight of the Challlennes 
The  events that followed lift off were brief: 
Launch Time 
- 6.6 sec. 
0 sec. 
+ 7 sec. 
.Eeenf 
Space Shuttle engines ignition 
Solid Rocket Booster ignition 
"Roll program ." (Challenger) 
"Roger, roll, Challenger." 
(Houston) 
Main engines throttled down to 
94 7% 
Main engines throttled down to 
65 % 
hlain engines throttled up to 
104 % 
"'Challenger, go at throttle up." 
(Houston) "Roger. Go at throttle 
up." (Challenger) 
Loss of signal from Challenger 
From lift off until the signal from the Shuttle 
was lost, no flight controller observed any indica- 
tion of a problem. The Shuttle's main engines 
throttled down to limit the maximum dynamic 
pressure, then throttled up to full thrust as ex- 
pected. Voice communications with the crew 
were normal. The crew called to indicate the 
Shuttle had begun its roll to head due east and 
to establish communication after launch. Fifty- 
seven seconds later, Mission Control informed 
the crew that the engines had successfully throt- 
tled up and all other systems were satisfactory. 
The commander's ackn~w%edgment of this call 
was the last voice communication from the 
Challenger. 
There were no darms sounded in the cockpit. 
The crew apparently had no indication of a prob- 
lem before the rapid break-up of the Space Shuttle 
system. The first evidence of an accident came 
from live video coverage. Radar then began to 
track multiplle objects. The flight dynamics of- 
ficer in Houston confirmed to the flight director 
that "RSO [range safety officer] reports vehicle 
explloded," and 30 seconds later he added that the 
range safety officer had sent the destruct signal 
to the Solid Rocket Boosters, 
During the period of the flight when the Solid 
Rocket Boosters are thrusting, there are no SUP 
vivabPe abort options. There was nothing that 
either the crew or the ground controllers could 
have done to avert the catastrophe. II 
Chapter III 
The Accident 
F light of the Space Shuttle Challenger on Mission 51-L began at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later in 
an explosive burn of hydrogen and oxygen pro- 
pellants that destroyed the External Tank and ex- 
posed the Orbiter to severe aerodynamic loads 
that caused complete structural breakup. All 
seven crew members perished. The two Solid 
Rocket Boosters flew out of the fireball and were 
destroyed by the Air Force range safety officer 
I 110 seconds after launch. 
The ambient air temperature at launch was 36 
degrees Fahrenheit measured at ground level ap- 
proximately 1,000 feet from the 5 1 -L mission 
launch pad 39B. This temperature was 15 degrees 
colder than that of any previous launch. 
The following description of the flight events 
is based on visual examination and image 
enhancement of film from NASA operated 
cameras and telemetry data transmitted from the 
Space Shuttle to ground stations. The last 
telemetry data from the Challenger was received 
73.611 8 seconds after launch. 
At 6.6 seconds before launch, the Challenger's 
liquid fueled main engines were ignited in se- 
quence and run up to full thrust while the entire 
Shuttle structure was bolted to the launch pad. 
Thrust of the main engines bends the Shuttle 
assembly forward from the bolts anchoring it to 
the pad. When the Shuttle assembly springs back 
to the vertical, the Solid Rocket Boosters9 restrain- 
ing bolts are explosively released. During this pre- 
release "twang" motion, structural loads are stored 
in the assembled structure. These loads are re- 
leased during the first few seconds of flight in a 
structural vibration mode at a frequency of about 
3 cycles per second. The maxi1~um srructura% 
loads on the aft field joints of the Solid Rockea 
Boosters occur during the exceeding 
even those of the maximum dynamic pressure 
period experienced later in flight. 
Just after liftoff at -678 seconds into the Wight, 
photographic data show a strong puff of gmy 
smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft 
field joint on the right Solid Rocltet Booster. The 
two pad 39B cameras that would have recorded 
the precise location of the puff were inoperative. 
Computer graphic analysis of film Gom other 
cameras indicated the initial smoke came from 
the 270 to 3 10-degree sector of the circumference 
of the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocker 
Booster. This area of the sollid booster faces the 
External Tank. The vaporized material stream- 
ing from the joint indicated there was neat corn- 
plete sealing action within the joint. 
Eight more distinctive puffs of increasing%). 
blacker smoke were recorded between .836 and 
2.500 seconds. The smoke appeased to pufT up- 
wards from the joint. While each smoke puff was 
being left behind by the upward Right of the Shut- 
tle, the next fresh puff could be seen near the level 
of the joint. The multiple smoke puffs in this se- 
quence occurred at about four times per second. 
approximating the frequency of the structural 
load dynamics and resultant joint flexing. Com- 
puter graphics applied to NASA photos from a 
variety of cameras in this sequence again placed 
the smoke puffs9 origin in the 270-to 310-degree 
sector of the original smoke spurt. 
As the Shuttle increased its upward velocity. 
it flew past the emerging and expanding smoke 
puffs. The last smoke  a as seen above the fieid 
joint at 2.733 seconds. At 3.373 seconds the last 
smoke was visible below the Solid Rocket 
Boosters and became indiscernible as it mixed 
with rocker plumes and surrounding atmosphere. 
The black color and dense composition of the 
smoke puffs suggest that the grease, joint insula- 
tion and mbber O-rings in the joint seal were be- 
ing burned and eroded by the hot propellant 
gases. 
Launch sequence films from previous missions 
were examined in detail to determine if there were 
any prior indications sf smoke of the color and 
composition that appeared during the first few 
seconds of the 5 1 -L mission. None were found. 
Other .ivapcsrs in this area were determined to be 
melting frost ifrom the bottom of the External 
Tank 01- steam from the rocket exhaust in the 
pad's sound suppression water trays. 
Shuttle main engines were throttled up to 104 
percent of their sated thrust level, the Challenger 
executed a programmed roll maneuver and she 
engnes were throttled back to 94 percent, 
At approximately 37 seconds, Challenger en- 
countered the first of several high-altitude wind 
shear conditions, which lasted until about 64 
seconds. The wind shear created forces on the 
apehicle with relatively large fluctuations. These 
were immediatdy sensed and countered by the 
guidance. navigation and control system. 
Although flight 51-L loads exceeded prior ex- 
perience in both yaw and pitch planes at certain 
instants, the maxima had been encountered on 
preavicbus flights and were within design limits. 
The steering system (thrust vector control) of 
she Solid Rocket Booster responded to all com- 
mands and wind shear effects. The wind shear 
caused the steerlig system to be more active than 
on any prea~icaus flight. 
At 45 seconds into the flight, three bright 
flashes appeared downstream of the Challenger's 
~ g h t  wing. Each flash lasted less than one- 
rrhiaccleth of a second. Similar flashes have been 
seen on other flights. Another appearance of a 
separate bright spot was diagnosed by film 
awdysis to be a reflection of main engine exhaust 
on the Orbiipd Maneuvering System pods located 
at the upper rear section of the Orbiter. The 
flashes were unrelated to the later appearance of 
she same plume from the right Solid Rocket 
Booster. 
Both the Shuttle main engines and the solid 
rockers operated at reduced thrust approaching 
and passing through the area of maximum 
dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. 
Main engines had been throttled up to 104 per- 
cent thrust and the Solid Rocket Boosters were 
increasing their thrust when the first flickering 
flame appeared on the right Solid Rocket Booster 
in the area of the aft field joint. This first very 
small flame was detected on image enhanced film 
at 58.788 seconds into the flight. It appeared to 
originate at about 303 degrees around the booster 
circumference at or near the aft fielid joint. 
One film frame later from the same camera, 
the flame was visible without image enhance- 
ment. It grew into a continuous, well-defined 
plume at 59.262 seconds. At about the same time 
(60 seconds), telemetry showed a pressure dif- 
ferential between the chamber pressures in the 
right and left boosters. The right booster chamber 
pressure was lower, confirming the growing leak 
in the area of the field joint. 
As the flame plume increased in size, it was 
deflected r e w a r d  by the aerodynamic slipstream 
and circumferentially by the protruding structure 
of the upper ring attaching the booster to the Ex- 
ternal Tank. These deflections directed the flame 
plume onto the surface of the External Tank. This 
sequence of' flame spreading is confirmed la)- 
analysis of the recovered wreckage. The grow- 
ing flame also impinged on the strut attaching 
the Solid Rocket Booster to the External Tank. 
At about 62 seconds into the fight, the con- 
trol system began to react to counter the forces 
caused by the pllume and its effects. The left Solid 
Rocket Booster thrust vector control moved to 
counter the yaw caused by reduced thrust from 
the leaking right Solid Rocket Booster. During 
the next nine seconds, Space Shutrle control 
systems worked to correct anomalies in pitch and 
yaw rates. 
The first visual indication that swirling flame 
from the right Solid Rocket Booster breached the 
External Tank was at 64.660 seconds when there 
was an abrupt change in the shape and color of 
the pllume. This indicated that it was mixing with 
leaking hydrogen from the External Tank. Te%e- 
metexed changes in the hydrogen tank pressuriza- 
tion confirmed the leak. Within 45 milliseconds 
of the breach of the External Tank, a bright sus- 
tained glow developed on the black-tiled under- 
side of the Challenger between it and the Exter- 
nal Tank. 
Beginning at about 72 seconds, a series of 
events occurred extremely rapidly that terminated 
the flight. Telemetered data indicate a wide varie- failed at 73.137 seconds as evidenced by the 
ty of flight system actions that support the visual vapors appearing in the intertank region. 
evidence of the photos as the Shuttle struggled Within milliseconds there was massive, alm 
futilely against the forces that were destroying it. explosive, burning of the hydrogen stseamin 
At about 72.20 seconds the lower strut linking from the failed tank bottom and the liquid o 
the Solid Rocket Booster and the External Tank gen breach in the area of the intertank. 
was severed or pulled away from the weakened At this point in its trajectory, while traveling 
hydrogen tank permitting the right Solid Rocket at a Mach number of 1.92 at an dtitude af 46,000 
Booster to rotate around the upper attachment feet, the Challenger was totally enveloped in the 
strut. This rotation is indicated by divergent yaw explosive burn. The Challenges's reaction con- 
and pitch rates between the left and right Solid trol system ruptured and a hypergolic burn of i t s  
Rocket Boosters. propellants occurred as it exited the oxygen- 
At 73.124 seconds, a circumferential white hydrogen flames. The reddish brown colors of the 
vapor pattern was observed blooming from the hypergolic fuel burn are visible on the edge of the 
side of the External Tank bottom dome. This was main fireball. The Orbiter, under severe 
the beginning of the structural failure of the aerodynamic loads, broke into severd large ses- 
hydrogen tank that culminated in the entire aft tions which emerged from the fireball. Separate 
dome dropping away. This released massive sections that can be identified on film include the 
amounts of liquid hydrogen from the tank and main engineltail section with the engines still 
created a sudden forward thrust of about 2.8 burning, one wing of the Orbiter, and the for- 
million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank up- ward fuselage trailling a mass of umbilical lines 
ward into the intertank structure. At about the pulled loose from the payload bay. 
same time, the rotating right Solid Rocket Booster Evidence in the recovered wreckage from she 
impacted the intertank structure and the lower 5 1-L mission hardware supports this final se- 
part of the liquid oxygen tank. These structures quence of events. w 
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-1;Lnltoring satellite operated by the National Oceanic and 
Aiirt~spheric Adm~nrstrat~on acquired th~s image of the 
a , i i ~ k d  and vapor cloud from the 51-L accident. The coast 
,af F~orrda is outirned In red. 
ST'S 51-E Sequence of Major Events 
.iiasszon f im i  
(G.tfT, In hr:mzn SEC) E L ~ I  
Elapsed 
Time (sacs.) Source 
ME - 3 Ignition Command 
hfE - 2 Ignition Command 
ME - 1 Ignition Command 
SRM Ignition Command ( T  = 0) 
Holddown Post 2 PIC firing 
First Continuous Vertical Motion 
Confirmed smoke above field joint on 
R H  SRhI 
Eight puffs of smoke (from 0.836 thru 
2.500 sec MET) 
Last positive evidence of smoke above 
right aft SRBIET attach ring 
Last positive visual indication of smoke 
SSkiE 104% Command 
RM SRh3 pressure 11.8 psi above 
nominal 
Roll maneuver initiated 
SSME 94% Command 
Roll maneuver completed 
SShIE 65% ~omma.62  
Roll and Yaw Attitude Response to Wind 
(36.990 to 62.990 sec) 
SSME 1104% Command ' 
First evidence of flame on RW SRM . 
Reconstructed Max Q (720 psf) 
Continuous well defined plume on R H  
SRki  
Flame from RW SRM in + Z direction 
(seen from south side of vehicle) 
SRM pressure divergence (RH vs. LH) 
First evidence of plume deflection, 
intermittent 
First evidence of SRB plume attaching 
to E T  ring frame 
First evidence of plume deflection, 
continuous 
Peak roll rate response to wind 
- 6.566 GPC 
- 6.446 , GPC 
- 6.326 GPC 
0.000 GPC 
0.008 E8 Camera 
0.250 E9 Camera 
0.678 E60 Camera 
0.836 E63 Camera 
2.733 CZR-1 Camera 
3.375 E60 Camera 
4,339 E4f R12076D 
36.990 V95H352wC 
51.860 E41MIb076D 
58.788 E207 Camera 
59.000 BET - 
59.262 E207 Camera 
59.753 E204 Camera 
60.004 B47P2302 
60.248 E203 Camera 
60.988 E207 Camera 
61 .a24 V90R5301C 
AC:I' PUS -Actuarc~r Posirlrm 
APC -hus i l~an  Po\\cSr Cnit 
HE?' - B C ~ I  Ehtttiiittcd Trajcc tor! 
C: H -Channel 
DISC: - Discharqv 
ET - Extcrnal Tank 
GG -Gas Gt.trcrnror 
G K: -GmvrJ  Purp41w Cr~nlpurvr 
G I  -Grcrn\\irh Slcan 71n1v 
ti PFT - Hlrh Pr.:c<r~rr. Fuvi 1 uti)ctpunil) 
LH - Lcltliatid 
LH, -Liquid H\dr.oqt.ri 
I.( J. - Ltqutd O\\ urn I ..iiii< .$. I.OS, 
I . .  Q - \la\irtluri~ L)\ ti.111111 i'rv>r;it.t. 
SIE -\lam En~qtit. I U I ~ I V  3. SSSIEI 
51EC 
MET 
111's 
PC: 
PIC: 
psl 
R(:S 
RG.4 
RH 
RSS 
SR H 
SRSl 
ShSIE 
TE\l  I' 
?'\'c' 
- Matn Engnc Controller 
- Sl  i\sion Elapsrd Time 
-Stain Propulsion Systmi 
-Chalnbrr P ~ s s u w  
- Pymtcchnics initialor Controller 
-Pounds per squaw fwr 
- Rcacrion Control Sysrcm 
- Ratr G\.rc> Asscrnb1~- 
- Richlhand 
- Ranpr Safvty Svsrcrn 
-Sol~d Rr~cke~ Bocntcr 
-Solid Rockct S111lor 
-Spa((. S)iuttlc .\lain Enqinr 
- 7'vntlxr.iturr 
-Thmrt \ ' c v  tor C:ontrt11 
NOTE: The Shuttle cwrdinare system used in Chaplii 
3 is, relative to rhc Orbiter. as b l i t > n s .  
+ X direction - forward (tail to nos?) 
- X direction - rearward (now in rail) 
+ Y direction - righl (toward !he nghn wing tap1 
- Y direction - left (toward the left wang lip) 
+ 2 dirccrion - down 
- 2 dirrction - up 
Eiapsrd 
. .. I rmc (>err ) Sourci 
Peak TVC response to wind 
Peak yaw rate response to wind 
R H  outboard elevon actuator hinge 
moment spike 
R H  outboard ellevon actuator delta 
pressure change 
Start of planned pitch rate maneuver 
Change in awoma%ous plume shape 
(LH2 tank leak near 2058 ring frame) 
Bright sustained glow on sides of ET 
Start SSME gimbal angle Barge pitch 
variations 
Beginning of transient motion due to 
changes in aero forces due to plume 
LH ou~board elevon actuator delta 
pressure change 
Start ET  LH2 ullage pressure 
deviations 
Start divergent yaw rates (WH %IS* &El 
SRB) 
Stare divergent pitch rates ( R H  vs. LH 
SRB) 
SRB major high-rate actuator command 
SSME roll gimbal rates 5 deg/sec 
Vehicle max + M lateral acceleration . 
( 9 , 2 2 7  g) 
SRB major high-sate actuator motion 
Start of H2  tank pressure decrease with 
2 flow control valves open 
Last state vector downlinked 
Start of sharp MPS LOX inlet pressure 
drop 
Last full computer frame of TDRS data 
Start of sharp MPS LH2 inlet pressure 
drop 
Vehicle max - Y lateral acceleration 
( - -254 g) 
Circumferential white pattern on ET aft 
dome (LH2 tank failure) 
R H  SRM pressure 19 psi lower than 
LH SRM 
First hint of vapor at intertank 
,411 engine systems stan responding to 
loss of he1 and LOX inlet pressure 
Sudden cloud along ET between 
intertank and aft dome 
Flash between Orbiter and LH2 tank 
SSME telemerry data interference from 
73.211 to 73.303 
E20.1 Carnera 
E204 Camera 
T4lP17006 
Data reduction 
V4%P1330C 
Data reduction 
E204 Camera 
B47P2302C 
E207 Camera 
SSME team 
E207 Camera 
E204 Camera 
.%fission Timr 
(G.\f T. in  h?:min:sn-) EI fnt 
Elapsed 
Timr (secs. ) Sourir 
Flash near SRB fkd attach and 
brightening of flash between Orbiter 
and ET 
First. indication intense white flash at 
'SRB fwd attach point 
Greatly increased intensity of white flash 
Start RCS jet chamber pressure 
fluctuations 
All engines approaching HPFT 
discharge temp redline limits 
hIE-2 HPFT disch. temp Chan. A vote 
for shutdo\vn; 2 strikes on Chan. B 
ME-2 controller last time word update 
ME-3 in shutdown due to HPFT 
discharge temperature redlline 
exceedance 
ME-3 controller last time word updare 
hlE-l in shutdown due to HPFT 
discharge temperature redline 
exceeciance 
ME-1 last telemetered data point 
Last validated Orbiter telemetry 
measurement 
End of last reconstructed data frame 
with valid synchronization and frame 
count 
Last radio frequency signal from Orbiter 
Bright flash in vicinity of Orbiter nose 
RH SRB. nose cap seplchute deployment 
RH SRB RSS destruct 
EH SRB RSS destruct 
E204 Camera 
E204 Camera 
E204 Camera 
hIEC data 
MEC data 
ME@ data 
hIEC data 
Calculation 
Calculation 
Data seduction 
Data seducrian 
E204 Camera 
E207 Camera 
E202 Camera 
E230 Camera 
Shuttle to Ground ~elernet* Channel' 
C h m d  Sample Raft Samplr Ikscnptton 
Identlpsn Pmod 
(&mp&s/src) (st() 
B47P11302C 12.5 ,080 LH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE 
B47P2302C 12.5 ,080 RH SRM CHAMBER PRESSURE 
B58Hl l5OC 25 ,040 LH SRB T\'C TILT ACT POS 
B58H1151C 25 .OM LH SRB TVC ROCK ACT POS 
E41M2076D 25 .040 ME-3 VEHICLE COSfMAND 
E4lTlOlOD 25 .OM ME-I HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A ' 
E41T2010D 25 .040 ME-2 HPFT DlSC TEMP-CH A 
E41T3010B 25 .ON ME-3 HPFT DISC TEMP-CH A 
f4IP1700C 5 ,200 ET LHI ULLAGE PRESSURE 
V41PllOOC I?  5 .080 MPS LH? INLET PRESS (ME-I) 
V41Pl330C 12 5 ,080 MPS LO2 INLET PRESS (ME-3) 
V42PI552A 25 040 RCS THRUSTER PC 
V46P0120.4 100 010 APU-I GG CHAMBER PRESS 
Shuttle to Ground Telemetry Chmnds 
Clhnnrl Sampk Ralc Somplc Dcsmpt~on 
Idmltfin P h d  
(&mp&s/sa) ($4 
V58H 1100A 25 .010 ME-PITCH A C X A T O R  PO5 
V58PO866C 12.5 .080 LH OB ELEVON PRI DELTA P 
V58P0966C 12.5 .080 RH OB ELEVON BRB DELTA P 
X ' 9 9 ~ 2 1 1 1 ~  25 .OM LH SRB TILT ACT DRIVER 
VWR2525C 5 .200 SEL LH SRB PITCH R.4TE 
V90R2528C 5 .200 SEL RH SWB YAW RATE 
V90R5301C 5 .200 SELECTED RGA ROLL RATE 
VWR5321C 5 .200 SELECTED WGA PITCH RATE 
VWR5341C 5 .200 SELECTED RGA YAW RATE 
V95H3522C 12.5 .080 BODY YAW A T I T W D E  ERROR 
V95H3523C 12.5 .080 BODY ROLL AmYTUDE ERROR 
V98Al1581C 25 .040 LATERAL ACCELERATIOS 
The Cause of 
the Accident 
he consensus of the Commission and 
participating investigative agencies is 
that the loss of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Bras caused by a failure in 
the joint between the two lower segments of the 
right Solid Rocket Motor, The specific failure was 
rhe deseruct~ow of the seals that are intended to 
prevent hoe gases from leaking through the joint 
during she propellant burn of the rocket motor. 
The exridence assembled by the Commission in- 
dicates that no other element of the Space Shut- 
lie system contributed to this failure. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission 
reviewed in detail all availlable data, reports and 
records; directed and supervised numerous tests, 
analyses, and experiments by NASA, civilian 
scowrma~m and various government agencies; 
and then developed specific failure scenarios and 
the range of most probab%e causative factors. The 
sections that follow discuss the results of the 
investigation. 
Analysis of the Accident 
- 
The results of the accident investigation and 
analysis ~ 1 1 %  be presented in this and the follow- 
ing sections. Throughout the investigation three 
cria.ica% questions were central to the inquiry, 
namely: 
r What were the circumstances surrounding 
mission 51-L that contributed to the 
catastrophic termination of that flight in 
contrast so 24 successful Wights preceding it? 
rn What evidence pointed to the right Solid 
Rocket Booster as the source of the accident 
as opposed to other elements of the Space 
Shuttle? 
m FFnnd%y. what was the mechanism of failure? 
Csing mission data, subsequently completed 
tests and analyses, and recovered wreckage, the 
Commission identified all possible faults that 
could originate in the respective flight elements 
of the Space Shuttle which might have the poten- 
tial to lead to loss of the Challenger. Potentid con- 
tributors to the accident examined by the Corn- 
mission were the launch pad (exonerated in 
Chapter IX of this report), the External 'Tank, 
the Space Shuttle Main Engines, the Orbiter and 
related equipment, pay%oad/Orbiter interfaces, 
the payload, Solid Rocket Boosters and Solid 
Rocket Motors. 
In a pwdle% effort, the question of sabotage was 
examined in detail and reviewed by the Commis- 
sion in executive session. There is no euidence of 
sabotage, either at the launch pad or during other proc- 
esses prior to or during launch. 
External Tank 
The External Tank contains propellants used 
by the Orbiter's three main engines during Shut- 
tle launch and ascent to orbit. Structurally the 
tank is attached to and serves as the backbone 
of the Orbiter and the two Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Three primary structures - the liquid oxygen 
tank, the intertank and the liquid hydrogen 
tank - comprise the configuration. (Figure 1) 
The External Tank delivers oxidizer and fuel 
from the propellant tanks to the Orbiter. The 
electrical subsystem includes instrumentation sen- 
sors, heaters, range safety electronics and ex- 
plosives, and lightning protection and associated 
cabling. A%1 flight instrumentation and electrical 
power are wired directly to the Orbiter. The ther- 
m d  protection subsystem is the insulation applied 
to the tank's exterior. Its function is to prevent 
heat leakage into the propellants, to protect the 
External Tank from overheating during flight and 
to minimize ice formation while the Shuttle is on 
potentially contributing to the Challenger acci- 
dent. Those potential contributors were: 
m Premature detonation of the External Tank 
range safety system 
Structural flaw 
8 Damage at lift-off , 
m Load exceedance 
B Overheating 
The Commission examined the possibility rhae 
the STS 51-L accident could have been triggered 
by accidental detonation of the range safety 
system explosives. This potential fault was as- 
sessed using flight data, observed events, and 
recovered hardware. Most of the e x p % s s l ~ e  
charges for the External Tank emergency destruc- 
tion system were recovered.2 Examination of tkas 
material established that none sf it had exploded 
and thus could not have contributed to the acca- 
dent (Photo 6 & D). Flight data verified that the 
External T a ~ k  range safety system was not 
activated. the pad. The possibility of an imperfection existing in 
Approximately 20 percent of the External Tank either the pressurized or nonpresaurized Exrer- 
structure was recovered after the accident and the nal Tank structural elements that could g a - 0 ~ ~  no 
majority of the pieces were from the intenank and a sufficient size to cause structural failure was ex- 
liquid hydrogen tank.1 The Commission initial- amined in detail. All construction history, srruc- 
ly considered all External Tank systems and sub- turd qualification test data, proof test inspection 
systems in identifying possible faults or failures records and x-rays were reviewed. One pre~~iously 
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undetected imperfection that was discovered dur- 
ing a reexamination of the x-rays was found in 
recovered hardware with no propagation in- 
d i ~ a t e d . ~  Other data from the pre-launch ice and 
frost seam inspections, film and video coverage, 
pressurization records and flight data revealled no 
evidence of leakage.' The Commission conclud- 
ed that no structural imperfections existed that 
could have grown to a size to create a leak or 
cause catasrrasphic failure of the External Tank. 
Possible damage to the liquid hydrogen tank 
at lift off was considered. The ice and frost team 
obsemed no vapor or frost that would indicate 
a leak. The liquid hydrogen vent arm retracted 
as expected during launch and did not recontact 
the rank or solid booster.* Photo analysis and 
television monitoring did hot indicate that any 
debris contacted the tank. Therefore, damage to 
the liquid hydrogen tank at lift off was determined 
to be highly improbab%e. 
The possibility that abnormally high structural 
loads caused an External Tank failure was ex- 
amined. Analysis indicated that there were no ex- 
cessive loading conditions based on lift off and 
flight data prior to the explosion. The maximum 
saruetura% load produced was less than 80 percent 
of the allowable design Boad.5 The strue~urall.irn- 
placations of vent and flow control valve opera- 
tion was examined and found not to be a factor. 
The possibility of a structural failure due to 
o\rerheacing was assessed with several causes 
postulated: high heating due to abnormal trajec- 
lory,  loss ofthe thermal protection system, a hot 
gas leak from the Solid Rocket Motor and a Piq- 
uid hydrogen leak from the External Tank. The 
trajecaoq was normal until well after the Solid 
Rocket Motor leak was observed at 58 seconds, 
Maimurn  aerodynamic heating would not have 
occurred until approximately 90 s e c ~ n d s . ~  At 73 
seconds, heating was well within tank component 
structural capability. Based on careful review of 
prelaunch and flight films and data, the Com- 
mission bund no evidence that any thermal pro- 
tection fsanx was lost during the launch and 
ascent, 
The possibility of a leak from the hydrogen 
tank resulting in overheating was addressed. 
Tests indicated that small leaks (0.037 Ibs/second) 
would Rave been visible. In addition, if there was 
a liquid hydrogen leak at lift off. it would have 
been ignited by either the Solid Rocket Booster 
ignition or Space Shuttle Main Engine ignition.' 
The resultant flame would have ignited the Solid 
Rocket Booster attach ring foam insulation almost 
immediately. Copious quantities of dense black 
smoke and open flames would be evident in such 
a case and would have continued for as long as 
the leak burned. Smoke and flames in these quan- 
tities were mot observed fat lift off nor anytime 
throughout the flight. It is therefore concluded 
that an initial Piquid hydrogen tank leak was im- 
probable, and that the only possib%e cause for 
overheating the tank was the impingement of 
leaking Solid Rocket Motor gases. This resulted 
in the ultimate breakup of the External Tank. 
The recovered external foam insulation on the 
External Tank was scorched and discolored am 
various locations.8 Burn patterns across the pieces 
of insulation on the External Tank indicate that 
various areas were subjected to fire both before 
and after the External Tank broke up in flight. 
The Commission aeuiewed the External Tank5 con- 
slmction recor& acceptance testing, prt-launch andflight 
cfeta, and reco%rcr.eB hardware andjound nothing rekating 
lo the External Tank that caused or contributed to the 
eause cf the accident. 
Space Shuttle Main Engines 
A cluster of three Space Shuttle Main Engines 
operates simultaneously with the Solid Rocket 
Boosters during the initial ascent phase of flight 
and provides primary propulsion until the Shur- 
tle has attained orbital velocity. These engines 
use liquid hydrogen as the atinel and liquid oxygen 
as the oxidizer, Both the liquid hydrogen and ox\-- 
gen are stored in the External Tank and are 
transferred to the engines under pressure. Dur- 
ing the mission the engines operate for about 8.5 
minutes. 
Engine thrust is controlled by throttling and 
has ranged from 65 to 104 percent of a specified 
thrust level. At sea level, 100 percent equals 
375,000 pounds of thrust per engine. 
Pitch, yaw and roll control of the Orbiter is 
provided by gimbals on each engine. Gimbaling 
is operated by two hydraulic sewoactuators, one 
for pitch motion and the other for yaw motion, 
with roll controlled by a combination of both pitch 
and yaw. These servoactuators are commanded 
by the Orbiter's computer. 
An electronic controller is attached eo the for- 
ward end of each en@ne. Each controller is a self- 
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contained system that monitors engine checkout, 
control and status, and sends the data to the Or- 
biter. Each of the three engine interface units in 
turn sends its data to the Orbiter computers and 
relays commands from the computers to the 
engines. 
A propellant management subsystem of 
manifolds, distribution lines and valves controls 
the flow of liquids from the External Tank to the 
engines, and the flow of gaseous hydrogen and 
oxygen from the engines into the External Tank 
to maintain pressurization. 
All three main engines from the Challenger, 
No. 2020 in position 2, No. 202 1 in position 3, 
and No. 2023 in position 1, were recovered in 
large part on February 23, 1986, off the Florida 
coast in about 85 feet of water. All pasts were 
recovered close to one another, and the engines 
were still attached to the thrust stmcture.9 All 
engine gimbal bearings had failed, apparently 
because of overload on water impact, 
All metallic surfaces were damaged by marine 
life, except titanium surfaces or those parts that 
were buried under the ocean bottom. The metal 
fractures, examined at 3x magnification, showed 
rough texture and shear lips, which appeared to 
be caused by overloads due to water impactOx0 
No pre-accident material defects were noted. 
The engine nozzles were sheared at the 
manifolds. The main combustion chambers, 
main injectors and preburners of each engine 
were attached to one another. The six hydraulic 
servoactuators used to control engine gimbaling 
were attached to segments of the Orbiter thrust 
structure. 
Sections of the main propulsio~a system fuel and 
liquid oxygen feedines and feedline manifarP%ds 
were recovered, as well as the Externd TawBig/Or- 
biter disconnect assembly in the mated cowfipra- 
tion. A portion of the oxidizer inlet duct was at- 
tached to the interface of engine 2020. All 
preburner valves were recovered. L2 
The main engine controllers far both engines 
2020 and 2021 were recovered. One controller 
was broken open on one side, and both were 
severely corroded and damaged by marine l i f e .  
Both units were disassembled and the memory 
units flushed with deionized water. After they 
were dried and vacuum baked, data from these 
units were retrieved.'3 
All engines had burn damage caused by inter- 
nal overtemperature typical of oxygen-rich shuf- 
down. Thus, the loss of hydrogen fuel appears 
to have initiated the shutdown. The Commission 
reviewed engine and ground measurements made 
while the three engines were prepared for launch. 
Ambient temperature during pre-launch was the 
coldest to date, but preflight engine data were 
normal." These data were also compared with 
Challenger engine data during the flight 61-A 
pre-flight period. All differences seen betayeen she 
two missions were due either to planned vana- 
tions in the pre-launch sequence or the cold am- 
bient conditions during the preflight period for 
flight 5 1 -L. These differences did not afkce engine 

The increased temperature caused an increase in and interface, and other government furnished 
pump speed. This could not, however, increase essential equipment. Onboard government fur- 
the fuel pressure because of a decrease in fuel tank nished equipment for STS 5 1-L, included the 
top (ullage) pressure resulting from the burned remote manipulator arm system, extra~9ehiculzr 
through hydrogen tank leakage. When the fuel mobility units, extravehicular activity hardware, 
pump pressures dropped below 140 pounds per television, equipment worn by the crew, storage 
square inch, the programed control system dis- provisions and communicationi equipment. 
qualified the measured data because it was past The significant pieces of Orbiter structure 
reasonable limits. This caused the fuel flowrate recovered included all three Space Shuttle Main 
and high-pressure fuel pump discharge pressure Engines, the forward fuselage including the crew 
to decrease, while the lack of load allowed the module, the right inboard and outboard elevows, 
pump's speed to increase. The decreased fuel flow a large portion of the right wing, a lower portion 
caused a drop in fuel preburner chamber of the vereicd stabilizer, three mddes speed brake 
pressure, though the fuel preburner oxygen valve panels and portions of mid-fuselage side walls 
was then advancing toward a more open position. from both the left and sight sides, This 
The mixture ratio in the he1 preburner became represents about 30 percent of the Orbiter but 
leaner, which raised high-pressure fuel turbine does nos provide sufficient evidence to establish 
discharge temperatures above the redline limits. conclusively the complete failure seqence of the 
This caused the engine control system to start entire Orbiter spacecraft. However, there was 
automatic shutdown of the engine. sufficient evidence to establish some of the stmc- 
The engine flight history showed that engine tu rd  failure modes that resdted in the Orbiter's 
2023 flew four previous times while engines 2020 destruction. 
and 2021 had flown five previous missions. 1' The M fractures and materid failures examined on 
flight data from flight 51-L compared well with 'the Orbiter, with the exception of the main 
flight data from all previous flights. engines, were the result of overload forces, and 
The analysis of flight data confirmed that the they exhibited no evidence of internal burn 
Space Shuttle Main Engines operated properly damage or exposure to explosive forces, This in- 
while reacting to changing external conditions. dicated that the destruction of a&e orbiter oc- 
Previous engine tests Suggest that the high- curred predominantly from aerodynamic and in- 
pressure pumps are the most likely components ertial forces that exceeded design limits, There 
to fail, because of either bearing or turbine blade was that during the breakup sequence, 
failure. There was no evidence of either in flight the right Solid Rocket Booster struck the our- 
51-L. Engine operation was normal until the fuel board end of the Orbiter's wing and right 
inlet Pressure dropped- As the Pressure decreased, outboard elevon. Additionally, chemical analysis 
the engine in a predictable manner- indicated that the right side of the Orbiter was 
Automatic shutdown of engine 2023 was verified sprayed by hot propellant gases exhaust in g from 
data. the the hole in the inboard circumference of the right 
salvaged engine 2021 computer vesif~ that Solid Rocket Booster. Evaluation of Orbiter 
this engine had b e ~ n  engines showed extensive internal thermal 
control computer data from engine 2020 showed damage to the engines as a consequence 
that this engine was within 20 milliseconds of oxygen-rich shutdown that resulted from a depje- 
shutdown when the "opped. l8  Inspec- tion of the hydmgen fuel supply. The of 
tion of recovered engine hardware verified that hydrogen fuel to the main engines would dl engines were shut down in a fuel-lean or been abruptly discontinued when liquid 
oxygen-rich condition which resulted in burn hydrogen tank in the External Tank disinte- through and erosion of the engine hot gas circuits. grated. The Commission concluded that the Space Shunle The crew module wreckage was found Main Engines did not cause or contribute lo the cause 
of the Challenger accident. submerged in about 90 feet of ocean water con- 
centrated in an area of about 20 feet by 80 feet 
Orbiter and Related Equipment Portions of the forward fuselage outer shell strut 
The Orbiter subsystems include propulsion ture were found among the pieces of crew module 
and power, avionics. structures, thermal and en- recovereda20 There was no evidence of an inter- 
vironmental control and life support, mechanical nal explosion, heat or fire damage on rhe fornard 
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principal 
system 
fuselagelcrew module pieces.. The crew m ~ d u l e  
was disintegrated, with the heaviest fragments- 
tiow and crash damage on the left side. The fiac- 
tures examined were typical of overload breaks 
and appeared to be the result of high forces 
generated by impact with the surface of the water. 
The sections of lower forward fusejage outer shell 
found Boating on the ocean surface were 
recovered shortly after the accident. They also 
contained crush damage indicative of an impact 
on the lefx side, 'The consistency of damage to the 
left side of the outer fuselage shell and crew 
module indicates that these structures remained 
attached to each other until impact with the 
water. 
The Orbiter investigation consisted of a review 
of all Qrbnner data and vehicle pans retrieved. 
Also re\yBewed were vehicle and equipment proc- 
essing records and pre-mission analyses. 
All orbital maneuvering system measurements 
such as temperatures, pressures, events, com- 
mands, stimuli, and switch positions were re- 
viewed with a11 related computer data. There 
were no indications of abnormal behavior. A11 
temperature and pressure transducers active dur- 
ing ascent for the reaction control system were 
reviewed, including thruster chamber pressure, 
leak temperature, line temperature, propellant 
tank, helium tank and propellant line trans- 
ducers. Nothing was found that could Rave con- 
tributed to the accident. 
Auxiliary power unit pressures and 
temperatures were reviewed, and no abnormal 
conditions were observed during ascent. Selected 
hydraulic measurements, including system 
pressures, fluid quantities m d  most temperatures 
in the aft compartment and in the wing cavity 
containing the eleven actuator supply lines, were 
reviewed by the Commission, and no abnormali- 
ty was found. All fuel cells and power reactant 
storage and distribution subsystem measuremenrs 
were reviewed and found to be normal during all 
phases of ground and flight operation prior to the 
accident. All avaiiabie pyrotechnic firing control 
circuit measurements were reviewed, along with 
radiography, shear bolt revie\%. and debris reports, 
Forward I Fuselage I Mid Fuselage 
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and there were no unintentiohal firing command 
indications.21 N1 available data regarding range 
safety and recovery system batteries were re- 
viewed, and no indications were found that the 
batteries were involved in initiating the accident. 
Guidance, navigation and control subsystems 
data were reviewed, and it appears that the sub- 
systems performed properly. All subsystem sen- 
sors and software apparently performed as desigm- 
ed until data loss. Inertial measurement unit data 
from the preflight calibration through signal loss 
were found to be normal. All data processing 
system related data were reviewed, and nothing 
significant was found. Data review of the ellec- 
trical power distribution and control subsystem 
indicated that its performance was normal until 
the time of the accident ,22 blll communication and 
tracking system parameters active during launch 
were evaluated and found to be normal. No in- 
strumentation abnormalities were observed dur- 
ing the pre-launch and launch period before 
signal loss. 
Structures eayalluation included analysis of 
ground and flight data (loads, temperatures, 
pressures and purge flows), hardware changes 
and discrepancy reports since the Past Chdlenger 
flight, and wreckage. The Commission found that 
no Orbiter structural elements contributed to the 
accident. 
Orbiter structural pre-launch temperature 
measurements were evaluated and found to be 
within specified limits. 
Data related to the atmospheric revitaliizarion 
system, which maintains cabin atmosphere, were 
evaluated.23 During pre-launch, launch and un- 
til signal loss, data indicated that both of the water 
coolant loops were normal, the pressure conrrol 
system functioned normally, dl fans functioned 
normallly, and all switches and valve positions 
were proper. 
Active thermal control subsystem data in- 
dicated that both of the freon coolant loops func- 
tioned normally, the ammonia boiler system wa": 
normal, and all switch and valve positions were 
proper. 24 
The water management subsystem functioned 
normally during the flight. The smoke detection 
and fire suppression subsystem and airlock sup- 
port subsystem both functioned normally. The 
waste collection subsystem is inoperative during 
rile launch phase, and no data were available.25 
No mechanical system abnormalities were 
identified, The vent' doors remained open 
throughout the Baunch. The payload bay doors 
remained latched. A%B landing gear were up and 
locked, all doors remained closed and locked, and 
the remate marsipu%ator system and payload 
retention system remained latched. Film and Or- 
biter interface data showed that there was no 
premature Orbiter/External Tank separation. 
Video tap" and photographs indicated the 
crew egress hatch, which caused the launch delay 
on the preceding day, operated properly. 
The onbsard government furnished equipment 
s o n f i ~ r a t i o n  and pre-launch processing were 
reviewed and determined to have been Wight- 
ready with no unusual or abnormal conditisns. 
Basad on this euiew and asses~menb, the Commis- 
ston concludtd that neither the Orbiter nor related equip- 
ment causad OP. contributed to the cause ofthe accident. 
Payload/Orbiter Interfaces 
Hntedaces between the Orbiter and the payload 
sene  to ataach the cargo to the Orbiter or pro- 
vide senices dsrom the Orbiter to cargo items. 
These interfaces are mechanical, thermal, 
avionics, power and fluid systems. 
The Spanan-Mdley payload was located in the 
front of the payload bay, attached to the equip- 
meet suppcan srmcture carrier. The Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite (TBRS) was attached to the 
Inenid Upper Stage (IUS) booster rocket used 
to move the TDWS into geosynchronous orbit. 
In the aft night deck, payload interfaces consisted 
a% a stmdard switch pmel, a payload deployment 
and retention system, and display and control 
panels for use wiith the payload. Payloads in the 
middeck area were in the stowage lockers. These 
were radiation monitoring, phase partitioning, 
fluid dynamics experiments, three student ex- 
periments, the Teacher in Space Project and the 
Comer: Halley mowitsring program. 
Thermd interfaces beaween the Orbiter and 
the payload in the aft flight deck and middeck 
consisted of the Orbiter's purge, vent and fluid 
heat exchanger systems. Thermal interface for 
TDRSiIUS, Spartan-Halley, and the ex- 
periments and projects were provided by the Or- 
biter environment control and life support 
system. 
Electrical power and avionics were provided 
to the payload through standard interface panels 
along both side of the cargo bay. In the aft flighr 
deck, the control and display panels supplied by 
the Orbiter provided the avionics and power in- 
terfaces for TDRS/IUS. The experiments and 
projects constituting the middeck payload had no 
interfaces with avionics and power systems. 
The only direct paylioad loads data from STS 
5 1 -L were accelerometer data recorded through 
the Orbiter umbilical prior to lift off. Ac- 
celerometer data from the payload bay and the 
crew cabin compared favorably with pre\?ious 
flights. Results indicate that payload loads on 
STS 51-L were similar to those of STS-6 and were 
within design levels and pre-launch predictions. 
The Commission found that all payload 
elements had been certified safe for Wight, and 
records for integation of hardware met engineer- 
ing requirements. Temperatures during pre- 
launch and ascent were norma%. Reconstructed 
lift off loads were below those used in the Wight 
readiness certification. The relay satellite's rate 
gyro data correlated with those for the Orbiter 
and boosters during ascent. Fittings attaching the 
payloads to the Orbiter remained in operation, 
as shown by telemetered data from monitoring 
microswitches. 
The Commission found no discrepancies in the Or- 
biter/payload interface performance that might have con - 
tributed to the Challenger accident. 
Payloads, Inertial Upper Stage, and 
Support Equipment 
The payload bay of the Orbiter Challenger 
contained a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
(TDRS) attached to an Inertial Upper Stage 
(IUS) booster rocket, and associated airborne 
support equipment. The IUS contained two solid 
rocket motors (SRMs): SRM-1 and SRM-2. 
The combined weight of these components was 
about 40,000 pounds. About five percent of the 
payload, IUS, and support equipment package 
was recovered from she ocean. Components 
recovered included segments of the cases of both 
IUS SRMs, the ignition safe/arm device for each 
SRM, the igniter for SRM-2, fragments of un- 
burned propellant from each SRM, five explosive 
ST% 54-L Payload 
Configuration Standard Interface Tracking and Relay Inertial Upper 
Mission-Peculiar 
Closed Circuit Equipment Support System (RMS) 
Televlslon (CCTV) Systems (MPESS) 
Overhead drawing of the Orbiter shows position of payload 
and other elements within the payload bay of the Challenger 
51-L mission. 
separation bolts that secure the two SRMs 
together, the forward support equipment trun- 
nions, the aft trunnions with spreader beams, and 
an undetonated section of explosive fasteners. 
There was no evidence of scorching, burning, 
or melting on any .of the components and struc- 
ture recovered, and all diactures were typical 
overload fractures. The safe arm device for each 
IUS SRM was in the safe position, the five ex- 
plosive SRM- 11SRM-2 separation bolts were in- 
tact, and pieces of propellant were not burned, 
indicating that the SR.Ms had not ignited. The 
two aft trunnion spreader beams were intact but 
were bent in the downward direction relative to 
the Orbiter. The right spreader beam was cracked 
and deformed about 7.5 inches, and the left 
spreader beam was cracked and deformed about 
1.5 inches.26 These deformations indicate that the 
payload and upper stage package was intact and 
secure in the cargo bay while being sub~ected to 
significant inertial flight loads. 
The inertial upper stage is a two-stage, solid- 
rocket-propellled, three-axis controlled, inenial- 
ly navigated upper stage rocket used to deliver 
spacecraft weighing up to approximately 5,000 
pounds from the Shuttle parking orbit to geosyn- 
chronous orbit. It includes the stage structure; 
solid rocket motors; a reaction control sub- 
system; avionics for telemetry, tracking and com- 
mand; guidance, navigation and control; data 
management; thrust vector control; electrical 
power sources and electrical cabling; a d  airborne 
software. 
Assessment of possible upper stage contribu- 
tion to the accident centered on the elimination 
of three possible scenarios: Premature upper stage 
rocket ignition, explosionlfire in the payload bay9 
and payload shift in the payload bay. 
Premature ignition of either nhe-upper stage 
stage 1 and/or stage 2 motor while still, in the Or- 
biter bay would have resulted in catastrap&a%c 
failure of the Orbiter. Potential causes for 
premature ignition were electrostatic discharge, 
inadvertent ignition command and auto-ipition . 
Each would have caused a rapid increase in the 
Orbiter payload bay temperature and pressure, 
and would have been immediately fal%owed 
structurd damage to the payload bay doors. The 
payload bay temperatures remained essentially 
constant, and the Orbiter photographic and 
telemetry data indicated the payload doors re- 
mained closed and latched from ]lift offunt2 s i p &  
loss.27 Both indications verified that there was no 
ignition of the IUS solid rocket motors, 
An IUS component explosion or fire could 
have damaged critical systems in the Orbiter by 
overheating or impact. Five sources other than 
an upper stage motor pre-ignition were identified 
as potential origins of a fire or explosion in the 
payload bay: (1) release and ignition? of JUS 
hydrazine from the reaction control system ranks, 
(2) fire or explosion from an IUS battery, (3) am- 
pact or rupture of a motor case and subsequent 
ignition of exposed propellant, (4) fire of electrical 
origin due to a short, and (5) fire or inadvertent 
ignition of pyrotechnic devices due to radio fre- 
quency radiation. Thermal measurements in the 
propellant tank and in. components adjacent to 
the propellant tanks indicated no abnormalities. 
Pre-launch and t h e m d  measurements in the Or- 
bgter payload bay and in TDRS near the reac- 
tion control system were stable throughout the 
ascent period. A fire and/or explosion resulting 
in shrapnel from an IUS battery was eliminated 
based on pre-launch monitoring of open circuit 
voltages on dl batteries, except the suppon equip- 
ment batteries. Location of these batteries made 
the potential for damage to critical systems very 
smd1 if they burned or exploded. Motor case im- 
pact or rupture and resulting exposure and pso- 
pellant ip i t ion  was determined improbable be- 
cause batteries and reaction contra% system burn- 
ing or explosion were eliminated "by flight data 
mdysis. They were the only potentid sources for 
IUS hearing and high velocity shrapnel. Pro- 
pellant burning was not indicated by payload bay 
&ermd measurements. Electrical shorting was 
e9lamigaated as a fire source in the payload bay 
because ZUS electrical and Orbiter voltage 
monitors were normal at launch and during STS 
5 1 -L ascent. Fires initiated by radio frequency 
radiation due to inadvertent IUS, TDRS, or 
ground cmittance were eliminated "because data 
showed worst case radio frequency radiation dur- 
ing ascent was less than ground-emitted radia- 
tion PO the payload bay during pre-launch check- 
ou e , The ground-emitted radiation was within 
specified limits. , 
IUSITDRS payload shifting or breaking free 
within the Orbiter due to structural failure or 
premature separation was investigated. Such a 
shift c ~ d d  have resulted in severe Orbiter damage 
from a direct impact, or could %lave induced a 
signifieaax shift in the Challenger vehicle center 
of pavity and possibly affected flight control. 
Four possible faults that could have led to Or- 
biter damage or substantid payload shift were 
considered : IUS stage 2/TDRS separation, %US 
stage listage 2 separation, IUSITDWS separa- 
tion from the airborne support equipment and 
I[US/airbome suppon equipment separation from 
Orbiter. All. were eliminated because dynamic 
response data conclusively showed that 
IUSJTDRS responded normally until the final 
Boss of dam. Further, TDRS data, which pass 
50 
through the IUS stage Ilstage 2 and support 
equipment, were continuous until data loss, verify- 
ing that these elements did not separate. 
The TDRS spacecraft weighs approximately 
4,905 pounds and is 9.5 icet in diameter and 19,s 
feet long. The forward 11 feet contain six 
deployable appendages, two solar arrays, one 
space-ground link antenna, and two single access 
antennas. The spacecraft body stmcture consists 
of a payload structure and a spacecraft structure. 
These structures house the tracking and telemetry 
and command subsystem, power subsystem, ther- 
mal control subsystem, ordnance subsystem, 
reaction control subsystem and attitude control 
subsystem. 
Telemetry data were transmitted from TDRS 
from approximately 48 hours prior to launch 
through signal loss. The telemetry system was 
functioning properly, and the data indicated that 
the telemetry processor was in its normal opera- 
tional mode and d l  power supply voltages and 
calibration voltages were n s m d .  There were no 
changes through she countdown to the time of 
structural breakup, when all telemetry abruptly 
halted. The telemetry tracking and control sub- 
systems command and tracking elements were in- 
active during the countdown through ascent, and 
no changes were noted, indicating that the TDRS 
was not commanded to alter its launch 
configuration. 
The TDRS power subsystem had a total of 138 
telemetry indications. These were the main data 
source used to deternine the power subsystem 
activity, Analyzing this telemetgk~ showed d l  sub- 
system elements performed normally. 
The TDRS themal  controll subsystem was 
designed to maintain proper temperatures 
primarily by passive means. Also, there is a %her- 
mostatically controlled heater system to ensure 
minimum required temperatures are maintain- 
ed. The thermal subsystem was monitored by 82 
configuration status indicators and 1.37 malog 
temperature channels. This telemetry showed 
that the TDRS remained in its nornal themal  
configuration and experienced normal 
temperatures %onti% s i p d  loss. 
No data indicated that the IUS separated from 
TDRS, that any deployable appendage ordnance 
had been fired or that any appendage motion had 
begun. 
The TDRS reaction control system was inac- 
tive at launch and required an ITdS command and 
two ground commands to activate any propeUant. 
Telemetry indicated no valve actuation, changes 
in tank pressures or temperatures, or propellant 
line temperature violations. Further, there was 
no telemetry that would suggest a hydrazine 
leakage or abnormality and no indications that 
the TDRS reaction control system contributed 
to the accident. 
During the launch phase, the attitude control 
subsystem was disabled except for the gyros and 
associated electronics necessary to provide the 
telemetry. Ml telemetry parameters reflecting at- 
titude control subsystem configuration remain- 
ed normal and unchanged during the STS 51 -L 
pre-launch and post-launch periods. 
The TDRS was mounted in a cantilevered 
fashion to the IUS by an adapter ring that pro- 
vided structurd, communications and power in- 
terfaces. Structural integrity loss indications 
would have been observed by interruptions in 
telemetry or electrical power. TDRS telemetry 
during the launch phase was transmitted by elec- 
trical cable to the IUS and interleaved with up- 
per stage data. If separation had occurred at 
either the TDRSIIUS interface or the IUSIsup- 
pon equipment interface, TDRS data would have 
stopped. There was no abnormal telemetry until 
signal loss of all vehicle telemetry. TDRS also 
received power from the Shuttle via the IUS 
through the same interfaces. There were no in- 
dications of TDRS batteries coming on line. This 
indicates that structural integrity at the TDRS 
m d  IUS interfaces was maintained until the 
structural breakup. Additionally, an inspection 
of the recovered debris gives the following indica- 
tions that the TDRSIIUS remained intact until 
the structural breakup. First, the separation bank 
lanyards frayed at the end where they attached 
to the band, indicating that the spacecraft was 
pulled forcefully from the adapter. Second, the 
V-groove ring structure at the top of the adapter 
was torn from its riveted connection to the 
adapter, indicating that a strong shear existed be- 
tween the spacecraft and IUS which would only 
"be generated if the two were still. attached. Final- 
ly, the adapter base was torn where it attached 
to the IUS, again indicating high tension and 
shear forces. There were no indications from 
telemetry or recovered debris that showed that 
the structural integrity of the satellite or the 
satellitelstage interface had been compromised. 
The TDRS records at Kennedy were review- 
ed for technical correctness and to verify that no 
open safety related issues existed. There were no 
findings that revealed unsafe conditions or that 
any safety requirements had been violated or 
compromised. 
A review and assessment of Spartan Halley 
performance was conducted to establish an) 
possible contributions to the STS 5 18 -L accident. 
The Spartan Hdley was unpowered except for 
the releaselengage mechanism latch monitor. Its 
electrical current was in the order a% milllamps 
and the telemetry records obtained Gram the OP- 
biter indicated that the latches were in the prop- 
er configuration and thus Spaflan Halley re- 
mained firmly attached during flight. In addition, 
the TDRS spacecraft data indicated there was no 
interaction from Spartan. Therehre, the Spar- 
tan Halley and its support structure remained in- 
tact. The payload bay temperature in the vicini- 
ty of Spartan was 55 degrees Fahrenheit in- 
dicating no abnormal thermal conditions, 
As a result of detailed analyses a% the STS 5 1 -L 
Orbiter, the payload flight data, payload 
recovered hardware, flight film, available payload 
pre-launch data and applicable hardware process- 
ing documentation, the Commisskn concluaYeB that 
the payload did not cause or contrib~da to the cause qr 
the accident. 
Solid Rocket Booster 
The Solid Rocket Booster comprises seven sub- 
systems: structures, thrust vector cowtroP, range 
safety, separation, electrical and insrmmentation. 
recovery, and the Solid Rocket Motor, 
All recovered Solid Rocket Boaster pieces were 
visually examined, and selected areas were ex- 
tracted for chemical and metal%urgical analysis. 
The exterior surfaces of the Solid Rocket 
Boosters are normally protected from corrosion 
by an epoxy resin compound. There were severaI 
small areas where this protective coa1:ing was 
gouged or missing on the pieces recovered and. 
as a result, the exposed metallic surfaces in the 
areas were corroded. The damage to the protec- 
tive coating was most likely the result of detona- 
tion of the linear shaped charges and water nm- 
pact. There was no obvious evidence of major ex- 
ternal flame impingement or molten metal found 
on any of the pieces recovered. A%% fracture sur- 
faces exhibited either the characteristic markings 
of rapid tensile overload, a complete bending 
failure due to overload, or a separation fracture 
due to the detonation of the linear shaped charges. 
Other pieces of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft 
field jolnr showed extensive burn damage, 
centered at the 307 degree position. 
h4osr of the Solid Rocker Motor case material 
recovered contained pieces of residual unburned 
propellant still attached to the inner lining of the 
case The severed propellant edges 
were sharp, with no unusual burn patterns. Bro- 
pdlanr recs\?ered with a forward segment of the 
booster exhibited the star pattern associated with 
the receding shape of the propellllant at the front 
end of the Solid Rocket Motor. There was no 
evidence h u n d  of propellant grain cracking or 
debonding on the pieces recovered. Casting flow 
lines could be distinguished on the propellant sur- 
faces in sever& areas. This is a normal occurrence 
due to minor differences in the propellant cast 
during the installation of the propellant in the 
motor case structure. 
Hardness tesxs of each piece of the steel casing 
material were taken before the propellant was 
burned from the piece, Allll of the tests showed 
normal hardness values. 
Owe of the pieces of casing showed evidence 
of O-ring seal tracks on the tang of the field joint. 
The tracks were cleaned with hexane to remove 
the grease presemative that had been applied after 
recovery of the piece. and samples of the track 
material were removed for analysis. Chemical 
andysis of the track maferial showed that the 
tracks were not composed of degraded O-ring seal 
material. 
The possible Solid Rocket Booster faults or 
failures assessed were: structurd overload, Solid 
Rocket Motor pressure integrity violation, and 
premature linear shaped charge detonation. 
Reconstructed lift off and flight loads were 
compared with design loads to determine if a 
structural failure may have caused the accident. 
The STS 51-L loads were within the bounds of 
design and capability and were not a factor. 
Photog~aphic and video imagery confirmed that 
both Solid Rocket Boosters remained structural- 
ly intact until the time of the exp%osion except for 
the leak observed on right Solid Rocket Motor. 
The possibility that the range safety system 
prematurely operated, detonating the %inear 
shaped charges was investigated. The Pinear 
Figure 8 
Soi~d Rocl(et Booster drawlng at top IS exploded In lower 
drawings lo show motor segments and other elements at for- 
ward and aft ends of booster 
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Table compares External TanklSolid Rocket Booster strut 
loads for first seven Shuttle flights with those for the mission 
54-L launch and the strut design loads for the vehicle. 
shaped charges were photographically observed tion. This process of elimination brought focus 
to destroy both Solid Rocket Boosters at 110 to the right Solid Rocket Motor. As a result, four 
seconds after launch when commanded to do so areas related to the functioning of that motor 
by the Range Safety Officer and therefore could received detailed analysis to determine their part 
not have discharged at 73 seconds after launch in the accident: 
causing the accident. The possibilities of the Solid 
Rocket Boosters separating prematurely from the 
External Tank, the nozzle exit cone premature- 
Iy separating or early deployment of the recovery 
system were examined. Premature activation of 
the separation system was eliminated as a cause 
of failure based on telemetry that showed no 
separation commands. There were no indications 
that the nozzle exit cone separated. The recovery 
system was observed photographically to activate 
only after the Solid Rocket Boosters had exited 
the explosion. * 
In addition to the possible faults or failures, 
STS 5%-L Solid Rocket Booster hardware 
manufacturing records were examined in detail 
to identify and evaluate any deviations from the 
design, any handling abnormalities or incidents, 
any material usage issues, and/or other indica- 
tion of problems that might have importance in 
the investigation. Bared on these observations, the 
Commission concluded that &he left Solid Rocket Booster, 
and all consponents ofthe right Solid Rocket Booster, ex- 
cept the right Solid Rocket Motor, did not contribute to 
or cause the accident. 
The Right Solid Rocket Motor 
As the investigation progressed, elements 
assessed as being improbable contributors to the 
accident were eliminated from further considera- 
B Structural Loads Evaluation 
Failure of the Case Wdl.(Case Membrane) 
rr Propellant Anomalies 
8 Loss of the Pressure Seal at the Case Joint 
Where appropriate, the investigation considered 
the potential for interaction between the areas. 
Structural Loads EvaPuation 
Structural loads for all STS 5 1-6, launch and 
flight phases were reconstnacted using test- 
verified models to determine if' any loading con- 
dition exceeded design limits. 
Seconds prior to lift off9 the Space Shuttle Main 
Engines start while the Solid Rocker Bossterlil are 
still bolted to the launch pad. The sesulrmt thrust 
loads on the Solid Rocket Boosters prior to lift 
off were derived in two ways: (1) through strain 
gauges on the hold-down posts, and (2) k a m  
photographic coverage of Solid Rocker Booster 
and External Tank tip deflections. These show- 
ed that the hold-down post strain data were within 
design limits. The Solid Rocket Booster tip deflec- 
tion ("twang") was about four inches less than seen 
on a previous flight, STS-6, which carried the 
same general payload weight and disrsibueion as 
STS 5 1 -L. The period of oscillation wFas normal. 
These data indicate that the Space Shuttle Main 
8huRIe Strut identification 
Forward External TanklQrbiller attachment Aft External Tanklorbiter attachment 
Figure I 0  
Drawing of transparent External Tank, w~th rtght Soltd 
Rocket Booster on far s~de, shows locatlon of struts 
measured an table of strut loads (Figure 9) 
Engine thrust buildup, the resulting forces and 
moments, vehicle and pad stiffness, and 
clearances wese as expected.-The resultant total 
bending moment experienced by STS 51-6, was 
29% x 10"inch-pounds, which is within the 
d e s i p  diilswable limit of 347 x 106 inch-pounds. 
The STS 5 1-L lift off loads were compared to 
d e s i p  loads and Wight measured loads for STS-1 
thmush STS-7 (Figure 9). The Shuttle strut iden- 
tification is shown in Figure 10. The loads 
measured on the struts are good indicators of 
stress since d1 loads between Shuttle elements are 
carried through the struts. The STS 51-L lift off 
loads were within the design limit. 
Because the Solid Rocket Motor field joints 
were the major concern, the reconstructed joint 
loads wese compared to design Isads. Most ofthe 
joint laad i s  due to the boosteis internal pressure, 
but external loads and the effects of inertia 
(dynamics) aBsio contribute. The Solid Rocket 
Motor field Joint axial tension loads at lift off were 
within the des ip  load limit (1 7.2 x lo6 pounds). 
The highest load occurred at the forward field 
joint, 15.2 x 1 O6 pounds. The mid-joint load was 
13.9 x lo6 pounds, while the aft joint showed 
13.8 x 106 pounds load. 
Loads were constmsted for dl in-flight events, 
including the roll maneuver and the region sf 
maximum dynamic pressure. A representative 
measure of these loads is the product of dynamic 
pressure (q) and the angle of attack (a). Since the 
Shuttle is designed to climb out at a negative 
angle of attack, the product is a negative number. 
The loads in the q x a pitch plane are shown 
in Figure 11. Although the q x a variations in 
loads due to wind shear were larger than ex- 
pected, they were well within the design limit 
loads. 
The Solid Rocket Motor field joint axial ten- 
sion loads were seabstantial%y lower at maximum 
dynamic: pressure than at lift offi % % -6 x %06 
pounds for the forward field joint and 10.6 x 106 
pounds for the aft field joint. Compared to the 
internal pressure loads, the dynamic variations 
due to wind shear were small - about ' / 1 5  those 
of the pressure loads. These loads were well belux. 
the design limit loads and were not considered the cause 
of the accident. 
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F~gure 11 
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61-8. The present desrgn lrmrts are the two lrnes marked "OV regron of q x a! above) 
Assumd inhibitor Flaw Case Membrane Failure 
The case membrane is the hdf-inch thick steel 
wall of the rocket between the joints. The 
possibility that the failure was initiated by 
anomalies associated with the case membrane was 
evaluated by analysis of design and rest criteria. 
Potential failure modes were constrained by the 
following flight data and photographre obsew:a- 
tions: 
(1) A bum through the membrane would have 
to occur at or near the aft field joint. 
(2) The failure could Rave linle or no influence 
on motor internal pressure since no devia- 
tion in pressure occurred prior to 60 
seconds. 
(3) The failure must cause a burn through the 
membrane in 58 seconds. 
The hypothesis of a membrane failure requires 
that the initial smoke obsen~ed at 8.678 seconds 
Frgure 12 was an independent occurrence, iir Is an uniikel; 
Sketch shows locat~on of assumed inhib~tor flaw used ln hypothesis for initiation of the F~~~~~~~ 
eilmlnat~ng such a problem as a possible cause 
mechanics analysis indicates that a hoZe in. the 
Cutaway view of the Soltd Rocket Booster showlng Sol~d 
Rockel Motor grogjellant and aft f~eld lorn! 
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Control System 
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case larger than one inch would cause the entire 
ease tea mpture in a few milliseconds. This would 
give rise to the appearance of a large ]longitudinal 
flame, an event that is contrary to the flight films. 
Evaluation of potential insulation or inhibitor 
(see F i p r e  1%) flaws against the three criteria 
above resulted in elimination of all candidates ex- 
cepw a defect in the fornard-facing inhibitor. This 
potentid failure mode was evaluated by assum- 
ing a 1-inch-diameter hole in the inhibitor. 
Andysis indicated. that the change in motor in- 
ternal pressure resulting from this failure would 
probably not be detected* However, an erosion 
rate substantidly higher than the observed values 
would be required to burn through the membrane 
by 58 seconds, In addition, the assumed flaw is 
unlikely since the inhibitor is constructed by 
vulcanizing eight individual plies ofthe material. 
Subsequent damage of the magnitude required 
is improbable and would be easily detected. 
A review of the segment inspection and of proof 
tests was conducted. Prior to vehicle assemb%y, 
each segment was pressurized to I12 percent of 
the maximum design operational pressure. A 
magnetic particle inspection of each membrane 
wax then conducted. These procedures are 
designed to screen critical flaws, and are capable 
of detecring cracks greater than 0.1 inches. Prac- 
ture mechanics analysis indicates that a flaw 0.1 
inch long and 0.050 inch deep would grow to only 
0.122 inches long and 0.061 inches deep in* 80 
uses of the segment. This flaw would be less than 
the critical size required to cause case rupture. 
Furthermore, as noted previously, a failure 
resulting in a case rupture is not consistent with 
photographic observations. 
Subsequent to these evduations, sections of the 
right Solid Rocket Motor case containing holes 
burned through in the area of the aft field joint 
were recovered. Assessments d t h e  sections do not sup- 
porl afailure that started in the membrane and progress- 
ed slowly to the joint; or one that started in the mem- 
brane and grew rapidly the length of the Solid Rockat 
motor segment. 
Propellant 
An examination of propellant characteristics 
and flight data was accomplished to determine 
if any anomalous conditions were present in the 
STS 5 1-L right Solid Rocket Motor. Propellant 
cracking and propellant mean bulk temperatures 
were evaluated. 
Historicall%y, the propellant family used in the 
Solid Rocket Motor (TP-PI 1 148) has exhibited 
good mechanical properties and an absence of 
grain structural problems. Should a crack occur, 
ho\vever. the effects would be evident by changes 
in chamber pressure. Shortly after lift off, the STS 
5 1 -L right Solid Rocket Motor chamber pressure 
was 22 pounds per square inch higher than that 
of the left solid. This would correlate to a 
postulated radial crack through the grain span- 
ning a 90-degree, pie-shaped wedge of the solid. 
However. with a crack of this nature, the 
chamber pressure would have remained high for 
approximately 60 seconds. Telemetry shows that 
the right Solid Rocket Motor chamber pressure 
did not remain high past 20-24 seconds and, 
therefore. the existence of a propellant crack was 
ruled out. 
Propellant mean bulk temperature calculations 
kcere made using the ambient temperature over 
the two-week period prior to launch. The lowest 
bulk temperature experienced was 57 degrees 
Fahrenheit on the day of the launch. This was 
17 degrees Fahrenheit above the minimum 
specified. 
Based on this assessment and subscale lot- 
acceptance motor-firing evaluations, it is im- 
probable that propellant anomalies contributed to the STS 
51 -L accident. 
Joint Seal Failure 
Enhanced photographic and computer-graphic 
positioning determined that the flame from the 
right Solid Rocket Booster near the aft field joint 
emanated at about the 305-degree circumferen- 
rid position. The smoke at lift off appeared in 
the same general location. Thus, early in the in- 
vestigation the right Solid Rocket Booster aft field 
joint seal became-the prime failure suspect. This 
supposition was confirmed when the Salvage 
Team recovered portions of both sides of the aft 
joint containing large holes extending from 291 
degrees to 318 degrees. Several possible causes 
could have resulted in this failure. These possi- 
ble causes are treated in the following paragraphs 
of this report. 
During stacking operations at the launch site, 
four segments are assembled to form the Solid 
Rocket Motor. The resulting ~o in t s  are referred 
to as field joints, located as depicted in Figures 
8. and 13. Joint sealing is provided by two rub- 
ber O-rings with diameters of 0.280 inches 
( + 0.005, - 0.003), which are installed, as re- 
ceived from Morton Thiokol, during motor 
assembly. O-ring static compression during and 
after assembly is dictated by the width of the gap 
between the tang and the inside leg of the c l e ~ ~ i s .  
This gap between the tang and clevis at any loca- 
tion after assembly is influenced by the size and 
shape (concentricity) of the segments as well as 
the loads on the segments. Zinc chromate putty 
is applied to the compositiow rubber (NBW) in- 
sulation face prior to assembIy. In &e assembled 
confiwration the putty was intel~ded to act as a 
thermal barrier to prevent direct contact of com- 
bustion gas with the O-rings. It was %%so intended 
that the O-rings be actuated an4 sealed by com- 
bustion gas pressure displacing the putty in the 
space between the motor segments (Figure 14) 
The displacement of the putty would act like: a 
piston and compress the air ahead of the pslimara. 
O-ring, m d  force it into the gap between the tang 
and clevis. This process is known as pressure ac- 
tuation of the O-ring seal. %This presure actuated 
sealing is required to occur very early during the 
Solid Rocket Motor ignition transient, because: 
t h e  gap between the tang and clevis increases as 
F~gure 14 . 
Solid Rocket Motor cross section shows positiorls of tang 
cievls and 0-nngs. Putty llnes the ]emf an the s!de rowaid the 
propellant. 
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pressure loads are applied to the joint during 
~ g n i ~ i o n ,  Should pressure actuation be delayed to 
the extent that die gap has opened considerably, 
[he poshiliry exists that the rocket's combustion 
gases \%,ill Polow by the O-ring and damage or 
destroy the seals. The principal factor influenc- 
trig the size of the gap opening is motor pressure; 
bur, gap opening is also influenced by external 
isads and other joint dynamics. The investiga- 
tion has shown that the joint sealing performance 
is sensitive to the foilowing factors, either in- 
dependently or in combination: 
(a) Damage to the joints/seals or generation 
of contaminants as joints are assembled as 
influenced by: 
(I ) Manufacturing tolerances. 
( 2 )  Out of round due to handling. 
(3) Effects of reuse. 
(b) TangJclevis gap opening due to motor 
pressure and other loads. 
( c )  Static O-ring compression. 
(d) Joint temperature as it affects O-ring 
response under dynamic conditions 
(resiliency) and hardness. 
( e )  Joint temperature as it relates to forming 
ice from water intrusion in the joint. 
(0 Putry performance effects on: 
(1 ) O-ring pressure actuation timing. 
42) O-ring erosion. 
The sewsirisrity of the O-ring sealing perforrn- 
ance to these factors has been investigated in ex- 
tensive tests and analyses. The sensitivity to each 
factor was egrduated independentIy and in ap- 
propmate combinations to assess the potential to 
cause or cornte"ibute to the 51-L aft field joint 
f d u r e .  Most of the testing was done on either 
BAorateaq or subsealie equipment. In many cases, 
she data from these tests are considered to be 
&rectly applicable to the seal performance in full 
scde. However, in some cases there is con- 
siderable uwcenainty in extrapolating the data to 
full-scde seal, performance. Where such is the 
case, it is noted in the fol%owing discussiions. 
Assembh Damage/Q:on~aaa%ito&tion 
It is possible that the assembly operation could 
influence joint sealing performance by damaging 
the 0-Plngs or by generating contamination. The 
shapes of the solid rocket segments which include 
the tang m d  clevis, are not perfect circles because 
of dimensional tolerances, stresses, distortions 
SRB Joint TangiClevis interference 
Premate Measurements of the Tang and Clews 
(Not to Scale) 
Regresents a "Positive" 
a 
I Diff erenee (DT - Dc) I 
Represents A "Negative" 1 h Difference (h - Dc) 6 
Measurements Made on Both Segments 
(Tang & Clevis) at Six Locations 
4- = Outside Diameter of Tang 
Dc = Inside Diameter of 
Clevis Outer beg 
Figure 15 
Sketch shows how d~ameters of tang and crev~s are measureo 
to assure proper fit of two Sol~d Rocket Motor segments. 
from previous use, and the effects of shipping and 
handling. The most important effect is from the 
load of propellant, a plastic and rubbery material, 
which can take a set that relaxes very slowly. For 
example, since the segments are shipped in a 
horizontal position on railroad cars, their weight 
can make them somewhat elliptical - a shape they 
can maintain for some time. At assembly, after 
the lower segment (with the clevis on top) is 
placed vertically, the tang of the next segment is 
lowered into it. To  make the fit easier, the up- 
per segment is purposely reshaped by connecting 
the lifting crane in an appropriate position and, 
on occasion (51-E was one of these), directly 
squeezing the tang section with a special tool, To  
monitor the fit, the diameters of the clevis, D, , 
and the tang, DT (Figure 15) are measured at 
six positions 30 degrees apart, and difference of 
these measurements (DT - D,) are noted. 
When these differences are such that the tang en- 
croaches somewhat into the outer clevis, slanted 
edges (chamfers) permit the pieces to slide 
together. If the difference is too great, flat areas 
of the tang meet flat areas of the clevis. What real- 
ly counts, of course, are differences of radii, which 
diameter measurements done do not determine, 
for one does not know during the assembly how 
far off the centers are. This is a circumstance to 
be avoided, but one that can be detected during 
assembly. Experience has shown that a diameter 
difference of less than + 0.25 inches usually per- 
mits assembly without a flat-on-flat condition aris- 
ing. A negative diameter difference means the 
tang encroaches on the inside of the clevis. The 
possibility was noted that contaminants from 
sliding meta$ and direct O-ring pinching might 
occur if this overlap is large. If it is too great, a 
flat-on-flat condition can arise inside the joint 
where it is very difficult to see. These dimensions 
shift as the pieces slide together and they change 
further as the propellant stresses relax during the 
period between assembly and launch. Therefore, 
a condition such as that which occurred during 
assembly of the aft segment for flight 51-L, 
wherein the maximum interference between tang 
and clevis at the O-rings was at approximately 
300 degrees, may or may not have persisted un- 
til launch - seven weeks after assembly. 
The O-rings are heavily greased to prevent 
damage. This grease adds another element of 
uncertainty to the configuration and action of the 
seal under pressurization, especially at low 
temperatures. 
Testing was conducted during the investiga- 
tion to evaluate the potential for assembly damage 
and contaminant generation, and its effect on seal 
performance. A sub-scale section of a field joint 
was configured in a test fixture and simulated 
assembly operations were conducted. This sec- 
tion was much stiffer than the full-scde booster 
segments and did not fully simulate actual 
assembly conditions. However, under these test 
circumstances, metal slivers were generated dug- 
ing situations wherein the tang flat overlapped 
the flat end of the clevis leg by 0.085 to O .0 10 
inches, The metal slivers in turn were c w ~ e d  into 
the joint and deposited on and around the O- 
rings. A second finding from this test series was 
that the O-ring section increased in lengh as the 
tang entered the clevis and compressed the O- 
ring diameter. The implication of this finding is 
that canted tang entry in a fu9% dhmeser s e p e n r ,  
while udikely, could chase the O-hasg xound the 
circumference, resulting in gathering (bulging 
from the groove) on the opposite side. This could 
make the O-ring more vulnerable to damage. 
There is no known experience sf such bulging 
during previous assemblies. 
T o  understand the effects of potentid con- 
taminants on sealing performance, tests were con- 
ducted employing metal contaminants simulating 
those generated in the segment assembly tests. 
The tests were to determine if joints with metal 
shavings positioned between the 0 - ~ n g  and seal- 
ing surface could pass a static leak check but fad 
under dynamic conditions. The contaminants 
that passed the 50 pounds per square inch leak 
check were between 0.001 and 0.003 inches thick. 
Testing to determine seal perfomance under 
dynamic conditions with these representative con- 
taminations is not complete. However, the 
possibility cannot be dismissed that consamiwa- 
tion generated under some assembly conditions 
could pass a leak check and yet cause the seal to 
leak under dynamic conditions. 
A second concern was stmcturd damage to the 
clevis due to abnormal loading during assembly. 
An analysis was made to determine the deflec- 
tions and stresses experienced during assemblv 
of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft center seg- 
ment to the aft segment. These stresses were then 
used in a fracture mechanics a~ndysis f the 0- 
ring groove to detemine the maximum f aw size 
that would not fail under the 51-L case segment 
life cycle history. Included in this analysis was 
the single point load needed to deflect a suspended 
s e p e n t  to the side by 0.200 inches, and the max- 
imum stress on the case clevis that this causes. 
The andysis further addressed a condition that 
has been encountered, where the tang sits on top 
of  the inner clevis leg on one side and slips down 
into the clevis groove. on the opposite side. 
The result of this analysis is that the stresses 
induced d u ~ n g  the operation were low and would 
not have resulted in hardware damage. Bllso, the 
stresses would Rave resulted in sipificant growth 
sf an undetected flaw, which then would be de- 
tectable by inspection on its next use. 
Gafi Opening 
The gap to be sealed between the tang and the 
inside leg of the clevis opens as the combustion 
gas pressure rises. This gap opening was 
calculated as a function of pressure and time by 
an andysis that was calibrated PO joint deflections 
measured on. a stmcturd test article. The analysis 
extended the risults beyond test caiibration con- 
ditions to include propellant effects and external 
ioads. The initial static gap dimensions combined 
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Figure 16 
Drawings show how tang/cIevls joint deflects during 
gressuraatton lo open gap at locatton of O-ring slots. lns~de of 
mQ%sf case and propellant are to left In sketches. 
with the time history of the gap opening deter- 
mined the minimum and maximum gap condi- 
tions used for testing the capability of the O-rings 
to seal. 
The joint deflection analysis established time 
histories for gap openings for primary and sec- 
ondary O-rings for a91 field,oints. For the aft field 
joints these data indicate gap opening increases 
of approximately 0.029 inches and 0.0% 7 inches 
for the primary and secondary O-rings respec- 
tively. These values were used for sub-scale 
dynamic tests. Due to differences in motor 
pressure and loads, the gap opening increases for 
forward field joints are approximately 0.008 
inches greater than for the aft field joints. Gap 
opening changes (called delta gap openings) ver- 
sus time are shown in Figure 17 for the aft field 
joints. The toed gap at any time also depends on 
the initial, static gap, on rounding effects during 
segment pressurization, and on loadings due to 
struts and airloads. Sub-scale tests were run con- 
taining combinations of the above variabBes9 but 
did not include the effects of the struts and 
airloads. 
Right Hand SRM Aft Field .&in% Primaw And 
dary bOPa Gap Opning 
Figure 17 Time, MS 
Graoh plots changes rn r~ght booster's aft f~eld joint primary 
and secondary gap openings. Hor~zontal scale is time In 
milliseconds from ~gn~tion. 
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F~gure 18 
Drawlngs show how progresswe reduct~on of gap between 
tang and clevls can snhlb~t and eventually block motor cavtly's 
Rtgh-pressure flow from gettlng behlnd 0-r~ng 
0-Ring Compression at Launch (Static) 
As noted previously, diameters measured just 
prior to assembly do not permit determination 
of conditions at launch because, among other 
things. the propellant s l o ~ ~ l y  relaxes. For STS 
51-L, the difference in the true diameters of the 
surfaces of tang and clevis measured at the fac- 
tory was 0.008 inches, Thus, the average gap at 
the O-rings between the tang and clevis was 0.004 
inches. The minimum gap could be somewhat 
less, and possibly metal-to-metal contact (zero 
gap) coulld exist at some locations. 
During the investigation, measurements were 
made on segments that had been refurbished and 
reused. The data indicate that segment cir- 
cumferences at the sealing surfaces change with 
repeated use. This expectation was not unique 
KO this joint. 
Recent analysis has shown and tests tend to 
confirm that O-ring sealing performance is 
significantly improved when actuating pressure 
can get behind the entire face of the O-ring on 
the upstream side of the groove within which the 
O-ring sits (Figure 18). If the groove is too nar- 
row or if the initial squeeze is so great as to com- 
press the O-ring to the extent that it fills the en- 
tire groove and contacts all groove surfaces, 
pressure actuation of the sea% could be inhibited. 
'This latter condition is relieved as the joint gap 
opens and the O-ring attempts to return to its un- 
compressed shape, However, if the temperature 
is low, resiliency is severely reduced and the O- 
ring is very slow in returning towards its original 
shape. Thus, it may remain compressed in the 
groove, contact all three surfaces of that groo~~e,  
and inhibit pressure actuation of the seal. In ad- 
dition, as the gap opens between the Go-ring and 
tang surface dowing pressure bypass, 0 - ~ n g  ac- 
tuation is further inhibited. 
Two sub-scale dynamic test fixtures were 
designed and built that simulated the initid static 
gap, gap opening rate, maximum gap opening 
and ignition transient pressures. These fixtures 
were tested over a temperature range with, vary- 
ing initial static gap openings. A simmany of 
results with initial gap openings of 0.028 and 
0.004 inches is provided in Figure 19. The results 
indicate that with a 0.020-inch mwimum initial 
gap, sealing can be achieved in most instances 
at temperatures as low as 25 degrees Fahrenheit, 
while with the 0.004-inch initial gap9 seding is 
not achieved at 25 degrees Fdrenheit and is 
marginal even in the 40 and 50 degd-ee Fahrenheit 
temperature range. For the 0.004-inch initial gap 
condition, sealing without any gas $%ow-by, did 
not occur consistently until the temperature was 
raised to 55 degrees Fahrenheit. To  evaluate the 
sensitivity to initial gap opening, four tests were 
conducted at 25 degrees Fahrenheit with an in- 
itial gap of 0.010 inch. In contrast to the tests at 
a 0.004 inch gap, these tests resuited in seding 
with some minimal O-ring blow-by cpbsewped dur- 
ing the sealing process. 
These tests indicate the sensitivity of the O-ring 
seals to temperature and O-ring squeeze in a join;e 
with the gap opening characteristics of the Solid 
Rocket Motors. 
It should be noted that the test fixture placed 
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Table plots results of tests of ,004 and ,020 ~nch ~ n ~ t ~ a l  gap 
opePatrags over the range of temperatures In left hand vert~cal 
column. 
the O-rings at a specific initial gap and squeeze 
condition uniformly around the circumference. 
It is not certain what the effect of differences in 
circumfereentid gaps might be in full size joints. 
Such effects could not be simulated in the sub- 
scale test results reported above. 
Joint Tempeaattsae 
Andyses were conducted to establish STS 5 1 -L 
joint temperatures at launch. Some differences 
existed m o w g  the six 51-L field joints. The joints 
on the right Solid Rocket Motor had larger cir- 
eumfereneia1 gradients than those on the left 
motor at launch, It is possible that the aft field 
joint sf the right Solid Rocket Booster was at the 
lowest temperature at launch, although all joints 
had cdculated local temperatures as low as 28 f 5 
degrees Fahrenheit. Estimated transient 
temperature fair several circumferential locations 
on the joints are shown for the right Solid Rocket 
Motor aft field joint and the left motor aft field 
joint in Figures 20 and 21. These data are 
representative of other joints on the respective 
Solid Rocket Motors. 
The investigation has shown that the low 
launch temperatures had two effects that could 
potentially affect the seal perfbmance: ( I )  O-ring 
resiliency degradation, the effects of which are 
explained above; and (2) the potential for ice in 
the joints. O-ring hardness is also a function sf 
temperature m d  may have been another factor 
in joint performance. 
Consistent results froan numerous O-ring tests 
have shown a resiliency degradation with reduced 
temperatures. F i w ~  23 provides O-ring recovery 
from 0.840 inches of initid compression versus 
time. This shows how quickly an O-ring will 
move back towards its uncompressed shape at 
temperatures ranging from 10 to 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit. When these data are compared with 
the gap openings versus time from Figure 1 7 ,  it 
can be seen that the O-rings will not track or 
Aft Right Segment Perrrpentlures for ST% 514 
Figure 20 
Temperature model for 51-L right solid booster aft segment 
circumferential positions from 16.5 hours pr~or to launch to 3.5 
hsurs after launch. 
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Figure 21 
Temperature model for 51-L left solid booster aft segment cir- 
cumferenrial positions from 16.5 hours prior to launch until 3.5 
hsurs after launch. 
Fielid Joint Distress 
lv2gh"f Joinl :- 
STS-2 AFT 
41-B FWD 
41 -e AFT 
41-13 FlVB 
51-C F%%'B 
51-C (3) hiID 
6%-A MID 
6 1 -A AFT 
6i-C AFT 
5 1-L AFT 
S R B  
(right 
or A n g u h r  
- kf?, location 
RH 090 
LH 35 1 
EH S!A 
RH 2751% 10 
%H 163 
RH 394 
LH 36-66 
LH 3381018 
LH 154 
RH 307 
Prerious 
Joint G s f  o f  Q P ~  o f  
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ExamrnaXren sf the records shows that ti one defines any sort 
sf damage around the 0-rlng as 'distress" then there have 
been 40 "d~stressed" field jo~nts. ~ncludlng the aft held joint on 
the r1gh1-Rand booster of 59-L These data. whlch are 
ncabulated above show 10 tnstances of d~stress ~ f l  a total of 150 
fi~ghr exposures One-half of the instances occurred In the aft 
jomn one-thlrd in Yhe forward joint. and one-fifth in the m~d- 
joint Sixty percent of the dlsrress occurred In the left Solid 
Rocker Wlotar 
recover to the gap opening by 600 milliseconds 
(gap full open) at low to moderate temperatures. 
These data show the importance of timely O-ring 
pressure actuation to achieve proper sealing. 
1% is possible that water got into some, if not 
d1 STS 51-L field joints. Subsequent to the 
GhAenger accident, it was %earned that water had 
been sbsewed in the STS-9 joints during restack- 
k g  opemeions following exposure to less rain than 
that experienced by STS 5%-E. It was reported 
that water had drained from the STS-9 joint when 
the pins were removed and that approximately 
0,5 inch of water was present in the clevis well. 
While on the pad for 38 days, STS 51-L was ex- 
posed to approximateliy seven inches of rain. 
Andyses m d  tests conducted show that water wiU 
freeze under the environments% conditions ex- 
perienced p ~ o r  to the 51-%, launch a d  could 
unseat the secondaq O-ring. T o  determine the 
effects of unseating, tests were conducted on the 
sub-scde dynamic test fixture at Thiokol to fur- 
ther evaluate seal performance. For these tests, 
water was frozen downstream of the secondary 
O-ring, With ice present, there were conditions 
under which the O-ring failed to seal. 
Party Pe fomance 
The significance of the possibil&y that putty 
could keep the motor pressure from promptly 
reaching the O-rings to pressure actuate and sea% 
them was apparently not fully appreciated prior 
to the Challenger accident. During the investiga- 
tion, it became evident that severd variables may 
affect the putty performance and, in turn, seal 
performance. However, limited test data and lack 
of fidelity in full scale joint simulation prevented 
a complete engineering assessment of putty per- 
formance. Tests were conducted over a range of 
putty conditions, including temperature at igni- 
tion, pretest conditioning to simulate the en- 
vironmental effects, and dimensional variations 
within the joint. These test results demonstrated 
that putty performance as a pressure sed is highly 
variable. The results may be intevreted to in- 
dicate that the putty can maintain pressure dur- 
ing the ignition transient and prevent O-ring sed- 
ing. For example, one test conducted with PUP- 
ty, which had been conditioned for 10 hours at 
80 percent relative humidity and 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit, delayed the pressure rise at the 
primary O-ring for 530 milliseconds at a 
- 
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F~gure 23 Note: Average 0-Ring Recovery at Varlaus Tesulempera 
Graph plots O-ring shape recovery rn lnches agarnst time ~n tures Durrng F~rst Second After Load Release Inifla1 
seconds tor a varlety of temperatures. Compress~on of 40 MIIS Was Wla~ntalned far 2 Hours 
tempemture of 75 degrees. Tests at 20 degrees i.e., a 0.004-inch gap, at 50 degrees Fahrenheit 
Fhrenheit with similarly conditioned putty with a pressure delay of 500 mi%lisecoards. For the 
delayed the pressurization time by 1-9 seconds. temperature and O-ring squeeze conditions that 
Such delays would allow hl l  joint gap opening existed for several of the STS 51-L field josnts, 
before a seal could pressure actuate. O-ring sealiig was not achieved in these tests with 
To evaluate this effect, a sub-scale test fixture simulated putty rupture times delayed to 250 to 
was fabricated that effectively simulated gap 500 milliseconds. 
opening at the rime of putty rupture and pressure 
application. The. tests simulate the O-ring 
pressure actuation delay due to the putty tem- 
pora~ ly  holding the motor pressure, They were 
conducted over a range of temperatures, putty 
rupture time and initial O-ring squeeze. Test 
results (Appendix L, Fig. 6.5.1) demonstrated 
that sealing performance is dependent on 
temperature and initial squeeze, both of which 
affect the pressure actuation capability of the 0- 
rings. The tests indicate that sealing capability 
is marginal for maximum squeeze conditions, 
Note that the sub-scale tests do not faithfully 
reproduce what happens in the red joint. These 
data do indicate, however, that the potential ex- 
ists for O-rings not to seal as a result of variables 
related to the putty. 
The seal is checked by pressurizing the ~ ~ a l u m e  
between the primary and secondaq O-rings. This 
action seats the secondary seal and drives the 
primary seal upstream into its groot9e. Because 
of concern that the putty could mask a leaking 
primary seal, the pressure was first increased from 
50 psi to 100 psi and then to 200 psi. The conse- 
quence of increasing the pressure is shown below. 
Stabilization Number Of Percentage of 
Pressure, psi Flights Fllighrs With 
O-ring 
Anosalies 
Clearly the increased pressure used in the leak 
check increased the likelihood of a gas path 
eilrasugh the putty to the primary seal. That is, 
with increased pressure, blow holes in the putty 
are more likely with a resulting greater potential 
for C I O S B B B ~  damage to the O-ring. On the positive 
side the blow holes tend to prevent the delay in 
pressurization discussed- in the previous 
paragraphs. This further ill%ustrates the influence 
of putty variables on the performance of the Solid 
Rocket Motor seals. 
T& Bpamic ~hmctef iS t ics  of
the Field Joint Seal 
'The discussion of static factors which affect 
joint pedomance is based on the assumption that 
motor semenes remain perfectly round, and that 
stacked segments are &ways a perfectly straight 
column. At launch the boosters are subjected to 
forces which bend and twist them. 'These forces 
cause physied changes in the shape of the 
boosters, actudly squashing them out-of-round 
and beading them dong their entire length. The 
dynmic  efkcas of this out-of-roundness are most 
sipificans just after booster ignition when the 
hold-down bolts have been released because in 
the previous 6.6 seconds the boosters have actud- 
ly bken tie:lt forward by the thrust from the main 
engines. The elastic energy stored in the entire 
system is h e n  released, induchg a bending vibra- 
tion in the boosters. This $era&& causes ihe case 
so change its shape from circular to e%liptisd, the 
mmimum out-if-roundness occurdng on the 
045-385 degree line on the outside of the sight 
booster. T ~ : S  deflection is a consequence of a 
vibration and occurs at a frequency of about 3 
cycles per second. The sameoccurs in the left 
b$poste;, only the deflection axis is oriented dif- 
ferently, being a mirror image of that which takes 
place in the right side. The dynamic effects cause 
an increase in the joint rotation, and, hence. in- 
crease the gap between the tang and clevis by 
about 10 percent. Another dynamic Ioad results 
from the geometry of the struts which attach the 
booster to the external tank. Strut P12 is at- 
tached to the booster at about the 314 degree 
point and imposes additional inertial forces on 
the booster which tend to additionally increase 
the gap by 10 to 2 1 percent. 
Analysis of the Wreckage 
The investigation of the sequence of events that 
led to the find breakup of the Challenger rests 
upon three primary sources of data: launch 
photographs, telemetry and tracking data, and 
the recovered pieces of the Shuttle wreckage. The 
third source of data is presented here, which is 
largely descriptive. It provides support for %he 
concPusions reached though use of the data from 
the other two sources. A more detailed analysis 
that provides technical details to be used for 
subsequent redesign or accident analysis is 
available in the appendix. 
Figure 24 shows an overview of the search areas 
with the general location of parts of both the %eft 
and the right Solid Rocket Boosters indicated. 
The area is at the edge of the ~ u l f  Stream in 
water depth that ranged from 100 to 1,200 feet. 
Pertinent pieces were examined by use of a 
remotely contmlled submapine eonthing a flood 
light and a television camera. The television pic- 
ture was available on ship board and was 
transmitted to Kennedy and to Marshall. The ar- 
rangement dowed a number of people who were 
familiar with the Solid Rocket Booster to com- 
ment upon the merit of recovering a particular 
piece, 
The aft left side of the Orbiter contained its 
original paint markings and showed no apparent 
sign of heat damage (photo A. aall photo 
references are to color section, pp. 74-81'). 'Ther- 
mal distress, however, was apparent on the ~ g h t  
mdder speed brake panel and elevon (photo B). 
The paint was scorched and blackened on the 
right side panels of the aft part of the fuselage and 
vertical fm. The remaining recovered pans of the 
Qrbiter did not seem to be affected by a hydrogen 
fire. The bottom side of the right wing showed 
some indentation on the tiles that make up the 
Thermal Protection System. This indentation was 
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Map shows ocean areas searched for Shuttle wreckage in 
relation to Cape Canaveral and Launch Pad 398. Wavy ver- 
tical llnes ~nd~cate water de~ths 
consistent with impact with the right booster as 
it rotated hllowing loss of restraint of one or more 
of its lower struts. 
The frustum of the nose cone of the right Solid 
Rocket Booster was damaged (photo E) as if it 
had struck the External Tank, but there were no 
signs of thermal distress. The frustum of the nose 
cone of the left Solid Rocket Booster (photo F) 
was essentially undamaged. 
A substantial part of the External Tank was 
recovered. Analysis of this recovered structure 
showed some interesting features. Interpretation 
of the photographs suggests that the flame from 
the right hand Sollid Rocket Booster encircled the 
External Tank. A short time later the dome at 
the base of the External Tank was thought to 
break free. Since the internal pressure ofthe liq- 
uid hydrogen tank is at approximately 33 pounds 
per square inch, a sudden venting at the aft sec- 
tion will produce a large initial thrust that tails 
off as the pressure drops. The intertank region 
of the wreckage contained buckling in the fore 
and aft direction consistent with this impulsive 
thrust. Similarly, the right side of the intertank 
showed signs of crushing. This crushing i s  con- 
sistent with the rotational impact of the Gusturn 
of the right Sollid Rocket Booster with the Exner- 
nal Tank folllowing complete loss of restraint at 
the aft lower strut attachment area. 
The telemetered signals from the rase ~ r o s  in 
the right Solid Rocket Booster clearly shorn? a 
change in angular velocity of the booster with 
respect to the Orbiter. It is believed that this 
velocity change was initiated by a faillure at or 
near the PI2 strut connecting the booster to the 
External Tank. Photographs of the flight could 
not define the failure point and none of the con- 
necting struts to the right Solid Rocket Booster 
or the corresponding area on the External Tank 
in this region were recovered. Therefore the ex- 
act location of initial separation could not be 
determined by the evidence. At the time of 
relative booster movement, the hole in the shell 
of the right Solid Rocket Booster was calcu%a.red 
to be six to eight inches in diameter located 6 2 
to 15 inches forward and adjacent to the PI2 
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Figlare 25 
Dravtlang deprctr; pleces sf r~ght Sol~d Rocket Booster aft seg- 
men? recovered At top IS plece of aft center segment. 
s t ru t ,  This location was within the center of the 
burned out zone on the right Solid Rocket Booster 
(photo 6)" As a matter of interest, the PI 2 strut 
is located close to the point on the circumference 
where the booster case experiences maximum 
radid defiection due to flight loads. It seems likely 
that the plume from the hole in the booster would 
imp"" near the location sf the PI2 strut connec- 
eisn md the Exaemd Tmk. Using geometric con- 
siderations alone suggests this strut separated 
from the External Tank before it separated from 
the right hand Solid Rocket Booster. 
F i p r e  25 shows a sketch of an interior unroll- 
ed view of  the aft part of the right hand Solid 
Rocket Booster with the recovered burned pieces 
131 and 7 12 noted. The critical region is between 
parts 131, the upper segment tang region, and 
part 7 12, the lower clevis region of the joint. This 
burned area extends roughly from station 1476, 
in the upper section, to 15 1% on the Power region. 
In a circumferential direction (see figure 26) the 
lower end of the eroded region extends from 
roughly 291 degrees to 320 degrees and the up- 
per eroded section extends between 296 and 3 18 
degrees. Note &at the region at about 3 14 degrees 
includes the attachment region of the strut to the 
attachment ring on the right Solid Rocket 
Booster. 
Some observations were made from a detailed 
examination of the aft center section of the joint, 
contact 131. This piece (photo I) shows a large 
hole that is approximately centered on the 
Angular Coordinate System 
For Solid Rocket Bsosters/Motors 
F~gure 26 
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(1) View Is Forward (Direction of Flight) 
or "Up" When Vehicle Is On Launch Pad 
(2) Angles Increase Counterclockwise 
307-degree circumferential position, Although ir- 
regular, the hole is roughly rectangular in shape, 
extending approximately 27 inches circumferen- 
t i d y  along the tang (296 to 318 degrees) with 
total burnout extension approximately 1 5 inches 
forward of the tang. At either side in the interior 
ofthe hole (photo K) the insulation and steel case 
material showed evidence of hot gas erosion that 
beveled these surfaces (indicative of combustion 
products flowing through the hole from the in- 
terior of the Solid Rocket Motor). The top sur- 
face of the hole was hardly bevelled at all. The 
tang O-ring sealing surface next to either side of 
the hole showed distinct erosion grooves starting 
from the O-ring locations (photo J). These ero- 
sion grooves indicate the O-rings were seding the 
joint away from the central area during the Bater 
stages of the trajectory. No other evidence of ther- 
mal distress, melting or burning was noted in the 
tang section of the joint. 
The part of the aft section of the Inghc Solid 
Rocket Booster in the circumferential position of 
the hole was recovered (photos L and N). This 
piece, contact 7 12, showed evidence of a burned 
hole edge extending from 291 degrees to 318 
degrees, approximately 33 inches long (see 
bracket, photo L). The burned surface extended 
into the aft attach stub region of the case adja- 
cent to the P12  strut attach point. The box struc- 
ture of the aft attachment ring was missing Dsm 
the attach stubs. The piece displayed fractures 
which led circumferential%y or aft from the haale 
and the burned surface, Booster pieces ow either 
side have not been recovered. Thus in the burn 
area no portion of the clevis or attachment ring 
other than the stubs was available for 
examination. 
The exterior surface of the aft case piece also 
contained a large heat affected area (phofto M3. 
The shape and location of this area indicates a 
plume impingement from the escaping gases. The 
light colored material at the downstream edge of 
the area is probably asbestos from the insulator 
The rust colored line more or less pardleli to the 
stubs may be a stagnation line produced in the 
gas flow when the gases passed around the artach- 
ment ring. Secondary flow of metail from the aft 
attach stub ring also shows this feature. There 
was a small burn hole in the case w d &  (arro$a, 
photo 0 )  which appeared to have penetrated the 
case from the exterior toward the interior. This  
may also have been due to a swirling flow of hot 
gases within the attachment ring box structure. 
The shadow of the insulation downstream of the 
attach box can also be seen. This evidence sug- 
gests strongly that a hot gas plume impinged 
against the attachment ring, passed around and 
through it, and ultimately destroyed its stmetural 
integrity, probably late in the flight of the Solid 
Rocket Booster. 
The photographs L, M ,  N, and 0 view the 
lower case piece in the inverted position. b$. tor- 
rect orientation of this piece is shown in a corn- 
posite view of the burn area located in photo P, 
Findings 
-- 
A combustion gas leak through the right 
Solid Rocket Motor aft field joint initiated 
at or shonPy after ignition eventually weaken- 
ed and/or penetrated the External Tank ini- 
tiating vehicle structural breakup and loss of 
the Space Shuttle Challenger during STS 
Mission 5%-La 
The evidence shows that no other STS5P -L 
Shuttle element or the payload contributed 
to the causes ofthe right Solid Rocket Motor 
aft field joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage 
was not a factor. 
3. E~~iidence examined in the review of Space 
Shuttle material, manufacturing, assembjy, 
quality control, and processing of non- 
conformance reports found no flight hard- 
ware shipped to the launch site that fell out- 
side the limits of Shuta%e design specifications. 
4, Launch site activities, including assembly 
and preparation, from receipt of the flight 
hardware to Baumch were generdlllly in accord 
with established procedures and were not 
considered a factor in the accident. 
5, Launch site records show that the right Solid 
Rocket Wiotor segments were assembled us- 
ing approved procedures. However, signifi- 
' cant out-of-round conditions existed between 
the two segments joined at the right Solid 
Rocket Motor aft field joint (the joint that 
failed). 
a, While the assemb%y conditions had the 
potential of generating debris or dam- 
age that could cause O-ring sea% hilure, 
these were not considered factors in this 
accident. 
b. The diameters of the two Solid Rocket 
Motor segments had grown as a result 
sf prior use. 
c. The growth resulted in a condition at 
time of launch wherein the maximum 
gap between the tang and clevis in the 
regon of the joint's O-rings was no 
mcs%.c4 cham .008 inches and the average 
gap would have been .004 inches* 
d. With a wng-to-clevis gap of .004 
inches, the O-ring in the joint would 
be compressed to the extent that it 
pmssed against all three walls of the 0- 
ring retaining channel. 
e.  The lack of roundness of the segments 
was such that the smallest tang-to-clevis 
clearance occurred at the initiation of 
the assembly operation at positions of 
120 degrees and 300 degrees around the 
circumference of the aft field joint. It 
is uncertain if this tight condition and 
the resultant greater compression of the 
O-rings at these'points persisted to the 
time of launch. 
6 .  The ambient temperature at time of launch 
was 36 degrees FArenheit, or 15 degrees 
lower than the next coldest previous launch. 
a. The temperature at the 300 degree 
position on the right aft field joint cir- 
cumference was estimated to be 28 
degrees 5 degrees Fahrenheit. This 
was the coldest point on the joint. 
b. Temperature on the opposite side of the 
right Solid Rocket Booster facing the 
sun was esxirraated to be about 50 
degrees Fah~nhei t  . 
7 .  Other joints on the leda and right Solid 
Rocket Boosters experienced similar corn- 
bimations of tmg-to-clevis gap clearance and 
temperature. It is not known whether these 
joints experienced distress during the flight 
of 51-L. 
8. Experimental evidence indicates that due to 
several effects associated with the Solid 
Rocket Booster's ignition and combustion 
pressures and associated vehicle motions, the 
gap between the tang and the clevis will open 
as much as .067 and -029 inches at the sec- 
ondary and primary O-rings, respecti%?ely. 
a. This opening begins upon ignition, 
reaches its masrimurn rate of opening 
at about 200-300 milliseconds, and is 
essentially complete at 600 maiseconds 
when the SoPid Rocket Booster reaches 
its operating pressure. 
b. The External Tank and right Solid 
Rocket Booster are connected by 
several struts, including one at 310 
degrees near the aft field joint that fail- 
ed. This strut's effect on the joint 
dynamics is to enhance the opening of 
the gap between the tang and clevis by 
about 10-20 percent in the region of 
300-320 degrees. 
9. O-ring resiliency is directly related to its 
temperature. 
a. A warm O-ring that has been corn- 
pressed will return to its original shape 
much quicker than will a cold O-ring 
when compression is relieved. Thus, a 
warm O-ring will follow the opening of 
the tang-to-clevis gap. A cold O-ring 
may not. . 
b. A compressed O-ring at 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit is five times more respon- 
sive in returning to its uncompressed 
shape than a cold O-ring at 30 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 12. 
c. As a result it is probable that the O- 
rings in the right solid booster aft field 
joint were not following the opening of 
the gap between the tang and clevis at 
time of ignition. 
10. Experiments indicate that the primary 
mechanism that actuates O-ring sealing is the 
application of gas pressure to the upstream 
(high-pressure) side of the O-ring as it sits 
in its groove or channel. 
a .  For this pressure actuation to work 
most effectively, a space between the 
O-ring and its upstream channel wall 
should exist during pressurization. 
b. A tang-to-clevis gap of -004 inches, as 
probably existed in the failed joint, 
would have initially compressed the 0- 
ring to the degree that no clearance ex- 
isted between the O-ring and its 
upstream channel wall and the other 
two surfaces of the channel. 13. 
c. At the cold launch temperature ex- 
perienced, the O-ring would be very 
slow in returning to its normal round- 
ed shape. It would not follow the open- 
ing of the tang-to-clevis gap. It would 
remain in its compressed position in the 
O-ring channel and not provide a space 
between itself and the upstream chan- 
nel wall. Thus, it is probable the O-ring 14. 
would not be pressure actuated to seal 
the gap in time to preclude joint failure 
due to blow-by and erosion from hot 
combustion gases. 
11. The sealing characteristics of the Solid 
Rocket Booster O-rings are enhanced by 
timely application of motor pressure. 
a. Ideally, motor pressure should be ap- 
plied to actuate the O-ring and seal the 
joint prior to significant opening of the 
tang-to-clevis gap (100 to 200 milli- 
seconds after motor ignition). 
b. Experimental evidence indicates that 
temperature, humidity and other 
variables in the putty compound used 
to seal the joint can delay pressure ap- 
plication to the joint by 500 milli- 
seconds or more. 
c. This delay in pressure could be a fat- 
tor in initial joint failure. 
Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures 
of 61 degrees Fahrenheit or gheiarer, only four 
showed signs of O-ring thermal distress: I. e . , 
erosion or blow-by and soot. Each 06 the 
launches below 61 degrees FahrenRent 
resulted in one or more O-rings showing 
signs of thermal. distress. 
a. Of these improper joint seding actions, 
one-half occurred in the aft fielid joints, 
20 percent in the center fie%$ joints, and 
30 percent in the upper field joints, The 
division between left and right Solid 
Rockter Boosters was roughly equal. 
b. Each instance of thermal O-ring 
distress was accompanied by a leak 
path in the insulating putty. The leak 
path connects the rocket's combustion 
chamber with the O-ring regmon of the 
tang and clevis. Joints xhar actuated 
without incident may also have had 
these leak paths. 
There is a possibility that there was water in 
the clevis of the STS 5 1 -L Joints since water 
was found in the STS-9 joints during a 
destack operation after exposure aa less rain- 
fall &an STS 51-L. At time of launch, it was 
cold enough that water present in the joint 
would freeze, Tests show that ice in the joint 
can inhibit proper secondary seal 
performance. 
A series of puffs of smoke were obserk~ed 
emanating from the 51-L aft field joint area 
of the right Solid Rocket Booster between 
0.678 and 2.500 seconds after ignition of the 
Shuttle Solid Rocket Motors. 
a. The puffs appeared at a frequency of 
about three puffs per second. This 
roughly matches the natural structural 
frequency of the solids at lift off and 
reflected in slight cyclic changes of she 
tang-to-clevis gap opening. 
b. The puffs were seen to be moving up- 
ward along the surface of the booster 
above the aft field joint. 
c .  The smoke was estimated to originate 
ar a circumferential position of between 
270 degrees and 315 degrees on the 
booster aft. field joint, emerging from 
the top of the joint. 
95 This smoke from the aft field joint at Shut- 
tle lift off was the first sign of the failure of 
the Solid Rocket Booster O-ring seals on STS 
51-L. 
16. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame 
an approximately 58 seconds into the flight. 
It is possible that the leak was continuous but 
unobservable or non-existent in ponions of 
the internewing period. It is possible in either 
case that thrust vectoring and normal vehi- 
cle response to wind shear as well as planned 
maneuvers reinitiated or magnified the 
leakage from a degraded seal in the period 
preceding the observed flames. The esti- 
mated position of the flame. centered at a 
point 307 degrees around the circumierence 
of the aft field joint, was confirmed by the 
recovery. of two fragments of the right Solid 
Racket Booster. 
a. A small leak could have been present 
that may have grown to breach the 
joint in flame at a time on the order of 
58 to 60 seconds after lift off. 
b. Alternatively, the O-ring gap could 
have been resealed by deposition of a 
fragile buildup of aluminum oxide and 
other combustion debris. This resealed 
section sf the joint could Rave been 
disturbed by thrust vectoring, Space 
Shuttle motion and flight loads indue- 
ed by changing winds alloft. 
c. The winds alofi caused control actions 
in she time interval of 32 seconds to 62 
seconds into the flight that were typical 
of the largest values experienced on 
previous missions. 
Conclusion 
In  view of the findings, the Commission concluded 
that the cause of the Challenger accident was the failure 
ofthe pressure sea% in the a j f ie ld jo in t  of the light Solid 
Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a faulty 
design unacceptably sensitive to a number of fac- 
tors. These factors were the effects of tempera- 
ture, physical dimensions, the character of 
materials, the effects of reusabiliity, processing, 
and the reaction of the joint to dynamic 
loading. e 
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he decision to launch the Challenger and management judgments, and a NASA man- 
was flawed. Those who made that agement structure that permitted int~rmd Wight 
decision were unaware of the recent safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. 
R B S P O ~  of problems concerning the The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a care- 
d the joint and were unaware of the fully flanned, step-by-step activity, established 
snitid written recommendation of the contractor by NASA program directive SPB-PD 9 %0.5A," 
advishg against h e  launch at temperatures below designed to certzy the readiness of d components 
53 degees FaVsreheit and the continuing opposi- of the Space Shuttle assembly. The process is 
tion of the engweers at Thiokol after the manage- focused upon the Level 1 Flight Readiness 
mene reversed i t s  position. They did not have a Review, held approximately two weeks before a 
clear udersrawding of Rockwen's concern that launch. The Ewe% I review is a conference 
it was nor safe to launch because of ice on the , chaired by the NASA Associate Administrator for 
pad. If the decisionmakers had known all of the Space Right and supported by the NASA Chief 
facts, it h highly unlikely that they would have Engineer, the Program Manager, the center 
decided to launch 51+L on January 28, 1986. directors and pro~ect managers from Johnson, 
Marshall and Kennedy, dong with senior con- 
tractor representatives. 
Flaws In The Decision The f o m d  portion of the process is initiated 
ocess by directive from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the schedule 
In addinion to anallyzing d l  available evidence for the Level I: Flight Readiness Review and for 
concerning the materid causes of the accident on the steps that precede it, The process begins at 
Jmuaq 28, the: Csmmission examined the chain Level IV with the contractors formal%y cer- 
of decisions h a t  culminated in approval of the tifying-in writing-the flight readiness of she 
launch, It concluded that the decision making elements for which they are responsible. Certifica- 
process was flawed in several ways. The actual tion is inade to the appropriate Eevel 111 NASA 
events &at produced the infomation upon which project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Ad- 
the approvd of launch was based are recounted ditiondly, at Marsha  the review is dbllowed by 
md apprksed in the sections of this chapter, The a presentation directly to the Center Direaor. At 
diacussioa that fallows relies heavily on exeeqts Kennedy the Level 111 review, chaired by the 
from the nestimswy of those involved in the Center Director, verifies readiness of the launch 
management judgments that led to the launch of support elements. 
the Chdlenger under conditions described. The next step in the process is the Certifica- 
That testimony reveals fdures in communica- tion of Flight Readiness to the Eevel I1 Program 
tion that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space 
based on iwcamplete and sometimes misleading Shuttle program element endorses that it has 
infomation, a conflict between engineering data satisfactorily completed the manufacture, 
82 
assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent ele- 
ment, including the contractors9 certification that 
design and performance are up to standard. The 
Flight Readiness Review process culminates in 
the Level I review. 
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I 
directive establlishei a Mission Management 
'Team for the panicular mission. The team 
assumes responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness 
for a period commencing 48 hours before launch 
and continuing through post-landing crew egress 
and the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout 
the entire period, the Mission Management 
Team supports the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight and the Program Manager. 
A structured Mission Management Team 
meeting -called L-1 - is held 24 hours, or one 
day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda 
includes closeout of any open work, a closeout 
of any Flight Readiness Review action items, a 
discussion of new or continuing anomdies, and 
an updated briefing on anticipated weather con- 
ditions at the launch site and at the abon land- 
ing sites in different pans of the world. It is s tmd-  
ard practice of Level I and II officids to en- 
courage the reporting of new problems or con- 
cerns that might develiop in the internal between 
the Flight Readiness Review and and the L-l 
meeting, and between the L-l and launch. 
In a procedural sense, the process described 
Wadkess Reviews 
Contractor Contractor &nttaetor Cssntmeor 
Readiness reviews for both the launch and the flight of a Shut- 
tle rnlssion are conducted at ascending levels that begin with 
contractors. 
NOTE: See Chart on page 102 for descrlpt~on of management 
'Ievds" and organizat~on chain of command. 
was followed in the case of flight 5 1 -L. However, 
in the launch preparation for 51 -L relevant con- 
cerns of Level 111 NASA personnel and element 
contractors were not, in the following crucial 
areas, adequately communicated to the NASA 
L e ~ ~ e l  I and II management responsible for the 
launch: 
m The objections to launch voiced by haorton 
Thiokol engineers about the detrimental ef- 
fect of cold temperatures on the performance 
sf the Solid Rocket Motor joint seal. 
M The degree of concern of Thiokol and Mar- 
shall about the erosion of the joint seals in 
prior Shuttle Wights. notably 51-C ("January, 
8985) and 51-B (April, 1985). 
On December 13, 1985, the Associate Ad- 
ministrator for Space flight, Jesse Moore, sent 
out a message distributed among NASA Head- 
quaners, NASA field centers, and U.S. Air Force 
units, that scheduled the Flight Readiness Review 
for J anuaq  15, 1986, and prescribed the dates 
for the other steps in the standard procedure. 
The message was followed by directives from 
James A. (Gene) Thomas, Deputy Director of 
Launch and Landing Operations at Kennedy on 
January 2 ,  8986; by the National Space 
Transportation System Program Manager, Ar- 
nold Aldrich, on January 3; by William R. 
Lucas, the &Iarshdl Center Director, on January 
"S ;;ad by the Marshall Shuttje projects Office on 
Januav  8. Each of these implementing directives 
prescribed b r  Level III the preparatory steps for 
the Flight Readiness Review. 
The Flight Readiness Review was held, as 
scheduiied, on January 15. On  the fo%lowing day, 
bgald~ch issued the schedule for the combined 
Level IJMission Management Team meetings; 
he dso announced plans for the Mission Manage- 
ment Team meetings continuing throughout. the 
mission and included the schedule for the E-1 
review. 
0 n  Januaq 23, Moore issued a directive 
stating that the Flight Readiness Review had been 
conducted on the % 5 ~ h  and that 5% -L was ready 
PO fly pending closeout of open work, satisfactory 
coun~down, and completion of remaining Flight 
Readiness Review action items, which were to 
be closed out during the L-l meeting. 6\90 prob- 
lems with the Solid Rocket Booster were 
identified. 
Since December. 1982, the O-rings had been 
designated a "Criticality 1'' feature of the Sollid 
The NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
issued this notice of scheduling of the Flight Readiness 
Review for mission 51-L. 
Rocket Booster design, a term denoting a failure 
point -without back-up - that could cause a loss 
of life or vehicle if the component fails. In July. 
1985, after a nozzle joint on STS 5 1-B showed 
erosion of a secondary O-ring, indicating that the 
primary seal failed, a launch constraint was 
placed on flight 5 1 -F and subsequent launches. 
These constraints had been imposed and regular- 
ly waived by the Solid Rocket Booster Project 
Manager at Marshal%, Lawrence B. Mulloy. 
Neither the launch constraint, the reason for 
it, or the six consecutive waivers prior to 5%-L 
were known PO Moore (Level I) or Pddrieh (Level 
11) or Thomas at the time of the Plight Readiness 
Review? process for 5 1 -E. 
It should be noted that there were other and 
independent paths of system reporting that were 
designed to bring forward information about the 
Solid Rocket Booster joint anomalies. One path 
was the task force of Thiokol engineers and Mar- 
shall engineers who had been conducting subscale 
pressure rests at Wasatch during 1985, a source 
of documented rising concern and frustration on 
the part of some of the Thiokol participants and 
a few of the Marshall participants. But Level 1% 
was not in the line of reporting for this activity. 
Another path was the examination at each Flight 
Readiness Review of evidence of earlier flight 
anomalies. For 51-L, the data presented in this 
latter path, while it reached Le~~els  I and 11, never 
referred to either test anomalies or flight 
anomalies with O-rings. 
In any event ,  no mention of the O-ring prob- 
lems in the Solid Rocket Booster joint appeared 
in the Certification of Flight Readiness, signed 
for Thiokol on January 9, 1986, by Joseph 
Kilrninster. for the Solid Rocket Booster set 
designated B1026.2 
Similarly, no mention appeared in the certifica- 
tion endorsement, signed on January 15, 1986, 
by Kilminster and by M u l l ~ y , ~  No mention ap- 
pears in several inches of paper comprising the 
entire chain of readiness reviews for 51-Lo4 
In the 5 % -L readiness reviews, it appears that 
neither Thiokol management nor the Marshall 
Level I11 project managers believed that the O- 
ring blow-by and erosion risk was critical. The 
testimony and contemporary correspondence 
show that Level 111 believed there was ample 
margin to fly with O-ring erosion, provided the 
leak check was performed an 200 pounds per 
square inch. 
Following the January 15 Flight Readiness 
Review each element of the Shuttle was certified 
as flight-ready . 
The L-1 Mission Management Team meeting 
rook place as scheduled at 11:00 a.m. Eastern 
Standard Time January 25. No technical issues 
appeared at this meeting or in the documenta- 
tion and all Flight Readiness Review actions were 
reported closed out. 
Mr,  Mulloy testified as follows regarding the 
F%ight Readiness Review record about O-ring 
concerns:5 
Chairman Rogers: . . . Why wasn't that a 
cause for concern on the part of the whole 
NASA organization? 
Mr. Mulloy: It was cause for concern, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: M'ho did you tell about 
this? 
Mr. Mulloy: Everyone, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: And they a11 knew about 
it at the time of 51-L? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. You will find in the 
Flight Readiness Review record that MVerrae 
all the way to the L-1 review. 
It is disturbing to the Gommission that con- 
trary to the testimony of the Solid Rocket Bsosrer 
Project Manager, the seriousness of concern was 
not conveyed in Flight Readiness Review to Level 
I and the 5%-L readiness review was silent. 
The only remaining issue facing the Mission 
Management Team at the L-1 review was the ap- 
proaching cold front, with forecasts oh rain 
showers and temperatures in the mid-sixties. 
There had dso  been heavy rain since 5 1 -L had 
been rolled out to the launch pad, approximare- 
ly seven inches compared with the 2 , 5  inches that 
would have been normal for that season and 
length of exposure (35 days). 
At 12:36 p.m. on the 27th? the Mission 
Management Team scrubbed the launch for that 
day due to high cross winds at the launch site. 
In the accompanying discussion that ran for about 
half an hour, all appropriate personnel were 
polled as to the feasibility of a launch within 24 
hours. Participants were requested to identify any 
constraints. This meeting, aimed at launch at 
9:38 a,m. onJanuary 28, produced no constraints 
or concerns about the performance of the Solid 
Rocket Boosters. 
At 2:00 p.m. on the 27th, the Mission Manage- 
ment Team met again. At that timre, the weather 
was expected to clear, but it appeared that 
temperatures would be in the low twenties for 
about I f  hours. Issues were raised with regard 
to the cold weather effects on the launch faciiltv, 
including the water drains, the eye wash and 
shower water? fire suppression system, and o1.e~-- 
pressure water trays. It was decided to activate 
heaters in the Orbiter, but no concerns were ex- 
pressed about the O-rings in the Sollid Rocket 
Boosters. The decision was to proceed with the 
countdown and with fueling, but all members of 
the team were asked to review the situation and 
call if any problems arose. 
At approximately 2:30 p.m. EST, at ThiokoY9s 
Wasatch plant, Robert Ebeling, after learning of 
the predicted low temperature for Ilaunclh, con- 
vened a meeting with Roger Boisjoly and wish 
other Thiokol engineers. A brief chronology of 
the subsequent chain of events begins on page 
104. Ebeling was concerned about predicted cold 
semperarures at Kennedy Space Center. In a 
post-accident interview, Mr. Ebeling recalled the 
substance of the meeting.6 
""The meeting lasted one hour, but the 
conclusim a8 tiat  meeting was Engineer- 
ing-especidly Arnie, Roger Boisjo%y, Brian 
Russell, myself7 Jerry Burns, they come to 
mind - were very adamant about their cow- 
cerns on this lower temperature, because we 
were way below our data base and we were 
way below what we qualified for." 
Eases in the afternoon on the same day, Allan 
McDcdndd- Thlokol's liaison for the Solid Rocket 
Booster project at Kennedy Space Center- 
received a telephone call from Ebeling, express- 
ing concern about the pexformance of the Solid 
Rocket Booster field joints at low temperatures. 
During testimony before the Commission on 
February 2 7 ,  McDonald recounted that 
conversation 
Mr, McDonald: We$%, I had first become 
aware of the concern of the low temperatures 
that were projected for the Cape, it was late 
in the afternoow ofthe 27th. I was at Carver 
Kennedy's house. He is a vice president of, 
as TI mentioned, our space operations center 
at she Cape, and suppons the stacking of the 
SRMs [Solid Rocket Motors]. 
And I had a call from Bob Ebeling. He 
is the manager of our ignition system and 
final assembly, and he worked Bbr me as pro- 
gram manager at Thiokol in Utah. And he 
cdled me and said that they had just received 
same word earlier that the weatheman was 
projecting temperatures as low as 18 degrees 
Fahrenheit some time in the early morning 
hours of the 28th, and that they had some 
meetings with some of the engineering peo- 
ple m d  had some concerns about the O-rings 
getting to those kinds of temperatures. 
And he wanted to make me aware of that 
and also wanted to get some more updated 
and better information on what the actual 
temperature was going to be depicted, so 
that they could make some ca$culations on 
what they expected the real temperature the 
O-rings may see. . . . 
I told him that I would get that 
temperature data for him and call him back. 
Gamer Kennedy then, when I hung up, cd1- 
ed she laur~eh operations center to get the 
predicted temperatures from pad B, as well 
as what the temperature history had been 
during the day up until that time. 
. . . He obtained those temperatures from 
the launch operations center, and they 
basically said that they felt it was going to 
get near freezing or freezing before mid- 
night. It would get as %ow as 22 degrees as 
a minimum in the early morning hours, 
probably around 6:00 o'clock, and that they 
were predicting a temperature of about 26 
degrees at the intended time, about 9:38 the 
next morning. 
I took that data and called back to the 
plant and sent it to Bob Ebeling and relayed 
that to him, and told him he ought to use 
Skis temperature data for his predictions, but 
I thought this was very serious and to make 
sure that he had the vice president, en$neer- 
ing, involved in this and all of his people; 
that H wanted them to put together some 
calcu%atisns and a presentation of material. 
Chairman Rogers: Who's the Vice Presi- 
dent, Engineering? 
Mr. McDonald: Mr. Bob Lund is our Vice 
President, Engineering, .at our Morton 
Thioko?. facility in Utah. 
To make sure he was involved in this, and 
that this decision should be an engineering 
decision, not a program management deci- 
sion. And I told him that I would like him 
to make sure they prepared some charts and 
were in a position to recommend the launch 
temperature and to have the rationale for 
supporting that launch temperature. 
I then hung up anad I called Mr. Mulloy. 
He was staying at the Holiday Inn in Mer- 
ritt Island and they couldn't reach him, and 
so 1 called Cecil Houston - Cecil Houston 
is the resident manager for the Marshall 
Space Flight Center ofice at KSC [Kennedy 
Space Center] a -  andl told him about our con- 
cerns with she low temperatures and the 
potential problem with the 0-kngs. 
And he said that he would set up a 
teleconferenrn He  had a four-wire system 
next PO his office. His office is right across 
from the MAB [Vehicle Assembly Building] 
in the trailer complex C over there. And he 
would set up a four-wire teleconference in- 
volving the engineering people at Marshall 
Space Flight Center at Huntsville, our peo- 
pile back at Thiokol in Utah; and that I 
should come down to his office and par- 
ticipate at Kennedy from there, and that he 
would get back with me and let me know 
when that time would be. 
Soon thereafter Cecil Houston called Dr. Jud- 
son Lovingood, Deputy Shuttle Project Manager 
at Marshall Space Flight Center, to inform him 
of the concerns about the O-rings and asked Lov- 
ingood to set up a teleconference with senior proj- 
ect management personnel, with George Hardy, 
Marshall's Deputy Director of Science and 
Engineering, and with Morton Thiokol person- 
nel. Lovingood called Stanley Reinartz, Shuttle 
Project Manager, a few minutes later and in- 
formed him of the planned telecon. 
The first phase of the teleconference began at 
5: 45 p. m. Eastern Standard Time; participants 
included Reinartz, Lovingood, Hardy, and 
numerous people at Kennedy. Marshall and 
Thiokol-Wasatch. (Allan McDonald missed this 
phase; he did not arrive at Kennedy until after 
8:00 p.m.) Concerns for the effect of low 
temperature on the O-rings and the joint seal 
were presented by Morton Thiokol, along with 
an opinion that launch should be delayed. A 
recommendation was also made that Aldrich, 
Program Manager at Johnson (Level 11), be in- 
formed of these concerns. 
The following are excerpts from testimony 
before the Commission relating to the 
teleconference: 
Dr. Keel: You just indicated earlier that, 
based upon that teleconference, you thought 
there was a good possibility of delay. Is that 
what Thiokol yas  recommending then, was 
delay? 
Dr. Lovingood: That is the way I heard it, 
and they were talking about the 51-C ex- 
perience and the fact that they had ex- 
perienced the worst case blow-by as far as 
the arc and the soot and so forth. And dso, 
they talked about the resiliency data that 
they had. 
So it appeared to me - and we didn't have 
dl of the proper people there. That was 
another aspect of this, It appeared to me that 
we had better sit down and get the data so 
thar we could understand exactly what they 
were talking about and assess that data. 
,4nd that is why I suggested that we go 
ahead and have a telecon within the center, 
so that we could review that. 
Dr. Keel: So as early as after that first after- 
noon conference at 5:45, it appeared that 
Thiokol was basically saying delay. Is that 
right? 
Dr. Lovingood: That is the way it same 
across to me. I: don't know how other peo- 
ple perceived it, but that's the way it came 
across to me. 
Dr. Keel: Mr. Reinartz, how did you 
perceive it? 
Mr. Rekartz: I did not perceive it that way. 
I perceived that they were raising some ques- 
tions and issues which required Isokiwg in- 
to by dl the right parties, but 1 did not 
perceive it as a recommendation delay. 
Dr. Keel: Some prospects for delay? 
Mr. Reinartz: Yes, sir, that possibility is 
always there. 
Dr. Keel: Did you convey that to Mro 
Mulloy and Mr. Hardy before the 8.15 
conference? 
Mr, Reinartz: Yes, I did. And as a master 
of fact, we had a discussion. Mr, MuUoy was 
just out of communication for about an 
hour, and then after that I got in eontact with 
him, and we both had a shon discussion 
relating to the general nature sf the concerns 
with Dr. Lucas and Mr, Kingsbury at the 
motel before we both departed for the teleesn 
that we had set up out at the Gape. 
Dr. Keel:: But based upon that, Mr, LOV- 
ingood, that impression, you thought it was 
a significant enough possibility that Mr. 
Alldrich should have been contacted? 
Dr, Lovingood: Yes. 
Dr. Keel: In addition, did you recommend 
that Mr. Lucas, who is director of Marsikidl, 
of course, and Mr. Kingsbury, who is Mr. 
Hardy's boss, participate in the 8: 1 5 
conference? 
Dr. Lovingood: Yes, I did. 
Dr. Keel: And you recommended that to 
whom? 
Dr. Lovingood: I believe I said thar over 
the net. I said that I thought we ought to 
have an inter-center meeting involving Dr. 
Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury, and then plan 
to go on up the line to Level TI and Level I. 
And then it was after we broke off that first 
tellecon I called Stan at the motel qnd told 
8 7 
him that he ought to go ahead and alert 
Arnie to that possibility. 
Ds- Keel: And Mr. Reinartz, you then 
.avisited the motel room of Mr. Lucas with 
Mr. kings bur)^, and also was Mr. Mulloy 
with you then? . 
Ma, Reinartz: Yes, sir, he was. In the first 
couple of minutes I believe 1 was there by 
myself, and then Mr. Mulloy joined us. 
Dr, Keel: And did you discuss with them 
Mr. Lovingood9s recommendation that the 
two of them, Lucas and Kingsbury, 
participate? 
Mr. Reinartz: No, sir. I don't recall discuss- 
ing Mr. Lovingood's recommendations. I 
discussed with them the nature of the 
relecon, the nature of the concerns raised by 
Thiokol, and the plans to gather the proper 
teehnicd stlpport people at Marshall for ex- 
amination of the data. And I believe that was 
the essence of the discussion. 
Chairman Rogers: But you didn't recom- 
mend that the information be given to Level 
BI or Level I? 
Mr, Reina&z: I don't recall that I raised that 
issue with Dr. kucas. IT told him what the 
p%ms were for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. 
Chairman, making any statement regarding 
that. 
MP, Hotz: Mr. Reinartz, are you telling us 
that you in fact are the person who made the 
decision not to escajate this to a Level I1 
item? 
Mr. Reinartz: That is correct, sir. 
Ae ispproximately 8:45 p.m. Eastern Standard 
Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenc- 
ed, the Thiska1 charts and written data having 
arrived at Kennedy Space Center by tellefax. (A 
table of teleconference participants is included 
with ChronoIow of Events.) The charts presented 
a hiistov of the O-ring erosion and blow-by in 
the Solid Rocket Booster joints of previous flights, 
presented the results of subscde testing at Thiokol 
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket 
Motors. In the following testimony, Roger Bois- 
joly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy ex- 
pressed their recollections of this teleconference 
up to the point when an off-net caucus was 
requested :" 
Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern 
about launching at low temperature. I 
presented Chart 2- 1 with emphasis - now, 
2-1, if you want to see it, I have it, but 
basically that was the chart that summariz- 
ed the primary concerns, and that was the 
chart that 1 pulled right out of the 
Washingon presentation without changing 
one word of it because it was still applicable, 
and it addresses the highest concern of the 
field joint in both the ignition transient con- 
dition and the steady state condition, and it 
really sets down the rationale for why we 
were continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion 
penetrates the primary O-ring seal, there is 
a higher probability of no secondary seal 
capability in the steady state condition. And 
I had two sub-bullets under that whish stated 
bench testing showed O-ring not capable of 
maintaining contact with metal parts, gap, 
opening rate to maximum operating 
pressure. I had another bullet which stated 
bench testing showed capability to maintain 
O-ring contact during initial phase (8 to 170 
milliseconds of trmsient). That was my com- 
fort basis of continuing to fly under normal 
circumstances, normal being within the data 
base we had. 
I emphasized, when I presented that chan 
about the changing of the timing function 
of the O-ring as it attempted to seal, I was 
concerned that we may go from that first 
beginning region into that intermediate 
region, from 0 to 1'70 being the first region, 
and % 70 to 330 being the intemediate region 
where we didn't have a high probability of 
sealing or seating. 
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added 
concerns related to the timing function. And 
basically on that chart, I started off talking 
about a lower temperature than current data 
base results in changing the primary O-ring 
sealing timing function, and I discussed the 
SRM- 15 [Flight 5 1 -C, January, 19851 obser- 
vations, namely, the 158. [Left SWM, Flight 
5 1 -61 motor had 80 degrees arc black pease 
between the O-rings, and make no mistake 
about it, when I say black, I mean black just 
like coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B 
[Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 1 10 degree 
arc of black grease between the O-rings. We 
would have low O-ring squeeze due to low 
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temperature which I calculated earlier in the 
day. We should have higher O-ring Shore 
hardness. . . . 
Now, that would be harder. And what 
that material really is, it would be likened 
to trying to shove a brick into a crack ver- 
sus a sponge. That is a good analogy for pur- 
poses of this discussion. I also mentioned 
that thicker grease, as a result of lower 
temperatures, would have a higher viscosi- 
ty. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it 
would be at room temperature. And so it 
would be a little bit more difficult to move 
across it. 
We would have higher O-ring pressure ac- 
tuation time, in my opinion, and that is what 
I presented. . . . These are the sum and 
substance of what I just presented. If action 
time increases, then the threshold of second- 
ary seal pressurization capability is ap- 
proached. That was my fear. If the threshold 
is reached, then secondary seal may not be 
capable of being pressurized, and that was 
the bottom line of everything that had been 
presented up to that point. 
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue 
with you? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. 
I dso showed a chart of the joint with an 
exaggerated cross section to show the seal 
lifted off, which has been shown to 
everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point 
in time I was asked to quantify my cc~ncems, 
and I said I couldn't. I couldn't quantify is. 
I had no data ro quantify )lit but I did say 
I knew that it was away from goodness in 
the current data base. Someone on the net 
commented that we had soot jb%ow-by on 
SWM-22 [Flight 6%-A, Octsber, 19853 
which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't 
remember who made the comment, but thaa 
is where the first comment came in. about 
the disparity between my conclusicpn and the 
observed data because SRM-22 [Flight 
61 -A, October, 19851 had blow-by at essen- 
tially a room temperature launch. 
1 then said that SWM-15 [Flight 51-6, 
January, 19851 had much more blow-by in- 
dication and that it was indeed teUing us that 
lower temperature was a factor, This was 
supported by inspection of flown hardware 
by myself. I was asked again for data to SLIP- 
port my claim, and I said I have none other 
&an what is being presented, a d  I had been 
trying to get resilience data, Arwie and I 
both, since last October, and that statement 
was mentioned on the net. 
Others in the room presented their charts, 
and the main telecon session concluded with 
Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of 
DEVELQPMENT MUTORS AT 4-7 TD s z Q ~  WITH 
PUTTY P A C B ~ P N ~  BS&w w e   BLOW-^^%^ 
15 (THE BEST O)*IWLA;PIOLI ) WORKED AT 5 3  -F 
initial ThiokoI recommendatron Chart presentea by Robert K. 
bund at second Peieconference prior to Thlokol caucus. 
Engineering, presenting his conclusions and 
recommendations charts which were based 
on our data input up to that point. Listeners 
on the telecon were not pIeased with the con- 
clusions and the recommendatiorns. 
Chairman Rogers: What was the 
conclusion? 
Mr* Boisjoly: The concllusion was we 
should not fly outside of our data base, which 
was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. 
And we were quite pleased because we knew 
in advance, having participated in the 
preparation, what the conclusions were, and 
we felt v e v  comfortable with that. 
Mr,  Acheson: Who presented that 
conclusion? 
Mr,  Boisjsly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had 
prepared those charts. He had input from 
other people. He had actually physical%y 
prepaxed the charts. It was about that time 
that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked 
what he &ought about the MTI  [Morton 
Thioksl] recommendation, and he said he 
was appded at the MTI decision. Mr. Har- 
dy w a d s o  asked about launching, and he 
said no, not if the contractor recommended 
not launching, he would not go against the 
contractor and liaunch. 
There was a short discussion that ensued 
about temperature not being a disciminator 
between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and 
SRM-22 [Flight 6%-A], and shortly after, I 
believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- 
excuse me, I'm getting confused here. Mr. 
Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would 
launch, and he said no because the engineer- 
ing recommendation was not to launch. 
Then MTI management then asked for 
a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure exactly 
who asked for that, but it was asked in such 
a manner that I remember it was asked for, 
a five-minute caucus, which we put on- 
the line on mute and went off-line with the 
rest of the net. 
C h i m a w  Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the rime 
that y ~ u  made the - that Thiokol made the 
recommendation not to launch, was that the 
unanimous recommendation as far as you 
knew? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. B have to make 
something clear. I have been distressed by 
the things that have been appeaPing in the 
paper and things that have been said in 
general, and there was never one positive, 
pro-launch statement ever made by any- 
body. There have been some fee%ings ince 
then that bilks have expressed that they 
would support the decision, but there was 
not one positive statement for launch ever 
made in that room. 
Mr. McISonalcPs testimony: lo  
Mr. McDonald: I arrived at the Kennedy 
Space Center at about 8:15 [p.m.], and 
when I arrived there at the Kennedy Space 
Center the others that had &ready arrived 
were Larry Mulloy, who was there-he i s  
the manager, the pro~ect manager for the 
SRB for Marshall. Stan Reinartz was there 
and he is the manager of the Shuttle Project 
Office. He's Larry Mulloy's boss. 
Cecil Houston was there, the resident 
manager for Marshall. And Jack Buchanan 
was there. He happens to be our manager, 
Morton Thiokol's manager of our launch 
support services office at Kennedy. 
The telecon hadn't started yet. It came om 
the network shortly after I got there. . . . 
Chairman Rogers: Was it essentially a 
telephone conference or was there actually 
a network of pictures? 
Ma. McDonald: It was a telephone con- 
ference. . . . 
But I will relay . . . what I heard at the 
conference as best I can. The teleconference 
started I guess close to 9:00 o'clock and, even 
though all the charts weren't there, we were 
told to begin and that Morton Thiokol 
should take the lead and go through the 
charts that they had sent to both centers. 
The charts were presented by the 
engineering people from Thiokol, in fact by 
the people that had made those particular 
charts. Some of them were typed, some of 
them were handwritten. ,4nd they discuss- 
ed their concerns with the low temperatures 
relative to the possible effects on the O-rings, 
primarily the timing function to seal the 8- 
rings. 
They presented a history of some of the 
data that we had accumuIated both in static 
test and in flight tests relative to 
temperatures and the performance of the 0- 
rings, and reviewed the history of all of our 
erosion studies of the O-rings, in the field 
joints. any blow-by of the primary O-ring 
with soot or products of combustion or 
decomposition that we had noted, and the 
performance of the secondary O-rings. 
And there was an exchange amongst the 
technical people on that data as to what it 
meant . . . But the real exchange never real- 
ly came until the concIusions and recommen- 
dations came in. 
At that point in time, our vice president, 
Mr.  Bob Lund, presented those charts and 
he presented the charts on the conclusions 
and recommendations. And the bottom line 
was that the engineering people would not 
recommend a launch below 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit. The basis for that recommen- 
dation was primarily our concern with the 
launch that had occurred about a year 
earlier, inJanuary of 1985, I belie-\ye it was 
51-C. 
Mr. Mulloy's testimony: l 1  
Mr. Mulloy: That telecon was a little late 
starting. It was intended to be set up at 8: 15 
- 
. . . and the telecon was begun at 8.45. 
And Thiokol will then present to you to- 
day the data that they presented to us in that 
telecon. I will not do that. The bottom line 
of that, though, initially was that Thlokol 
engineering, Bob Lund, who is the Vice 
President and Directo; of Engineering, larho 
is here today, recommended that 51 -L not 
be launched if the O-ring temperatures 
predicted at launch time would be lower than 
any previous launch, and that was 53 
degrees. 
Dr. Walker: May I ask a question? B wish 
you would distinguish between the predicted 
bulk temperatures and the O - r i n g  
temperatures. In fact, as 1 understand it, you 
really don't have any official O-mng 
temperature prediction in your models, and 
i t  seems ahat the assumption has been that 
the O-ring temperature is the same as the 
bulk temperature, which we know is not the 
case. 
, 
Mr. Mulloy: You will see, sir, in the 
Thiokol presentation today that that is not 
the case. This was a specific caHcapPatioaa of 
what the O-ring temperature was on she day 
of the January 1985 launch. It is not the bulk 
temperature of the propellant, hor is it the 
ambient temperature of the air. 
It was Thiokol's calculation of what the 
lowest temperature an O-ring had seen ~ g b  
previous flights, and the en$neering recom- 
mendation was that we should not r n o ~ ~ e  aur- 
side of that experience base. 
I asked Joe KiPrninster, who i s  the pro- 
gram manager for the booster program an 
Thiokol, what his recommendation was, 
because he is the gentleman that I get my 
recommendations from in the program of- 
fice. He stated that, based on that engineer- 
ing recommendation, that he could not 
recommend launch. 
At that point I restated, as j% have testified 
to, the ;ationale that was essentially 
documented in the 1982 Critical Items List, 
that stated that the rationale had been that 
we were flying with a simplex joint seal. And 
you will see in the Thiokol presentation that 
the context of their presentation is that the 
primary ring, with the reduced temperatures 
and reduced resiliency, may not function as 
a primary seal and we would be relying on 
secondary. 
And without getting into their rationale 
and getting ahead, the point, the bottom 
line, is that we were continuing- the assess- 
ment was, my assessment at that time was, 
that we would have an effective simplex seal, 
based upon the engineering data that 
Thiokol had presented, and that none of 
those engineering data seemed to change 
than basic rationale. 
Stan Weinartz then asked George Hardy, 
the Deputy Director of Science and 
Engineering at Marshall, what his opinion 
was, George stated that he agreed that the 
engineering data did not seem to change this 
basic rationale, but also stated on the telecon 
that he certainly would not recommend 
launching if Thiokoll did not. 
At that time Joe Kilminster requested a 
five minute off-net caucus, and that caucus 
lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
The teleconference was recessed at approx- 
imateBy 10:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. The 
off-net caucus of Thiokol personnel started and 
continued for about 30 minutes at the Wasatch 
ofice. The major issues, according to the 
ressnmony ofJerv  Mason, Senior Vice President 
for Wasatch Operations, were the effect of 
tempemmx upon the O-rings and the history of 
erosion of the O-rings: l2 
Mro Masow: Now, in the caucus we 
revisited a%% sf our previous discussions, and 
the imponant things that came out of that 
was that, as we had recognized, we did have 
the possibility that the primary O-ring might 
be slower to move into the seating position 
and that was our concern, and that is what 
we had focused on originally. 
The face that we couldn't show direct cor- 
relation with the O-ring temperature was 
discussed, but we still felt that there was 
some concern about it being colder. 
We then recognized that, if the pTimav 
did move more slowly, that we could get 
some blow-by and erosion on the primary. 
But we had pointed out to us in that caucus 
a point that had not come across clearly in 
our earlier discussions. and that is that we 
had run tests where we deliberately cut large 
pieces out of the O-rings to see what the 
threshold of sealing was, and we found we 
could go to 125 thousandths of a cut out of 
the O-ring and it would still seal. 
Approximately 10 engineers participated in the 
caucus, dong  with Mason, Kilminster, 6. G.  
Wiggins (Vice President, Space Division), and 
Lund. Arnold Thompsdn and Boisjoly voiced 
very strong objections to launch, and the sugges- 
tion in their testimony was that Eund was also 
reluctant to launch: 
Mr. Boisjoly: Okay, the caucus started by 
Mr. Mason stating a management decision 
was necessary. Those of us who opposed the 
launch continued to speak out, and I am 
specifically speaking, of Mr,  Thompson and 
myself because in my recollection he and I 
were the only ones that vigorously continued 
to oppose the launch. And we were attempt- 
ing to go back and rereview and try to make 
clear what we were trying to get across, and 
we couldn't understand why it was going to 
be reversed, So we spoke out and tried to 
explain once again the effects of low 
temperature. Amie actually got up from his 
position which was down the table, and 
walked up the table and put a quarter pad 
down in front of the table, in front of the 
management folks, and tried to sketch our 
once again what his concern -was with the 
joint, and when he realized he wasn't ger- 
ting through, he just stopped. 
I tried one more time with the photos. I 
grabbed the photos, and 1 went up and 
discussed the photos once again and tried to 
make the point that it was my opinion from 
actual observations that temperature was in- 
deed a discriminator and we should not ig- 
nore the physical evidence that we had 
observed 
And again, I brought up the point that 
SRM-15 [Flight 51-6, January, 19853 had 
a 110 degree arc of black grease whi1c. 
SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 19851 had 
a relativelly different amount, which was less 
and wasn't quite as black. 1 dso  stopped 
when it was apparent that I couldn't get 
anybody to listen. 
Dr. Walker: At this point did anyone else 
speak up in favor of the launch? 
Mr. Boisjoly: NO, sir. 30 one said 
anything, in my recollection, nobody said 
a word. It was then being discussed amongst 
the management folks. After Arnie and 1 had 
our last say, hlr .  Mason said we have to 
make a management decision. He turned to 
Bob Lund and asked him to take off his 
engineering hat and put on his management 
hat. From this point on, management for- 
mulated the points to base their decision on. 
There was never one comment in favor, as 
I have said, of launching by any engineer 
or other nonmanagement person in the room 
before or after the caucus. I was not even 
asked to participate in giving any input to 
the final decision charts. 
I went back on the net with the final charts 
or final chart, which was the rationale for 
launching, and that was presented by Mr. 
Kilminster. It was hand written on a 
notepad, and he read from that notepad. I 
did not agree with some of the statements 
that were being made to support the deci- 
sion. I was never asked nor polled, and it 
was clearly a management decision from that 
point. 
I must emphasize, I had my say, and I 
never [would] take [away] any management 
right to take the input of an engineer and 
then make a decision based upon that input, 
and I truly believe that. I have worked at 
a lot of companies, and that has been done 
from time to time, and I truly believe that, 
and so there was no point in me doing 
anything any further than I had already at- 
tempted to do. 
I did not see the find version of the chart 
until the next day. I just heard it read. I left 
the room feeling badly defeated, but I felt 
I really did dl I could to stop the launch. 
I felt personally that management was 
under a lot of pressure to launch and that 
they made a very tough decision, but I didn't 
agree with it. 
One of my colleagues that was in the 
meeting summed it up best. This was a 
meeting where the determination was to 
launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond 
a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to 
do so. This is in total reverse to what the 
position usually is in a preflight conversa- 
tion or a flight readiness review. It is usual- 
ly exactly opposite that. 
Dr. Walker: Do vou know the source of the 
pressure on management that you alluded 
to? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, the comments made 
over the [net] is what I feit, I can't speak for 
them, but I felt it-I feit the tone of the 
meeting exactly as I summed up, than %afe 
were being put in a position to prstve that 
we should not launch rather than being put 
in the position and prove that we had enough 
data to launch. And I felt that v e v  seal 
Dr. Walker: These were the comments from 
the NASA people at Marshdl and at Ken- 
nedy Space Center? 
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. 
Dr. Feynman: I take it you were trying to 
find proof that the seal would fail? 
Mr. Boisjoly:: Yes. 
Dr. Feynman: And of course, you didn '~ .  
you couldn9t, because five of them didn't, 
and if you had proved that they would have 
all failed, you would have found yourself in- 
correct because five of theram didn't fail. 
Mr. Boisjoly: That is right. I was very cow- 
cerned that the cold temperatures would 
change that timing and put us in another 
regime, and that was the whole basis of my 
fighting that night. 
As appears from the foregoing, after the discus- 
sion between Morton Thiokol management and 
the engineers, a find management rek~iew was 
conducted by Mason, Lund, Kilminsrer. and 
Wiggins. Lund and Mason recall this review as 
am unemotional, rational discussion of the 
engineering facts as they knew them at that time; 
differences of opinion as to the impace of those 
facts, however, had to be resolved as a judgment 
call and therefore a management decision. The 
testimony of Lund taken by Commission staff in- 
vestigators is as follows:$4 
Mr. Lund: We tried to have the telecon, as 
I remember it was about 6:60 s9clock 
[MST], but we didn't quite get things in 
order, and we started transmitting charts 
down .to Marshall around 6:00 or 6:30 
[MST], something like that, and we were 
making charts in real time and seeing the 
data, and we were discussing them with she 
Marshall folks who went along. 
We finally got the- all the charts in, and 
when we got all the charts in H staad ar the 
board and tried to draw the conclusions rhae 
we had out of the charts that had been 
presented, and we came up with a coneBu- 
sions chart and said that we didn't feel like 
ir was a wise thing to fly. 
Question: What were some of the 
conclusions? 
Mr, Luwd: I had better look at the chart. 
Well, we were concerned the temperature 
was going to be lower than the 50 or the 53 
that had flown the previous January, and we 
had experienced some blow-by, and so we 
were concerned about that, and although the 
erosion on the O-rings, and it wasn't critical, 
that, you know, there had obviously been 
some little puff go through. It had been 
caught. 
There was no red extensive erosion of that 
O-ring, so in wasn't a major concern, but we 
sid,  gee, you know, we just don't know how 
much fuflher we can go below the 51 or 53 
degrees or whatever it was. So we were con- 
cerned with the unhown. And we presented 
that PO Marsha%l, and that rationale was re- 
jected, They said that they didn't accept that 
rationde, and they would like us to consider 
some other thoughts that they had had. 
. . . Mr. Mulloy said he did not accept 
that, and Mr. Hardy said he was appalled 
that we would make such a recommenda- 
tion. And that made me ponder of what 19d 
missed, and so we said, what did we miss, 
and Mr, Mulloy said, well, I would like you 
10 consider these other thoughts that we have 
had down here. And he presented a very 
strong and forthright rationale of what they 
thought was going on in that joint and how 
they thought that the thing was happening, 
and they said, we'd like you to consider that 
when they had some thoughts that we had 
not considered. 
. . . So after the discussion with Mr. 
Mulloy, and he presented that, we said, well, 
let's ponder that a little bit, so we went off- 
line to t d k  about what we- 
Question: Who requested to go off-line? 
MI=, Lund: I guess it was Joe Kill- 
minster, . . . 
And so we went offline on the telecon . . . 
so we could have a roundtable discussion 
here. 
Questicon: %Vho were the management peo- 
ple that were there? 
Mr* Luard: Jerry Mason, Cal Wiggins, Joe, 
I. manager of engineering design, the 
manager of applied mechanics. On the 
chart. 
Before the Commission on February 25, 1986, 
Mr. Eund testified as follows regarding why he 
changed his position on launching Challenger 
during the management Caucus when he was 
asked by Mr. Mason "To take off his engineer- 
ing hat and put on his management hat":I5 
Chairman Rogers: How do you explain the 
fact that you seemed to change your mind 
when you changed your hat? 
Mr, Eund: I guess we have got to go back 
a little further in the conversation than that. 
We have dealt with Marshall for a long time 
and have always been in the position of 
defending our position to make sure that we 
were ready to fly, and I guess I didn't realize 
until after that meeting and after several days 
that we had absoiutely changed our position 
from what we had been before. But that 
evening I guess 1 had never had those kinds 
of things come from the people at Marshall. 
We had to prove to them that we werew9t 
ready, and so we got oursellves in the &ought 
process &at we were trying to find some way 
to prove to them it wouldn't work, and we 
were unable to do that. We couldn't prove 
absolutely that that motor wouldn't work. 
Chairman Rogers: In other words, you 
honestly believed that you had a duty to 
prove that it would not work? 
Mr. Lund: We%%, that is kind of the mode 
we got ourselves into that evening. It seems 
like we have always been in the opposite 
mode. I should have detected that, but % did 
not, but the roles kind of switched. . . . 
Supplemental testimony of Mr. Mason ob- 
tained in a Commission staff interview is as 
follows: 
Question: Do you recall Mr. Hardy and 
Mr. Mu%lcay9s comments after- I think after 
Mr. Kilminster had got done, or Mr. Lund 
got done presenting the charts? They had 
some comments. Do you recall - 
Mr. Mason: Oh, yes, it was over and over. 
Hardy said that, "19m appalled at your 
recommendation.''. . . . 
Question: Well, did Mr. Hardy's "appall- 
ed" remark and Mr. Mulloy7s "can't launch, 
we won't be able to launch until April" 
remark, how did that affect your thinking 
and affect your decision? 
Mr. Mason: My personal thinking, I just, 
you know, it didn't make that much dif- 
ference. . . . 
And the comments that they made, in my 
view, probably had got more reaction from 
the engineer[s] at the lower level than they 
would from the manager[sj, because we deal 
with people, and managers all the time. . . . 
Mr. McDonald indicated that during the 
period of the internal Morton Thiokoli caucus he 
continued to argue for delay with Mulloy, 
challenging, among other things, the rationale 
that the rocket motor was qualified down to 40 
degrees Farhenheit. Present were Reinartz, Jack 
Buchanan, the manager of Morton Thiokol 
Launch Support Services at Kennedy, and Cecil 
Houston. McDonald's testimony described that 
conversation: l 7  
Mr. McDonald: . . . while they were off- 
line, reevaluating or reassessing this data 
. . . I got into a dialogue with the NASA 
people about such things as qualification and 
launch commit criteria. 
The comment I made was it is my under- 
standing that the motor was supposedly 
qualified to 40 to 90 degrees. 
I've only been on the program less than 
three years, but I don't believe it was. I don't 
believe that all of those systems, elements, 
and subsystems were qualified to that 
temperature. 
And Mr. Mulloy said well, 40 degrees is 
propellant mean bulk temperature, and 
we're well within that. That is a requirement. 
We're at 55 degrees dbr that -and that the 
other elements can be bellow that . . . that, 
as long as we don't fall out of the propellant 
mean bulk temperature. I told him I thought 
that was asinine because you could expose 
that large Solid Rocket Motor to extremely 
low temperatures-I don't care if it's 100 
below zero for several hours- with that 
massive amount of propellant, which is a 
great insulator, and not change that pro- 
pellant mean bulk temperature but only a 
few degrees, and I don't think the spec real- 
ly meant that. 
But that was my interpretation because I 
had been working quite a bit on the filament 
wound case Solid Rocket Motor. It was my 
impression that the qual if icat ion 
temperature was 40 to 901, and I knew 
everything wasn't qualified to thar 
temperature, in my opinion. Bur we were 
trying to qualify that case itself at 40 to 90 
degrees for the filament wound case. 
s I then said I mayr be naive about what 
generates launch commit criteda, but i t  was 
my impression that launch commit criteria 
was based upon whatever the lowest 
temperature, or whatever Ioads, or whatever 
environment was imposed on any element 
or subsystem of the Shuttle. And i f  you are 
operating outside of those, no matter whnch 
one it was, then you had violated some 
launch commit criteria. 
That was my impression of what that was, 
And I still didn't understand how NASA 
could accept a recommendarion to fly below 
48 degrees. I could see why they took issue 
with the 53, but I could never see why they 
would . . . of accept a recommendation 
below 40 degrees, even though I didn't agree 
that the motor was fully qudified to $0. I 
made the statement that if we're wrong and 
something goes wrong on this flight, I 
wouldn't want to have to be the person to 
stand up in front of board of inquiry. m d  say 
that I went ahead and told them to go ahead 
and fly this thing outside what the motor was 
qualified to. 
I made that very statement. 
Mr. Mu%$oy's recollections of these discussions 
are as 
Mr, Mulloy: Mr. K2minster then requested 
an off-net caucus, It has been suggested, im- 
plied, or stated that we directed Thiakol to 
go reconsider these data. That is nos true. 
Thiokol asked for a caucus so that they could 
consider the discussions thar had ensued and 
the comments that Mr. Hardy and I and 
others had made. 
That caucus, as has been stated, was go- 
ing to s t m  at that point, and Mr. McDondd 
interjected into the teleconference, At that 
point, he made the first comment that he had 
made during this entire teleconference. 
Mr. McDonald testified for quite a while 
yesterday about his thoughts on this, but he 
did not say any of them until this point. At 
that point, he stated that he thought what 
George Hardy said was a v e q  important 
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consideration, and that consideration was, 
and he asked Mr. Kilminster to be sure and 
consider the comment made by George Har- 
dy during the course of the discussions, that 
the concerns expressed were for primary 0- 
ring blow-by and -that the secondary O-ring 
was in a position to sea% during the time of 
blow-by and would do so before significant 
joint rotation had occurred. 
They then went into their caucus, having 
asked for five minutes- 
Mr. HQEZ: . . . It figures quite prohinent- 
ly in the discussion that you were quoted as 
saying, do you expect us to wait till April 
to launch? 
Mr, Mulloy: Yes, sir. 
Dr, Walker: Is that an accurate statement 
or notJ 
Mr, Mu%i%aay: It is certainly a statement that 
is our of context, and the way 1 read the 
quote, sir-and I have seen it many times, 
too many times - the quote I read was: My 
God, Thiokol, when do you want me to 
launch, newt April? 
Mr. McDonald testified to another quote 
that says: You guys are generating new 
Launch Commit Criteria. 
Now, both of those I think kind of go 
together. and that is what I was saying. I 
don't know whether that occurred during the 
caucus or subsequent to. I just simply can't 
remember that. 
Mr, Hotz: We%%, never mind the timing. 
Mr, Mullgby: Well, yes, sir. I'm going to 
answer your huestion now. I think those 
quotes defive from a single thought that may 
have been expressed by me using some of 
those words. 
I have not yet encountered anyone other 
than those at KSC who heard those words, 
so I don't believe they were transmitted over 
the net. The total context I think in which 
those words may have been used is, there 
are currently no Launch Commit Criteria 
I LGC] for joint temperature. What you are 
proposing to do is to generate a new Launch 
Commit Criteria on the eve of launch, after 
we have successfully flown with the existing 
Launch Commit Criteria 24 previous times. 
With this LCC, i.e., do not launch with a 
temperature greater [sic] than 53 degrees, 
we may not be able to launch until next 
April. We need to consider this carefully 
before we jump to any conclusions. 
It is all in the context, again, with 
challenging your interpretation of the data, 
what does it mean and is it logical, is it tru- 
ly logical that we really have a system that 
has to be 53 degrees to fly? 
At approximately f f p.m. Eastern Standard 
Time, the ThiokoPINASA teleconference resum- 
ed, the ThiokoB management stating that they had 
reassessed the problem, that the temperature ef- 
fects were a concern, but that the data were ad- 
mittedly inconclusive. KiPminster read the ra- 
tionale recommending launch and stated that that 
was Morton Thiokol's recommendation. Hardy 
requested that it be sent in writing by telefasr both 
to Kennedy and to Marshall, and it was. The 
testimony of Mulloy and Hardy regarding the re- 
mainder of the te%econference and their rationale 
for recommending launch f o P % o ~ s : ~ ~  
Mr. Manl%oy:: Okay, sir. At the comp%etion 
of the caucus, of course, Mr. Kilminster 
came back on the Poop and stated they had 
assessed all the data and considered the 
discussions that had ensued for the past cou- 
ple of hours and the discussions that oc- 
curred during their caucus. 
Chairman Rogers: Was it a couple of 
hours? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. We started at 8:45 
and 1 believe it was probably 1 1 :00 o'clock 
before he came back on the loop. It was a 
long discussion. And I must emphasize that 
H had no knowledge of what interchange oc- 
curred during the caucus at Thiokol, because 
d l  sites were on mute. We were om mute at 
KSC . N0 communications occurred between 
myself and Mr. Hardy at Huntsville, nor did 
any communication occur between KSC and 
Thiokol during that caucus. 
After Mr. Kilminster made that recorn- 
mendation, Mr- Reinanz then asked if there 
were any hr ther  comments, and PO my 
recolliection there were none. There were no 
funher comments made. 
I then asked Mr, Kilminster to send me 
a copy of his flight readiness rationale and 
recommendation. The conference was then 
terminated at approximately 1 1 : 15. 
I have no knowledge of, as has been 
testified, of Mr. McDonald being asked to 
sign that documentation. That would Rave 
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been unusual, because Mr. Kilminster signs sidered by the Mission Management Team 
all flight readiness documentation. before deciding to proceed and that a fur- 
NOW, after the teleconference was com- ther periodic monitoring of that condition 
plete, Mr.  McDonald informed Mr.  was planned. I hrther stated that I had been 
Reinartz and me that if the Thiokol made aware of the recovery area weather 
engineering concern for the effect of cold was 
not sufficient cause to recommend not 
launching, there were two other considera- 
tions, launch pad ice and recovery area 
weather. 
I stated that launch pad ice had been con- 
sidered by the Mission Management 
Team - 
Chairman Rogers: Excuse me. Could you 
identify that discussion, where that took 
place? 
Mr .  Mullloy: That  was after the 
teleconference was completed, after Mr. 
Kilminster made his recommendation, after 
Mr. Reinaraz asked are there any other com- 
ments. There were no other comments on 
the telecon from anyone, . . . 
I stated that launch pad ice had been con- 
previously and planned to place a call to Mr. 
Aldrich and advise him that the weather in 
the recovery area exceeded the Launch 
Comrnit Criteria. 
So I stated earlier, when you asked what 
were the Launch Commit Criteria, one of 
them was that the recovery area weather has 
limitations on it. The report we had, that 
Mr. McDonald confirmed, was hat  we were 
outside of those limits. 
Now, I must point out that that i s  nos a 
hard Launch Commit G ~ t e r i a .  That is an 
advisory call, and the LCC so states that. 
It does require that we discuss the condition. 
So at about 11:30 p.m., Mr. Cecil 
Houston established a teleconference with 
Mr. Aldrich and Mr. Sesrile at KSC. I in- 
formed Mr. Aldrich that the weaxher in the 
reroLreay area could preclude immediate 
rec~%~ery of the SRBs, slnce the ships were 
in a sur%~ival mode and they were moving 
back toward Cape Kennedy at about three 
knots, and the estimate provided to us by 
Mr. Sestile was that they would be probably 
40 miles from the SWB impact area at the 
rime of launch, at 9~38; and then, contiwu- 
ing at three knots, it was going to be some 
period of time before they could get back and 
Boeate the boosters. 
The concern I had for that was not loss 
of the total booster, but loss of the main 
parachutes for the booster, which are 
separated at water impact, and loss of the 
frustum of the boosters, which has the 
d r o p e  parachute on it, which comes down 
separately, because with the 50 knot winds 
we had out there and with the kind of sea 
stares we had, by the time the rec~%~ex+y ships 
got back 01ut there, there was little probabili- 
ty of being able to recover those. 
1 informed Mr. A%drich of that, and he 
decided to proceed with the Paunch after that 
informarion. 1 did not discuss with Mr. 
Aidrich the conversations that we had just 
completed with Monon TkiokoP. 
Chaiman, Rogers: Could you explain why? 
Mr. MuSiloy: Yes, sir. At that time, and I 
still consider today, that was a Level 111 
issue, Level 111 being an SRB element or an 
extemd tank dement or Space Shuttle main 
engne element or an Orbiter. There was no 
violation of Launch Commit Criteria. There 
was no waiver required in my judgment at 
that rime and still today. 
And we work many problems at the Qr- 
bitex- and the SRB and the External Tank 
level that never get communicated to Mr. 
AjdricR or Mr. Moore. It was cleariy a Level 
HI1 issue that had been resolved. 
. . . There were 27 full-scale sea% tests with 
an O-ring groove damage to%eramces, 
damage in the grooves and damage tollerance 
on O-rings, And then there were two co%d 
gas tests. 
And these data were presented on the 
night of the 27th. All of that was at ambient 
temperature. And then we did discuss what 
is a development qualification motor ex- 
perience mange, and that is shown on the 
chart. We had experience everywhere from 
40 to $5 degrees. 
There then were data presented on two 
cold gas tests at 30 degrees, where the 6- 
ring was pressurized at the motor pressuriza- 
tion rate at 30 degsees, which would indicate 
that an O-ring would operate before joint 
rotation at 30 degrees. 
Dr, Wide: Was that actually in a joint? 
Mr. M d o y :  No, it is not. It is a full-scale 
O-ring, full-scale groove, in a scaled test 
device, where the pressurize rate on that 8- 
ring is zero to 900 psi [pounds per square 
inch] in 600 milliseconds at a temperature 
of 30 degrees. 
Dr. 'Walker: You would say, then, the O- 
ring was qualified to a temperature of 36 
degrees? Would that be an accurate 
statement? 
Mr. Mullog: The day that we were look- 
ing at it, ow the 27th, these two tests that 
we did indicated that it would perform at 30 
degrees under the motor pressurization rate 
before the joint rotated. - 
Dr. Walker: What about, let's consider the 
putty and the O-ring, because that is really 
the system that responds to the pressure 
surge. What temperature was the putty/O- 
ring system qualified to? 
Mr. Maolloy: The lowest that I'm aware 
of- and we're still flushing this out, because 
this is kind of what we talked about on the 
27th, but the lowest that I'm aware of is the 
48-degree test on one of the dee~ellopmenr 
motors. 
Dr. Walker: And, of course, during those 
tests the putty was modified before the test. 
The putty was not just laid up and then the 
seal made. The putty was then smoothed out 
or some attempt was made to remove the 
volcanoes, I think. 
Mr. Mulloy: Because the horizontal 
assembly caused that. 
Now, there's one other significant point 
on this charr that we did discuss, that we 
didn't have the quantities on on the 27th. 
and I mentioned this earlier. We have 150 
case segment proof tests, with a large 
number of joints with a simulation of a cold 
O-ring. That is the 90 durometer with a 
.275, and that was at about 35 degrees. 
So those are the certification data that we 
kind of discussed, all of which we didn't 
discuss. The two cold gas tests we did, the 
segment proof tests we did, the development 
and qualification motor test we did, as a 
basis for understanding what we could ex- 
pect to happen at colder temperatures on the 
joints. 
Mr. Hardy testified as 
Mr, Hardy: At the teleconference on the 
evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol 
engineering personnel in Utah reviewed 
charts that had been datafaxed to Huntsville 
and KSC participantsjust prior to the begin- 
ning of the conference. Now, I am not go- 
ing to repeat a lot of what you have dready 
heard, but I will give you some of my views 
on the whole matter. 
The presentations were professional in 
nature. There were numerous questions and 
answers. There was a discussion of various 
data and points raised by individuals at 
Thiokol or at Marshall or at Kennedy. I 
think it was a rather full discussion. There 
were some 64 charts presented, and as has 
been mentioned earlier, we spent about two, 
two and a half hours reviewing this. To  my 
knowledge, anyone who desired to make a 
point, ask a question or express a view was 
in no way restrained from doing so. 
As others have mentioned, I have heard 
this particular teleconference characterized 
as a heated discussion. I acknowledge that 
there were penetrating questions that were 
asked, I think, from both, from a%] people 
involved. There were various points of view 
and an interpretation of the data that was 
exchanged. The dissussion was not, in my 
view, uncharacteristic of discussions on 
many flight readiness issues on many 
previous occasions. Thiokol engineering 
concluded their presentation with recom- 
mendation that the launch time be determin- 
ed consistent with flight experience to date, 
and that is the launch with the O-ring 
temperatures at or greater than 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
Mr. Kilminster at Thiokol stated . . . to 
the best of my recollection, that with that 
engineering assessment, he recommended 
we not launch on Tuesday morning as 
scheduled. After some short discussion, Mr. 
Mulloy at KSC summarized his assessment 
of the data and his rationale with thar data, 
and I think he has testified to that. 
Mr. Reinartz, who was at KSC, asked me 
for comment, and I stated I was somewhat 
appalled, and that was referring specifically 
to some of the data or the interpretation of 
some of the data that Thiokol had presented 
with respect to its influence on the joint seal 
performance relative to rh.e issue under 
discussion, which specifically was the 
possibility that the primary seal may take 
longer to actuate and therefore to blow by 
the primary seal. The blow-by of the 
primary seal may be longer, and I am go- 
ing to elaborate on that a little funher in this 
statement. 
Then I went on to say that 1 supported 
the assessment of data presented essentidiy 
as summarized by Mr. Mulloy, but I wouBd 
not recommend launch over Thiokol's 
objections. 
Somewhere about this tinae, M r .  
Kilminster at Utah stated that he wanted to 
go off the loop to caucus b r  about five 
minutes. I believe at this point Ma. 
McDonald, the senior Thiokol represen- 
tative at KSC for this launch suggested to 
Mr. Kilminster that he consider a point that 
I think I had made earlier, that the secon- 
dary O-ring is in the proper position to seal 
if blow-by of the primary O-ring occurred. 
I clearly interpreted this as a somewhat 
positive statement of supponing sationde for 
launch. . . . The status of the caucus by 
Thiokol lasted some 30, 35 minutes. At 
Huntsville during this Thiokol caucus, we 
continued to discuss the data presented, We 
were off the loop, we were on mute. We were 
around a table in small groups. It was not 
an organized type discussion, But X did take 
that opportunity to discuss my assessment 
and understanding of the data with several 
of my key advisors, and none of us had anv 
disagreement or differences in our inrer- 
pretation of what we believed the data was 
telling us with regard to the primary issue 
at hand. 
When Thiokol came back on line, Mr. 
Kilminster reviewed rationale thar supported 
proceeding with the launch and so 
recommended. 
Mr. Reinartz asked if anyone in the loop 
had a different position or disagreed or 
something to that effect, with the Thiokol 
recommendation as presented by Mr. 
Kilminster . There were no dissenting 
responses. 
The telecon was terminated shortly after, 
and I have no knowledge of any subsequent 
events or discussions between personnel at 
KSC or at Thiokoll on this matter. 
At about 5:00 a.m. on January 28, a discus- 
sion took place among Messrs. Mulllloy, Eucas, 
and Reiwartz in which Mulloy reported to Lucas 
only that these had been a discussion with Thiokol 
over their concerns about temperature effects on 
the O-rings, and that it had been resolved in favor 
of launch, The Sollilowing testimony of Mr. Mulloy 
and Dr, Lucins recount that dis~ussion:~P 
General Ksatyna: . . . Larry, let me foillow 
through on that, and I am kind s f  aware of 
the launch decision process, and you said 
you made the decision at your level om this 
thing. 
If this were an airplane, an airliner, and 
I just had a two-hour argument with Boe- 
ing on whether the wing was going to fall 
off or not, I think I would tell the pilot, at 
least mention it. 
Why didn't we esca1at.e a decision of this 
importance? 
MP, Mullloy: I did, sir. 
General Kutyna: You did? 
Mr, Manlloy: Yes, sir. 
General Kutpa:  Tell me what levels above 
you. 
Mr. Mu114~y: As I stated earlier, Ms. 
Reinanr, who is my manager, was at the 
meeting, and on the morning, about 5:00 
o'clock in she operations support room where 
we dl were I informed Dr. Lucas of the con- 
tent of the discussion. 
General Kutyna: But this is not in the 
launch decisiin chain. 
Mt, Mullsy: No, sir, Mr. Reinanz is in the 
launch decision chain, though. 
General Kutyna: And is he the highest level 
in that chain? 
Mr. Muloy: No. Normally it would go 
from me to Mr. Reinanz to Mr. Aldrich to 
Mr. Moose. 
Dr. Lucas' testimony is as follows:2* 
Chairman Rogers: Would you please tell 
the Commission when you first heard about 
the problem of the O-rings and the seds in- 
sofar as it involves launch 5 1-E? And I don't 
want you to go wayrbac&, but go back to 
when you first heard. I guess it was on 
January 27th, was it? 
DIP, Lucas: Yes, sir. It was on the early 
evening of the 22h,  I think about 7 $0 p. rn . , 
when I was in my motel room dong with 
Mr. Kingsbury. And about that time, Rfs. 
Reinartz and Mr. Mullloy came to my room 
and told me that they had heard that some 
members of Thiokol had raised a concern 
about the performance of the Solid Rocker 
Boosters in the low temperature that was an- 
ticipated for the next day, specificdly on the 
seds, and that they were going out to the 
Kennedy Space Center to engage in a 
telecon with the appropriate engineers back 
at M m h d  Space Flight Center in Hunts- 
viIle and with corresponding people back at 
the Wasacch division of Thiokoll in Utah. 
And we discussed it a few moments and 
I said, fine, keep me informed, let me know 
what happens, 
Chairman Rogers: And when was the next 
time you heard something about that? 
Dr. Lucas: The next time was about 5:00 
a.m. on the follllowing morning, when I went 
to the Kennedy Space Center and went go 
the launch control center. I immediately saw 
Mr. Reinartz and Mr, Mulloy and asked 
them how the mattes of the previous even- 
ing was dispositioned. 
Chairman Rogers: You had heard nothing 
at d l  in between? 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: So from 8:00 o'clock that 
evening until 5:00 o'clock in the morning, 
you had not heard a thing? 
Dr. Lucas: It was about 7:OO, I believe, sir. 
But fbr that period of time, I heard nothing 
in the interim. . . 
Chairman Rogers: . . . And you heard Mr. 
Reinartz say he didn't think he had to notify 
you, or did he notify you? 
Dr. Lucas: He told me, as I testified, when 
I went into the control room. that an issue 
had been resolved, that there were some peo- 
ple at Thiokol who had a concern about the 
weather, that that had been discussed very 
thoroughly by the Thiokol people and by the 
Marshall Space Flight Center people, and 
it had been concluded agreeably that there 
was no problem,. that he had a recommen- 
dation by Thiokol to launch and our most 
knowledgeable people and engineering talent 
agreed with that. So from my perspective, 
I didn't have - I didn't see that as an issue. 
Chairman Rogers: And if you had known 
that ThiokoI engineers almost to a man op- 
posed the flight, would that have changed 
your view? 
Dr. Lucas: I'm certain that it would. 
Chairman Rogers: So your testimony is the 
same as Mr. Hardy's. Had Re known, he 
would not have recommended the flight be 
launched on that day. 
Dr. Lucas: I didn't make a recommenda- 
tion one way or the other. But had I known 
that, 'I would have then interposed an ob- 
jection, yes. 
Chairman Rogers: I gather you didn't tell 
Mr. Alldrich or Mr. Moore what Mr. 
Reinartz had told you? 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir. That is not the report- 
ing channel, Mr. Reinartz reports directly 
to Mr. Aldrich. In a sense, Mr. Reinartz in- 
forms me as the institutional manager of the 
progress that he is making in impllementing 
his program, but that I have never on any 
occasion reported to Mr. Aldrich. 
Chairman Rogers: And you had subsequent 
conversations with Mr. Moore and Mr. 
Aldrich prior to the flight and you never 
mentioned what Mr. Reinartz had told you? 
Dr. Lucas: I did not mention what Mr. 
Reinartz told me, because Mr. Reinanz had 
indicated to me there was not an issue, that 
we had a unanimous position between 
Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight 
Center, and there was no issue in his judg- 
ment, nor in mine as he explained it to me. 
Chairman Rogers: But had you known, 
your attitude would have been totally 
different? 
Dr. Eucas: Had I had the advantage at that 
time of the testimony that I haaye heard here 
this week. I would have had a different at- 
titude, certainly. 
Chairman Rogers: In view of the fact that 
you were running tests to improve the joint, 
didn't the fact that the weather was so bad 
and Reinartz had told you about the ques- 
tions that had been raised by Thiokol, at 
least, didn't that cause you serious concern? 
Dr. Lucas: I woulld have been concerned 
Thiokol had come in and said, we don't think 
you should launch because we've got bad 
weather. 
C h i m u m  Rogers: Well, that's what they 
did, of course, first. That is exactly what they 
did. You didn't know that? 
Dr. Lucas: 1 knew only that ThiokoB had 
raised a concern. 
Chainmaw Bogers: Bid you know they came 
and recommended against the launch, i s  the 
question? 
Dr. Lucas: I knew that I was told on the 
morning of the launch that the initial poxi- 
tion of some members of '$"hioB%oB-- and I 
don't know who it was - had recommended 
that one not launch with the temperature less 
than 53 degrees Fahrenheit. 
CRairman Rogers: And that didn't cause 
you enough concern so you passed that in- 
formation on to either Mr. Moore or Mr. 
Aldrich? 
Dr. Lucas: No, sir, because B was shown a 
document s iped  by Mr. Ki%miwslees that in- 
dicated that that would not be significant, 
that the temperature wou%d nor be-that it 
would be that much lower, as I recall is. 
It is clear that crucial information about the 
O-ring damage in prior flights and about the 
Thiokol engineers9 argument with the NASA 
telecon participants never reached Jesse Moore 
or Arnold Aldrich, the Levels I and 11 program 
officials, or J .Ae (Gene) Thomas, the Launch 
Director for 51-L. The testimony of Aldrieh 
describes this fdlmre of the communication sptem 
very aptly: 23 
Dr. Feynrnan: . . . have you col%ecsed your 
thoughts yet on what you think is the 
cause- I wouldn't call% it of the accident but 
the lack of communication which we have 
seen and which every-body is worried about 
from one level to another? . . . 
Mr. Aldrich: Well, there were two specific 
breakdowns at least, in my impression, 
about that situation. One is the situation that 
occurred the night before the launch and 
leading up to the launch where there was a 
significant review that has been charactex-iz- 
ed in a number of ways before the Commis- 
sion and the Co&mission9s Subpanels and 
the fact that that was not passed f~rward .  
And 1 can only conc%ude what has been 
reported, and that is that the people respon- 
sible for that work in the Solid Rocket 
Booster project at Marshall believed that the 
concern was not of a significance that would 
be required to be brought forward because 
clearly the program requirements specify 
that c ~ t i c d  problems should be brought for- 
ward to Level %I and not only to Level %% 
bur through myself to Level I. 
The second breakdown in communica- 
tions, however, and one that I personally am 
concerned about is the situation of the varie- 
ty of reviews that were conducted last sum- 
mer between the NASA Headquarters 
Organization and the Marshall Organiza- 
tion on the same technical area and the fact 
that that was not brought through my office 
in either direction-that is, it was not 
worked through-by the NASA Mead- 
quaners Organization nor when the Mar- 
shall Organization brought these concerns 
PO be reported were we involved. 
And I believe that is a critical breakdown 
in process and I think it is also against the 
documented repofling channels that the pm- 
gram is supposed to operate to. 
Now, it in fact did occur in that matter. 
In fact, these is a third area of concern to 
me in the way the program has operated. 
These is yet one other way that could have 
come to me, given a different program stmc- 
tenre. I'm sure you've had it reported to you 
as it has been reported to me that in August 
or I think or at least at some time late in the 
summer or early fall the Marshall SRB proj- 
ect went fornard to procure some additional 
Solid Rocket Motor casings to be machined 
and new configurations for testing of the 
joints. 
NOW it turns out that the budget for that 
kind of work does not come through my 
Level ZI office. It is worked directly between 
the Marshdl Center in NASA Headquarters 
and there again had I been responsible for 
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the budget for that sort of work, it would 
have to come through me, and it would have 
been clear that something was going on here 
that I ought to know about. 
And so there are three areas of 
breakdown, and. I haven't exactly answered 
your question. But I have explained it in the 
way that I best know it and- well, I can say 
a fourth thing. 
There was some discussion earlier about 
the amount of material that was or was not 
reported on O-ring erosion in the FRRs 
[Flight Readiness Reviews] and 1 researched 
the FRR back reports and also the flight 
anomaly reports that were forwarded to my 
center-to my office-by the SWB [Solid 
Rocket Booster] pro~ect and as was in- 
dicated, there is a treatment of the Solid 
Rocket Motor O-ring erosion, I believe, for 
the STS 41-6 FRR, which quantifies it and 
indicates some limited amount of concern. 
The next time that is mentioned, I believe 
it is the STS 51-E, FRR in January 1985 
or early in February, and that indicates, 
again, a reference to it but refers back to the 
41-C as the only technical data. 
And then from these forward the com- 
ment on O-ring erosion only is that there was 
another instance and it is not of concern. 
Clearly the amount of reporting in the 
FRR is of concern to me, but in parallel with 
that, each of the flight anomalies in the STS 
program are required to be logged and 
reviewed by each of the projects and then 
submitted through the Level I1 system for 
formal close-out . 
And in looking back and reviewing the 
anomaly close-outs that were submitted to 
Level 11 from. the SRB project, you find that 
O-ring erosion was not considered to be an 
anomaly and, therefore, it was not logged 
and, therefore, there are not anomaly reports 
that progress from one flight to the other. 
Yet, that is another way that that infor- 
mation could have flagged the system, and 
the system is set up to use that technique for 
flagging. 
But if the erosion is classified as not an 
anomaly, it then is in some other category 
and the system did not force it in that direc- 
tion. None of those are very focused 
answers, but they were all factors. 
The Commission Chairman, Ms, Rogers, 
asked four key officials about their knowledge of 
the Thiokol objections to launch:24 
Chairman Rogers: . . . By way of a ques- 
tion, could I ask, did any of your gentlemen 
prior to launch know about the objections 
of Thiokol to the launch? 
Mr. Smith [Kennedy Space Center Direc- 
tor]: I did not. 
Mr.  Thomas [Launch Director]: No, sir. 
Mr. Aldrieh [Shuttle Program Director]: 1 
did not. 
Mr.  Moore [Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight]: I did not. 
Additionally, in further testimony J .A. (Gene) 
Thomas commented on the l a ~ n c h ~ ~ ~  
Mr. Motz: . . . Mr. Thomas, you are 
familiar with the testimony that this Com- 
mission has taken in the last several days Ban 
. the relationship of temperature to the seals 
in the Solid Rocket Booster? 
Mr ,  Thomas: Yes, sir, I have been here all 
week. 
Mr. Hotz: Is this the type of information 
that you feel that you shouId have a.s Launch 
Director to make a launch decision? 
Mr. Thomas: If you refer to the fact that 
the temperature according to the Launch 
Commit Criteria should have been 53 
degrees, as has been testified, raher  than 3 1 , 
yes, I expect that PO be in the Lee. That 
is a controlling document we use in most 
cases to make a decision for launchih, 
Mr. Hotz: But you are not really very hap- 
py about not having had this infarmarion 
before the launch? 
Mr. Thomas: No, sir. I cain assure you that 
if we had had that information, we wouldn't 
have launched if it hadn't 'I~eew 53 degrees. 
Findings 
1. The Commission concluded that there was 
a serious flaw in the decision making process 
ieadiugg up  to the launch of flight 51-L. A well 
structured and managed system emphasizing 
safety would have flagged the rising doubts about 
rhe Solid Rocket Booster joint seal. Had these 
matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the 
Wight readiness process in. terms reflecting the 
vaews of most of the Thiokol engineers and at least 
some of the Marshall engineers, it seems likely 
that she launch of 51 -L might not have occurred 
when it did. 
2 .  The waiving of launch constraints appears 
to have been ar the expense sf flight safety. There 
was no system which made it imperative that 
launch constraints and waivers of launch con- 
straints  be considered by a11 levels of 
management. 
3.  The Commission is troubled by what ap- 
pears to be a propensity of management at 
Marshall to contain potentially serious prob%ems 
and to attempt to resolve them internally rather 
than communicate them forward, This tendency 
is altogether at odds with the need for Marsha%% 
to function as part of a system working toward 
suecessfuB Wight missions, interfacing and corn - 
municatiwg with the other parts of the system that 
work to the same end. 
4. The Commission conc%uded that the 
Thiokoll Management reversed its position and 
recommended the launch of 51-E, at the urging 
of Marshall and contrary to the views of its 
engineers in order to accommodate a major 
customer. I 
Chronology of Events Related to Temperature Concerns Prior to 
Launch of Ghallenger (STS 51-Lj) 
Time K t y  Participants Eoent 
%2:36 PM (EST) 
gawkpay 2 7 ,  1986 
Approximarel?. 
1-00 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
1;OO PM (EST) 
.\%SA Project Managers and Contractor 
Support Personnel (including Morton 
Thiokol). 
Same as abozle. 
Kennea) Space Center 
(1) Boyd C. Brinton, Manager, 
Space Booster Project, MTI; 
(2) Lawrence 0. Wear, Manager, 
SRM Project Office, Marshall. 
Morton Thiokol, h h  
(1) Arnold R. Thompson, Super- 
visor, Rocket Motor Cases; 
(2) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Igni- 
tion System and Final Assembly, 
SWM Project. 
a Launch Scrub. Decision is made to 
scrub due to high crosswinds at launch 
site. 
B Post-Scrub Discussion. All appropriate 
personnel are polled as to feasibility to 
launch again with 21%-hour cycle and it 
results in no SWB constraints for 
launch at 9:38 AM, 28 January 1986. 
Request is made for all participants 
to report any constraints. 
Conuessarion. Wear asks Brinton if 
Thiokoll had any concerns about 
predicted %ow temperatures and about 
what Thiokol had said about cold 
temperature effects following January 
1985 flight 5 % -C . 
1111 Brintow telephones Thompson and 
other MTI personnel to ask them to 
determine if there were concerns based 
on predicted weather conditions. Ebel- 
img and other engineers are notified 
and asked for evaluation. 
Time 
- - - -- - - . . - - - . - - 
.dapproxirnaeely 
2:00 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
2:30 PLI (EST) 
Approximately 
4:00 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
5: 15 PM (EST) 
Kq Participants 
-- - -. - ---- - --- 
NASA Lerlels I and II Management Wi th  
Appropriate Program Managers and Con- 
tract Personnel 
( I )  Jesse Mr. Moore, Associate Ad- 
ministrator, Space Flight, NASA 
HQ, and Director, JSC; 
(2) Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, 
Space Transportation Systems Pro- 
gram, JSC; 
(3) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, Marshall Space Flight 
Center (MSFC); 
(4) Dr. William Lucas, Director, 
MSFC. 
A6 Thiokol, Utah 
(1 ) W. Boisjoly , Seal Task Force. 
Morton Thiokol, Utah; 
(2) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Igni- 
tion System and Final Assembly, 
SRM Project. 
At Kmnedj  Space Ctxier 
( 1 )  Allan J. hfcDondd, Director, 
SRM Project, Morton Thiokal; 
(2) Carver Kennedy, Directoi of 
Vehicle Assembly Building Opera- 
tions, and Vice President of Space 
Operations at KSC, for Morton 
Thiokol. 
At Thiokol, Utah 
Robert Ebeling, Department 
Mariager, Ignition System and Final 
Assembly, SRM Project. 
A t  Kenne* Space Center 
(1) Allan J. McDonald, Director, 
SRM Project, Morton Thiokol, Inc.; 
(2) Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
Manager, at KSC. 
Event 
-- - - 
Mission Management '7aeam Mfetzng 
Discussion is centered around the 
temperature at the launch facility and 
weather conditions predicted for 
launch at 9:38 AM on 28 January 
1986. 
Is Boisjoly learns of cold temperatures 
at Cape at meeting conx~ened by 
Ebeling 
Telephone Conversatioaa. McDona%d 
receives call at Carves Kennedy's 
~sidence from Ebelinf expressing con- 
cern about performance of SRB field 
joints at low temperatures. 
B McDonald indicates he will call 
back latest temperature predictions up 
to launch time. 
8 Carver Kennedy calls Launch 
Operations Center and reeeitied latest 
temperature information. 
B McDonald transmits data to Utah 
and indicates will set up teleecsn and 
asks engineering to prepare. 
Telephone Conversation. McDonald 
calls Cecil Houston informing him that 
Morton Thiokol engineering hiad con- 
cerns regarding O-ring temperatures. 
B Cecil Houston indicates he will sea 
up teleconference with Marsha%% Space 
Flight Center and Morton Thio&o%. 
Time Key Parbicipan 6s Event 
Approximately 
5:25 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
5:30 PM (EST) 
,"Bgzaproxirnately 
5:45 PM (EST) 
Appm~mately 
6:30 PM (EST) 
Ae Kennedy Space Center 
Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
Manager, at KSC. 
At Marshall Space Fli'ghl Cmter 
Judson A, Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC. 
At Kennedy Space Center 
Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shut- 
tle Projects Office, MSFC 
At Marshal! Space Flight Center 
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Ofice, 
MSFG. 
A6 Kennedy &'pack Center 
Staniley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shut- 
tle Projects Office (MSFC). 
At Marshall Spaw Flight Ccntm 
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC. 
P h s  other personnel at Kennedy, Marshall, 
and Thbkol,  Utah. 
A6 Marshall Space Flight Center 
Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, 
MSFC. 
Aa Kennedy Space Center 
Stanley W. Reinanz, Manager, Shut- 
tle Projects Office, MSFC. 
Telephone Conversation. Cecil Houston 
calls Lovingood, informing him of the 
concerns of temperature on the 0. 
rings and asks him to establish a 
telecon with: ' 
(1) Stanley W. Reinanz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC (at 
Kennedy); 
(2) Lawrence B, Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC (at Kennedy); 
(3) George Hardy, Deputy Director, 
Science and Engineering (at Marshall); 
(4) Thiokol Wasatch Division 
personnel, 
Telephone Conversation. Lovingood 
calls Reinartz to inform him of 
planned 5:45 PM (EST) 
teleconference. 
Lovingood proposes that Kingsbuq 
(Director of Science a d  Engineering, 
MSFC), panicipate in te%ecomference. 
First Telecontence. Concerns regard- 
ing temperature effects on the O-rings 
are discussed. 
@ MTI is of the opinion launch 
should be delayed until Noon or 
afternoon. 
It is decided that another aeleson ar 
8115 PM will 'be set up to transmit the 
data to all of the parties and to Rave 
more personnel involved. 
Lovingood recommends to Reinartz 
to include Lucas, Director, MSFG and 
Kingsbury in 8:45 PM conference and 
to plan to go to Level 1% if MTI 
recommends not launching. 
Telephone Conversalion. Lovingood 
cdlis Reinartz and tells him that if 
Thiokoj persists, they should nor 
launch. 
ti# Lovingood &so suggests advising 
Aidrich, Manager, National Transpor- 
tation System (%eve% II), of telecon- 
ference to prepare him for Level I 
meeting to inform of possible recom- 
mendation to delay. 
Tim Key Particifiants Event 
Approximately At Kennedj Space Cen t~r  
7:00 P?ci (EST) (1) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC. 
(2) Stanley R.  Reinartz, Manager, 
. Shutele Projects Office, MSFC; 
(3) Dr. William Eucas, Director, 
MSFC; 
(4) Jim Kingsbury, Director of 
Science and Engineering, MSFC . 
Approximately Af ,210rton Thiokol, LOah 
8:45 PM ( E S T )  (1) Jerald Mason. Senior Vice Presi- 
dent, Wasatch Operations; 
(2) Calvin briggins, Vice President 
and General Manager, Space Divi- 
sion, Ia'asatch; 
(3) Joe C. Killminster, Vice Presi- 
dent, Space Rooster Programs, 
Wasatch: 
(4) Robert M. Lund, Mice President, 
Engineering; 
(5) Roger Boisjoly, Member Seal 
Task Force: 
( 6 )  Arnold R. Thompson, Super- 
visor, Rocket Motor Cases. 
At Kennea) Space Center 
( 1 )  Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager. 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC; 
(2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRE Project, MSFC; 
(3) Allan J .  McDonald, Director, 
SRR4 Project, hITI. 
A6 Marshall Spact Flight Center 
(1) George B. Hardy, Deputy Direc- 
tor, Science and Engineering; 
(2) Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy 
Manager, Shuttle Project Office; 
(3) Ben Powers, Engineering Struc- 
tures and Propulsion. 
Plus other personnel (see table page I I I ) .  
8 Conversation. Reinartz and Muiloy 
visit Lucas and Kingsbury in their 
motel rooms to inform them o f  
Thiokol concern and planned 
teleconference. 
8 Second Ibleconference. Charts present 
a history of the O-ring erosion and 
blow-by for the primary seal in the 
field joints, including resujts of 
subscale tests, previous Wights and 
static rests of Solid Rocket Motors. 
8 The data shows that the riming 
function of the O-rings w%%E be slower 
due to lower temperatures and that the 
worst blow-by occurred on SRM 9 5 
(STS 5%-C) in January I985 with 0- 
ring temperatures of 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
8 Recommendation by Thiakol 
(Lund) is not to fly STS 5 %  -& 
(SRM-25) until the temperature of the 
O-ring reached 53 degrees Fahseaahei~, 
which was the lowest temperature of 
any previous flight. 
6 Mulloy asks for recommendation 
from Kilminster. 
8 Kilrninster states that based upon 
the engineering recommendation, he 
can not recommend launch. 
sl Hardy is reported by both 
McDonald and Boisjcrlv aa have said 
he is "appalled by Thiokol's 
recommendation. 
Reinanz comments ahat he is under 
the impression that SRM is qualified 
from 40 degrees Fahrenheit to 90 
degrees Fahrenheit. 
f# NASA personnel chaljenge conclu- 
sions and recommendations. 
Kilrninster asks for fiere minutes off- 
net to caucus. 
Approximately 
i0:30 PM (EST) 
Apysso~imaee%)~ 
10:30 PM to 
1 1 :00 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
d l :g%O Phi (EST) 
Thiokol Personnel 
( 1 )  Jerald Mason, Senior Vice Presi- 
dent. l%'asaach Operations; 
(2) Joe C.  Kilminster, Vice Presi- 
dent, Space Booster Program; 
(3) Calvin Wiggins, Vice President 
and General Manager, Space 
Division; 
(4) Robert K. Eund, Vice President, 
Engineering; 
( 5 )  Arnold R. Thompson, Super- 
visor, Rocket Motor Cases; 
(6) Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal 
Task Force; 
(7) Brian Russell, Special Projects, 
SRM Program Office; 
(8) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Igni- 
tion System and Final Assembly, 
SRM Project. 
P6us oaher personne! 
At I(°enne$ Space cen6er 
( I )  Allan J .  McDonald, Manager, 
Space Booster Project, Morton 
Thiokol, Inc. (MTI); 
(2) Lawrence 1%. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Projects, MSFG; 
(3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, 
Shuttle projects, MSFC; 
(4) Jack Buchanan. Manager, KSC 
Operaeions, for MTI; 
( 5 )  Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident 
manager, at KSC. 
Same pa~ticipants  a s  8:45 PM 
TeIeconference. 
Thiokol Caucus. Caucus continues for 
about 30 minutes at Thiokol. 
Wasatch, Utah. 
Major issues are (]I) temperature ef- 
fects on O-ring, !and (2) erosion of the 
O-ring. 
Thompson and Biosjoly voice objec- 
tions to launch and indication is that 
Lund also is re%uctant to launch. 
H A final management review is con- 
ducted with only Mason, Lund. 
Kilminster, and Wiggins. 
B Lund is asked to put on manage- 
ment hat by Mason. 
e Find agreement is: (1) there is a 
substantial margin to erode she 
primary O-ring by a factor of three 
times the previous worst case, and (2) 
even if the primary O-ring does not 
seal, the secondary is in position and 
will. 
Consrersation at Kennra). McDonald 
continues to argue for delay. 
McDonald challenges Reimartz's ra- 
tionale that SRM is qualified at 40 
degrees F. to 90 degrees F., and 
MullPoyqs explanation that Propelllant 
Mean Bulk Temperatures are within 
specifications. 
Second Telecopoferepoce (Cont9d). %hioko% 
indicates it had reassessed; 
temperature effects are concern, bur 
data is inconclusive. 
&i K lminster reads the rationale for 
recommending launch. 
Thiokol recommends launch. 
Hardy requests that Thiokol put in 
writing their recommendation and 
send it by fax to both Kenmedy and 
Marshall. 
Time Key Participants Eveni 
Approximately At finnea) Space Center Conversation at Kennedj. hlcDonald 
1%:115 to (1) Allan J. McDonald, Manager, argues again for delay asking how 
1 % :30 Phl (EST) Space Booster Project, MTI; NASA could rationalize launching 
(2) Lawrence Mulloy, Manager, SRB below qualification temperature. 
Projects Office, MSFC; 8 McDonald indicates i f  anything 
(3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, happened,-he would not want to haye 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC; to explain to Board of Inquiry. 
(4) Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC . McDonald indicates he would 
Operations, for MTI; cancel launch since (1) O-ring problem 
(5) Cecil Houston, Manager, MSFC at low temperatures; (2) booster 
Resident Office at KSC. recovery ships heading into wind 
toward shore due to high seas, and (3) 
icing conditions on launch pad. 
6 McDonald is told it is nos his con- 
cern and that his above concerns will 
be passed om in advisory capassry. 
Approximately 
% % :45 PM (EST) 
Approximately 
1 1 :30 PM to 
%2:00 AM (EST) 
Approximately 
f2:01 AM (EST) 
January 28 
Approximately . 
%:30 to 
3:00 AM (EST) 
Approximately 
3:00 AM (EST) 
At Kennet$* S p r e  Cent@ 
( 1 )  Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Projects Office, MSFC; 
(2) Stanley R. Reinanz, Manager, 
Shuttle Projects, MSFC; 
(3) Arnold D. Aldrich, Manager, Na- 
tional Space Transportation System 
Program Office. JSC. 
At Kennedy Space Center 
(1) Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of 
Ice Crew; KSC 
(2) B.K. Davis, Ice Team Member, 
MSFC 
A6 Kennedy Space Center 
( I )  Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, 
SRB Project, MSFC; 
(2) Dr. William Lucas, Director, 
(MSFC); 
(3) Jim Kingsbury, Director of 
Science and Engineering, MSFC. 
Tekefar. Kilrninster faxes Thiokok~s 
recommendation to launch ae 9:45 
MST, 27 January 1986 (1 1 :45 EST). 
8 Fax is signed by Kilmiwsaer. 
8 McDonald retrieves fm at KSC. 
6 Teleconference. Discussion centers 
around the recovery ships' actl\?ities 
and brief discussion of the ice issue on 
the launch complex area. 
. Reinartz and Mulloy place call io  
Aldrich. 
.  McDonald delivers fax so Jack 
Buchanan's office at Kennedy Space 
Center and overhears part of 
conversation. 
@ Aldrich is apparently not inhrmed 
of the O-ring concerns. 
6 Kennedy Space Center meeting 
breaks up. 
6 Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad B 
Ice crew finds large quantity of Ace on 
Fixed Service Structure, mobRae launch 
platform, and pad apron; and reports 
conditions. 
Conversation. Mulloy tells Eucas of 
Thiokol's concerns over temperature 
effects on O-rings and final resolution. 
8 Lucas is shown copy of ThiokoI 
telefax. 
- - 
Tune Kea. Participants 
Approximarely 
7:00-9:00 ,432 (EST) 
Approximately 
8:08 A M  (JEST) 
Approximately 
9~60 A M  (EST) 
Approximate1 y 
10:30 AM (EST) 
$ P :38 A M  ((EST) 
At Kennedy Space Center Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad B. 
( 1 )  Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of Ice crew inspects Launch Pad B and 
Ice Crew, KSC; Challenger for ice formation. 
(2) B. K. Davis, Ice Team Member, Davis measures temperatures on 
MSFC. SWBs, External ,Tank, Orbiter, and 
launch pad with infrared pyrorneter. 
@i Left-hand SRB appears to be about 
25 degrees F. and right-hand SRB ap- 
pears t~ be about 8 degrees F. near 
the aft region. 
Ice crew is not concerned since 
there is no Launch Commit Criteria 
on surface temperatures and does nor 
report. 
Crew repons patches of sheet ice on 
lower segment and skirt of left Solid 
* Rocket Booster 
At MarshaN Space Flight ~ m t e r  Conversation. Lovingood informs Lee 
( I  ) Judson A. kovingood, Deputy of previous night's discussions. 
Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, He indicates that Thiskol had at 
MSFC; first rec~mmended not launching, and 
(2) Jack Lee, Deputy Director, then after Wasasch conference recorn- 
MSFC. mended Iaunchimg. 
@i Me dm informs Lee that Thiokol is 
providing in writing their recommen- 
dation for launch. 
NASA Levels I and Eeue6 N Management !i# Mission Management Team Meefing. 
With Appropriate Projicl Managers lnnd Ice eondirions at launch complex are 
Contract Personnel. discussed. There is no apparent discus- 
sion of temperature effects -on O-ring 
seal. 
At Kennedy Space Center 
( I )  Charles Stevenson, Supervisor of 
Ice Crew; 
(2) B.K. Davis, Ice Team Member 
Ice Crew Inspection of Launch Pad B.  
Ice crew inspects Launch Pad B for 
third time. 
ID Crew removes ice from water 
troughs, returns to Launch control 
Center at T-20 minutes, repons condi- 
tions to Mission Management Team, 
including fact that ice is still on left 
Solid Rocker Booster. 
@i Launch. Challenger (STS 51-L) is 
launched. 
Final Teleconference Participants 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division 
1. George B. Hardy; Deputy Director, Science 1. Jerald Mason, Senior Vice President, 
and Engineering, MSFC Wasatch Operations, MTI 
2. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, 2. Calvin Wiggins, Vice President and General 
Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC Manager, Space Division, MTl 
3. Leslie F. Adams, Deputy Manager, SRB 3.  Joe C. Kilminster, Vice President, Space 
Project, MSFC Booster Programs, MTI 
4. Lawrence 8. Wear, Manager, SRM Proj- 4. Robert K, Lund, Vice President, Engineer- 
ect Office, MSFC ing, MTI 
5. John Q. Miller, Technical Assistant, SRM 5. Larry PI. Sayer, Director, Engineering m d  
Project, MSFC Design, MTI 
6 .  J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for 6. William Macbeth, Manager, Care Projects. 
Engineering, MSFC Space Booster Pro~ect Engneering, Wasarch 
7.  Robert J . Schwinghamer, Director, Material \ Division, MTI 
and Processes Laboratory, MSFC 7.  Donald M. Ketner, Supervi~or, Gas 
8. Wilbur A. Riehl, Chief, Nonmetallic Dynamics Section and Head Seal Task 
Materials Division, MSFC Force, MTI 
9. John P. McCarty, Deputy Director, Struc- 8. Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal TasEc Force, 
tures and Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC MTI 
10. Ben Powers, Engineering Structures and 9. Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket 
Propulsion Laboratory, MSFC Motor Cases, MTI 
11. James Smith, Chief Engineer, SRB Pro- . Jack R. Kapp, Manager, Applied Mechanics 
gram, MSFC Department, MTI 
12. Keith E. Coates, Chief Engineer, Special 11. Jerry Burn, Associate En~paeer, Applied 
Projects Office, MSFC Mechanics, MTI 
13. John Schell, Retired Engineer, Materials 12. Joel Maw, Associate Scientist, Heat Transfer 
Laboratory, MSFC Section, MTI 
13. Brian Russeil, Manager, Special Projects, 
Present at KSG SRM Project, MTI 
14. Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident Manager, 14. Robert Ebelling, Manager, Ignition System 
at KSC and Find Assembly, SRB Project, MTH 
15. Stanley I(. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Proj- Present at MSFC 
ects Office, MSFC 
16. Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB Proj- 15. Boyd C. Brinton, Manager, Space Booster 
ect, MSFC Project, MTI 
16. Kyle Speas, Ballistics Engineer, MTli 
Present at KSC 
17. Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM Project, 
MTI 
1 8. Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC Operations, 
MTI 
F below fieezlng, i s  lndlcated b; the kwer left photo which 
shows thick ice in a water trough despite use of an antr- 
freeze solution. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Above, foot long icicles on a lower level of the 
Fixed Service Structure frame the attachment 
point where the Orbiter is attached to the exter- 
nal tank (arrow). lcing was even more extensive 
at upper levels of the service structure (upper 
right and below). At right below is a ground com- 
munications box (not used during launch) ren- 
dered ino~erable bv heavy ice. 
Ambipities In 
The Decision Making Process 
- 
D u ~ n g  the nigl~t and early morning of January 
28, another problem was developing due to the 
extreme cold weather, predicted to be in the low 
20s for aapproximate%y 12 hours. Reaction con- 
trol system heaters on the Orbiter were activated 
and the Solid Rocket Booster recovery batteries 
were checked =dl found to be functioning within 
specifieati~ms. There were no serious concerns 
regarding the External Tank. The freeze protec- 
tion pllan for the Paunch pad was implemented, 
but the results were not what had been an- 
ticipated. The freeze protection plan usually in- 
volves completely draining the water system. 
However, this was not possible because of the im- 
minent launch of 51-L, In order to prevent pipes 
from freezing, a decision was made to dew water 
to run s%cswBy from the system. This had never 
been done before, and the combination sf freea- 
gag temperatures and stiff winds caused Barge 
mounts of ice to form below the 240-foot level 
sf the fixed senice structure including the access 
to the crew emergency egress slide wire baskets. 
Ice dso was hrming in the water trays beneath 
the vehicle. 
These conditions were first identified by the Ice 
Team ar approximately 2:00 a.m. onJanuary 
and were assessed by management and enginee 
ing &roughout the night, culminating with a Mi 
sion Management Team meeting at 9:00 a.m. 
At this n~eeting, representatives b r  the Orbiter 
prrime contractor, RockwelI PnternationaB, ex- 
pressed their concern about what effects the ice 
might have on the Orbiter during launch. 
Rockwell had been alerted about the icing con- 
ditions das~ng the early morning and was work- 
ing on the problem at its Downey, California, 
facility. 
D u ~ n g  Commission hearings, the president of 
WockweU9s Space Transportation Systems Divi- 
sion, Dr. Rocco Petrone, and two of his vice 
presidents, Robert Glaysher and Martin Ciof- 
foletti, dB descdbed the work done regarding the 
ice conditions and the Rockwell position at the 
9:00 a,m. meeting with regard to launch. Dr. 
Petsane had arrived at Kennedy on Friday, 
J m u q  24. On Monday the 27th he left to return 
to Rockwell's facility in California, but Glaysher 
and Cioffolerti remained at Kennedy. Dr. 
Petsone testified that he first heard about the ice 
at 4:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time. He explained 
what followed: 26 
"I had gotten up and went to the support 
room to support this launch. We have peo- 
ple rn~nitoring conso%es, and I checked in, 
and they told me there was a concern, and 
when I arrived at about &:do, 4:40 (PSI$), 
I was informed we were working the prob- 
lem with our aerodywamicist and debris peo- 
ple, but very importantly, we wouid have 
to make an input to Kennedy for a meeting 
scheduled at 6:00 o'clock our time and 9:00 
o'clock Florida time. 
"We had approximately an hour of work 
to bring together. The work had been under- 
way when I arrived and was continuing. 
"At that time I got on the phone with my 
Orbiter program managers just to discuss 
background of where we were, how things 
stood, and what their concerns were local- 
ly. They described what they knew in 
Florida, and we also in Downey did televi- 
sion input, and we could see some of the ice 
scenes that were shown here this morning. 
"We arrived through a series of meetings 
to a top level. discussion at approximate%y 
5:30 Pacific Standard Time, from which we 
drew the following conclusions:~ Ice on the 
mobile launcher itself, it could be debris. M'o 
were very concerned with debris of any kind 
at the time of launch. With this particular 
ice, one, could it hit the Orbiter? There was 
wind blowing from the west. That appeared 
not to be so, that it wou%dn90 hit the Orbiter 
but would land on the mobile launcher. The 
second concern was what happens twhat ice 
at the time you light your liquid fuel engines, 
the SSMEs, and would it throw it around 
and ricochet and potentially hit the Orbiter. 
"The third aspect is the one that has been 
discussed here of aspiration, what would 
happen when the large SRM [Solid Rocket 
Motors] motors ignite and in effect suck in 
air, referred to as aspiration, and ice addi- 
tionally wou1d come down, how much 
unknown. 
"The prime thing we were concerned 
about was the unknown base line. b y e  had 
not launched in conditions of that nature. 
and we just felt we had an unknotvn. 
"I then callled my program managers otVer 
in Florida at 5:45 (PST) and said we could 
not recommend launching from here, from 
what we see. We think the tiles would be en- 
dangered, and we had a very short conver- 
sation. We had a meeting to go through, and 
I said let's make sure that NASA under- 
stands that Rockwell feels it is not safe 
to launch, and that was the end of my 
conversation ." 
Mr. Glaysher, who was at Kennedy, came to 
the center at approximately 7:45 a.m. EST. He 
conferred with Rockwell's Chief Engineer as well 
as the Vice President of Engineering, Dr. John 
Peller, at Rockwell's Downey plant. At 9:00 a.m., 
after the ice debris team had reported back from 
the pad inspection, Glaysher was asked for 
Rockwell's position on launch. He discussed 
aspiration effects, the possible ricochet of ice from 
the fixed service structure, and what the ice 
resting on the mobile launch platform would do 
at ignition. Glaysher said he told the Mission 
Management Team when it met at 9:00 a.m. that 
the ice was an unknown condition, and Wockwe%l 
was unable to predict where the ice would go or 
the degree of potential damage to the Orbiter 
thermal protection system if it were struck by the 
ice. He testified that his recommendation to. 
NASA was:27 
"[MI y exact quote - and it comes in two 
parts. The first one was, Rockwell could not 
100 percent assure that it is safe to fly which 
I quickly changed to Rockwell cannot assure 
that it is safe to fly . . ." 
Rockwell's other vice president at Kennedy, 
Martin Cioffoletti, described the concern about 
ice in a slightly different manner:28 
Mr. Gioffoletti: Similarly, 1 was called in 
and told about the problem and came into 
the 6:00 o'clock meeting which you heard 
about a few minutes ago, and at the conclu- 
sion of that meeting I spoke with Mr. Dick 
Kohrs, the deputy program manager from 
Johnson Space Flight Center, and he asked 
if we could get the Downey folks to look at 
the falling ice and how it might reverse 
toward the vehicle, and also, did we have 
any information on aspiration effects. 
So I did call back to Downey and got the 
John Peller folks working on that problem, 
and they did, as you saw from Charlie 
Stevenson's sketches, predict that the ice 
would travel only about halfway to the vehi- 
cle, freefalling ice carried by the winds. SO 
we felt that ice was not a problem. However, 
it would land on the mobile launch platform. 
That we considered a problem. We also in- 
vestigated the aspiration data base we had, 
and we had seen the aspiration efkct on 
previous launches where things were pulled 
into the SRB [Solid Rocket Booster] hole 
after ignition, but we had never seen 
anything out as far as the fixed surface 
tower. So we felt in fact it was an unknown. 
We did not have the data base to operate 
from an aspiration effect. 
At the 9:00 09cllock meetirdg, 1 was asked 
by Arnie Aldrich, the program manager, to 
give him the results of our analysis, and I 
essentially told him what I just told you and 
felt that we did not have a sufficient data 
base to absolutely assure that nothing wsu%d 
strike the vehicle, and so we could not lend 
our 100 percent credence, if you will, to the 
fact that it was safe to fly . . . 
I said I could not predict the trajectory 
that the ice on the mobile launch platform 
would take at SRB ignitio1.a. 
Chairman Rogers: But I think NASA's 
position probably would be that they thought 
that you were satisfied with the launch. Did 
you convey to them in a way that they were 
able to understand that you were nor appro\-- 
ing the launch from your stmdpoint? 
Mr. Cioffoletti: I felt that by telling them 
we did not have a sufficient data base and 
could not analyze the trajectov of she ice, 
I felt he understood that Rockwell was not 
giving a positive indication that we were for 
the launch. 
After Cioffoletti's testimony at the Csmmission 
hearings, Dr. Petrone was pressed for a mare de- 
tailed description of RockwelI's launch recom- 
mendation: 29 
General K u t y n a d r .  Petrone, you've got 
a lot more experience than I have in this 
business, but the few launch conferences &at 
f have been on the question is v e v  simple, 
Are you go or are you no-go for launch, and 
maybe " isn't an answer. I hear d1 kinds 
of qualifications and cautions md considera- 
tions here. 
Did someone ask you are you go or no- 
go? Was that not asked? 
Dr, Peerone: At this particular meeting, as 
far as-and I was not in Florida, and so I 
cannot answer that. It had been done at 
earlier meetings. This was a technical 
evaluation of a series of problems, and we 
talked about debris hitting the TPS [ther- 
rnd protection system] and the tiles, and the 
long series of reviews that we had done that 
morning and all led us to a conclusion that 
they were not safe to fly. 
And we transmitted that to program 
managers along with the technical evalua- 
tion quickly of why we had arrived at that. 
So mush of it is h o ~ ~  the question gets rais- 
ed because earlier we had aspiration work, 
ricochet work, a number of things which we 
did, and then we came up with our 
recommendation. 
Chairman Wogers: And your recommenda- 
tion now you say it was, it was unsafe to fly? 
Dr, Petrssne: Correct. sir. 
Two things are apparent from the Rockwell 
testimony. First, Rockwell did not feel it had suf- 
ficient time to research and resolve the ice on the 
pad problem. Second, even though there was con- 
sldesable discussion about ice, Rockwell's posi- 
tion on launch described above was not clearly 
communicared to NASA officials in the launch 
decision chain during the hours preceding 5 1 -L9s 
Iauwch. 
At ti% meeting with Commission investigators 
on March 4, 1986, at Kennedy, Horace 
Lamberth, NASA director of Shuttle Engineer- 
ing, said he did not interpet Rockwell's position 
aa the 9:00 a.m. Mission Management Team 
meeting on January "2 as being "no-go." 
Lambenh said the the language used by Rockwell 
was "we can9t pve you 100 percent assurance" but 
there was no feeling in his mind that Rockwell 
was voicing ;a no-go recommendation. '-It just 
didn't come across as the normal Rockwell no- 
go safery of flight issues come across,"30 This cow- 
clusiow i s  confirmed in part by an interview of 
Dr. John Pe%%er, Rockwel%'s Vice President of 
Engineering, who was assigned the ice problem 
early Tuesday morning. Dr. Peller, in describ- 
ing a releph~~ne conversation with the Johnson 
Director of Engineering, Tom Moser, stated:31 
Dr, Pelles: That was a call from Tom Moser 
stand my concerns. And I just repeated the 
same concerns. And he asked, "Did I think 
that it was likely that the vehicle would take 
safety critical damage?" 
And I said, "From the possibility that the 
vehicle would take safety critical damage," 
I said, "there's a probability in a sense that 
it was probably an unlikely event, but I 
could not prove that it wouldn't happen . . .- 
. . . I never used the words "no-go" for 
launch. I did use the words that we cannot 
prove it is safe. And normdly that's what we 
were asked to do. We were unable to do that 
in this particular case, although it was a 
strange case, that we normally don't get in- 
volved in. 
Arnold Adrich, NASA Mission Management 
Team Leader, described NASA's view of the ice 
situation and his recollection of Rockwell's posi- 
tion. He  said that on Tuesday morning the mas- 
sion management team did a detaiied analysis of 
the ice on the fixed service structure. Represent- 
atives from the ice team, Rockwelll, and the direc- 
tors of Engineering (Horace Lamberth) and the 
Orbiter project (Richard Colonna) all. considered 
the problem. Aldrich reported this discussion as 
follows:42 
"hollowing the discussion of the accept- 
ability of the ice threat to the Orbiter, based 
upon the conditions described in detail of the 
fixed service structure-and some of that 
you've seen here portrayed well this morn- 
ing- I asked the NASA managers invo%ved 
for their position on what they felt about the 
threat of that to the Orbiter. 
"Mr. Lamberth reported that KSC [Ken- 
nedy Space Center] engineering had 
calculated the tra~ectories, as you've heard. 
of the falling ice from the fixed service struc- 
ture east side, with current 10-knot winds 
at 300 degrees, and predicted that none of 
this ice would contact the Orbiter during its 
ignition or launch sequence; andl that their 
ca%cullations even showed that if the winds 
wou%d increase to 15 knots, we still would 
not have contact with the Orbiter. 
"Mr. Colonna, Orbiter project manager, 
reported that similar calculations had been 
performed in Houston by the mission 
evaluation team there. They concurred in 
this assessment. And further, Mr.  Colonna 
to me. in which he asked again to under- stated that, even if these calculations were 
significantly in error, that it was their belief 
that falling ice from the fixed service struc- 
ture, if it were in fact to make its way to the 
Orbiter, it would only be the most 
lightweight ice that was in that falling 
stream, and it would impact the Orbiter at 
a very oblique arigle. 
"Impacts of this type would have very low 
probability of causing any serious damage 
to the Orbiter, and at most would result in 
post-flight turnaround repairs. 
"At this point I placed a phone call to Mr. 
Moser that I had previously mentioned, 
director of Engineering at the Johnson Space 
Center, who was in the mission evaluation 
room, and he confirmed the detailed agree- 
ment with Mr.  LamberthPs and Mr. Colon- 
na9s position, . . . 
"And both Mr. Lamberth and Mr. 
Colonna reported that their assessment was 
that the time it took for the ice to fall, to hit 
the Orbiter and to rebound, and the loca- 
tion of the fixed service structure on the 
MEP [mobile launch platform] would not 
cause that ice in their view to be a concern 
to rebound and come up and impact the rear 
end of the Orbiter. 
"Following these discussions, I asked for 
a position regarding proceeding with the 
launch. Mr,  Colonna, Mr. Lamberth, and 
Mr. Moser all recommended that we 
proceed. 
"At that time, I also polled Mr. Robert 
Glaysher, the vice president, Orbiter proj- 
ect manager, ockwe$ l  International STS 
Division, and Mr. Marty Cioffo%etti, Shut- 
tle Integration Project Manager, Rockwe%l 
International STS Division. Mr. Glaysher 
stated - and he had been listening to this en- 
tire discussion and had not been directly in- 
volved with it, but had been party to this the 
whole time. 
"His statement to me as best I can 
reconstruct it to report to you at this time 
was that, while he did not disagree with the 
analysis that JSC lJohnson Space Center] 
and KSC had reported, that they would not 
give an unqualified go for launch as ice on 
the launch complex was a condition which 
had not previously been experienced, and 
thus this posed a small additional, but un- 
quantifiable, risk. Mr. Glaysher did not ask 
or insist that we not launch, however. 
"At the conclusion of the above review, 1 
felt reasonably confident that the launch 
should proceed." 
In addition to Rockwell's input, Mr. Aldrish 
also had reports from othdr contractors and the 
ice, frost and debris team at the 9:00 session. Bee 
on the vehicle assembly appeared to be sf no con- 
cern; sheet ice in the noise suppression trays had 
been broken up and removed; as prev10usIy wore$: 
the ice team reported that there was ice on the 
fixed service structure between 95 feet abo\-e 
ground and 21 5 feet; no ice above 255 feet. The 
north and west sides had large amaunts of ice and 
icicles. The final assessment was made that the 
ice on the fixed service structure would not strike 
or damage the Orbiter tiles or the vehicle 
assembly d u r h g  ignition or ascent, owing to the 
considerable horizontal distance between the sen7- 
ice structure and the vehic%e assembly. The deci- 
sion was made to Paunch pending a final ice team 
review of the launch complex in order to assess 
any changes in the situation. This inspection was 
completed following the Mission Management 
Team meeting and the ice team report indicated 
no significant change. 
Findings 
The Commission is concerned about three 
aspects of the ice-on-the-pad issue. 
1. An analysis of all of the testimony and in- 
terviews establishes that Rockwell's recornmen- 
dation on launch was ambiguous. The Commis- 
sion finds it difficult, as did Mr. Aldrich, ro con- 
clude that there was a no-launch recommenda- 
tion. Moreover, all parties were asked specificall19 
to contact Aldrich or Moose about launch objec- 
tions due to weather. Rockwell made no phone 
calls or further ob~ections to AIdrich or other 
NASA officials after the 9:00 Mission Manage- 
ment Team meeting and subsequent PCP the 
resumption of the countdown. 
2. The Commission is also concerned about 
the NASA response to the Rockwell position at 
the 9:00 a.m. meeting. While it is undenrsesd that 
decisions have to be made in launching a Shut- 
tle, the Commission is not convinced Levels I and 
11 appropriately considered Rockwell's concern 
about the ice. However ambiguous Rockwell's 
position was, it is clear that they did tell NASA 
that the ice was an unknown condition. Ci l~en 
the extent of the ice on the pad (see photos pages 
f I 2  and 3 131, the admitted unknown effect of the 
Solid Rocket Motor and Space Shuttle Main 
En@wes ipition on the ice, as well as the fact that 
debris striking the Orbiter was a potential flight 
safety hazard, the Commission finds the decision 
KO launch questionable under those circum- 
stances. In this situation, NASA appeared to be 
requiring a contractor to prove that it was not 
safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has determined 
that the ice was not a cause sf the 51 -L accident 
and does not conclude that NASA's decision to 
iaunch specifisal%y overrode a no-launch recom- 
mendation by ;an element contractor. 
3. The Commission concluded that the freeze 
protection plan dbr launch pad 39B was inade- 
quate. The Commission believes that the severe 
cold and presence of so much ice on the fixed sen-  
ice stmcnure made it inadvisable to launch ow the 
morning o f J a n u z ~  28, and that margins of safexy 
were whittjed down too far. 
Ad$itional%y, access to the crew emergency 
slide wire baskets was hazardous due to ice con- 
ditions, Had the crew been required to evacuate 
the Orbiter on the launch pad, they wou%d have 
been running on an icy surface* The Ce)mmis- 
saon BseSiea~es the crew shou%$ have been made 
aware of the situation, and based on the 
seriousness sf the condition, greater considera- 
tion should Rave been giveh to delaying the 
launch, a 
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An Accident 
Rooted in History 
Early Design 
he Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket 
Booster psoblem began with the 
faulty design of its joint and increased 
as both NASA and contractor man- 
agement first failed to recognize i t  as a problem. 
then failed to fix it and finally erearedl it as an 
acceptable flight risk. 
hlsrton Thiskol. Hnc.. the contractor, did not 
accept the implication of tests early in the pro- 
gram that the design had a serious and unan- 
tacipated flaw.d N,BaSA did not accept the judg- 
ment of its engineers that the design was unac- 
ceptable, and as she joint problems grew in 
number and severity NASA minimized them in 
management briefings and reportsS2 Thiokors 
stated position was that "the condition is not 
desirable bur is acseptabIeO9'3 
Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rub- 
ber O-rings sealing the joints to be touched by 
hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be par- 
tnaPly burned. However, as tests and then flights 
confirmed damage to the sealing rings, the reac- 
tion by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase 
rhe amount of damage considered "acceptable." 
At no rime did management either recommend 
a redesip of the joint or call for the Shuttle's 
grounding until the problem was solved. 
ThiokoB was selected to receive the NASA con- 
trast ro design and build the Solid Rocket 
Boosters on November 20, 11973.* The booster 
was she largest Solid Rocket Motor ever produced 
in the United States; it was also the first solid 
motor program managed by NASA's Marshall 
Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. 
Costs were the primary concern of NASA's 
se$eeaion board, particularly those incurred early 
in the program. 
Thiokol's three competitors were Aerojet Solid 
Propulsion Co., ~oc&eed  Propulsion Co. and 
United Technologies. The Source Evaluation 
Board on the proposals rated Thiokol founh 
under the desigh, deve~o~men t  and verification 
fastor, second %nder the-manufactur~ng, refur- 
bishment and product support factor and first 
under the management factor.' 
Thiokol received the second -highest overall 
Mission Suitability score, tied with United 
Techno%ogies -6  
In a December 12, 1973, report, NASA sellec- 
tion officials said Thiokol's "cost adyantages were 
substantla% and consistent throughout all areas 
evaluated," They dso singled out Thiokol's joint 
design for special. mention. 
"The Thiokoll motor case joints utilized dual 
O-rings and test ports between seals, enabling a 
simple leak check without pressurizing the entire 
motor," the officials' report said. "This innovat$\'e 
design feature increased reliability and decreas- 
ed operations at the launch site, indicating good 
attention to low? cost (design, development, testing 
and engineering) and production ."a 
"We noted that the [NASA Source Selection] 
board's analysis of cost factors indicated that 
Thiokol could do a more economical job than any 
of the other proposers in both the development 
and the production phases of the program; and 
that, accordingly, the cost per flight to be ex- 
pected from a Thiokoli-built motor wouPd be the 
lowest," the officials said. "CVe, therefore, conclud- 
ed that any se%ection other than Thiokol would 
gi1.e rise to an additional cost of appreciable 
size." 9 
The Selection officials said they "found no other 
dacrors bearing upon the selection that ranked in 
weight \vith the fol-egoing." 
Cost considerarion overrode any other objec- 
tions, they decided. " i t 'e  concluded that rhe main 
criticisms of' the Thiokol proposal in the hlission 
Suitability eva%uation \vere technical in nature, 
avere readilv correctabltt. and rhe costs to correct 
did not negate [he sizable Thiokol cost ad\-an- 
ragv." rhc wlct tion ol'fic*ials c.oncludtd. 
The cost-plus-axvard-fee contract. estimated to 
be lrorrh S800 million. was a~varded to Thiokol. 
The design of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster 
tvas prirnaril?. based on the Air Force's Titan 111 
solid rocket. one of the most reliable ever pro- 
duced. Thiokol hoped to reduce new design prob- 
lems. speed up the development program and cut 
costs by borrojving from the Titan design. In 
Thiokol's Solid Rocket Xlotor proposal. the rocket 
fuel is contained in four forged steel cases which 
are stacked one on t-op of the other. The casings 
were connected by a circumferential tang and 
clevis, as were the Tiaans.Ro 
Despite their many similarities, the Thiokol 
Solid Rocket Booster and the Titan motors had 
some significant design differences. For example. 
the joints of the Titan were designed so that the 
insulation of one case fits tightly against the in- 
sulation of the adjacent case to form a more gas- 
tight fat than the Thiokol design. One O-ring bore 
seal was used in each Titan joint to stop any hot 
gas pressure that might pass by the insulation 
o\verlap, but in the Titan design the O-ring was 
able but not intended to take the brunt of the 
combustion pressure. In contrast, the Thiokol O- 
rings were designed to take the brunt of the com- 
bustion pressure. with no other gas barriers pres- 
ent except an insulating putty. Also, the Solid 
Comparison of Original 
Design to Design Used 
Or~g~nal design with 
Face Seal and Bore Seal 
Design used with 
Double Bore Seal 
Figure 1 
Rocket Motor joint had two O-rings, the second 
to provide a backup in case the primary seal 
failed. 
Asbestos-filled putty was used in the Solid 
Rocket Motor to pack the space between the Q 
case s e p e n t s  to prevent O-ring damage from the 
heat of combustion gases. I 2  Thiokol beliex~ed the 
putty was plastic, so when acted ow by the corn- 
bustion pressure at the rnotois ignition the pup- 
tv flow tolvards the O-ring \soul$ compress the 
air in the gap betw-een the putty and the primary 
0-ring.13 The compressed air, in turn, would 
cause the primary O-ring to extrude into the gap 
bei-iveen the clevis and the tang, behind the 
pPPma~ O-ring groo19e, thereby sealing the open- 
sng. If the primary O-ring did not seal. the in- 
rent svas that the secondary would pressurize and 
seal the joint by extruding into the gap behind 
ads groove. l B  
Another difference in the Solid Rocket Motor 
and the Titan \\#as that the tang portion of the 
Thiokoi joint was longer in order to accommodate 
two O-rings instead of one. %r was more suscep- 
tible ro bending under combustion pressure than 
the Titan joins, as post-design tests and later flight 
experience demonstrated. ' 5  
The initial Thiokol design proposal was 
changed before the production motors were 
manuhctured. Originally, the joint seal design 
incorporated both a face seal and a bore sealeS6 
(Figure 1 .) However, the motor that was eLVen- 
~udRv used had double bore O-rings. The oxiginal 
bore seaibface sea% design was chosen because it 
was anrneipateci that it "provides [better] redun- 
dance 01'er a double bore ring seal since each is 
csnrro%le$ by different manufacturing tolerances, 
and each responds differently during joint 
assembly."fl Because the early design incor- 
porated tolerances simi%ar to the Titan and it dso  
incorporated a face seal, Thiokol believed it 
possessed "complete, redundant seal ~apabi l i ty .~ l8 
Ne\9eraheless, as the Solid Rocket Motor pro- 
gram progressed, Thiokol- with NASA's 
concurrence-dropped the facehose sea% design 
for one using a double bore seal (Figure 1). NASA 
en$neeu-s at Marshall said the original design 
would have required tapered pins to maintain 
wecessav tolerances and assure enough "squeeze" 
on the face-seding 0-ring.19 However, design 
analysis determined that motor ignition woulld 
create tension loads on the joint sufficient to cause 
the tapered pins to pop out. Solving that woulld 
have meant designing some type of pin-retainers. 
Moreover, the rocket assembly was much easier 
with the dual bore seals. Besause inspections and 
tests had to be conducted on the Solid Rocket 
b f o t ~ r  stack, h~rizontal. assembly was required. 
Thiokol engineer, Howard hl[cIntosh, described 
this in a Com~nlssion interview on April 2, 1986: 
"We were concerned very much about the 
homzowtal assembly that we had to do to do 
the static rests. The Titan had always been 
assembled vertically, and so there had never 
been a larger rocket motor to our kno\vledge 
that was assembled (hor i~onta l ly )" .~~  
Because of the extremely tight tolerances in the 
joints caused by horizontal assemblly, hlcIntosA 
noted, "We . . . put the bore seals in there, and 
we opened the tolerance ,in the gaps slightly to 
accommodate that."aI To  tighten the joint's f i r  and 
to increase the squeeze in the O-rings to compen- 
sate for the larger tolerances, Thiokoll subsequent- 
ly put thin metal shims between the outer walls 
of the tang and clevis. 
Another significant feature of the Thiokol 
design Lvas a vent, or port, on the side of r h t  
motor case used after assembly to check the seal- 
ing of the O-rings. As will be noted later. this leak 
check eventually became a significant aspect of 
the O-ring erosion phenomenon.22 
The manufacture of the O-rings themselves 
constituted another difference between the Titan 
and the Thio&o% Solid Rocket Motor. b'hille borh 
O-rings were Viton rubber, the Titan O-rings 
were molded in one piece. The So%id Rocker 
Motor O-rings were made from sections of rub- 
ber O-ring material glued together. The specifica- 
tions allowed five such joints, a number chosen 
arbitrarily, and the-vendor routinely made repairs 
of voids and inclusions after getting the material 
supplies. Only surface inspections were per- 
formed by Thiokol and by the manufacturer. 
Finally, unlike the Titan, the Thiokol Solid 
Rocket Motor was designed for multiple firings. 
T o  reduce program costs, each Thiokol motor 
case for the Shuttle was to be recovered afier flight 
and reused up to 20 times.23 
Early Tests 
Thiokol began testing the Solid Rocket Motor 
in the mid-1970)s. One of the early important tests 
was a 1977 "hydroburst test."24 
Its purpose was to test the strength of the steel 
cases by simulating a motor firing. The case was 
pressurized with water to about one and one-half' 
times the pressure of an ignited motor (about 
1,500 pounds per square inch) to make certain 
the ease had adequate structural margin.25 Also. 
to measure the pressure between the O-rings. 
engineers attached instruments to the leak eesr 
port at a segment joint. Although the test was suc- 
cessful in that it demonstrated the case rner 
strength requirements. test measurements showed 
that, contrary to design expectations, the joint 
tang and inside clevis bent away from each other 
instead of toward each other and by doing so 
reduced - instead of increased -pressure on the 
O-ring in the miI%iseconds after ignition.26 This 
phenomenon was called "joint rotation," Testi- 
fying before the Commission, Arnold Thompson, 
Thiokol" supervisor of structures, said, 
"We discovered that the joint was open- 
ing rather than closing as our original 
analysis had indicated, and in fact it was 
quite a bit. I think it was up to 52 one- 
thousandths of an inch at that time, to the 
primary O-ring." 
Thiokol reported these initial test findings to 
the NASA program office at MarshalI. Thiokol 
engineers did not believe the test results redly 
proved that "joint rotation9' would cause signifi- 
cant problems9*8 and scheduled no additional tests 
for the specific purpose of confirming or disprov- 
ing the joint gap behavior. 
Reaction from Marshall to the early Solid 
Rocket Motor test results was rapid and totally 
opposite of Thiokol's. In a September 2, 1977 
memorandum, Glenn Eudy, Marshall's Chief 
Engineer of the Solid Rocket Motor Division, in- 
formed Alex McCool, Director of the Structures 
and Propulsion Laboratory, that the assembly of 
a developmental motor provided early indications 
that the Thiokol design: 
"Allowed O-ring clearance. . . . Some 
people believe this design deficiency must be 
corrected by some method such as shimming 
and perhaps design modification to the case 
joint for hardware which has not been final 
machined, . . . I, personally believe that our 
first choice should be to correct the design 
in a way that eliminates the possibility of 0- 
ring clearance. . . . Since this is a very 
critical SRM issue, it is requested that the 
assignment results be compiled in such a 
manner as to permit review at the S&E 
Director's level as well as project manager." 
After seeing the data from the September 1977 
hydroburst test, Marshall engineer Leon Ray 
submitted a report entitled "Solid Rocket Motor 
Joint Leakage Study" dated October 21, 1977. 
It characterizes "no change" in the Thiokol design 
as "unacceptable" -"tang can moxVe outboard and 
cause excessive joint clearance resulting in sea% 
leakage. Eccentric tanglclevis interfaace can cause 
O-ring extrusion when case is pressurized." Ray 
recommended a "redesign of the tang and reduce 
tolerance on the clevis" as the "'best option for a 
long-term fix." 29 
After Ray's 1977 repon: ~ o h n  Q. Miller, chief 
of the Solid Rocket Motor branch at Marshall, 
signed and sent a memorandum on January 9. 
1978 to his superior, Glenn Eudy, describing the 
problems evident in the Solid Rocker Motor joint 
seal. "We see no valid reason for not designing 
to accepted standards," the memo said, and it em- 
phasized that proper sealing of the joint by use 
of shims to create necessary O-ring pressure tvas 
"mandatory to prevent hot gas leaks and resulting 
catastrophic failure." 3 O  
One year later, not having received a response 
to his I978 memo, Miller signed and forwarded 
a second memo strenuously objecvlng to Thiokors 
Solid Rocket Motor joint seal desigaa. This memo, 
dated January 19, 1979, opened with:: "We find 
the Thiokol position regarding design adequacy 
of the clevis joint to be completely unaccepr- 
able. . . ." 31 The memorandum made three prin- 
cipal objections to Thiokol's joint designa. The first 
was the "large sealing surface gap created by ex- 
tensive tanglclevis relative movement,99 The 
memo said this movement, the so-rdled ''joint 
rotation," caused the primary O-ring to extrude 
into the gap, "forcing the seal to function in a way 
which violates industry and government O-ring 
application practices," Moreover, joint rotation 
allowed the secondary O-ring to ""'become com- 
pletely disengaged from its sealing surface on the 
tang." Finally, the memorandum noted that 
although Thiokors contract required all high 
pressure case seals to be verifiable, "the clevis joint 
secondary O-ring seal has been verified by rests 
to be un~at i s fac tory ."~~ A copy of the second 
memorandum was sent to George Hardy, thew 
Solid Rocket Booster project manager at h b r -  
shall. Thiokol apparently did not receive copies 
of either Miller memorandum, and no reply from 
Eudy to Miller has been found. 
The Commission has learned that Leon Raab 
actually authored the Miller memos to Eud). 
although Miller signed them and concurred in the 
ob~ections raised.34 During F e b r u a ~ ,  1979, Ral 
also reported on a visit he made to two O-ring 
manufacturers - the Precirion Rubber Products 
Corporation at Lebanos Tennessee, and the 
Parker Seal Co. at Lexington, Ken tap~ky .~~  Eudy 
% 23 
accompanied Ray on the Precision visit. The pur- 
pose sf the trips was to give the manufacturers 
she data on the Q-ring experiences at Thiokol and 
wo ""seek opinions regarding potential risks in- 
.t~sPved," Ray wrote in a February 9, 1979, memo 
describing the visit. Officials at Precision did 
"voice concern for the design, stating that the 
Solid Rocker Motor O-ring extrusion gap was 
larger than that covered by their experience," Rag. 
repofled. "Their first thought was that the O-ring 
was beivltg asked to perform beyond its intended 
design and that a different type of seal should be 
considered," Ray added. 36 
During the Commission hearing on May 2, 
1986, Ray was asked why the 1978 and 1979 
memoranda were written: 
Mr, Way: The reason they were written was 
as a result of test data that we had, and 1 
have to go back to, 1% guess, a little bit fur- 
ther back in time than these memos. When 
the joint was first designed, the analysis pro- 
duced by Thiokol says the joint would close, 
the extrusion gap would actually close. 
We had quite a debate about that until we 
did a test on the first couple of segments that 
we recei~~ed from the manufacturer, which 
in fact showed that the joint did open. Later 
on we did some tests with the structural test 
article, and this is mentioned in the memo 
as STA- I [Structural Test Article]. 
At &at time, we reallinailed it down* We 
got some very accurate numbers on joint 
rotanion, and we know for a fact that dur- 
ing these tests that, just what the memo says, 
the joint rotated. The primary O-ring was 
extmded up into the joint. The secondary 
O-ring did in fact detach from the seat.=' 
No records show Thiokol was informed of the 
visits, and the O-ring design was not changed. 
Thiokol's phase 1 certification review on March 
23, 1979, mentioned leak check failures, and 
forces d u ~ n g  case joint assembly that resulted in 
clevis O-ring grooves not conforming with tang 
sealing surfaces, However, this was not listed as 
a problem or a failure,a* 
b7erificartia%n and 
Certification Committee 
While Ray was warning of problems with joint 
rotation, static motor tests in July 1978 and April 
1980 again were demonstrating that inner tang1 
clevis relative movement was greater than orig- 
inally predicted.39 Thiokol continued to ques- 
tion the validity of these joint rotation measure- 
ments and their effect on the availability of the 
secondary Q-ring. 
In 1980, NASA empaiaelled a Space Shuttle 
VerificationICertification Committee to study the 
flight worthiness of the entire Shuttle system. A 
subdivision of that group, the Propu%sion Com- 
mittee, met with NASA Sollid Rocket Motor pro- 
gram personnel and raised several concerns about 
the joint desigw.40 The Committee pointed our 
that the booster's leak test pressurized the primas\. 
O-ring in the wrong direction so that the motor 
ignition would have to move the ring across its 
groove before it sealed. The Committee added 
that the effect of the insulation putty was not cer- 
tain. Redundancy of the O-rings was also listed 
as a verification concern. The same report, how- 
ever, said ""she Committee understands from a 
telecon that the primary purpose of the second 
O-ring is to test the primary and that redundaw- 
cy is not a requirement." Geoige Hardy testified 
that the Committee's statement conflicted with his 
understanding: 
"The discussion there or the reference 
there to a tellecon- and % don9t know who 
that was with - that implies theie was no in- 
tent for the joint to be-redundant is totally 
foreign to me. I don't know where they 
would have gotten that inabrmation because 
that was the design requirement for the 
joint." 4 1  
In May 1980, the VerificationICenificaPion 
Committee recommended that NASA conduct 
full-scale tests to verify the field joint integrity, 
including firing motors at a mean bulk propellanr 
temperature range of 40-90 degrees Fahrenheit. 
The panel also asked NASA to: 
"Perform case burst test with one O-ring 
removed. During the burst test for final 
verification of the motor ease safety factor7 
one of the two O-rings failed by extmsisn 
and leaked, The analysis used for additional 
verification did not include funher gap open- 
ings caused by joint deflection at pressuriza- 
tion or any deflections caused by bending 
loads. The panel considers the above to be 
inadequate to provide operational program 
reliability, and marginal to provide adequate 
safety factor confidence on [Shuttle flight] 
one 42 
The NASA program response to these issues 
was included in the final Committee report in 
September 1980. It said that the original 
hydroburst tests and'the lightweight case tests, 
being conducted at the time, satisfied the intent 
ofthe Committee's recommendations. Moreover, 
the response stated: "NASA specialists have 
reviewed the field joint design, updated with 
larger O-rings and thicker shims and found the 
safety factors to be adequate for the current 
design. Re-analysis of the joint with larger O- 
rings and thicker shims is being accomplished as 
para of the lightweight case program. . . . The 
joint has been sufficiently verified with the testing 
accomplished to date (joint lab tests, structural 
test article, and seven static firings and the two 
case configuration burst tests) and currently 
scheduled for lightweight case 
Criticality Classification 
and Changes 
The Solid Rocket Motor certification was 
deemed satisfactory by the Propulsion Commit- 
tee of the ~erific&io*l~enifi;ation Group on 
September 15, 1980. Shortly thereafter, on 
November 24, 1980, the Solid Rocket Booster 
joint was classified on the Solid Rocket Booster 
Critical Items List as criticality category 1W. 
NASA defines "Criticality 1Ta" as any subsystem 
of the Shuttle that contains "redundant hardware, 
total element failure of which could cause loss of 
life or vehicPe."44 The use sf "R", representing 
redundancy, meant that NASA believed the 
secondaq O-ring would pressurize and seal if the 
primary O-ring did not. Nonetheless, the 1980 
Critical Items List (CIL) states: 
"Redundancy of the secondary field joint 
seal cannot be verified after motor case 
pressure reaches approximately 40 percent 
of maximum expected operating pressure. 
It is known that joint rotation occurring at 
this pressure level with a resulting enlarged 
extrusion gap causes the secondary O-ring 
to lose compression as a seal. It is not known 
if the secondary O-ring would successfully 
reseal if the primary O-ring should fail after 
motor case pressure reaches or exceeds 40 
percent of maximum expected operating 
pressure." 
When asked about the text of the 1980 
Criticality 1R classification, A,rno%d Aldrich, 
NASA Manager of the National Space Transpor- 
tation System, said, 
"The way that . . . l anpage  [reads], I 
would call it [criticality] 1 
Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction in 
the classification 1R and the questionabBe status 
of the secondary described in the text of the CIE, 
the joint carried a 1R clas!jifisaa.piaw from 
November 1980 through the Right of  STS-5 
(November 1982). 
The Space Shuttle first flew on April 12- 14, 
1981. After the second flight, STS-2, in No\-em- 
ber 198 1, inspection revealed the first in-BBieRr 
erosion of the" primary 0-ring.46 ~t occurredin 
the right Sollid Rocket Booster's aft field joint and 
was caused by hot motor gasesea7 The damage 
to the ring proved to be the worst ever found on 
a primary O-ring in a field joint on any recovered 
Solid Rocket Booster.48 Post-flight examination 
found an erosion depth of .053 inches on the 
primary .O-ring; nonetheless, the anomaly was 
not reported in the Level I Flight Readiness 
Review for STS-3 held on March 9, 6982, Fur- 
thermore, in 1982 the STS-2 O-ring erosion was 
not reported on the Marshall problem assessment 
system and given a tracking number as were other 
flight anomalies. *9 
In mid- 1982, two significant devellopmenrs 
took place. Because Thiokol believed blow holes 
in the insulating putty were a cause of the ero- 
sion on STS-2,50 they began tests of the method 
of putty layup and the effect of the assembly of 
the rocket stages on the integrity of the putty. The 
manufacturer of the original putty, FuPlier- 
O'Brien, discontinued the product a d  a new put- 
ty, from the Randolph Products Company, was 
tested and selected in May 1982.51 The new Ran- 
dolph putty was eventually substituted for the old 
putty in the summer of 1983, for the STS-8 Solid 
Rocket Motor flow. 52 
A second major event regarding the joint seal 
occurred in the summer of 1982. As noted bebre, 
in 1977-78, Leon Ray had concluded that joint 
rotation caused the loss of the secondary O-ring 
as a backup seal. Because of May 1982 high 
pressure O-ring tests and tests of the new 
lightweight motor case, Marshall managemens 
Gndly accepted the conclusion that the secondary 
O-ring was no longer functional after the joints 
rotated uvhen the Solid Rocket Motor reached 40 
percent of its maximum expected operating 
pressure. It obviously followed that the dual 0- 
rings were not a completely redundant system, 
so she Gritica$%ty % R  had to be changed to Grit- 
icaliry 1 . 5 9  This was done at Marsha%l on 
December 1 7 ,  1982. The revised Critical Items 
List read (See pages 1157 and 1158): 
"Criticality Category 1. . . . 
"Failure Mode and Causes: Leakage at case 
assembly joints due to redundant O-ring seal 
failures or primary seal and leak check port 
O-ring failure. 
f vote: Leadsage of the primer)! O-ring seal is 
c&rs$ied m a single failure point due to poss i bili- 
p of loss dsealing at the secondmy QO-ng because 
oJi;.sinf rotalion a)er motor pressuriaea'opa. 
""Fai%ure Effect Summary: Actual Loss -Loss 
01 mzssion, vehide and crew due to metal erosion, 
burn through, and probablt case burst resulting in 
F a 6  asad dtflgration. . . . 
""Ratisana%e for Retention: 
"The Solid Rocket Motor case joint design 
is common in the lightweight and regular 
weight eases having identical dimensions. 
The joint concept is basically the same as the 
single O-ring joint successfully employed on 
the Titan I11 Solid Rocket Motor, . . . On the 
Shuttle Solid R ~ c k e t  Motor, the secondary 
O-ring was designed to provide redundancy 
and to permip a leak check, ensuring proper 
instdlatisn of the O-rings. Full redundancy 
exists at the moment of initial pressurization. 
However, test data shows that a phe- 
nomenon called joint rotation occurs as the 
pressure rises, opening up the O-ring extm- 
sion gap and permitting the energized ring 
to pmtmde into the gap, This condition has 
been shown by test so be well within that re- 
quired for safe primary O-ring sealing. This 
gap may, however, in some cases, increase 
sufficiently to cause the unener~zed second- 
ary 0-hg. to lose compression, raising ques- 
tion as t s  its ability to energize and sea% if 
cdled upon to do so by primary sea% failure. 
Since, under this latter condition only the 
single 0-ring is sealing. a rationale for reten- 
tion is provided for the simplex mode where 
only one O-ring is acting" [emphasis 
added]. 54 
The retention rationale for the "simplex9' or 
single O-ring seal was written on December 1. 
1982, by Howard McIntosh, a Thiokol 
This document gave thef justification for flight 
with the single functional O-ring. It reported that 
tests showred the Thiokoli design should be re- 
tained, citing the Titan history, the leak and 
hydroburst tests, and static motor firings as 
justification. However, it also contained the 
following rationale which appeared to conf icr 
with the Criticality 1 classification that the sec- 
ondary O-ring was not redundant: 
"Initid information generated in a light- 
weight cylinder-to-cylinder proof test s h o ~ ~ s  
a total movement of only .030 inch at 1,004 
pounds per square inch, gauge pressure in 
the center joint. This . . . indicates that the 
tang-PO-clevis movement will not unseat the 
secondary 0-rimg at operating pressures ." 56 
Testimony in hearings and statements giaven 
in Commission interviews support the view that 
NASA management and Thiokol still considered 
the joint to be a redundant seal even after the 
change from Criticality 11R to 11. For example. 
McIntosWs interview states: 
Question: [After the Criticality I classifica- 
tion], what did you think it wou%d take to 
make [the joint seal] % R? 
Mr. MclIwtosh: I thought it was already 
% W. I thought that after those tests that 
would Rave been enough to do it. 
Question: Well, you knew it was 1 but you 
were hoping for l R ?  
Mr McIntosh: Yeah, I was hoping for 1R, 
and I thought this test data would do it, but 
it didn't. 57 
At the time (in 1982-83), the redundansy of 
the secondary O-ring was analyzed in terms of 
~ o i n t  or hardware geometry, with no considera- 
tion being given to the resiliency of the ring as 
affected by temperatures.58 Moreover, Marshall 
engineers like Ray and Miller disagreed with 
Thiokol's calculations on the measurement of joinr 
opening.59 That engineering debate eventually 
went to a "referee" for testing which was nor con- 
cluded until after the 5 1-L accident. 
Not\rithstanding the view of some of Marshall 
engineers that the secondary ring was not redun- 
dant, even at the time of the Criticality revision, 
Marshall Solid Rocket Motor program manage- 
ment appeared to believe the seal was redundant 
in ail. but exceptional.cases, Dr. Judson Loav- 
ingood told the Commission: 
". . . [Tlhere are two conditions you have 
to have before you don't have redundancy. 
One of them is what I call a spatial condi- 
tion which says that the dimensional toler- 
ances have to be such that you get a bad 
stackup, you don't have proper squeeze, etc. 
on the O-ring so that when you get joint 
rotation, you will lift the metal surfaces off 
the O-ring. All% right, that's the one condi- 
tion, and that is a  orst st case condition in- 
volving dimensional tolerances. 
"The other condition is a temporal con- 
dition which says that you have to be past 
a point ofjoint rotation, and of course, that 
relates back to what I just said. 
"So first of all, if you don't have this bad 
stackup, then you have full redundancy. 
NOW, secondly, if you do have the bad 
stackup, you had redundancy during the ig- 
nition transient up to the 170 millisecond 
point, whateaver it is, but that is the way I 
understand the [Critical Items List]."60 
George Hardy and Lawrence Mulloy shared 
Lovingood's view that the secondary seal was 
redundant in all but situations of worst case 
tolerances.61 However, there is no mention of this 
caveat in the Critical Items List itself, nor does 
it appea r in  the -subsequent "waiver" of the 
Criticality 1 status granted by NASA Levels I and 
%I in March, 1983.62 This waiver was approved 
to avoid the obligations imposed on the Shuttle 
Program by Paragraph 2.8 of the Space Shuttle 
Program Requirements Document, Level I, 
dated June 30, 1977. That paragraph states: 
"The redundancy requirements for d l  
flight vehicle subsystems (except primary 
structure7 thermal protection system, and 
pressure vessels) shall, be established on an 
individual subsystems basis, but shall not be 
less than fail-safe, 'Fail-safe9 is defined as the 
ability to sustain a failure and retain the 
capability to successfully terminate the mis- 
sion. Redundant systems shall1 be designed 
so that their operational status can be 
verified during ground turnaround and to 
the maximum extent possible while in 
flight ." 63 
Glynn Lunney, the former manager of the S T S  
Program (Level I1 at JSC) described the CrieicaXi- 
ty 1 change and resulting waiver KO the Commis- 
sion on May 2: 
Mr. Lunney: Well, the appsss.al of  the 
waiver in March of '83, at the time I was 
involved in that. I was operating on the 
assumption that there really would be 
redundancy most of the time except when 
the secondary O-ring had a set of dimen- 
sional. tolerances add up, and in that ex- 
treme case there would not be a secondary 
seal. 
So I was dealing with what 1 thought was 
a case where there were two seals unless the 
dimensional tolerances were such that there 
might only be one seal in certain cases. 
Chairman Rogers: NOW*, to me, if you ~ r % Y a l %  
excuse the expression, that sounds almost 
contradictory, what you just simd. What you 
first said was you came to the conclusion 
that you could only rely on the pmm;ary seal 
and therefore you removed the R.  
Mr. Lunney: Yes, sir. 
Chairman Rogers: And now you're saying, 
if I understand it, that experience showed 
that there was redundancy afier all. 
Mr. Lunney: No, I[ don't know of any ex- 
perience showing that. What I'm saying i s  
that the removal of the R is an indicator that 
under all circumstances we did not have 
redundancy. There were a cenain number 
of cases under which we would not have 
redundancy of the secondav O-ring. 
Recognizing that, even though there were 
a lot of cases where we expected we would 
have redundancy we changed the: criticali- 
ty designation. 
Chairman Rogers: It was saying to 
everybody else you can7t necessarily rely on 
the primary sed, and if the priimav seal 
fails, as you've said here, there may be loss 
of vehicle, mission and crew. 
Mr. Lunney: I would adjust that to only 
say you cannot rely on the secondav 0-$"g141~ 
but sve: would expect the primary O-ring to 
always be therea6+ 
The c~ticalias waiver was processed outside the 
formal NASA Program Requirements Control 
Board, hs~yever, representatives of that group 
"signed off" on the document.65 It was forward- 
ed to  Level I and approved by Associate Ad- 
ministrator for Space Flight (Technical), L. 
Michael 'Weeks ow March 28, 1983. Weeks told 
the Commission he signed the waiver because of 
she CenificationJVesifieation Review of the Pro- 
pulsion Committee in 1980. Weeks explained, 
"We felt at the time - all of the people in the pro- 
gram I think felt that this Solid Rocket Motor 
in particular or the Solid Rocket Booster was 
probab1y one of the least worrisome things we had 
in the p r n g ~ r a r n . ~ ' ~ ~  The waiver was signed less 
thaw one week prior to the launch of STS-6 on 
April 4. According to interviews of Arnold 
~\1$ric%$ and of Richard Kohrs, the latter having 
been involved wlith the waiver review at Johnson 
L,eve% 11, the waives was approved so that STS-6 
could fly." However, Weeks denied any connec- 
tion between the Level I waiver approval and the 
Wight of STS-6.68 
Although some Thiokol engineers and officialls 
claimed that they had no n ~ t i c e  of the Criticality 
change and waiver in December, 1982 and in 
IMarch, 16983, from the approval signatures (in- 
cluding 'Thiiokol"~ Operations Manager at Mar- 
shdkn%%, Maurice Parker) and the distribution of the 
Criticality and Waiver documents, apparently 
Thioksl officids were sent copies and were in- 
volved in the criticality reclassificatiofl 
Nonetheless, the Commission has also deter- 
mined ha t  aseverd documents tracking the O-ring 
erosion at Thiokol and Marshall refer to the Solid 
Rocket Msror field joint seal as Criticality 1-R, 
long afier the status was changed to Criticality 
1 
STS 41-B 0-Rina Erosion 
As F i p r e  2 showsq7B prior to STS 41-B, the 
0 - ~ n g  erosiow/blow-by problem was infrequent, 
osacsurriwg ow a fielld joint of STS-2 (November, 
19811, nozzles of STS-6 (April, 1983) and a noz- 
zle of  QM-4 (March, 1983). a qualification test 
motor fired by Thiokoll. '2 However, when STS 
41-I3 flew on February 3,  1984, the left Solid 
Rocker Booster forward field joint and the right 
nozzle joint primary O-rings both suffered ero- 
sion damage. Thiokol engineers reacted to this 
discovery by filing a problem report on the O- 
ring erosion found on STS 41-%. Thiokol 
presented a series of charts to the Marshall Solid 
Rocket Booster Engineering Office about the 
41-B O-ring erosion. Thiokol told Marshall that 
recent joint rotation measurements in tests in- 
dicated the secondary O-ring will not unseat, pro- 
viding confidence that the secondary was an ade- 
quate backup. Keith Coates described his view 
about Thiokol's data in a February 29: 1984 
memorandum to George Hardy: 
"We have two problems with their ra- 
tionale. The effect of 0.065 inch erosion on 
O-ring sealing capability is not addressed. 
We have asked Thiokol to provide their data 
to justify their confidence in the degraded 
O-ring. The second concern is the amount 
of joint rotation, L. Ray does not agree with 
Thiokol numbers, and he has action to 
discuss his concern with R. Boisjoly 
(Thiokol) and reach agreement. 
"Thiokol definition of their plans on 
resolution of the problem is-very weak." 
The erosion problem was identified and 
tracked by the Marshall Prob%em Assessment 
System as Marshall Record A07934 and by 
Thiokol as Thiokol Contractor Record 
DR4-5/30, "Slight char condition on primary Q- 
ring seal in forward field joint on SRM A57 of 
STS- 1 1 flight, Mission 41 B ." 73 The Marshall 
Problem Assessment System Report states: 
"Wemedid action - none required; prob- 
lem occurred during flight. The primary 0- 
ring sea% in the forward field joint exhibited 
a charred area approximately 1 inch %ong 
.03-. 050 inches deep and .I00 inches wide. 
This was discovered during pose-flight seg- 
ment disassembly at KSC ." 
A March 8, 1984 entry Qn the same report 
continues: 
"Possibility exists for some O-ring erosion 
on future flights. Analysis indicates max. 
erosion possible is .090 inches accordins to 
Flight Readiness Review findings for 
STS-13. Laboratory test shows sealing iw- 
tegrity at 3,000 psi using an O-ring with a 
simulated erosion depth of .095 inches. 
Therefore, this is not a constraint to future 
launches." '4 
0-Ring Anomalies Compared with Joint Temperature and Leak Check Pressure 
F/;l,,~:h I fSo/;d PT~JSUTC.  Joint 
or Roik$.t . Jo;?lt,' ( in  psi) 7 h n p  
.\dotor Datr. Boostcsr) ' 0-Ring Field 1 E ~ o ~ i o n  B1ou.- ba. O F  
BA4-1 07/18/77 - - NA NA - - 84 
Dhf -2 01/18/78 - - NA NA - - 49 
DhI-3 10/19/78 - - NA NA - - 6 1 
DM-4 02/17/79 - - NA NA - - 40 
QRI- l 07/13/79 - - NA NA - - 8 3 
QM-2 09/27/79 - - NA NA - - 6 7 
Qh% - 3 02/13/80 - - N A  NA - - 45 
STS- n 04/12/81 - - 5 o 50 - - 66 
STS-2 11/12/81 (Wight) Aft 
- ,  
FieldIPrimarv 5 0 50 X - 10 
STS-3 03/22/82 - - 5 0 50 - 69 
STS-4 06/27/82 unknown: hardware lost 
at sea 50 50 NA NA 80 
DM-3 10/2%/82 - - NA NA - - 58 
STS-3 11/1%/82 - - 5 0 5 0 - - 68 
- 4  03/21/83 - Nozzle/ 
Primarv NA NA X - 60 
STS-6 04/04/83 (Right) Nozzle/ 
(Left) Nozzle1 
STS-8 08/30/83 - - 100 50 - - 7 3 
ST§-9 11/28/83 - - 1002 1 00 - - 90 
STS 41 -B 02/03/84 
(Left) Forward Field/ 
Primary 200 100 X - 5 7 
STS 41-C 04/06/84 (Right) Nozzle/ 
Dash (-) denotes no anomaly. 
NA denotes not applicable. 
NOTE: A list of the sequence of launches (1-25), identified by STS mission designation, is pro- 
vided on pages 4 thru 6. 
On STS-6, both nozzles had a hot gas path detected in the putty with an indication of heat on 
the primary O-ring. 
On STS-9, one of the right Solid Rocket Booster field joints was pressurized at 200 psi after 
a destack. 
Pressure Join6 
(in psi) 7 k t ~ l p  
Ficld h'oz:ic E r o ~  ion Blorr - 41 O F  
STS 41-C 
jcon~'d) (Left) Aft Field/ 
Primarv 200 100 (3 )  - 6 3 
(Right) Igniter/ 
Primarv NA NA - X 63 
STS 41-D 08/38/84 (Wight) Forward 
Field/Primarv 200 100 X - 7 0 
(Left) Nozzle/ 
Primary 200 100 X X 70 
(Right) Igniter1 
Primaw NA NA - X 70 
STS 4 1 - 6  10/85/84 - - 200 100 - - 78 
TI%$-6 10/25/84 - Inner Gasket/ 
Primarv NA NA X X 5 2 
STS 5 1-A 1 1/08/84 - - 
- 200 100 - - 67 
STS 5%-C 01/24/85 (Wight) Center 
Field/Primary 200 100 X X 5 3 
(Right) Center FiddB 
Secondarv 200 % 00 (4) - 53 
(Wight) Nozzle/ 
Primarv 200 100 - X 5 3 
(Left) Forward 
FieldIPriman~ 200 100 X X 53 
(Left) Nozzle/ 
Primary 200 100 - X 53 
STS 5%-D 04/12/85 (Wight) Mozzllel 
Primarv 200 200 X - 6 7 
(Right) Igniter1 
Prirnarv NA NA - X 67 
(Left) Nozzle/ 
Primarv 200 200 X - 6 7 
(Left) Hgpliterl 
Primarv NA NA - X 67 
S T S  51-B 04/29/85 (Right) Nozzle1 
Primary 200 100 X - 75 
(Left) Nozzle/ 
Dash (--I denotes no anomaly. 
NA denores not applicable. 
NOTE: A list sf the sequence sf launches (1-25), identified by ST$ mission designation, is pro- 
\pidad OW pages 4 thru 6, 
W n  STS 4142, left aft field had a Rot gas path detected in the putty with an indication of hear 
on the primary O-ring. 
W n  a center field joint of STS 51-C. soot was blown by the primary and there was a heat effect 
on the secondary. 
F!icht t Sltiicl' P r r ~ ~ u r r  ,/olnt 
it r Rockrt j o i n (  (in psi) 7>9np 
.I lotor L)utc &oo i ( (7)  U-Hi~r,q Ficld 1 Erosion Hlori -41 b F  
STS 5%-B (Left) Nozzle1 
STS 51-G 06/17/85 (Right) Xozzlel 
Primarv 200 200 X5 X 70 
(Left) Nozz%e/ 
Primarv 200 200 X X 70 
( Left) Igniter1 
primary N -4 NA - '7 0 
STS 31-F 07/29/85 (Righr) Nozzle1 
Primarv 200 200 ( 6 )  
STS 51-1 08/27/85 (Left) Nozzllel 
Primarv 200 200 ~7 - 7 6 
200 200 - - STS 511-J 10/03/85 - - 4 9 
STS 61-A 10/30/85 (Righr) Nozz$e/ 
Primary 200 . 200 X - 7 5 
(Left) Aft 
200 X * - FieldfPrimarv 200 - 4 3  - 
(Left) Center Field/ 
Primary 200 200 - X 3 5 
STS 6 I -B 1 1/26/85 (Right) Sozzle/ 
Primarv 200 200 X a 7 6  - 
(Left) Nozzle1 
200 200 X Primarv 
STS 61 -C 01/12/86 (Right) Nozzle1 
Primarv 200 200 X - 58 
(Left) Aft 
Field/Primar\~ 200 200 X - 58 
(Left) Nozzle/ 
Primarv 200 200 - X 58 
STS 51-L 01/28/86 200 200 3 1 
Dash ( - )  denotes no anomaly. 
NA denotes not applicable. 
NOTE: A list of the sequence of launches (1-25), identified by STS mission designation, is pxo- 
vided on pages 4 thru 6. 
5 On STS 51-G, right nozzle had erosion in two places on the primary O-ring. 
6 On STS 51-F, right nozzle had Rot gas path detected in putty with an indication of heat ow rhe 
primaq O-ring. 
On STS 51-1. left nozzle had erosion in two places on the primary O-ring. 
This last esatr:. is also a summary of the briefing 
qjl-ewa ba Tl~iokol to Laivrence klulloy about the 
41-B erosion at the Level I11 Flight Readiness 
Revie\% for STS 41-C held at hlarshall on March 
8. 1984. An that same briefing. the Chief Engineer 
for United Space Boosters. George Morefield. 
ralsed praor Titan experience with O-ring prob- 
lems, Me explained in a memorandum to h4ulloy 
the fojlou ing day: 
"I alluded to the Titan I11 SRM history 
~ R s e h  i s  quire similar ro the current STS 
Solid Rocket Motor esperience. Post-fire in- 
speeaaon of Titan Solid Rocket Motor static 
resr motors showed that pressurization of the 
single O-rings in the pressure vessel routine- 
1y occurred via a single break-down path 
across the joint putty. There n-as also 
evidence that some O-rings never see 
pxssure in the Titan motor. The segment- 
to-segment case insu%ation design resu%ts in 
a compression butt joint \vhich apparentl>- 
i s  often sufficient to i\.irhstand I?, . . . . 
"Your revie\\* shoxved that there was suf- 
ficient margin of O-ring remaining to do the 
job, I'm sure you have considered that if it 
does burn through. the secondary O-ring 
will then be simiParIy pressurized through a 
single port. So. some concern remains. 
"hecornmend that you set up a panel to 
study the use of putry and consider some 
alternatives: 
" I )  Is putty needed at all? 
"2) If the tradition can't be broken, can 
the putty be applied with multiple 
(6 or. 8) pressurization paths built 
in? 
"k think that the primary seal should be 
aalcalih7ed to work in its classical design mode. 
Both the Titan and STS Solid Rocket 
Motors have been designed for this not to 
happen. Titan has flown over a -thousand 
pressure joints ~ r i t h  no failure, My opinion 
is that she potential for failure of the joint 
i s  higher for the STS Sollid Rocket Motor, 
especially when occasiondlly the secondary 
seal may not be totally effec~i\9e."~~ 
iVhen the $1-B erosion was taken to the Level 
I Flight Readiness Re\iew for 41-C on March 
30, 1984, it was briefed as a "technical issue9'. A 
seccsmmenda~ion ro fly 41-C lvas approved by 
&eve% I ""accepting the possibility of some O-ring 
erosion due to the hot gas impingement ." i 6  The  
rationale for acceptance w9as the same as that 
given at the Leave1 111 Flight Readiness Revie\$ 
and entered into the Marshall problem assess- 
ment report. An outgro\vth of this review lvas an 
April 5, 1984, directive from NASA Deputy Ad- 
ministrator Dr. Hans Mark to Lawrence h%u%loy 
at Marshall. This "Programmatic Action Hrern" 
was signed by Weeks and asked Mul%oy to con- 
duct a "formal review ofthe Solid Rocket h%orol. 
case-to-case and case-to-nozzle joint sealing pro- 
cedures to ensure satisfactory consistent close-- 
outs." 7i This action item had been preceded b\ 
a letter written from NASA Assoclatt. Xd- 
ministrator for Space Flight General Abraham- 
son to Marshall Center Director L ~ c a s . ~ ~  That 
letrer. sena Januan  18, 1984. requested that hfar- 
shall develop a pIan of action to make impro\.e.- 
ment in NASA's abilliry to design, manufacture 
and fly Solid Rocket Motors. Abrahaw~son 
pointed QUP that NAS.4 was flying motors where 
basic design and test resules were not \\-ell 
understood The letter addressed the o\.esall 
general Solid Rocket Motor design but did nor 
specifically mention O-ring erosion. 
After h'%ul%oy received the April 5 .  1984 STS 
41-C action item on the O-rings, he had 
Lawrence M'ear forward a Better to Thiokol svhic h 
asked for a formal review of the booster field joinr 
and nozzle joint sealing procedures. Thiokol\~ as 
to identify the cause of the erosion, determine 
whether it  was acceptable, define necessary 
changes, and reevaluate the putty then in use. 
The M'ear letter also requested small motor rests 
reflecting joint dynamics as well as analysis of the 
booster assembly process. g9 
Thiokol replied to the Marshall STS 41 -C ac- 
tion item on May 4. 1984, with a program plan 
entitled "Protection of SWM Primary blotor 
Seals." The plan was prepared by Brian Russell, 
then Thiokol's h4anager of S)%tems Engineering. 
It outlined a systematic program to isolate the 0- 
ring erosion and charring problem and ro 
eliminate damage to the joint sea%s.80 Proposed 
areas of inquiry included the leak check pressures. 
assembly loads, case eccentricity and putty layup. 
The Thiokol response inz Mav 1984 was merel\. 
a proposal. The actual final response to the dire;- 
tive from Marshall: was not completed until rhe 
August 19. 1985 briefing on the Solid Rocket 
hlotor seal held at S A G A  headquarters some 15 
months later.81 
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Graphs dep~ct fllght anomaly frequency for both f~eld and noz- 
zle jolnt of solid motors for a varlely of leak check pressures. 
F~gure 3 
Leak Check and Putty 
In addition to the action item from NASA 
Headquarters, another result of the 41-B erosion 
was a warning written by John Q. Miller, Mar- 
shall chief of the solid motor branch, to George 
Hardy, through Keith Coates.82 Miller was wor- 
ried about the two charred rings on 41-B and the 
"missing putty" found when the Solid Rocket 
Boosters were recovered and disassembled. He 
specifically identified the putty9s sensitivity to 
humidity and temperature as potential sources 
of problems. "The thermal design of the [Solid 
Rocket Motor] joints depends on thermal pro- 
tection of the O-ring by the [putty]," Miller said. 
Failure of the putty to "provide a thermal bar- 
rier can lead to burning both O-rings and subse- 
quent catastrophic failure." The memorandum 
also said that "the O-ring leak check procedure 
and its potential effect on the (putty) installation 
and possible displacement is also an urgent con- 
cern which requires expedition of previously iden- 
tified full scale tests." 
From the beginning, SFlhiokol had suspected the 
putty was a contributing factor in O-ring erosion, 
even after STS-2.83 In April 1983, Thiokol re- 
ported on tests conducted to study the behavior 
of the joint putty. One conclusion of the report 
was that the STS-2 erosion was probably caused 
by blow holes in the putty) which allowed a jet 
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of hot gas to focus on a point on the primarv 8- 
ring. Thiokol discovered the focused jet are au.5). 
or "impinged" on portions of the O-ring. ThiskoB 
calculated that the maximum possible impinges- 
rnent erosion was .090 inch, and that lab test 
proved that an O-ring would sea% at 3,000 psi 
when erosion of .095 inches was siqulated. Thas 
"safety marginn was the basis for appro\-ing Shut- 
tle flights while accepting the possibilit? of O-ring 
erosion .a4 
Shortly after Miller's routing slip TO Hardy 
about the "urgent concern" of the missing purr J- 
on 41-B, at Thiokol, Brian Russell authored a 
letter to Robert Ebeling which analyzed the em- 
sion history and the test data. Wusse%B's April 9, 
1984 conclusion was that the putty itself and i t s  
layup were not at fault but that eke higher 
stabilization pressure adopted an leak check pro- 
cedures, first implemented in one field joint on 
STS-9, may increase the chances sf O-ring ero- 
sion. The conclusion by Miller and Russell was 
that the air pressure forced through the joint dur- 
ing the O-ring leak check was creating more putt\- 
blow holies, allowing more focused jets on the: 
primary O-ring, thereby increasing the frequency 
of erosion. 85 
This hypothesis that O-ring erosion i s  related 
to putty blo\v holes is substantiated by the leal 
check history (Figure 3). Prior to January, 9984. 
and STS 41-B, when the leak check pressure mvas 
50 or 100 psi, only one field joint O-ring anoma- 
1v had been found during the first nine flights. 
Howearer, when the leak check stabilization 
pressure Lvas officially boosted to 200 psi for STS 
41 -B, over half the Shuttle missions experienced 
fie%$ joint O-ring blow-by or erosion of some 
kind * g 6  
Moreover, the nozzle O-ring history of prob- 
%ems is sami%ar, The nozzle joint leak check was 
changed from 50 psi to 100 psi before STS-9 
launched in November 1983. After this change, 
the incidence of O-ring anomalies in the nozzle 
jolint ancreased from 12 percent to 56 percent of 
all Shuttle Wights. The nozzle pressure was in- 
creased to 208 psi for mission 5 1 -D in April, 1985, 
and 5 1-G in June, 1985, and dl subsequent mas- 
saons. Following the implementation of the 200 
psl check on the nozzle. 88 percent of all flights 
experienced erosion or blow-by .a7 
Both Tkokol and NASA witnesses agreed that 
they were aware that the increase in blow holes 
in the purry could eontr%bute to O-ring erosion. 
The Commission testimony of May 2, 1986, 
reads: 
Dr, Walker: The analysis that some of our 
staff has done suggests that after you in- 
crease the test pressure to 200 pounds, the 
incidence sf blow-by and erosion actually 
increased. 
Mr* Russell: We realized that. 
Lawrence Mulloy was also questioned about 
the blow holes in the putty: 
Dr, Wdke~r: Do you agree that the primary 
cause of the erosion is the blow holes in the 
putty? 
Mre Mulloy: I believe it is. Yes. 
Dt, Walker: And so your leak check pro- 
cedure created blow holes in the putty? 
Mr, Mu'lloy: That is one cause of blow 
holes in the putty. 
Dr, Walker: But in other words, your leak 
check procedure could indeed cause what 
was your p r h a ~  problem. Didn't that con- 
cern you? 
Mr, Mulloly: Yes, sir.88 
Notwithstanding the knowledge that putty 
blow holes caused erosion and that higher 
pressure in the leak check caused more blow 
holes, Thiokol recommended and NASA ac- 
cepted the increased pressure to ensure that the 
joint actually passed the integrity tests.89 
The documentary evidence produced b?. 
NASA and Thiokol demonstrates that A4arshall 
was ve? concerned about the putty erosion/bloa\ 
hole problem after STS 41 -B. In addition toJohn 
Miller's routing slip about putty on STS 4 % - B  
discussed above. there is a report of a June 7. 
1984. telephone conference between kaessrs. 
Thompson, Coates and Ray (Marshall) and 
Messrs. Sayer, Boisjoly, Russell and Parker 
(Thiokol), among others.g0 Marshall told Thiokol 
that NASA was \.en. concerned about the 0-r ina 
erosion problem and that design changes \byere 
necessary, including possible putty changes. T h e  
Thiokol engineers discussed Marshall's sugges- 
tions after the telephone conference, but decided 
they could not agree a change was mandatory. 
A follow-up telephone conference was held be- 
tween Ben Powers of Marshall and Ea~vrence 
Sayer of Thiokol on July 2. Powers told Sayer 
that NASA would woe accept the removal of the 
putty from the Joint and that everyone expected 
the tests to show that gas jets would damage an 
O-ring. However, Powers expressly stated that 
Marshall would not accept Thiokol's opinion that 
no further tests were necessary. 
In mid-1984, the early tests after NASbh9s ac- 
tion item for 41-C led Thiokol to the-conclusion 
that O-ring erosion was a function of the putty 
blow hole size and the amount of free volume be- 
tween the putty orifice and the O-ring. The 
damage to the O-ring was judged to be worse 
when the blow hole was smaller and the free 
volume was larger.91 
While Slhiokoll did establish plans for putty tests 
to determine how it was affected by the leak check 
in response to the 41-C action item, their prog- 
ress in complleting the tests was slow, The action 
item was supposed to be completed by May 30, 
1984, but as late as March 6, 1985, there are 
Marshall internal memos that complain that 
Thiokol had not taken any action on Marshall's 
December I983 directive to provide data on putty 
behavior as affected by the joint leak check 
stabilization pressure .'2 
STS 5114 and Cold Temgerature 
On January 24, 1985, STS 5 1 -C was launched. 
The temperature of the O-rings at launch \\-as 53 
Description o f  .4wareness 
-Yd4SA Ojficial Position o f  O-Ring Problems 
John Young Chief. r9stronaut Office "The secret seal. \vhich no one that \ye 
know kne\v about." 93 
k4ilton Silveira Chief Engineer . ". . . If P had knownf. . . I'm sure in the 
'82 time period when we first came t s  that 
conclusion [that the seal was nor redun- 
dant], I would have insisted that we get 
busy right now on a design change and 
also look for any temporary fix w e  could 
do to improve the operation of rke 
seal." 94 
James Beggs (Former) NASA "1 had no specific concerns p.vieh the joint. 
Administrator the O-rings or the putty. . . . 7- 95 
Arnold Aldrich Manager, National Space 
Transportation System 
Jesse Moore (Former) Associate Admin- 
istrator for Space Flight 
Richard Smith Director, Kennedy Space { 
Center 
James A. Thomas Deputy Director, Kennedy 
Launch and Landing 
Operations 
F~gure 4
None were aware of Thiokol's 
concern about negative effect 
of cold temperature on O-ring perform- 
ance, nor were they 
informed of the same concern 
raised after STS 51 -@.96 
degrees, the coldest to that date, O-ring erosion 
occurred in both solid boosters. The right and left 
nozzle joint showed evidence of blow-by between 
the primaq and sitcondary O-rings. The primary 
O-ring in the left booster's forward field joint was 
eroded and had blow-by, or soot behind the 
ring.97 The right booster's damage was in the 
center field joint-the first time that field joint 
seal was damaged. Both its primary and second- 
ary O-rings were affected by heat, and the 
primary ring also had evidence of blow-by of soot 
behind it. This was also the first flight where a 
secondary O-ring showed the effect of heat. 
STS 51-6 was the second example of O-ring 
damage in flight where there was evidence of 
blow-by erosion as well as impingement erosion. 
AS noted previously, impingement erosion occurs 
where the O-ring has already sealed and a focused 
jet of hot gas strikes the surface of the ring and 
removes a portion of it. Blow-by erosion happens 
when the O-ring has not yet sealed the joirar gap 
and the edge of the ring erodes as the hsr gas flo\v> 
around it. 
Roger Boisjoly described the blop.a?-by erosion 
seen in 51-C: 
"SRM 15 [STS 5 1-61 actually increased 
[our] concern because that was the first rime 
we had actually penetrated a pramas?; O-ring 
on a field joint with hot gas, and we had a 
witness of that event because the grease be- 
tween the O-rings was blackened just like 
cod  . . . and that was so much more signifi- 
cant than had ever been seen before on any 
blow-by on any joint . . . the fact was r h a ~  
now you introduced another phenomenon. 
You have impingement erosion and bypass 
erosion, and the O-ring material gels re- 
moved from the cross section of the 0 - r i n ~  
much, much faster when you have bypass 
erosion or blow-by ." 9" 
SoisjsBy also said blon.-6y erosion \spas where 
tihe primary O-ring "at the beginning of the tran- 
sient cycle . . . is still being attacked by hot gas, 
and i t  is eroding at the same time it is trying to 
seal, and i a  is a race between. will i t  erode more 
than the rime allowed to have it seal." He describ- 
ed the b%o\v-by on 51-C as "over 100 degrees of 
arc, and the blow-by was absolutely jet black. It 
bvas totally intermixed in a homogeneous mixture 
in the grease." When the blow-by material was 
 chemical%^: analyzed, Boisjoly said, "we found the 
products of putty in it. we found the products of 
O-ring in i r  ." 
On she hiasshall problem assessment report 
that was started to track field joint erosion after 
STS 41 -B, the STS 51-C O-ring anomalv was de- 
scribed as "0-rirng burns were as bad br worse 
than prel-iously experienced . . . Design changes 
are pending test results." loo The changes being 
cons~dered included modifying the O-rings and 
adding grease around the O-rings to fill the void 
left by putty blow holes. 
O n  Januaral 3 1 ,  1985, Marshall Solid Rocket 
Booster Project Manager hlulloy sent an urgent 
message to Lawrence Wear with the stated sub- 
jeer: "51 -@ 0-Ring  Erosion Re: 5 1-E FRR." The 
anessage ordered- that the Flight Readiness 
Review for the upcoming Wight: 
""Should recap all incidents of O-ring ero- 
sion. \%pherher nozzle or case joint, and all 
incndenrs where there is evidence of flow past 
the pr ima7 O-ring. Also, the rationale used 
801- accepting the condition on the nozzle 0- 
ring.. Also, the most probable scenario and 
limiting mechanism for flow past the 
p r i m q  on the -5 1 -C case joints. If [Thiokol] 
does nor have all this for today I would like 
to see the logic on a chart with blanks [to 
be filled in]." lo' 
On February 8,  1985, Thiokol presented its 
most derailed analysis to date of the erosion prob- 
%ems to the Solid Rocket Motor project office at 
Marshall for what was then called Shuttle mas- 
sion 5 1 -E, bus later changed to 5 1-D, Thiokoli in- 
cluded a reporr on damage incurred by the O- 
rings during Wight 5 1 - 6  at the left foxward and 
right center field joints. The right center joint had 
hot gas past the primary O-ring. Thiokol said that 
caused a concern that the gas seal could be lost, 
but its resolution was "accept risk." '02 
TRiokeal presented test results showing "max- 
imum expected erosion" and "maximum erosion 
experienced" for both primary and secondary 0- 
rings for the field and nozzle joints. Accepting 
damage to the primary O-ring was being justified, 
in part, based on an assumption of the secondary 
O-ring working even with erosion. Ho\vever, ehc 
Criticality classification indicated the primary seal 
Isas a "single point faailure." During this flight 
readiness assessment at Marshall%, for the first 
time Thioko% mentioned temperature as a factor 
in O-ring erosion and b%owf-by. Thiokol said in 
its conclusions that "Pow temperature enhanced 
probability of blow-by - [flight] 5 P -C experienced 
worst case temperature change in Florida 
history." Thiokol concluded that kvhile the next 
Shuttle flight "could exhibit same behaarior," 
nonetheless "the condition is not desirable but is 
a~ceptable.~' 103
At the Level I Flight Readiness Rel~ieaar con- 
ducted on F e b r u a ~  21, there was no detailed 
analysis of O-ring problems presented or any 
reference made to low temperature effects. Instead, 
a single reference indicated the O-ring erosion and 
blow-by experienced was "acceptable' because of 
"limited exposure time and redundanc)~." 
ST$ 51-B and 
the Launch Constraint 
Joint seal problems occurred in eachof the next 
four Shuttje flights. Flight 51-D, launched April 
12, 1985 had nozzle O-ring erosion and blow-by 
on an igniter joint. STS 51-B, launched % 7 days 
later, experienced both nozzle O-ring erosion and 
blow-by as did 5 1 -G, which flew on the follo~*- 
ingJune 17. STS 51-F, launched July 29, 1985 
had nozzle O-ring blow-by. 104 
In reponse to the apparent negative effect of 
cold leading to the extensive O-ring problems on 
flight 5 1 -C in January, Thiokol conducted some 
O-ring resiliency tests in early 1985. Io5 The tests 
were conducted to quantify the seal timing func- 
tion of the secondary O-ring and the effect ofjoint 
rotation on its ability to back up the primary ring. 
The key variable was temperature. The June 3 
test report, which was described in an August 9. 
1985 letter from Brian Russel$ at Thiokol toJim 
Thomas at Marshall, showed: 
"Bench test data indicates that the O-ring 
resiliency (its capability to follow the metal) 
is a function of temperature and rate of case 
expansion. [Thiokol] measured the force of 
the O-ring against Instron platens, which 
simulated the nominal squeeze on the O-ring 
and approximated the case expansion 
distance and rate. 
"At 1 0OCF. the O-ring maintained contact. 
At i j C F  the O-ring lost contact for 2.4 
seconds. At 50°F, the O-ring did not re- 
establish contac; in ten minutes at which 
time the test was terminated."lo6 
On  June 25. 1983. the left nozzle joint of STS 
5 1-B (launched April 29) was disassembled and 
inspected after it had been shipped back to 
Thiokol. What Thiokol found was alarming. The 
primary O-ring seal had been compromised 
because ir eroded -1'7 1 inches and it did not seal. 
The secondary O-ring did seal. but it. had erod- 
ed .032 inches. Lawrence MuPloy described the 
3 I -B problem as folloab,s: 
"This erosion of a secondary O-ring was 
a new and significant event . . . that we cer- 
tainly did not understand. Everything up to 
that point had been the primary O-ring, 
even though it had experienced some ero- 
sion does seal, \%'hat we had evidence of was 
that here was a case where the primary O- 
ring was violated and the secondary O-ring 
was eroded, and that was considered to be 
a more serious observation than previously 
observed . . . 107 
"\%'hat we saw [in 5 1-B], it was evident 
that the priman ring never sealed at d l ,  and 
we saw erosion all the .%?ay around that O- 
ring, and that is where the . 17  1 came from, 
and that was not in the model that predicated 
a maximum of .090, the maximum of .090 
is the maximum erosion that can occur if the 
primary O-ring seals. 
"But in this case, the primary O-ring did 
not seal; therefore, you had another volume 
to fill, and the flow was longer and it was 
blow-by and you got more erosion." lo* 
Upon receiving the report of the 51 -B primaq 
ring failure. Solid Rocket Booster Project 
Manager Mulloy and the Marshall Problem 
Assessment Committee placed a "launch con- 
straint" on the Shuttle system.109 A 1980 Mar- 
shall letter which references "Assigning Launch 
Constraints on Open Problems Submitted to 
MSFC PAS" defines launch constraint as: 
"All open problems coded Criticality 1, 
1 R, 2. or 2R will be considered launch con- 
straints until resolved (recurrence control 
established and its implementation effeceivir? 
determined) or sufficient rationale, i.e., daf- 
ferent configuration, etc., exists to conclude 
that this problem will not occur on the flight 
vehicle during pre-launch. launch, OK 
flight ." 11° 
0 
Lawrence Mulloy told the Commission that the 
launch constraint was "put on after \ye saw thc 
secondary O-ring erosion on the 151 -Bj nozzle.'" 
"Based on the amount of charring," the prob%em 
report listing the constraint said, ""the erosio~l 
paths on the primary O-ring and xvhat 
understood about the erosion phenomenon. i t  n i  
believed that the primary O-ring [of she jol w s ]  
never sealed." 1" The constraint applied to ST5 
511-F and all flights subsequent, including S T S  
51-L. Although one Marshall documenr says thau 
the constraint applied to a%% O-ring anomalies, 
no similar launch constraint was noted on the 
Marshd Problem Assessment Wepow that started 
tracking the field joint erosion after STS 4%-B 
Thiokol officials who testified before the Com- 
mission d l  claimed they were not a\%-are of the 
July 1985 launch constraint:"3 howpever, Thaokol 
letters referenced Marshall Record number 
A09288, the report that expressly identified the 
constraint. I *  
After the launch constraint was imposed. Prq- 
ect Manager Mulloy waived it for each Shrnreffv 
flight after July 10, 1985. Mr. Mulloy and Sir. 
Lawrence Wear outlined the ]procedure in the 
following manner: 
Chairman Rogers: T o  you. \vhal: does a 
constraint mean, then? 
Mr. Mulloy: A launch constraint means 
that we have to address the obsewations, see 
if we have seen anything on the previous 
flight that changes our previous ranionale. 
and address that at the Flight Readiness 
Review. 
Chairman Rogers: When you say ""address 
it," I always get confused by the word. Do 
you mean think about it? Is that %*hat you 
mean? 
Mr. Mulloy: No, sir. I mean present the 
data as to whether or not what we ha\qe seen 
in our most recent obser\larion, which may 
not be the last flight. it may be the flight 
before that, is within our experience base 
and whether or not the previous andysis and 
tests rhae previously concluded char was an ring was eroded, and that was considered 
accepmue situation is still valid. based upon to be a more serious observation than 
later obser\7ations. . . . ~reviouslv observed. 
The consrraint n.as put on after we saw 
1 
she secondary O-ring erosion on the nozzle. Dr. Ride: Correct me if I am wrong, but 
I believe. weren't you basing most of your decisions 
on the field joint on analysis of what was the 
Chairman Rogers: M'ho decided that? maximum, what you believed to be the 
- 
Mr, Mulloy: 1 decided ehar. that that would 
be addressed. until that problem was re- 
solved, i t  would be considered a launch con- 
straint, and addressed at Flight Readiness 
Re\,iews to assure that we were staying 
w~irhira our test experience base. . . . 
Chairman Rogers: Do you have ultimate 
responsibility for \vai\ring the launch 
conseraiwr~? 
Ms, MuIloy: Yes, sir, 1 have ultimate 
responsibi$ir) for the launch readiness of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Chairman Rogers: So there was a launch 
constraint, and you waived it. 
Mr, Mulloy: Yes, sir, all flights subsequent 
PO.. . . 
Dr, Ride: I'm trying to understand how you 
deal with the launch constraint. How im- 
portant do you think a launch constraint is 
and how unusual is it in your system? 
Mr, Wear: 1 think a launch constraint is a 
significant event in our system, and it is one 
thar has to be addressed within the Flight 
Readiness cycle because I don't have the 
authority zo not do that. . . . 
Ds, Ride: Why didn't you put a launch con- 
seraiasr on the field joint at the same time? 
Mr, MuUoy: % think at that point, and I will 
react to than question in real time, because 
I haven't redly thought about it, but P think 
the loge was that we had been observing the 
field joint, the fidd and nozzle joint primary 
O-ring erosion. This erosion of a secondary 
0 - ~ n g  was a new and sipifacmt event, very 
new and significant even that we certainly 
did nor understand. Everything up to that 
point had been that the primary O-ring, 
even though it had experienced some ero- 
sion, does seal. What we had evidence of 
was that here was a case where the primary 
O-ring was violated and the secondary O- 
maximum possible erosion, and you had 
that analysis for the field joint and for the 
nozzle joint. When you saw the complete 
erosion of the primary O-ring on the noz- 
zle joint, that showed you that your analysis 
on the nozzle joint wasn't any good, I would 
think. That woulld indicate to you that vour 
analysis on the field joint wasn't very good. 
either, or at least should be suspect. 
Mr.  Mulloy: The conclusion, rightly or 
wrongly, for the cause of the secondary O- 
ring erosion on the nozzle joint, i t  was con- 
cluded from test data we had that 100 psi 
pressurization Beak check, that the putty 
could mask a primary O-ring that was nor 
sealing. The concllusion was - and that one 
was done at 100 psi. The conclusion was that 
in order to get that type of erosion t h a ~  we 
saw on the primary O-ring, that that O-ring 
never sealed, and therefore the conclusion 
was that it never was capable pf sealing. 
The leak check on subsequenr nozzles, all 
subsequent nozzles was run at 200 psi, which 
the test data indicated would ailways blow 
through the putty, and in always blowing 
through the putty we were guaranteed rhat 
we had a primary O-ring sea% that was 
capable of sealing, and then we further did, 
and we already had that on the field joints 
at that time.fl5 
While Mullloy and Wear both testified that the 
constraint was still in effect and waived for 
Challenger's flight, they told the Commission that 
there had been two erroneous entries on the 0- 
ring erosion nozzle problem assessment report 
stating the O-ring erosion problem had been 
resolved or closed. "96 Thiskol had suggested this 
closure on December 10, 198% (at Marshalys re- 
quest according to Brian Russell) but Wear and 
Mulloy told the Commission they rejected thar 
recommendation and the problem was still be- 
ing addressed in Flight Readiness Review's. l l '  
NASA Levels I and I1 apparently did not realize 
Marshall had assigned a launch constraint within 
the Problem Assessment System.N8 This corn- 
August 19, 1985 Headquarters Briefing 
General Conclusions 
* All O-ring eroslon has occurred where gas paths in the 
vacuum putty are formed 
0 Gas paths in the vacuum putty can occur during 
assembly, leak check, or during motor pressurization 
Improved filler materials or layup configurations which 
still allow a valid leak check of the primary O-rings may 
reduce frequency of O-ring erosion but will probably not 
eliminate it or reduce the severity of erosion 
* Elimination of vacuum putty in a tighter joint area will 
eliminate O-ring erosion if circumferential flow is not 
present-if it is present, some baffle arrangement may be 
required 
* Erosion in the nozzle joint is more severe due to eccen- 
tricity; however, the secondary seal in the nozzle will seal 
and will not erode through 
e The primary O-ring in the field joint should not erode 
through but if it leaks due to erosion or lack of sealing the 
secondary seal may not seal the motor * 
@ The igniter Gask-0-Seal design is adequate providing 
proper quality inspections are made to eliminate overfill 
conditions 
Recommendations 
* The lack of a good secondary seal In the field joint IS most 
crltlcal and ways to reduce jotnt rotat~on should be Incor- 
porated as soon as posslble to reduce crlttcallty 
* The flow conditions in the joint areas during ignition and 
motor operation need to be established through cold flow 
modeling to eliminate O-ring erosion 
* OM-5 statlc test should be used to qualify a Second 
source of the only flight certified jsrnl filler material 
(asbestos-filled vacuum putty) to protect the fl~ght pro- 
gram schedule 
* VLS-1 should use the only flight certified joint filler 
material (Randolph asbestos-filled vacuum putty) In ail 
joints 
Additional hot and cold subscale tests need to be con- 
ducted to Improve analyt~cal modeling of 0-rtng eroslon 
problem and for establlshlng margins of safelli for eroded 
O-rings 
* Analysis of existing data indicates than rt as safe la corl- 
tlnue flying exsttng design as long as ail joints are leak 
checked w~th a 200 psig stabilization pressure, are free of 
contamination in the seal areas and meet 0-r~ng squeeze 
requirements 
* Efforts need to continue at an accelerated pace 90 
eliminate SRM seal erosion 
munication failure was contrary to the require- 
ment, contained in the NASA Problem Report- 
ing and Corrective Action Requirements System, 
that launch constraints were to be taken to Level 
11. 
Escalating Concerns 
When the burn through of the primary nozzle 
O-ring on the left Solid Rocket Booster of STS 
51-B was discovered in Utah on June 25, 1985, 
an engineer from the NASA headquarters Shut- 
tle Propulsion Group was on the scene. Three 
days after the 5 1 -B inspection, a memorandum 
was written to Michael Weeks, also at Head- 
quarters, reporting on the primary O-ring burn 
through."g The memo blamed the problem on 
the faulty 100 psi leak check and reminded Weeks 
that Thiokol had not yet responded to the O-ring 
erosion action item sent out after STS 41-B one 
year earlier. 
Engineers at Thiokol also were increasingly 
concerned about the problem. On July 22,1985, 
Roger Boisjoly of the structures section wrote a 
memorandum predicting NASA might give the 
motor contract to a competitor or there might be 
a flight failure if Thiokol did not come up with 
a timely solution. lZ0 
Nine days later (July 3 1) Boisjoly wrote another 
memorandum titled "O-ring Erosion/Potential 
Failure CriticaIity* to R. K. Lund, Tbiokol's V i c e  
President of Engineering: 
"The mistakenly accepted position on the 
joint problem was to fly without fear of 
failure and to run a series of design evalua- 
tions which would ultimately lead to a solu- 
tion or at least a significant reduction of the 
erosion problem. This position is now 
changed as a result of the [5  1 -B j nozzle joint 
erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring 
with the primary O-ring never seding. If the 
same scenario should occur in a field joint 
(and it could), then it is a jump bdH whether 
as to the success or failure of the joint 
because the secondary O-ring camnor re- 
spond to the clevis opening rare and may nor 
be capable of pressurization. The result 
would be a catastrophe of the highest 
order - loss of human life," 
Boisjoly recommended setting up a team to 
solve the O-ring problem, and concluded by 
stating: 
"It is my honest and very real fear ahas i f  
we do not take immediate action to dedicate 
a team to solve the problem, with the field 
joint having the number one priority, ther 
we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight dong  
with all the launch pad faci8ities." I 2 l  
1139 
I n  repB? ro specific questions from htarshall on 
."august 9. Thiokolqs Brian Russell reported the 
resr data on the June 3 resiliency tests. As noted 
prevaously, he indicated O-ring resiliency was a 
function of the temperature and case expansion. 
,Also, he aztrote, 'Thiokol had no reason to suspect 
ehar the primary O-ring would fail after motor 
ipi t ion rransient. He said the secondary O-ring 
ivasuld seal writhin the period after ignition from 
O to % 70 mil%isesonds. 122 From 170 to 330 miili- 
seconds, rhe probability of the sealing of the 
secondary O-ring \%-as reduced. From 330 to 600 
millisecoxacfs, there was only a slight chance the 
- 
secondary seal would hold. 
On. August 19. 1985. Thiokol and Marshall 
program managers briefed NASA Headquarters 
on erosion of' the motor pressure seals.123 The 
briefing paper concluded that the O-ring seal was 
a critical matter, but it \%,as afe to fly. The brief- 
ing was detailed, identifying dil prior instances of 
field joint* noazlie joint and igniter O-ring erosion. 
It recommended an "accelerated pacen to elimi- 
nate seal erosion but concluded nlith the recom- 
mendation that '5t is safe to continue flying ex- 
isring design as long as all joints are leak checked 
with a 200 psig stabilization pressure, are free of 
contamination in the seal areas and meet O-ring 
squeeze requirements." The briefing conclusions 
and recommendations appear in Figure 5,ta4 
Thiokol's Roben Lund, Vice President - Engi- 
neering, noting that "the result of a leak at any 
o f  the joints ~ n ~ u l d  be catastrophic," announced 
the establishment of a Thiokol O-ring task force 
on August 20, 1985, to "investigate the Solid 
Rocker Motor case and nozzle joints, both 
materials and configurations, and recommend 
both short-term and long-term solutions." 125 
Two days later, A. R.  Thompson, Thiokol's 
supervisor of structures design, said in a 
memorandum to S. R.  Stein, project engineer, 
ehat the "O-ring seal problem has lately become 
acute." Thompson recommended near-term solu- 
tions of increasing the thickness of shims used at 
the tang and cle;is mating, and increasing the 
diameter of the O-ring. "Several long-term solu- 
eions look good; but, several years are required 
rs incorporate some of them," Thompson wrote. 
"The simple short-term measures should be taken 
8.0 reduce flight risks." During a Commission 
hearing, Thompson was asked about the larger 
diameter O-ring solution: 
Dr, Wdker: Why didn't you go to the larger 
O-ring, then? 
3 40 
Mr. Thompson: One problem in going to 
larger O-rings is in field joints- plant joints. 
excuse me. In the plant joints, if you put 
in the 295 and you take the worst on worst, 
when the joint is raised to a temperature of 
325 degrees during the curing of the insula- 
tion, it is an overfill condition because of the 
alpha problems with the case, and the 
rubber. 
Dr. Walker: There is no reason why a field 
joint and a pliant joint had to have the same 
O-ring. is there? 
Mr. Thompson: There \yere some ehat 
were afraid of the Q C  people, that were 
afraid of the confusion that might be 
developed between two nearly the same 
sized O-ring. 12' 
Thiokol's revised O-ring protection plan, dated 
August 30, 1985, indicated that NASA and 
Thiokol were still not in agreement on the 
magnitude of the joint rotation phenomenon. It 
said that "presently there are conflicting data from 
Solid Rocket Motor case hydrotest and [static 
tests] concerning the magnitude of case field joint 
rotation under motor pressure. A referee test will 
be devised, which is mutually acceptable to 
NASA and Thiokol, to determine joint opening 
characteristics." ns 
Design Questions Resurface 
Also in late August, Thiokol submitted 
"Preliminary Solid Rocket Motor Nozzle/Field 
Joint Seal Concepts" to NASA, which were "for- 
mulated to solve the [Solid Rocket Motor] seal- 
ing problems." The document contained 43 pos- 
sible design concepts for field joints and 20 for 
nozzle joints. The report said Thiokol "feels the 
case field joint poses the greatest potential risk 
in that its secondary seal may not maintain metal 
contact throughout motor operation. The nozzle 
joint is also of major concern because the frequen- 
cy and severity of seal damage experienced has 
been greater than any other joint." 
In September 1985, Thiokol's plans called for 
test-firing a static motor with various O-ring con- 
figurations. In a September 10 presentation to 
Marshall, Thiokol discussed erosion predictions. 
and evaluated primary engineering concerns in- 
cluding joint deflection and secondary O-ring 
resiliency. Temperature was not mentioned.'29 
Prior to that Thiokol presentation, Marshall 
Science and Engineering Director Kingsbury had 
informed Solid Rocket Booster Program 
h4anager Mulloy: 
"I am most anxious to be briefed on plans 
for improving the Solid Rocket Motor O-  
ring seals. Specifically, I want to review 
plans \vhich lead to flight qualifications and 
the attendant schedules. I have been ap- 
prised of general ongoing activities but these 
do not appear to carry the priority which I 
attach to this situation. I consider the O-ring 
seal problem on the Solid Rocket Motor to 
require priority attention of both Morton 
Thiokol/U'asatch and hlSFC." 130 
Early in October, internal. warnings about the 
lack of results from the O-ring task force came 
when Thiokoi's management got two Separate 
memoranda complaining about administrative 
delays and lack of cooperation. One memoran- 
dum was written by Roger Boisjoly on October 
4, 1985, and it warned Thiokol management 
about lack of management support of the O-ring 
team's efforts.131 He said that "even NASA 
perceives that the team is being blocked in its 
engineering efforts to accomplish its task. NASA 
is sending an engineering representative to stay 
with us starting October 14th. We feel that this 
is the direct result of their feeling that we 
[Thiokol] are not responding quickly enough on 
the seal problem." 
R.  V. Ebeling, manager of Thiokol's Solid 
Rocket Motor ignition system, began his October 
1, 1985, report to McDonald with the alarming 
word "HELP!" Ebeling said the seal task force was 
"constantly being delayed by every possible 
means." "Marshall Space Flight Center," he said, 
"is correct in stating that we do not know how 
to run a development program." Ebeling con- 
tinued: 
"The allegiance to the O-ring investiga- 
tion task force is very limited to a group of 
engineers numbering 8-10. Our  assigned 
people in manufacturing and quality have 
the desire, but are encumbered with other 
significant work. Others in manufacturing, 
quality, procurement who are not involved 
directly, but whose help we need, are 
generating plenty of resistance. We are 
creating more instructional paper than 
engineering data. We wish we could get ac- 
tion by verbal request, buit such is not the 
case. This is a red flag.''132 
Shuttle flight 61-A was launched October SO, 
1985. It experienced nozzle O-ring erosion and 
field joint O-ring blow-by. 133 These anomalies 
were not mentioned at the Level % Flight Readi- 
ness Review for flight 61-B. That flight was 
launched on November 26, 1985, and sustained 
nozzle O-ring erosion and b l ~ w - b y . ~ ~ ~  
The following month (December) Thiokal's 
problem status report which tracked the field joint 
erosion anomaly stated that the O-ring task force 
had made one hot gas test and preliminav sesulrs 
indicated the test chamber needed ro be re- 
designed.135 Mr. Ebeling of Thiokoli became so 
concerned about the gravity of the O-ring prob- 
lem that he told fellow members of the seal rask 
force that he believed Thiokol should not ship m y  
more motors until the problem was fixed. 
In testimony before the Commission, Ebeling 
said : 
Mr. Ebeling: Well, I am a hydraulics engr- 
neer by profession, and O-rings and seals 
and hydraulics are very sacred, but for the 
most part, a hydraulics or pneumatics enge- 
neer controls the structure, the structural 
design, the structural deformation to make 
sure that this neat little pan that is so critical 
is given every thing it needs io operate. In 
Solid Rocket Motors I have been there no\% 
pushing 25 years. They had a difkrent at- 
titude on O-rings when I came these, and 
it is not just Thiokol, it is uni%versal. 
Dr. Covert: By universal? you mean the 
solid rocket industry? 
Mr. Ebeling: The entire solid rocket in- 
dustry. It gets around from ane, the corn- 
petitors' information eventually gets to me 
by one track or another, and mine to them. 
but my experience on O-rings was and is 
to this date that the O-ring is not a 
mechanism and never should be a 
mechanism that sees the heat of the 
magnitude of our motors, and 1 think before 
I do retire, I'm going to make sure that we 
discontinue to fly with round seals which H 
am against round seals anyway. I think seals 
with memories, not pressure-activated, bur 
energized through mechanical means, and 
in all cases, keep the heat of our rsckee 
motors aavay from those seals. !'hatever it 
is. )YOU do not need chamber pressure to 
energize a seal. 
Dr, Covert: In this regard, then. did you 
have an increasing concern as you saw the 
tendency first to accept thermal distress and 
then to say, we%%, we can model this 
reasonably and we can accept a little bit of 
erosion, and then etc., etc.? Bid this cause 
you a feeling of if not distress, then betrayal 
in terms of your feeling about O-rings? 
Mr,  Ebeling: I'm sure sorry you asked that 
question. 
Mr, Covert: I'm sorry I had to. 
Mr, Ebeling: T o  answer your question. 
yes. In fact. I have been an advocate. I used 
to sir in on the O-ring task force and was 
involved in the seals since Brian Russell 
worked directly for me, and I had a certain 
alle@ance to chis type of thing anyway, that 
I felw tkar we shouldn't ship any more rocket 
motors until we got it fixed. 
Dr, Covert: Did you voice this concern? 
Mr, Ebelixlg: Unfortunately, not to the 
right people. 
The Closuie Issue 
On December 6, 1985, Thiokol's Brian Russell 
wrote AJ McDondd, Thiokol Solid Rocket Motor 
Project Director, requesting "closure of the Solid 
Rocket Motor O-ring erosion critical prob- 
lems," 37 He gave 1 7  reasons for the closure, in- 
cluding test results, future test plans and the work 
so date of Thiokol's task force. Four days later 
(December 10) PicDonald wrote a memorandum 
to NASA's Wear asking for closure of the O-ring 
problem* All O-ring erosion probllems, including 
the problem containing the July 1985 launch con- 
straint, were among the referenced matters that 
ThiokoB suggested should be closed. McDonald 
noted that the O-ring problem would not be fully 
resolved for some time, and he encl~sed a copy 
sf Thioks19s August 30 plan for improving the 
motor seals. fi'8 
Brian Russell described the problem tracking 
process and gme the reason for the closure recom- 
mendation during the following exchange: 
Mr. Russell: We have our reliability 
engineePlng department, who is responsible 
to complete the monthly problem report: and 
in addition to that we have our monthly 
problem review board telephone conference 
with NASA and the contractors, of which 
we are a part, and the monthly problem 
review or the monthly problem report that 
reliability prepares, the'y get the information 
from engineering or diom the office as neces- 
sary to complete their status of what has hap- 
pened during that month, whether the prob- 
lem originated that month or what has been 
done to close the problem out, and that i s  
submitted every month. and I for one do 
review that before it is submitted to the 
Marshall Space Flight Center, and so much 
of the information that I would read in these 
reports would be the same information that 
we had given in that monthly problem 
' report or over the telephone on the tele- 
conference. 
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Russell, when you 
say close the problem our, what do you 
mean by that? How do you close it our 
normally? 
Mr. Russell: Normally, whether it takes 
engineering analysis or tests or some cor- 
rective action, a closeout to the problem 
would occur after an adequate corrective ac- 
tion had been taken to satisfy those on the 
problem review board that the problem had 
indeed been closed out. That is the way that 
that happens; for example, we had found a 
loose bolt on the recovery one time, and we 
had to take corrective action in our pro- 
cedures and in the engineering to make sure 
that that wouldn't happen again, and then 
to verify that corrective action, and at that 
point that problem would be ready to be 
closed out. It generally involves a report or 
at least a mention by the review board 
stating what had been done to adequately 
close it out, and then it is agreed upon by 
the parties involved. . . . 
Question: What do you understand a 
launch constraint to mean? 
Mr. Russell: My understanding of a launch 
constraint is that the launch cannot proceed 
without adequately - withour everyone's 
agreement that the problem is under 
control. 
Chairman Rogers: Under control meaning problem is closed, it comes off the board and 
what? You iust said a moment ago that sou is no longer under active review. . . . 
would expect some corrective aition to be Chairman Rogers: What was being done taken. to fix it? 
Mr. Russell: That is correct, and in this 
particular case on this 5 1 -B nozzle O-ring 
erosion problem there had been some cor- 
rective action taken. and that was included 
in the presentation made as a special adden- 
dum to the next Flight Readiness Review, 
and at the time we did agree to continue to 
launch, which apparently had lifted the 
launch constraint, would be my under- 
standing. . . . 
Chairman Rogers: But really my question 
is: Did you gentlemen realize that it was a 
launch constraint? 
Mr. Russell: I would like to answer for 
myself. I didn't realize that there was a for- 
mal launch constraint on this one, any dif- 
ferent than some of the other erosion and 
blow-by that we had seen in the past. 
Mr. Ebeling: I agree. . . . 
Question: . . . Mr. Russell, you wrote a 
letter; did you not, or a memorandum in- 
dicating that the problem should be closed. 
Could you explain to the Commission 
what you meant by that? 
Mr. Russell: Yes. In our December 
telephone call on the Problem Review7 
Board -and I can't remember the date - it 
was around the 9th or so- there was a re- 
quest to close the problems out and par- 
ticularly the ones that had been open for a 
long time, of which this was one, and a long 
time meaning six months or more. 
There was a request from the Director of 
Engineering, as I recall it, that we close these 
problems out. . . . 
Dr. Walker: That was the Director of 
Engineering at Marshall? 
Mr. Russell: Yes, at Marshall Space Flight 
Center. Now, he wasn't in that call. My 
understanding is what they told us and my 
recollection was that Mr. Kingsbury would 
like to see these problems closed out. 
NOMI, the normal method of closing them 
out is to implement the corrective action, 
verify the corrective action, and then the 
Mr. Russell: Well, we had a task force 
created of full-time ' people at ThiokoB, of 
which I was a member of that task team. 
and we had done some engineering eesrs 
We were trying to develop concepts. We had 
developed some concepts to block the Wsaz 
of hot gas against the O-ring to the point 
where the O-ring would no longer be 
damaged in a new configuration. 
And we had run some cold gas rests and 
some hot gas motor firing rests and were 
working toward a solution of the problem 
and we had some meetings scheduled svirh 
the Marshall Space Flight Center M'e had 
weekly telephone calls where we starused our 
progress and there was a team rat Marshall 
also of engineering people who were 
monitoring the things that we were doing rs 
fix the problem with the goal of implement- 
ing a fix in our qualification motor No. j7 
which was scheduled at that time in Januaq ,  
this timeframe being about the December 
timeframe of last year. 
Chairman Rogers: Can I interrupt? So 
you're trying to figure out how ro fix it .  
right? And you're doing some things to try 
to help you figure out how to fix it. 
Now, why at that point would you close 
it out? . . . 
Mr. Russell: Because I was asked 10 do i e .  
Chairman Rogers: I see. Wrell, that ex- 
plains it. 
Mr. Rummel: It explairls it, but really 
doesn't make any sense. On one hand you 
close out items that you've been revie~ring 
flight by flight, that have obviously critical 
implications, on the basis that after you close 
it out, you're going to continue to try to fix 
it. 
So I think what you're really saying is. 
you're closing it out because you don'r want 
to be bothered. Somebody doesn't wan1 to 
be bothered with flight-b?+-fl ight re\-ieavs. bu; 
you're going to continue to work on it after 
it's closed out. 139 

Mr. 'fulloy: Yes, sir. That is correct. . . . 
Mr. Notz: Then you finally, you're talking 
about these margins of safer)., and I wonder 
if you could express in either percentages or 
actual measurement terms - you have used 
the term "wide margin." I wonder if you 
could give us a quantitative measurement as 
to what you consider a wide margin? 
Mr. Mulloy: Yes, sir. Well, as I said we had 
demonstrated that itre could stand 125 
thousandths of erosion and still seat. The 
maximum erosion that we had seen in the 
case joint was on STS-2, which was 53 
thousandths. so that is a factor of t\vo and 
a half . . . 
Dr. Keel: . . . I think, Larry, if you go back 
and look at your Flight Readiness Reviews, 
that you were relying on less margins than 
that. 
You were arguing in the Flight Readiness 
Reviews where you briefed the problems of 
primary O-ring erosion that for the worst 
case for the field joint also that it would be 
90 thousandths. 
Mr.  Mulloy: That is correct. 
Dr. Keel: At that point you were pointing 
out that's okay, because you can seal at 95, 
not at 125 but at 95. It wasn't until later on 
during the process that you determined you 
could seal at 125. 
Mr. Mulloy: That is when we got the hot 
gas test data. 
Dr. Keel: So that's a five percent margin, 
roughly, five and a half. 
Mr. Mulloy: On the 90 to 95 on a max 
predictable, yes.143 
Temperature Effects 
The record of the fateful series of NASA and 
Thiokol meetings, telephone conferences, notes, 
and facsimile transmissions on January 27th, the 
night before the launch of flight 51 -L, shows that 
only limited consideration was given to the past 
history of O-ring damage in terms of tempera- 
ture. The managers compared as a function of 
temperature the flights for which thermal distress 
of O-rings had been observed -not the frequen- 
cy of occurrence based on all flights (Figure 6 ). 
In such a comparison. there is nothing Irregulal- 
in the distribution of O-ring "distress" over the 
spectrum of joint temperatures at launch between 
53 degrees Fahrenheit and 75 degrees Fahrenhclit . 
When the entire history of flight experience is 
considered, including "normal" flights \.%-itb no 
erosion or blow-by, the comparison is substan- 
tially different (Figure 7). 
This comparison of flight histor). indicates r h a ~  
only three incidents of O-ring thermal distress oc- 
curred out of twenty flights with O-ring 
temperatures at 66 degrees Fahrenheit or above. 
whereas, all four flights with O-ring temperatures 
at 63 degrees Fahrenheit or below experienced 
O-ring thermal distress. 
Consideration of the entire launch temperature 
history indicates that the probability sf O-ring 
distress is increased to almost a certainty if the 
temperature of the joint is less sham 65. 
Flight Readiness Reviews 
It is clear that contractor and NASA program 
personnel all believed that the O-ring ero- 
sion/blow-by anomaly, and even the launch con- 
straint, were problems that should be addressed 
in NASA's Flight Readiness Review process, The 
Flight Readiness Review is a multi-tiered revieax 
that is designed to create an information f l s a x  
from the contractor up through Level I11 at Mar-  
shall, then to Level I1 officials from Johnson and 
Level I at Headquarters. With regard to [Re Solid 
Rocket Booster, the process begins at the elemenr: 
level and culminates in a coordinated Masshall 
position at the subsequent Levels HI and I Flaghi 
Readiness Review. 144 
NASA policy manuals list four objectives sf the 
Shuttle Projects Flight Readiness Review, an in- 
termediate review between Le\?el llII and Lea.e: 
I, when contractors and Level III program per- 
sonnel consider the upcoming launch. The stated 
objectives are: 
"1. T o  provide the review team with suffi- 
cient information necessary for them eo 
make an independent judgment regard- 
ing flight readiness. 
'2. Review solved problems and previous 
flight anomalies and establish confidence 
in solution rationale. 
Calculated Jolnt Temperature. O F  
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'9. Address all problems, technical issues, 
open items and constraints requiring 
resolution before flight. 
"1. Establish the flight baseline configuration 
particularly as-it differs from previous 
missions ." 
The Commission has reviewed the various 
documentary presentations made by Thiokol and 
NASA program people for Flight Readiness 
Re\~iews on all Shuttle flights. The O-ring presen- 
tations in those Flight Readiness Reviews have 
been summarized in an Appendix to this report. 
The erosion on STS-2 was not considered on 
any level of the Flight Readiness Review for 
STS-3 Similarly the heat effect on STS-6's 
primary O-ring in-the nozzle was not mentioned 
on the STS-7 Flight Readiness Revielv in 1983. 
However, the rationale for acceptance of the 
"secondary seal condition" for the liihtweight case 
first flown on STS-6 contained the observation 
that an O-ring sealed during a Thiokol test under 
3,000 psi where .I25 inches had been .cut out of 
the O-ring. '47 
The inattention to erosion and blow-by anoma- 
ly changed when Thiokol filed a report 
on the field joint erosion after STS 41-B. The O- 
ring problems (field and nozzle) on 41-B were 
briefed as a "technical issue" in the 41-6 Flight 
Readiness Review. "Probable causes'' were de- 
fined as: 
"Putty blow-through at ignition causes 
cavity between putty and-primary O-ring to 
fill during pressurization. Inability of putty 
to withstand motor pressure. Air entrapment 
in putty during mating. Blow holes in putty 
during joint leak test.'' 
Thiokol presented the question at its 41-C pre- 
board to Marshall, "If primary O-ring allowed 
a hot gas jet to pass through, would the second- 
ary O-ring survive impingernent?"'*8 At the 41 -C 
Level I Flight Readiness Review, on March 30, 
1984, Marshall said the erosion phenomenon was 
"acceptable" and that blow holes in the putty were 
the "most probable cause." The rationale for the 
acceptance of the possibility of erosion on STS 
4-1-6 was: 
"Conservative analysis indicates max erosion 
possible: 
".090 in. (field joint) 
".090 in. (nozzle joint) 
"Laboratory test of full scale 0-ringljoint 
cross section shows capability to sustain joint 
sealing integrity at 3!000 psi pressure using 
an O-ring with a simulated .093 in.  erosion 
depth. 
"Recommendation : 
"Fly STS 41-C accepting possibiliry of some 
O-ring gas impingement." 
The next significant treatment of the problenl 
occurred after the coldest flight, 51-C ar 53 
degrees in January 1985. In part, Thiokol's ex- 
tensive analysis for the 51-E Flight Readiness 
Review was due to the fact that four joints on 
51 -C had problems. 150 Additional1~-, hill- 
Mulloy's specific request for a recap of the O-ring 
history undoubtedly prompted a full treatment. 
Temperature was highlighted as a concern avhen 
Mulloy took Thiokol's analysis up to the Shuerle 
Projects Office Flight Readiness Revie\v. Thas 
18-page briefing concluded with the sraeemenr. 
that: "STS 51-C consistent with erosion data 
based. Low temperature enhanced probability of 
blow-by. STS-5 1-6 experienced m90rsr case 
temperature change in Florida history. ST% 5 l -E 
i 
could exhibit the same behavior. Condition as 
acceptable." 
At the Level I Flight Readiness Review for 
5 1 -E on February 21, 1985, the previous 18-page 
analysis had been reduced to a one page charr 
with the resolution: "acceptable risk because of 
limited exposure and redundancy (Ref. STS 41 -C 
FRR)". lS2 NO mention of temperature was found 
in the Level I report. 
The last m a ~ o r  discussion of erosion tvas at the 
Level I Flight Readiness Review for STS 5 1 -F 
(July 2, 1985). An analysis of the failure of the 
nozzle primary O-ring to seal due to erosion on 
flight STS 5%-B (April 29, 1985) was presented. 
This serious erosion was attributed to leak check 
procedures. An increase in the nozzle leak check 
to 200 psi was proposed to be a cure. There was 
no mention of the fact that .I71 inches of ero- 
sion on the primary O-ring far exceeded a more 
recent analysis model prediction of .070 inches 
maximum possible erosion. This was a relrision 
of the former prediction of ,090 inches. The 
launch constraint activated after STS 5 I -B was 
not specifically listed in the Level I Flight 
Readiness Review for 5 1 -F. The Commission has 
also not found any mention of the July 9.985 con- 
straint, or its waiver for subsequent Shuttle 
flights, in any Flight Readiness Review briefing 
documents. 
The Commission's review of the haarshall and 
Fhiokol dosumenray presentations at the various 
Flight Readiness lRevie\vs revealed several signifi- 
cant trends First. O-ring erosion was not con- 
sldered early ln the program \vhen it first occur- 
red Second. when the problem grew worse after 
- S TS $1 -B, rhe initial analysis of the problem did 
woe produce much research: instead, there was 
a n  earl%- acceptance of the phenomenon. Third, 
because of a belief that in-flight O-ring erosion 
sa as "svrthln she data base" of prior experience, 
Liter Flighr Readiness Revie\z~s gave a cursory 
review and often dismissed the recurring erosion 
as svithin b"'rscseptable" or "allowab%e" limits. 
koarrrh, both ThiokoP and 124arshall continued to 
rely on the redundancy of the secondary O-ring 
long after NAS.4 had officially declared that the 
seal \%as a non-redundant single point failure. 
% anally, in 1985 when temperature became a ma- 
jor concern after STS 5 P -@ and when the launch 
csnsasannr \vas app%ied after 511-B, NASA Levels 
I and I1 were nest informed of these de\velopments 
rli the Flight Readiness Review process. 
Findings 
The genesis of the Challenger accident - the 
failure of the joint of the right Solid Rocket 
h/Iotor-began with decisions made in the design 
of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol and 
YASA9s Solid Rocket Booster project office to 
understand and respond to facts obtained dur- 
Ing testing, 
The Commission has concluded that neither 
Thiokol nor YASA responded adequately to in- 
ternal \warnings about the faulty seal design. Fur- 
thermore, Thiokol and NASA did not make a 
timely attempt to develop and verify a new seal 
aAes the initial design was shown to be deficient. 
Neither organization developed a solution to the 
unexpected occurrences of O-ring erosion and 
blow-by even though this problem was experi- 
enced frequently during the Shuttle flight history. 
Instead, Thiokol and NASA management came 
to accept erosion and blow-by as unavoidable and 
an acceptable flight risk. Specifically, the Com- 
mission has found that: 
8. The joint test and certification program 
was inadequate. There was no require- 
ment to configure the qualifications rest 
motor as it ~vould be in flight, and the 
motors were static tested in a horizontal 
position, not in the vertical flight 
position. 
2. Prior to the accident. neither NASA nor 
Thiokol fully understood the mechanism 
by which the joint sealing action took 
place. 
3 .  NASA and Thioko). accepted escalating 
risk apparently because they "got a\sa!. 
with it last time." As Commissioner 
Feynman observed. the decision making 
was: 
"a kind of Russian roulette. . . . 
[The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring ero- 
sion] and nothing happens. Then it 
is suggested, therefore, that the risk 
is no longer so high for the next 
flights. We can lower our standards 
a little bit because we got away with 
it last time, . . . You got a\%.ay 
it, but it shouldn't be done over and 
over again like that." 15+ 
4. NASA's svstem for tracking anomalies for 
Flight Readiness R e v i e ~ ~ s  failed in that. 
despite a history of persistent O-ring ero- 
sion and blow-by, flight was still per- 
mitted. It failed again in the-strange se- 
quence of six consecutive launch con- 
straint waivers prior to 5 1 -L, permitting 
it to fly without any record of a waiver, 
or even of an explicit constraint. Track- 
ing and continuing only anomalies that 
are "outside the data base" of prior flight 
allowed major problems to be removed 
from, and lost by, the reporting system. 
5.  The O-ring erosion history presented to 
Level I at NASA Headquarters in 
August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to 
require corrective action prior to the next 
flight. 
6. A careful analysis of the flight history of 
O-ring pedormance would have revealed 
the correlarion of O-ring damage and 1011- 
temperature. Neither NASA nor Thiokol 
carried out such an analysis; consequent- 
ly, they were unprepared to properly 
evaluate the risks of launching the 5 1 -L 
mission in conditions more extreme than 
they had encountered before. B 
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The Sgent Safety 
Program 
he Commission was surprised to 
realize after many hours of testimony 
that NASA's safety staff was never 
mentioned. No witness related the 
approval or disapproval of the reliability 
engneess, and none expressed the sati~%8ctaon or 
dissatisfaction of the quality assurance staff- No 
one thought to invite a safety representative or 
a reliabdiry and quality assurance engineer to the 
J a n u a r ~  27,  % 986, teleconference between Mar- 
shall and Thiokol. Similarly, there was no 
representative of safety on the Mission Manage- 
ment Team that made key decisions during the 
countdown on January 28, 1986. The Commis- 
sion is concerned about the symptoms that it sees. 
The unrelenting pressure to meet the demands 
of an accelerating flight schedule might have been 
adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted 
upon the exactingly thorough procedures that 
were ~ P S  hallmark during the Apolllo program. An 
extensive and redundant safety program corn- 
*sing interdependent safety, reliability and 
qudity assurance functions existed during and 
after she lunar program to discover any poten- 
tiiaQ safety problems. Between that period and 
12 986, however, the program became ineffective. 
This loss of effec~iveness eriously degraded the 
checks and balances essential for maintaining 
sight safe"* 
On April 3, 1986, Arnold Aldrich, the Space 
Shuttle program manager, appeared before the 
Commission at a public hearing in Washington, 
D C . He described five different communication 
or organization failures that affected the launch 
decision om January 28, 1986.1 Four of those 
failures relate directly to faults within the safety 
program. These faults include a lack of problem 
reporting requirements, inadequate trend 
analysis, misrepresentation of criticality and lack 
of involvement in critical discussions . 2  A properly 
staffed, supported, and robust safety organiza- 
tion might well have avoided these faults and thus 
eliminated the communication failures. 
NASA has a safety program to ensure that the 
communication failures to which Mr. Aldrich 
referred do not occur. In the case of mission 51-E, 
that program fell short. 
NASA's Safety Program 
The NASA Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance Program should play an important role 
in agency activities, for the three concerns in- 
dicated in the program title are its functions. In 
general terms, the program monitors the status 
of equipment, validation of design, problem 
analysis and system acceptability. Each of these 
has flight safety implications. 
More specifically, safety includes the prepara- 
tion and execution of plans for accident preven- 
tion, flight system safety and industrial safety re- 
quirements. Within the Shuttle program, safety 
analyses focus on potential hazards and the assess- 
ment of acceptable risks. 
Reliability refers to processes for determining 
that particular components and systems can be 
relied on to work as planned. One product sf such 
processes is a Critical Items List that identifies 
how serious the failure of a particular item or 
system would be. 
Quality assurance is closely related to both safe- 
ty and reliability. All NASA elements prepare 
plans'and institute procedures to insure that high 
standards of quality are maintained. To  ac- 
complish that goal. elements charged with respon- 
sibility for quality assurance establish procedural 
controls. assess inspection programs, and par- 
ticipate in a problem identification and reporting 
system. 
The Chief Engineer at NASA Hezdquarters, 
has overall responsibility for safety. reliability and 
quality assurance. The ability of the Chief 
Engineer to manage N.4SA's safety program is 
limited by the structure of safety, reliability and 
quality assurance organizations within the agen- 
cy. His limited s~affof 20 persons3 includes only 
one who spends 25 percent of his time on Shut- 
tle rnaintainabiiiry, reliability and quality 
assurance and another who spends 10 percent of 
his time on these vital aspects of flight safety.+ 
At Johnson, a large number of government and 
contractor engineers support the safety, reliability 
and quality assurance program, but needed ex- 
pertise concerning h3arshall hardware is absent. 
Thus the effectiveness of the oversight respon- 
sibilities at Level I1 was limited.5 
Kennedy has a myriad of safety, reliability and 
quality assurance organizations. In most cases, 
these organizations report to supervisors who are 
responsible for processing. The clear implication 
of such a management structure is that it fails to 
provide the kind of independent role necessary 
for flight safety. 
At Marshall? the director of Reliability and 
Quality Assurance reports to the director of 
Science and Engineering who oversees the 
development of Shuttle hardware. Again, this 
results in a lack of independence from the pro- 
ducer of hardwareand is compounded by reduc- 
tions in r n a n p ~ w e r , ~  the net bringing about a 
decrease in effectiveness which has direct implica- 
tions for flight safety. 
Monitorinn Safetv Critical Items 
As part of the safety, reliability and quality 
assurance effort, components of the Shuttle 
system are assigned to criticality categories as 
fo'ollows: 
Criticality 1 Loss of life or vehicle if the 
component fails. 
Criticality 2 Loss of mission if the com- 
ponen t fails. 
Criticality 3 All others. 
Criticality 1 R Redundant components. the 
failure of both could cause 
loss of life or vehicle. 
Criticality 2R Redundant components. the 
failure of both could cause 
loss of mission. 
- 
The assignment of criticality follows a high]!. 
detailed analysis of each Space Shuttle compo- 
nent to determine the effect of various ways the 
component could fail. This analysis altva>.s 
assumes the most adverse conditions with the 
most conservative assumptions. Any cornponegal 
that does not meet the fail-safe design requlse- 
rnent is designated a Criticality 1 itern and must 
receive a waiver for use, A Critical Items List as 
produced that contains information about all 
Criticality 1 components. The Solid Rocket 
Booster Critical Items List entry for the Geld joint, 
dated December 1 7 ,  1982 is am example sf this 
process. 
Component criticality is related to test re- 
quirements in the Operational Maintenance Re- 
quirements and Specifications Document pub- 
lished and maintained by Level I1 at Johnson, 
For the Orbiter, the references from the Critical 
Items List to the requirements and specificarlons 
document are complete and traceable in both 
directions. The Solid Rocket Booster Critical 
Items List, however, does not include references 
to the requirements and specifications document 
Such references would make the Critical Items 
List a more efficient management tool for track- 
ing activities concerned with items critical lor 
flight safety. 
The next step in procedures documentation is 
the Operations and Maintenance Instaucrisn, 
which develops the directives into step-by-step 
procedures used at Kennedy by technicians, i n -  
spectors and test personnel to accomplish each 
step of the hardware preparations for Wighe, The 
current Operations and Maintenance Insamctian 
does not indicate the criticality level of 
components. 
If the Operations and Maintenance Bnseructian 
clearly indicated when the work to be performed 
related to a Criticality 1 component, dB concerned 
would be alerted that a higher than normal %eveE 
of care should be used. The same point applies 
to production activities at Thiokol where csieicali- 
ty should be directly incorporated into manufac- 
turing quality planning. 
Problem Reporting 
Prior so 1983, Level 111 was required to report 
a11 problems, trends. and problem closeout ac- 
71ons as Level II unless the problem was 
associased with hardware that was not flight- 
critical.$ UUwrtunately, this requirement was 
substantially reduced to include only those prob- 
lems which dealt kvith common hardware items 
or physical interface elements. The revision 
eliminated reposting on flight safety problems, 
flight schedule problems. and problem trends. 
The change to the reporting requirements was 
signed by James B. Jackson, Jr., for Gllynn Lun- 
ney, who was at that time manager of the Na- 
tional Space Transportation System (Level I1 
manager), The change was submitted by Mar- 
tin Raines, director of Safety, Reliability and 
Qualirv Assuraaace at Johnson.9 With this action) 
Level [I lost all insight into safety, operational 
and flight schedule issues resulting from Level 111 
problems. 
On May 19, 1986, Mr. Raines wrote a memo 
in which he explained that the documentation 
change was made in an attempt to streamline the 
sptern since the old requirements were not pro- 
ductive for the operational phase of the Shuttle 
program. " In retrospect, it is still difficult to 
understand why the director of Safety, Reliability 
and Quality Assurance at Johnson initiated this 
action, and it as even more difficult to understand 
why Level II approaved it. 
A revsew of all %eve% IEI month%y problem 
repons (Open Problem List) issued by Marshall 
during $984 and 1983 indicates that none was 
distributed to Level I1 management. From a 
1enigrh.y list of recipients, only a single copy was 
sent ro Johnson, and that one was sent to an 
engneer in the flight control division. Mr. 
Aldrich's office and the entire Johnson safety, 
reliability and quality assurance directorate were 
not on the distribution list for the problem 
repons. A Rockwell International safety, reliabil- 
ity and quality assurance contractor at Johnson 
received a statistical summaq of problem status, 
but not the actual problems descriptions. 
Reporting of In-flight Anomalies 
A second method of notifying Level I1 of prob- 
lems would have been through the in-flight 
anomaly reporting channels. The identification 
and resolution of anomalies that occur during 
flight are addressed in Space Shuttle Program 
Directive 34E. For the Solid Rocket Booster. the 
Huntsville Operations Support Center is charged 
with these activities as well as other evaluations 
and documentation of mission results. 
"The Space Shuttle Project Managers at 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Marshall, and the 
Manager for Systems Integration are 
responsible for the implementation of this 
directive in their respective areas."%' 
A letter dated October 20. 1981, from the 
manager of the National Space Transportation 
System (Level 11) addressed flighr anornal! 
resolution: 
"Beginning with the STS-2 evaluations. 
the enclosed new form and instructions. 
outlined in enclosure 1, will be utilized for 
all official flight anomaly closeouts. F%ighx 
anomalies will be presented for revie\v and 
closeout at the Noon Special PRCB [Pro- 
gram Requirements Change Board]. The 
briefing charts will be prepared by the Proj- 
ect elements. and should include a 
schematic/graph/sketch of the problem area. 
This material, along with the closeout form 
and appropriate signatures, wiII become a 
part of the permanent closeout record. 
Enclosure 2 provides a sample of c%oseour 
material from STS-1 that- would be 
acceptable. 
""Your cooperation in this activity will be 
appreciated." 
Since O-ring erosion and blow-by were con- 
sidered by Marshall to be Plight anomalies,13 ehe 
letter above would appear to require reporting 
by the Solid Rocket Booster Project Office to 
Level 11. However, the sample closeout material 
attached to the 1981 letter was identified as per- 
taining to "Flight Test" (the first four flights). The 
1983 change might well have been interpreted as 
superseding the 1981 Lunney letter, particu%ar- 
ly since the program officially became "opera- 
tiona%" in Bate 19882. 
The reporting of anomdies (unexpected events 
or unexplained departures from past experience) 
that occur during mission performance is a key 
ingredient in any reliability and quality assurance 
program. Through accurate reporting, careful 
analysis and thorough testing, probiems or recur- 
rence of problems can be prevented. In an effec- 
tive program, reporting, analysis, testing and irn- 
plementation of corrective measures must be fully expected function of any reliability and quality 
documented. assurance program. As previously noted. the 
The level of management that should be in- history of problems with the Solicl Rocket Booster 
formed is a function of the seriousness of the prob- O-ring took an abrupt turn in January, 1984. 
Iem. For Criticality 1 equipment anomalies, the when an ominous trend began. Until that date. 
communications must reach all levels of manage- only one field joint O-ring anomdy had been 
ment. Highly detailed and specific procedures for found during the first nine flights of the Shuttle. 
reporting anomalies and problems are essential Beginning with the tenth mission, however, and 
to the entire process. The procedures must be concluding withthe twenty-fifth. the Challenger 
understood and followed by all. flight, more than half of the missions expernenced 
Unfortunately, NASA does not have a concise field joint O-ring blow-by or erosion of some 
set of problem reporting requirements. Those in kind. 
effect are found in numerous individual In retrospect, this trend is easily recognizable 
documents, and there is little agreement about According to Wiley Bunn, director of Weliabil- 
which document applies to a given level of ity and Quality Assurance at Marshall: 
management under a given set of circumstances 
for a given anomaly. "I agree with you from my peilrviekt in 
qualitv, but we had that data. %t was a mat- 
ter of assembling that data and looking a1 
Safetv Program Failures 
The safety, reliability and quality assurance 
program at Marshall serves a dual role. It is 
responsible for assuring that the hardware 
delivered for use on the Space Shuttle meets 
design specifications. In addition, it acts as a 
"watch dog" on the system to assure that sound 
engineerins judgment is exercised in the use of 
hardware and in appraising hardware problems. 
Limited human resources and an organization 
that placed reliability and quality assurance func- 
tions under the director of Science and Engineer- 
ing reduced the capability of the "watch dogn role. 
Much of what follows concerns engineering 
judgments and decisions by engineers and 
managers at Marshall and Morton Thiokol. It 
is the validity of these judgments that the Corn- 
mission has examined closely. In its "watch dogn 
role, an effectively functioning safety, reliability 
and quality assurance organization could have 
taken action to prevent the 51-L accident. 
In the discussion that follows, various aspects 
of the Solid Rocket Booster joint design issue 
discussed earlier will be reviewed in the context 
of safety, reliability and quality assurance. The 
critical issue, discussed in detail elsewhere, in- 
volves the O-rings installed to seal the booster 
joints. 
Trend Data 
Development of trend data and the possible 
relationships between problems is a standard and 
it in the proper lashion. Had we done rhar. 
the data just jumps off the page at you."'B4 
This striking change in performance shou1d 
have been observed and perhaps traced to a rosr 
cause. No such trend analysis was conducted. 
While flight anomalies involving the O-rings 
received considerable attention as Morran 
Thiokol and at Marshall, the significance of the 
developing trend went unnoticed. The safer y , 
reliability and quality assurance program. of 
course, exists to ensure that such trends are 
recognized when they occur. 
A series of changes to Solid Rocket Boosrer 
processing procedures at Kennedy may be signifi- 
cant: on-site O-ring inspections were discon- 
tinued; O-ring leak check stabilization pressure 
on the field joint was increased to 200 pound per 
square inch from 100, sometimes iblow~rag holes 
through the protective putty; the patterns for posi- 
tioning the putty were changed; the putty type 
was changed; re-use of motor segment casings in- 
creased; and a new government contractor began 
management of Solid Rocket Booster assembly. 
One of these developments or a combination of 
them was probably the cause of the higher 
anomaly rate, The safety, reliability and quality 
assurance program should have tracked and 
discovered the reason for the increasing erosion 
and blow-by. 
The history of problems in the nozzle joint i s  
similar to that of the Solid Rocker Booster fie%$ 
joint. While several of the changes mentioned 
above also could have influenced the frequency 
Pressure tEsRS at 200 pounds per square inch of the Solid 
Pocket Booster joints produced bubbles in putty used to line 
she JOBPIPS 
of nozzle O-ring problems, the frequency cor- 
relates with leak check pressure to a remarkable 
degree. 
Again, development of trend data is a standard 
and expected function of any reliability and qual- 
ity assurance program. Even the most cursory ex- 
amination of failure rate should have indicated 
that a seAsus and potentially disastrous situation 
was developing on all Solid Rocket Booster joints. 
Not recog~izing and reporting this trend can only 
be described, in NASA terms, as a "quality 
escape," a failure of the program to preclude an 
avoidable If the program had func- 
tioned properly, the Challenger accident might 
have been avoided. The trend should have been 
identified and analyzed to discover the physical 
processes damaging the O-ring and thus jeopard- 
izing she integrity of the joint. 
A likely cause of the O-ring erosion appears 
to have been she increased leak check pressure 
that caused hazardous $ 1 0 ~  holes in the putty. 
Such holes at booster ignition provide a ready 
path for combustion gases directly to the O-ring. 
The blow holes were known to be created by the 
was visible on the inside core of the Solid Rocker 
Booster. 
The trends of flight anomalies in relation to 
leak check stabilization pressurk are illustrated for 
the field joint and the nozzle joint in Figure 3. 
on page 133. While the data point concerning the 
100 pound per square inch field joint leak check 
is not conclusive since it is based on only two 
flights, the trend is apparent. 
Management Awareness 
During its investigation, the Commission 
repeatedly heard witnesses refer to redundancy 
in the Solid Rocket Motor joint and argue o v e r  
the criticality of the joint. While the field joint 
has been categorized as a Criticality 1 item since 
1982 (page 1571, most of the problem reporting 
paperwork generated by Thiokol and Marshall 
listed it as Criticality lR, perhaps leading some 
managers to believe - wrongly - that redundan- 
cy existed. The Problem Assessment System 
operated by Rockwell contractors at Marshall. 
which routinely updates the problem status still 
listed the field joint as Criticality %W on March 
7, 1986, more than five weeks after the accident. 
higher pressure used in the Ieak check. The Such misrepresentation of criticality must also be 
phenomenon was observed and even photo- categorized as a failure of the safety. reliabiiity 
graphed prior to a test firing in Utah on May 9, and quality assurance program. As a result. in- 
1985. In that particular case, the grease from the formed decision making by key managers was 
O-ring was actuaIjy blown through the putty and impossible. 
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Mr. Bunn, the director of Reliability and 
Quality Assurance at Marshall, stated on April 
17, 1986: 
"But the other thing you will notice on 
those problem reports is that for some reason 
on the individual problem reports we kept 
sticking [Criticality] I-R on them and that 
is just a sheer quality escape."ls 
The Impact of Misinformation 
The manner in which misinformation in- 
fluences top management has been illustrated by 
former Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
Jesse Moore. 
"And then we had a Flight Readiness 
Review, I guess, in July. getting ready for 
a mid-July or a late July flight. and the ac- 
tion had come back from the project office. 
I guess the Level I11 had reported to the 
Level I1 Flight Readiness Review, and then 
they reported up to me that - they reported 
the two erosions on the primary (O-ring) and 
some 10 or 12 percent erosion on the sec- 
ondary (O-ring) on that flight in April, and 
the corrective actions, I guess, that had been 
put in place was to increase the test pressure, 
I think, from 50.psi [pounds per square inch] 
to 200 psi or 100 psi - I guess it was 200 psi 
is the number-and they felt that they had 
run a bunch of laboratory tests and analyses 
that showed that by increasing the pressure 
up to 200 psi, this would minimize or 
eliminate the erosion, and that there would 
be a fairly good degree of safety factor 
margin on the erosion as a result of increas- 
ing this pressure and ensuring that the sec- 
ondary seal had been seated. And so we left 
that FRR [Flight Readiness Review] with 
that particular action closed by the proj- 
ect. . . . " 16 
Not only was Mr. Moore misinformed about 
the effectiveness and potential hazards associated 
with the long-used "new* procedure, he also was 
misinformed about the issue of joint redundan- 
cy. Apparently, no one told (or reminded) Mr. 
Moore that while the Solid Rocket Booster noz- 
zle joint was Criticality l R ,  the field joint was 
Criticality 1. No one told him about blow holes 
in the putty, probably resulting from the in- 
creased stabilization pressure, and no one told 
him that this "new" procedure had been in use 
since the exact time that field joint anomalies had 
become dangerously frequent. At the time of this 
briefing. the increased pressure already had been 
used on four Solid Rocket Motor nozzle joints, 
and all four had erosion. Erosion was the enem?.. 
and increased pressure was its ally. 
While Mr.  Moore was not being intentionally 
deceived, he was obviouslj. misled. The reporr- 
ing system simply was not making trends, status 
and problems visible with sufficient accuracy and 
emphasis. 
Reporting Launch Constraints 
The Commission was surprised to %earn that 
a launch constraint had been imposed on the 
Solid Rocket Booster. It was further surprised to 
learn that those outside of Marshall were nor 
notified. Because of the seriousness of the mis- 
sion 51-B nozzle O-ring erosion incident, Baunch 
constraints were placed against the next six Shut- 
tle flights. A launch constraint arises from a flight 
safety issue of sufficient seriousness to justify a 
decision not to launch. The initial problem 
description stated that, "based on the amount of 
charring, the erosion paths on the pnmaq  0 - ~ n g  
and what is understood about the erosion 
phenomenon, it is believed that the pnmar). 0- 
ring of SRM 16A [the Solid ~ o c k e t  Motor on 
flight 5 1 -B] never seated." l 7  The maximum ero- 
sion depth was 0.17 1 inches on the -primary 0- 
ring and 0.032 inches on the secondary. On  
February 12, at a Level 111 Flight Readiness 
Review, maximum expected erosion ow nozzle 
joint O-rings had been projected as 0.870 inches 
for the primary and 0.004 inches for the second- 
ary. Thus, the results far exceeded the max- 
imum expected. If this same ratio of actud to pro- 
jected erosion were to occur on a field joint, the 
erosion would be 0.225 inches. With secondary 
seal inadequacy, as indicated by Criticality 1 
status, that degree of erosion could result in joint 
failure and loss of vehicle and crew. 
The Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
document (JSC 08126A, paragraph 3.2d) re- 
quires project offices to inform Level 11 of launch 
constraints. That requirement was not met, 
Neither Level 11 nor Level I was informed. 
Implications of an Operational Program 
Following successful completion of the orbital 
flight test phase of the Shuttle program, she 
system was declared to be operational. Subse- 
quenrlv. se~~erajI safety. reliabiIity and quality 
assurance organizations found themselves with 
reduced and/or reorganized functional capabil- 
iev. Included. nota.bly, were the Marshall offices 
where there was wet attrition18 and NASA Head- 
quaners where there were several reorganizations 
and transfers. 
The apparent reason for such actions was a 
pereep"on that less safety, reliability and quali- 
ty assurance aetiapity would be required during 
"raurine" Shuttle operations. This reasoning was 
faulry.. The maehineq is highly complex, m d  the 
requirements are exacting. The Space Shuttle re- 
mains a totaP1y new system with little or no 
h i s t o ~ .  AS the system matures and the experience 
chmges, careful tracking will be required to pre- 
vent premature failures. As the flight rate in- 
creased, nlore hardware operations were in- 
vsSved, and more total in-flight anomalies 
occurred. l3 Tracking requirements became more 
rather than less critics% because of implications 
for the newt sight in an accelerating program, 
T w o  problems on mission 61-e): were not 
ewduaaed as pan of the review process for the next 
aght ,  5 9 -E, A serious failure of the Orbiter wheel 
brake was not known to the crew as mission 5%-L 
lifted off with a pian to make the .first Kennedy 
Banding since a similar problem halted such 
operations in April, 1985.20 Secondly, an O-ring 
erasion problem had occurred on mission 6 1 -C , 
and while i t  had been discovered, it had not been 
incoqorated into the Problem Assessment 
System when mission 5 1-L was launchede2P If rhe 
p r o g t m  cannot ciome to grips with such criticall 
safety aspects before subsequent flights are 
scheduld to occur, *it obviouslly is moving too 
fast? or its sde~y ,  reliability and quality assurance 
p r o ~ m s  must be strengthened to provide more 
mpid response. 
me inherent risk of the Space Shuttle program 
is dcfmed by the combination of a highly dynamic 
environment, enormous energies, mechanical 
complexities, time consuming preparaxions and 
extremely time-c~ticd decision making. Com- 
placency m d  failures in supervision and report- 
ing seriously aggavate these risks. 
Rather than weaken safety, reliability and 
qudity assuraglce programs through attrition and 
reorganization, NASA must elevate and 
srrenshen these vital functions. In addition, 
3XSAqs traditional safety, reliability and quali- 
ty ssurance effons need to be augmented by an 
alert and vigorous organization that oversees the 
flight safety program. 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (she 
"panein in what foIIows) was established in the 
dfremath of the Apolld spacecraft fire January 
27, 1967. Shonly thereafter the United States 
Congress enacted legislation (Section 6 of the 
NASA Authorization Act, 1 968; 42 U .S.C . 24'7 7)  
to establish the panel as a senior advisory com- 
mittee to NASA. The statutory duties of the panel 
are: 
"The panel shall review safety studies and 
operations plans referred to it and shdI make 
reports thereon, shall advise the Ad- 
minisrrator with respect to the hazards of 
proposed operations and with respect to the 
adequacy of proposed or existing safety 
standards, and shall perform such other 
duties as the Administrator may request." 
'The panel membership is set by statute at no 
more than nine members, of whom up to four 
may come from NASA. The NASA Chief Ewgi- 
nee; is an ex-officio member. The staff consists 
of full-time NASA employees, and the staff direc- 
tor serves as both executive secretary and 
technical assistant to the panel. 
The sole of the panel has been defined and 
redefined by the members themselves, NASA 
senior management and members of the House 
and Senate of the U .S. Congress. The panel 
began to review the Space ~ h ; t t l e  program in 
1971, and in its 1974 annual reporr, i t  
documented a shift in focus: 
''The panel feels that [a] broader exarnina- 
tion of the programs and their management 
gives them more confidence than in limiting 
their inquiry to safety alone."22 
Over ensuing years, the panel continued to ex- 
amine the Space Shuttle program including safe- 
ty, reliability and quality assurance; systems 
redundancy; flight controls; and ground process- 
ing and handling, though management issues 
continued to dominate their concerns. Followring 
the first flight of the Shuttle, the panel in: 
vestigated a wide variety of specific subjects. to 
include the lightweight External Tank, the Cen- 
raur and Inertial Upper Stage programs, Shut- 
tle logistics and spare parts, landing gear, tires, 
brakes, Solid Rocket klotor nozzles and the Solid 
Rocket blotor using the filament-wound case. 
There is no indication, howevert that the details 
of SoIid Rocket Booster joint design or in-flight 
problems were ever the subject of a panel activi- 
ty. The efforts of this panel were not sufficiently 
specific and immediate to prevent the 51-L 
accident . 
Space Shuttle Program Crew 
Safetv Panel 
The Space Shuttle Crew Safety Panel, 
established by Space Shuttle Program Directive 
4A dated April 17, 1971, served an lmponant 
function in NASA flight safety activities, until it 
went out of existence in 198 1. If it were still in 
existence, it might have identified the kinds of 
problems now associated with the 51-L mission. 
The purpose of the panel was twofold: (1) to iden- 
tify possible hazards to Shuttle crews and (2) to 
provide guidance and advice to Shuttle program 
management concerning the resolution of such 
conditions. 
The membership of the panel comprised 10 
representatives from Johnson and a single 
representative each from Dryden (the NASA 
facility at Edwards Air Force Base, California), 
Kennedy, bZarshall and the Air Force. 
The panel was to suppon the Level 11 Program 
Requirements Control Board chaired by the proj- 
ecr manager, and recommendations were subject 
to Control Board approval. 
From 1974 through 1978, the panel met on a 
regular basis (24 times) and considered vital issues 
ranging from mission abort contingencies to 
equipment acceptability. The membership of the 
panel from enpneering, project management and 
asrronaut offices ensured a minimum level of safe- 
ty communications among those organizations. 
This ceased to exist when the panel effectiarely 
ceased to exist in 1980. *3 XASA had expected the 
panel to be functional only "during the design, 
development and flight test phases" and to "con- 
cern itself with all vehicle systems and operating 
modes."24 When the original chairman. Scott H. 
Simpkinson. retired in 1981. the panel was 
merged bvith a safety subpanel that assumed 
neither the membership nor the functions of the 
safety panel. After that time. the NASA Shuttle 
program had no focal point for flight safety. 
The Need for a New Safety 
Organization 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel unques- 
tionably has provided NASA a valuable service. 
which has contributed to the safety of NASA"s 
operations. Because of its breadth of activities. 
however, it cannot be expected to uwcoa7er all of 
the potential problems nor can it be charged with 
failure when accidents occur that in hlndsighr 
were clearly probable. The ability of any panel 
to function effectively depends on a focused scope 
of responsibilities. An acceptable level of opera- 
tional safety coverage requires the rard csmbiaa- 
tion of NASA and contractor organlaatlons, 
working more effectively on a coordinated basis 
at all levels. The Commission believes, therefore, 
that a top-to-bottom emphasis on. safety can bcsr 
be achieved by a combination of a strong central 
authority and a working level panel devoted ro 
the operational aspects of Shuttle flight safety 
I .  Reductions in the safety, seliiabiliry and 
quality assurance work force at Marshall 
and NASA Headquarters have serious- 
ly limited capability in those vital 
functions. 
2. Organizational structures at Kennedy 
and Marshall have pPacd safety, 
reliability and quality assurance offices 
under the supervisiorl of the very 
organizations and activities whose effons 
they are to check. 
3 .  Problem reporting requirements are not 
concise and fail to get critical informa- 
tion to the proper levels of management. 
4. Little or no trend analysis was pedommed 
on O-ring erosion and blow-by problems. 
5. As the flight rate increased, the Marshall 
safety, reliability and quality assurance 
work force was decreasing, whleh 
adversely affected mission safety. 
6. Five weeks after the 51-L accident, the 
criticality of the Soiid Rocker Motor field 
joint was still not properly documented 
in the problem reporting system at 
Marshall. 
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Chapter VIII 
Yressures on 
the Svstem 
ith the 1982 completion of the or- 
bital flight test series, NASA 
began a planned acceleration of 
the Space Shuttle launch sched- 
ule. One early plan contemplated an eventual rate 
of a mission a week, but realism forced several 
downward revisions. In 1985, NASA published 
a projection calling for an annual rate of 24 flights 
by 1990. Long before the Challenger accident, 
however, it was becoming obvious that even the 
modified goal of two flights a month was 
overambitious. 
In establishing the schedule, NASA had not 
provided adequate resources for its attainment. 
As a result, the capabilities of the system were 
strained by the modest nine-mission rate of 1985, 
and the evidence suggests that NASA would not 
have been able to accomplish the 15 flights 
scheduled for 1986. These are the major conclu- 
sions of a Commission examination of the 
pressures and lprobllems attendant upon the ac- 
celerated launch schedule. 
On the same day that the initial orbital tests 
concluded -Jury 4, 1982 -President Reagan an- 
nounced a national policy to set the direction of 
the U.S. space program during the following 
decade. As pan of that policy, the President stated 
that: 
"The United States Space Transportation 
System (STS) is the primary space launch 
system for both national security and civil 
government missions ." 
Additionally, he said: 
"The first priority of the STS program is 
to make the system fully operational and 
cost-effective in providing routine access so 
space." 
From the inception of the Shuttle, NASA had 
been advertising a vehicle that would make space 
operations "routine and economical." The greater 
the annual number of flights, the greater the 
degree of routinization and economy, so heavy 
emphasis was placed on the schedule. However, 
the attempt to build up to 24 missions a year 
brought a number of difficulties, among them the 
compression of training schedules, the lack of 
spare parts, and the focusing of resources on near- 
term problems. 
One effect of NASA's accelerated flight sate and 
the agency's determination to meet it was the dilu- 
tion of the human and material resources that 
could be applied to any particular flight, 
The part of the system responsible for turning 
the mission requirements and ab~ectives into 
flight software, flight trajectory information and 
crew training materials was struggling to keep up 
with the flight rate in late 1985, and forecasts 
showed it would be unable to meet i t s  miIesecanes 
for 1986. It was faIIing behind because its 
resources were strained to the limit, strained by 
the flight rate itself and by the constant changes 
it was forced to respond to within that accelerating 
schedule. Compounding the problem was the fact 
that NASA had difficulty evolving from its single- 
flight focus to a system that could efficiently sup- 
port the projected flight rate. It was slow in 
developing a hardware maintenance plan for its 
reusable fleet and slow in developing the 
capabilities that would allow it to handle the 
higher volume of work and trainung associated 
with the increased flight frequency. 
Pressures developed because of the need to 
meet customer commitments. which translated 
into a requirement to launch a certain number 
of Wights per year and to launch them on time. 
Such considerations may occasionally have 
obscured engineering concerns. Managers may 
have forgotten - partly because of past success, 
partly because of their own well-nurtured image 
of the program - that the Shuttle was sea11 in a 
research m d  development phase. In his testimony 
before a BJ . S. Senate Appropriations subcommit- 
see on May 5 ,  1982, following the third flight of 
the Space Shuttle, James Beggs. then the NASA 
Adminlsrrator, expressed NASA's commitment: 
"The highest priority we have set for 
NAS4Ba is to complete development of the 
Shuttle and turn it into an operational 
svsxem. Safety and reliability of flight and 
the control of operational costs are pr ima7 
objecti~~es as we move fom~ard with the Shut- 
tie program .e9s 
Sixteen months later, arguing in support of the 
Space Station, Mr. Beggs said, "We can start 
anytime. . . . There's no compelling reason [why] 
ir has to be 1985 rather than '86 or '87. The point 
that we have made is that the Shuttle is now 
operational."2 The prevalent attitude in the pro- 
gram appeared to be that the Shuttle should be 
ready to emerge from the developmental stage, 
and managers were determined to prove it 
""operational .," 
Various aspects of the mission design and 
devdspment process were directly affected by that 
determination. The sections that follow will 
discuss the pressures exerted on the system by the 
flight rate, the reluctance to relax the optimistic 
ssheduie, and the attempt to assume an opera- 
tlonail status. 
Planning of a Mission 
The planning and preparation for a Space 
Shuttle fiight require close coordination among 
those making the flight manifest, those design- 
ing the flight and the customers contracting 
NASA's semices. The goals are to establish the 
manifest; define the objectives, constraints and 
capabilities of the mission; and translate those into 
hardware, software and flight procedures. 
There are major program decision points in the 
development of every Shuttle flight. At each of 
these points, sometimes called freeze points. deci- 
sions are made that form the basis for further 
engineering and product development. The 
disciplines affected by these freeze points include 
integration hardware, engineering, crew timelinc. 
flight design and crew ;training. 
The first major freeze point is at launch minus 
15 months. At that time the flight is officiaily 
defined: the launch date, Orbiter and major 
payloads are all specified, and initial design and 
engineering are begun based on this information. 
The second major freeze point is at launch 
minus 7 . 7  months, the cargo integration rek~ien.. 
During this review, the integration hardkvare 
design. Orbiter vehicle configuration. flighr 
design and software requirements are agreed to 
and specified. Further design and engineering can 
then proceed. 
Another major freeze point is the flight plan- 
ning and stowage review at Iaunch minus G1.e 
months. At that time, the crew activity timeline 
and the crew companment configuration, which 
includes rniddeck payloads and payload specialist 
assignments, are established. Final design, 
engineering and training are based on these 
products. 
Develonxnent of Flight Products 
The "production process" begins by collecting 
all mission objectives, requirements and con- 
straints specified by the payload and Space Shut- 
tle communities at the milestones described 
above. That information is interpreted and 
assimilated as various groups generate products 
required for a Space Shuttle flight: trajectory 
data, consumables requirements, Orbiter flighr 
software, Mission Control Center software and 
the crew activity plan, to name just a few. 
Some of these activities can be done in parallel. 
but many are serid. Once a particular process 
has started, if a substantial change is made to the 
flight, not only does that process have to be 
stmed again, but the process that preceded it and 
supplied its data may also need to be repeated. 
If one group fails to meet its due date, the group 
that is next in the chain will start late. The delay 
then cascades through the system. 
Were the elements of the system meeting their 
schedules? Although each group believed it had 
an adequate amount of time allotted to perform 
its function, the system as a whole was fafalling 
SRuttle Itfission Simulator Training 
When Shuttle Mission Simulator Training Began in 
Compar~son With the Normal Launch-minus-77-Days 
Tra~ning Start Date 
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Graph depicts beginn~ng of simulator training for Shuttle 
crews in days before launch for m~ssions 41-8 through 61-E. 
behind. An assessment of the system's overall per- 
formance is best made by studying the process 
at the end of the production chain: crew train- 
ing. Analysis of training schedules for previous 
flights and projected training schedules for flights 
in the spring and summer of 1986 reveals a clear 
trend: less and less time was going to be available 
for crew members to accomplish their required 
training. (See the Shuttle mission simulator train- 
ing chart.) 
The production system was disrupted by 
several factors including increased flight rate, lack 
of efficient production processing and manifest 
changes. 
Changes in the Manifest 
Each process in the production cycle is based 
on information agreed upon at one ofthe freeze 
points. If that information is later changed, the 
process may have to be repeated. The change 
could be a change in manifest or a. change to the 
Orbiter hardware or software. The hardware and 
software changes in 1985 usually were mandatov 
changes; perhaps some of the manifest changes 
were not. 
The changes in the manifest were caused by 
factors that fall into four general caregoies: hard- 
ware problems, customer requests, operational 
consrrainss and external factors. The significant 
changes made in 1985 are shown in the accom- 
panying table. The following examples illustrate 
r h a ~  a single proposed change can have extensive 
impact, nor because the change itself is particular- 
iv difficult ro accommodate (though it may be), 
but because each change necessitates four or five 
other changes The cumulative effect can be 
substanrid. (See the Impact of Manifest Changes 
chart.) 
When a change occurs, the program must 
choose a response and accept the consequences 
of that response. The options are usually either 
to maximize the benefit to the customer or to 
minimize rhe adverse impact on Space Shuttle 
operations, If the first option is selected, the con- 
sequences will include short-term andlor long- 
term effects. 
Hardware problems can cause extensive 
changes in the payload manifest. The 5%-E mis- 
sion was ow the launch pad, only daysfrom 
launch, with a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
and Telesat satellite in the cargo bay, when a 
hardware pro"e>em in the tracking satellite was 
discovered. That flight was canceled and the 
payload reassigned. The cancellation resullted in 
major changes to sever& succeeding flights. Mis- 
sion 5 P -D, scheduled to fly two months Iater, was 
chmged to add the Telesat and delete the retrieval 
of the Long Duration Exposure Facility. The 
retrievd mission was then added so mission 61-1, 
replacing another saw%lite. A new mission (6 1 -M) 
was scbedu$e$ for July, 1986, to accommodate 
she Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and the 
displaced satellite, and all flights scheduled later 
in 1986 slipped to make room for 61-M. 
Customers occasionally have notified NASA 
Headqmlaers of a desire to change their sched- 
uled Paunch date because of development prob- 
lems, financial difficulties or changing market 
conditions. NASA generally accedes to these re- 
quests and has never imposed the penalties 
a\~ai%able, An example is the request made to 
delay the flight of the Westar satellite from mis- 
sion 61-C (December, 9985) to a flight iw March, 
1986. Westar was added to flight 61-E, and the 
Getaway Specid bridge assembly was removed 
to make room for it; the HS-376 satellite slot was 
deleted kom 51-L and added to 61-6; the 
Spanan-Halley satellite was deleted from 61-D 
md added to 5 1 -L. Thus, four flights experienced 
rnsJ.0~ payload changes as a result of one 
customer's request. 
1985 Changes in the Manifest 
Hardware Problems 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (canceled 
51-E, added 6%-M). B 
Synchronous Communication Satellite (added 
to 6%-C)* 
Synchronous Communication Satellite (re- 
moved from 6 1 -C). 
OV-102 late delivery from Palmdale 
(changed to 51 -G, 51-1, and 61-8). 
Customer Requests 
HS-376 (removed from 5 1 -I). 
G-Star (removed from 6 1-6). 
Satellite Television Corporation - Direct 
Satellite (removed from 6 1 -El. 
Wesxar (removed from 6 1 -C) . 
Satellite Television Corporation - Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (removed from 6 1 -PI[). 
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed 
from 61-B). 
Electrophoresis Operations in Space (removed 
from 6 1 4 ) .  
Hubble Space Telescope (swap with Earth 
Observation Mission). 
Operational Constrazkts 
No launch window for SkynetIIndian Satellite 
Combination (61-H). 
Unacceptable structural loads for Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite/Indian Satellite (61-H). 
Landing weight above allowable limits for each 
of the following missions: 61-A, 61-E, 7 1 - 8 ,  
6 1 -K. 
External Factors 
Late addition of Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) 
(51-D). 
Late addition of Representative Bill Nelson (D- 
Florida) (6 l 4). 
Late addition of Physical Vapor Transport 
Organic Solid experiment (5 1 -I). 
Impact of Manifest Changes 
on Workload at Johnson Space Center 
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Graph shows that changes to the payload manifest for Shuttle 
miss~ons can boost Johnson Space Center workload as much 
as 130 percent. 
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at Kennedy 
Operational constraints (for example, a con- 
straint on the total cargo weight) are imposed to 
insure that the combination of payloads does not 
exceed the Orbiter's capabilities. An example in- 
volving the Earth Observation Mission Spacelab 
flight is presented in the NASA Mission Planning 
and Operations Team Report in Appendix J. 
That case illustrates that changes resulting from 
a single instance of a weight constraint violation 
can cascade through the entire schedule. 
External factors have been the cause of a 
number of changes in the manifest as well. The 
changes discussed above involve major payloads, 
but changes to other payloads or to payload 
specialists can create problems as well. One smdil 
change does not come alone; it generates several 
others. A payload specialist was added to mission 
6 1 -C only two months before its scheduled lift off* 
Because there were already seven crew members 
assigned to the flight, one had to be removed. The 
Hughes payload specialist was moved from 61 -C 
to 51-L just three months before 51-EL was 
scheduled to launch. His experiments were also 
added to 51-L. Two middeck experiments were 
deleted from 51-L as a result, and the delered ex- 
periments would have reappeared on later Rights. 
- 
Simulation Training 
When Shuttle Simulator Tra~ning Began In Compar~son with 
the Normal Launch-Minus-77-Days Tra~ning StaPf Date 
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Again, a "dngle" late change affected at least two cargo integration review, have only a minimal 
flights very late in the planning and preparation impact; changes at launch minus five months (two 
cycles. months after the cargo integration review) can 
The effects of such changes in terms of budget, carry a major impact, increasing the required 
cost and manpower caw be significant. In some resources by approxirnatelly 30 percent. In the 
cases, the dlocation of additional resources dows  missions from 4% -6: to 5 11 -L, only 60 percent of 
the change to be accommodated with little or no the major changes occurred before the cargo in- 
impact to the overall schedule. In those cases, tegration review. More than 20 percent occurred 
steps that weed to be re-done can still be ac- after launch minus five months and caused 
complis~ed before their deadlines. The amount disruptive budget and manpower impacts.3 
of additional resources required depends. of Engineering flight products are generated 
course, on the magnitude of the change and when under a contract that allows for increased es- 
the change occurs: early changes, those before the penditures to meet occasional high workloads. 
Even tvith this built-in flexibility. ho\vever, the 
requested changes occasionally saturate facilities 
and personnel capabilities. The strain on re- 
sources can be tremendous. For short periods of 
two to three months in mid-1985 and early 1986, 
facilities and personnel were being required to 
perform at roughly twice the budgeted flight rate. 
If a change occurs late enough, it will have an 
impact on the serial processes. In these cases, ad- 
ditional resources will not alleviate the problem, 
and the effect of the change is absorbed by all 
downstream processes, and ultimately by the last 
element in the chain. In the case of the flight 
design and software reconfiguration process, that 
last element is crew training. In January. 1986, 
the forecasts indicated that crews on flights after 
51-L. would have significantly less time than 
desired to train for their flights.* (See the Simula- 
eion Training chart .) 
According to Astronaut Henry Hartsfield: 
"Had we not had the accident. we were 
going to be up against a wall: STS 61-H 
. . . would have had to average 3 1 hours in 
the simulator to accomplish their required 
training, and STS 61-K would have to 
a17erage 33 hours. That is ridiculous. For the 
first time, somebody was going to have to 
stand up and say we have got to slip the 
launch because \\.e are not going to have the 
crew trained ."5 
"Operational9' Capabilities 
For a long time during Shuttle development, 
the program focused on a single flight, the first 
Space Shuttle mission, When the program be- 
came "operational," flights came more frequent- 
ly, and the same resources that had been applied 
to one flight had to be applied to several flights 
concurrently. Accomplishing the more pressing 
immediate requirements diverted attention from 
what was happening to the system as a whole. 
That appears to be one of the many telling dif- 
ferences between a "research and development" 
program and an "operational program." Some of 
the differences are philosophical, some are at- 
ticudinal and some are practical. 
Elements within the Shuttle program tried to 
adapt their philosophy, their attitude and their 
requirements to the "operational era." But that 
era came suddenly, and in some cases, there had 
not been enough preparation for what ""opera- 
tional" might entail. For esample. mutine and 
regular post-flight maintenance and inspections 
are critical in an operational program: spare pares 
are critical to flight readiness in an operational 
fleet; and the software tools and training faciliries 
developed during a test program may not be 
suitable for the high volume of work required in 
an operational environment. In many respects. 
the system was not prepared to meet an ""opera- 
tional" schedulle, 
As the Space Shuttle system matured, with 
numerous changes and compromises. a com- 
prehensive set of requirements was developed to 
ensure the success of a mission. What evolved was 
a system in which the preflight processing. flight 
planning, flight control and flight training were 
accomplished with extreme care applied to ever\. 
detail. This process checked and rechecked 
everything, and though it was both labor- and 
rime-intensive, it was appropriate and necessary 
for a system stil% in the developmencd phase. This 
process, however, was not capable of meeting the 
flight rate goals. 
After the first series of flights, the system 
developed plans to accomplish what was required 
to support the flight rate. The challenge was to 
streamline the processes through automarion. 
standardization, and centralized management, 
and to convert from the developmental phase to 
the mature system without a compromise in 
quality. It required that experts carefully analyze 
their areas to determine what could be standard- 
ized and automated, then take the time to do st .  
But the increasing flight rate had priority - 
quality products had to be ready on time. Fur- 
ther, schedules and budgets for developing the 
needed facility improvements were not adequate. 
Only the time and resources left after supporring 
the flight schedule could be directed toward ef- 
forts to streamline and standardize. In 19635, 
NASA was attempting to develop the capabilities 
of a production system. But it was forced to do 
that while responding-with the same person- 
nel - to a higher flight rate. 
At the same time the flight rate was inereas-- 
ing, a variety of factors reduced the number of 
skilled personnel available to deal with i t ,  These 
included retirements, hiring freezes, transfers to 
other programs like the Space Station and eran- 
sitioning to a single contractor for opwations 
support. 
The flight rare did not appear to be based om 
assessment of available resources and capabilities 
and was nor: reduced to accommodate the capacity 
of the work force. For example, on January 1, 
1986, a new contract took effect at Johnson that 
consolida~ed the entire contractor work force 
under a single company. This transition was 
another disturbance at a time when the work force 
needed to be performing at full capacity to meet 
the 1986 flight rate. In some important areas, a 
significant fracrion of workers elected not to 
change contractors. This reduced the work force 
and its capr%bi%iries. and necessitated intensive 
~ranning programs to qualify the new personnel. 
According to projections, the work force would 
not have been back to full capacity until the sum- 
mer of 1986. This drain on a critical part of the 
system came just as NASA was beginning the 
most challenging phase of its flight schedu1ee6 
SnmiIarIy, at Kennedy the capabilities of the 
Shuttle processing and facilities support work 
force became increasingly strained as the Orbiter 
turnaround time decreased to accommodate the 
accelerated launch schedule. This factor has 
resulted in ovenime percentages of almost 28 per- 
cent in some directorates. Numerous contract 
employees have worked 72 hours per week or 
longer and frequent 112-hour shifts. The poten- 
tial implications of such overtime for safety were 
made apparent during the attempted launch of 
mission 61-42 on January 6, 1986, when fatigue 
and shifiwsrk were cited as major contributing 
factors to a serious incident involving a liquid 
oxygen depletion that occurred less than five 
minutes before scheduled lift off. The issue of 
workload at Kennedy is discussed in more detail 
in Appendix 6. 
Another example of a system designed during 
the de\qe%~pmentd phase and struggling to keep 
up with operati,ond requirements is the Shuttle 
Mission Simulator. There are currently two 
simulators. They support the bulk of a crew's 
training for ascent, orbit and entry phases of a 
Shuttle mission. Studies indicate two simulators 
can support no more than 12- 15 flights per year. 
The flight race at ehe time of the accident was 
about to saturate the system's capability to pro- 
vide trained astronauts for those flights. Further- 
more, the two existing simulators are out-of-date 
and require constant attention to keep them 
operatins at capacity to meet even the rate of 
12- 15 flights per year. Although there are plans 
PO improve capability, funds for those im- 
provements are minimal and spread out over a 
10-year period. This is another clear demonstra- 
tion that the system was trying to develop its 
capabilities to meet an operational schedule but 
was not given the time, opportunity or resources 
to do it.' 
Responding to Challenges 
and Changes 
Another obstacle in the path toward accom- 
modation of a higher flight rate is NAS.4's legen- 
dary "can-do" attitude. The attitude that enabled 
the agency to put men on the moon and to build 
the Space Shuttle will not allow it to pass up an 
exciting challenge-even though accepting the 
challenge may drain resources from the more 
mundane (but necessasy) aspects of the program. 
A recent example is NASA's decision to per- 
form a spectacular retrieval of two communica- 
tions satellites whose upperstage motors had 
failed to raise them to the proper geosynchronous 
orbit, NASA itself then proposed to the insurance 
companies who owned the failed satellites that the 
agency design a mission to rendezvous with them 
in turn and that an astronaut in a jet backpack 
fly over to escort the satellites into the Shuttle's 
payload bay for a return to Earth. 
The mission generated considerable excitement 
within NASA and required a substantial effort 
to develop the necessary techniques, hardware 
and procedures, The mission was conceivedg 
created, designed and accomplished within 10 
months. The result, mission 5 11 -A (November, 
1984), was a resounding success, as both failed 
satellites were successfuly returned to Earth. The 
retrieval mission vividly demonstrated the senrice 
that astronauts and the Space Shuttle can 
perform. 
Ten months after the first retrieval mission, 
NASA launched a mission to repair another com- 
munications satellite that had failed in %ow-Earth 
orbit, Again, the mission was developed and ex- 
ecuted on relatively s h o ~  notice a d  was resound- 
ingly successful for both NASA and the satellite 
insurance industry. 
The satellite retrieval missions were not isolated 
occurrences, Extraordinary efforts on NASA's 
part in developing and accomplishing missions 
will, and should, continue, but such efforts will 
be a substantial additional drain on resources. 
NASA cannot both accept the relatively spur-of- 
the-moment missions that its "can-do9' attitude 
tends to generate and also maintain the planning 
and scheduling discipline required to operate as 
a "space truck" on a routine and cost-effecti\?e 
basis. As the flight rate increases, the cost in 
resources and the accompanying impact on future 
operations must be considered when infrequent. 
but extraordinary efforts are undertaken. The 
system is still not sufficiently developed as a "pro- 
duction line" process in terms of planning or im- 
plementation procedures. It cannot routinely or 
eeven periodically accept major disruptions 
without considerable cost. NASA's attitude 
historically has reflected the position that "We can 
do anything," and while that may essentially be 
true, NASXs optimism must be tempered by the 
realization that it cannor do everything. 
NASA has al\%.ays taken a positive approach 
to problem solving and has not evolved to the 
point where its officials are Lvilling to say they no 
longer have the resources to respond to proposed 
changes. Harold Draughon. manager of the Mis- 
sion Integration Office at Johnson. reinforced this 
point by describing ~vhat ~voulid have to happen 
in 1986 to achieve the flight rate: 
"The next time the guy came in and said 
'I want to get off this flight and want to move 
down ttvo' . . . [the s\?stem ~vould have had 
to say.] 4l.e can't d d  that.' and that would 
have been the decision."s 
Even in the event of a hardlvare problem. after 
the problem is fixed there is still a choice about 
holv to respond. Flight 41-D had a main engine 
shutdown on the launch pad. It had a commer- 
cial payload on it? and the NASA Customer Sen -  
ices division wanted to put that commersial 
payload on the next flight (replacing some NASA 
payloads) to satisfy more customers. Draughon 
described the effect of that decision to the Corn- 
mission: "We did that. We did not have to. And 
the system went out and put that in work, but 
it paid a price. The next three or four flights all 
slipped as a result ."9 
NASA \sfas being too bold in shuffling mani- 
fests. The total resources available to the Shuttle 
program for allocation were fixed. As time went 
on, the agency had to focus those resources more 
and more on the near term -worrying about to- 
day's problem and not focusing on tomorro\v's. 
NASA also did not have a \vay to forecast the 
effect of' a change of a manifest. As already in- 
dicated, a change to one flight ripples through 
the manifest and typically necessitates changes to 
many other flights, each requiring resources 
(budget, manpower, facilities) to imp%emenar. 
Some changes are more expensive than others, 
but all have an impact, and those impacts must 
be understood. 
In fact, Leonard ~icholsbn, manager of Space 
Transportation System Integration and Opera- 
tions at Johnson, in arguing for the development 
of a forecasting tool, illustrated the fact that the 
resources were spread thin: "The press of busi- 
ness would have hindered us getting that kind of 
tool in place, just the fact that all of us were 
busy .  . . . "10 
The effect of shuffling major payloads caw be 
significant. In addition, as stated earlier, even ap- 
parently "easyn changes put demands ow she 
resources of the system. Any middeck or second- 
ary payload has, by itself, a minimal impact com- 
pared with major payloads. But when several 
changes are made, and made late, they put sipifi- 
cant stress on the flight preparation process by 
diverting resources from higher p~ormty problems. 
.Volume I11 of JSC 07700, Revision B, specifies 
that all middeck experiments must be scheduled, 
and payload specialists assigned, 22 %leeks before 
launch." That rule has not been enforced-in 
fact, it is more honored in the breach than in the 
observance. A review of missions 43-G through 
6 1 -C revealed that of the 16 payload specaalists 
added to those flights, seven were added ae'rer 
launch minus five months. 
Even "secondary" payloads take a %st of time 
and attention when they are added to a flight late. 
Harold Draughon: 
"I spend more than half of my time work- 
ing on things that are not very important 
because they get put in so late. Rather thaw 
working on PAM'S [Payload Assist Modules] 
and IUS's [Inertial Upper Stages], 1 am 
working on chicken eggs ."I2 
Those directing the changes in the manifest 
were not yet sensitive to the problem. Each 
change nibbles away at the operational resources. 
and the changes were occurring frequentlj*, 
even routinely. Much of the capacity of the 
system was being used up responding to Bare 
changes in lower priority experiments. Thar flexi- 
bility toward secondary experiments tied up the 
iesources that would have been better spent build- 
ing capability to meet the projected Right rate. 
Tommy Hollo~fay. chief of the Johnson Flight 
Director Office. emphasized that. given finite 
resources, one must decide: "It's flight rate ver- 
sus [maxaifes] flexibility."13 
The portion of the system forced to respond 
so the late changes in the manifest tried to bring 
its concerns to Headquarters. As h%r. Nicholson 
explained. 
"M'e haase done enough complaining about 
it that 1 cannot believe there is not a grow- 
ing awareness, but the political aspects of the 
decision are so overwhelming that our con- 
cerns do not carry much weight. . . . The 
general argument we gave about distracting 
the attention of the team late in the process 
of implementing the flight is a qualitative 
argument . . . . And in the face of that, 
political advantages of implementing those 
late changes outweighed our general 
Is is important to determine how many flights 
can be accommodated. and accommodated safe- 
ly, NASA must establish a realistic level of ex- 
pectation, then approach it carefully. Mission 
schedules sbotn%d be based on a realistic assess- 
ment of what NASA can do safely and well, nor 
on what is possible with maximum effort. The 
gound rules must be established firmly, and then 
enforced. 
The attitude is imponant; and the word opera- 
tional can mislead. "Operationall" should not im- 
ply any less commitment to quality or safety, nor 
a dilutnon of resources. The attitude should be, 
"We are going to fly high risk flights this year; 
e v e y  one is goiIIig to be a challenge, and every 
one is going to involve some risk, SO we had bet- 
ter be careful in our approach to 
Effect of Flight Rate on Spare Parts 
As tho flight rate increases, the demand on 
resources and the demand for spare parts in- 
creases. Since 1981, NASA has had logistics plans 
for Shuttle flight rates of 12 and 24 flights a year. 
IP was origindly forecast (in mid-1983) that the 
supply of spares required to support 12 flights an- 
nually could be accomplished in the spring of 
9986. Actual inventory of spare parts had run 
close to plan until the second quarter of fiscal year 
1985. Ae that time, inventory requirements for 
spares began to increase faster than deliveries. 
A year later, when inventory stockage should 
have been complete, only 32,000 of the required 
50,000 items (65 percent) had been delivered.I6 
The spare parts plan to support 24 flights per 
year had called for completing inventory stockage 
by June, 1987. By mid-1985, that schedule was 
in jeopardy. 
The logistics plan could not be fully im- 
plemented because of budget reductions. In Oc- 
tober, 1985, the logistics funding requirement for 
the Orbiter program, as determined by Level 111 
management at Johnson, was $285.3 million. 
That funding was reduced by $83.3 million - a 
cut that necessitated major deferrals of spare pans 
purchases. Purchasing deferrals come at great 
cost. For example, a reduction due to deferral of 
Q 1 1 -2  million in fiscal year 1986 would cost Q 1 1 . 2  
million in fiscal year 11987, plus an additional 
$21.6 million in fiscal year 1988. This chree-to- 
one ratio of future cost to current savings is not 
uncommon. Indeed, the ratio in many instances 
is as high as seven to one. This practice cannot 
make sense by any standard of good financial 
management. 
According to Johnson officials, reductions in 
spares expenditures provided savings required to 
rneet the revised budgets. As Program Manager 
Arnold Aldrlch reported to the Commission: 
"There had been fund contentions in the 
program for a number of years, at least starr- 
ing in the mid-seventies and running 
through into the early to mid-eighties . . . 
intentiond decisions were made to defer the 
heavy build-up of spare parts procurements 
in the program so that the funds could be 
devoted to other more pressing activities. 
. . . It was a regular occurrence for several 
annual budget cycles. And once the flight 
rare really began to rise and it was really 
clear that spare pans were going to be a 
problem, significant attention was placed on 
that problem by d l  levels of NASA and ef- 
forts had been made to catch up. But . . . 
our pans availability is well behind the flight 
need. . . . 9917 
Those actions resulted in a critical shortage of 
serviceable spare components. T o  provide parts 
required to support the flight rate, NASA had to 
resort to cannibalization. Extensive cannibaliza - 
tion of spares, i.e., the removal of components 
from one Orbiter for installation in another, 
became an essential modus operandi in order to 
maintain flight schedules. Forty-five out of ap- 
proximately 300 required parts were cannibalized 
for Challenger before mission 5 1 -L. These parts 
spanned the spectrum from common bolts to a 
thrust control actuator for the orbital maneuver- 
ing system to a fuel cell. This practice is costly 
and disruptive, and it introduces opportunities 
for component damage. 
This concern was summarized in testimony 
before the Commission by Paul U'eitz, deputy 
chief of the Astronaut Office at Johnson: 
"It increases the exposure of both Orbiters 
to intrusion by people. Every time you get 
people inside and around the Orbiter you 
stand a chance of inadvertent damage of 
whatever type, whether you leave a tool 
behind or whether you, without knowing it, 
step on a wire bundle or a tube or something 
along those lines." l 8  
Cannibalization is a potential threat to flight 
safety, as parts are removed from one Orbiter, 
installed in another Orbiter, and eventually 
replaced. Each handling introduces another op- 
portunity for imperfections in installation and for 
damage to the parts and spacecraft. 
Cannibalization also drains resources, as one 
Kennedy official explained to the Commission on 
h4arch 5 ,  1986: 
"It creates a large expenditure in man- 
power at KSC. A job that you would have 
normally used what we will call one unit of 
effort to do the job now requires t\vo units 
of effort because you've got two ships [Or- 
biters] to do the task with." l9 
Prior to the Challenger accident, the shortage 
of spare parts had no serious impact on flight 
schedules, but cannlbalization is possible only so 
Iong as Orbiters from which to borrow are 
available. In the spring of 1986, there would have 
been no Orbiters to use as "spare parts bins." 
Columbia was to fly in March, Discovery was to 
be sent to Vandenberg, and Atlantis and 
Challenger were to fly in May. In a Commission 
intenview, Kennedy director of Shuttle Engineer- 
ing Horace Lamberth predicted the program 
would have been unable to continue: 
"I think \re would have been brought to 
our knees this spring [I9861 by this problem 
[spare parts] if we had kept trying to fly." 
NASA's processes for spares provisioning 
(determining the appropriate spares intten~ory 
levels), procurement and inventory control are 
complicated and could be streamlined and 
simplified. 
As of spring 1986, the Space Shuttle logistics 
program was approximately one year behind. 
Further, the replenishment of all spares (e%?en 
parts that are not currently available in t h e  
system) has been stopped. Unless logistics sup- 
port is improved, the ability to maintain e v e n  a 
three-Orbiter fleet is in jeopardy. 
Spare parts provisioning is yet another illustra- 
tion that the Shuttle program was not prepared 
for an operational schedule. The policy was shsrr- 
sighted and led to cannibdization in order to meet 
the increasing flight rate. 
The Importance of 
Flight Ex~erience 
In a developmental program it is important to 
make use of flight experience, both to understand 
the system's actual performance and to uncover 
problems that might not have been disco'vered in 
testing. Because Shuttle flights were coming in 
fairly rapid succession, it was becoming difficult 
to analyze all the data from one flight before the 
next was scheduled to launch. In fact, the Flight 
Readiness Review for 51-L was held while mis- 
sion 61 -C was still in orbit. Obviously, it was im- 
possible to even present, much less analyze and 
understand, anomalies from that flight. 
The point can be emphasized by citing ~ M ~ O  
problems that occurred during mission 6 1 -C but 
were discovered too late to be considered at the 
5 1 -L Flight Readiness Review: 
1. The Space Shuttle brakes and tires has?e 
long been a source of concern. In panicular, 
after the 51-D Orbiter blew a tire at Ken- 
nedy in April, 1985, there was considerab%e 
effort (within budgetary constraints) to 
understand and resolve the problems, and 
Kennedy landings were suspended until cer- 
tain improvements were made. (See section 
"Landing: Another Critical Phase," page 186 .) 
Mission 51-L was to be the first flight eo %and 
in Florida since 5 1 -D had experienced brake 
problems. STS 6 1 -C landed at Edwards Air 
Force Base in California on January 19, 
1986. four days after the 51-E Flight 
Readiness Review. The 61 -C brakes were 
remo\ved following landing and shipped to 
the \rendor for further inspection and 
analysis. That inspection revealed major 
brake damage. The subsystem manager at 
Johnson in charge of the brakes did not 
reclelxVe the information until January 27, 
1986, one day before 51-L was launched, 
and did not learn the extent of the problem 
until January 30, 1986. 
2. The inspection of the 61 -C Solid Rocket 
Booster segments was completed on January 
19, 1986, four days after the 51-L Level I 
Flight Readiness Review. The post-recovery 
inspection of the 6% -6 Solid Rocket Booster 
sepenrs  reayeded that there was O-ring ero- 
sion in one of the %eft booster field joints and 
additional O-ring anomalies on both booster 
nozzles. Although the information was 
available for Marshall's 51-L Level I11 
review at launch minus one day, it was clear- 
ly not available in time for consideration in 
the forma4 launch preparation process.21 
These examples underscore the need to 
establish a list of mandatory post-flight in- 
spections that must precede any subsequent 
launch. 
Effect on Payload Safety 
The payload safety process exists to ensure that 
each Space Shuttle payload is safe to fly and that 
on a ~ v e n  mission the total integrated cargo does 
not create a hazard. NASA policy is to minimize 
its involvement in the payload design process. 
The payload developer is responsible for produc- 
ing a sak design, and the deavelloper must verify 
compliance with NASA safety requirements. The 
Payload Safety Panel at Johnson conducts a 
phased series of safety reviews for each payload. 
At those reviews, the payload developer presents 
matend so enable the panel to assess the payload's 
compliance with safety requirements. 
Problems may be identified late. however, 
oAen as a msult of late changes in the payload 
design and late inputs from the payload 
developer. Obviously, the later a hazard is iden- 
tified, the more difficult it will be to correct, but 
the payload safety process has worked well in 
identifying and resolving safety hazards. 
Unfortunately, pressures to maintain the flight 
schedule may influence decisions on payload safe- 
ty provisions and hazard acceptance. This in- 
fluence was evident in circumstances surrounding 
the development of two high priority scientific 
payloads and their associated boosrer, the 
Centaur, 
Centaur is a Space Shuttle-compatible booster 
that can be used to carry heavy satellites from the 
Orbiter's cargo bay to deep space. It was sched- 
uled to fly on two Shuttle missions in May, 1986. 
sending the NASA Galileo spacecraft to Jupiter 
and the European Space Agency Ulysses space- 
craft first to Jupiter and then out of the planets" 
orbital plane over the poles of the Sun. The 
pressure to meet the schedule was substantial 
because missing launch in May or early June 
meant a year's wait betore planetary dignmenr 
would again be satishctory. 
Unfortunately, a number of safety and 
schedule issues clouded Centaur's use. In par- 
ticular, Centaur's highly volatllle cryogenic pro- 
pellants created several problems. If a return-to- 
launch-site abort ever becomes neckssary, the 
propelllants will definitely have to be dumped 
overboard. Continuing safety concehns about the 
means and feasibility of dumping added pressure 
to the launch preparation schedule as the program 
stmgg%ed to meet the launch dates. 
Of four required payload safety reviews, @en- 
taur had complleted three at the time of the 
Challenger accident, but unresolved issues re- 
mained from the last two. In November, 1985. 
the Payload Safety Panel raised several impor- 
tant safety concerns. The final safety review, 
though scheduled for late January, 1986, ap- 
peared to be slipping to February, only three 
months before the scheduled launches. 
Several safety waivers had been granted, and 
several others were pending. Late design changes 
to accommodate possible system failure would 
probably have required reconsideration of some 
of the approved waivers. The military version of 
the Centaur booster, which was not scheduled to 
fly for some time, was to be modified to provide 
added safety, but because of the rush to get the 
1986 missions launched, these improvements 
were not approved for the first two Centaur 
boosters. After the 5 1 -L accident, NASA allotted 
more than $75 million to incorporate the opera- 
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tional and safety improvements to these two 
vehicles.22 M'e will never know whether the 
payload safety program would have aIlowed the 
Centaur missions to fly in 1986. Had they flown. 
however, they would have done so without the 
level of protection deemed essential after the 
accident. 
Outside Pressure to Launch 
The flight activity officer who was responsible 
for developing the crew activity plan testified that 
three live telecasts were planned for the 
Challenger, but they related in no \%*a?* to the 
State of the Union M e ~ s a g e : ~ ~  
During the teacher activities on flight day 4. 
During the phase partitioning experiment 
on flight day 5. 
During the crew conference on flight day 6. 
After the accident, rumors appeared in the 
press to the effect that persons who made the deci- 
sion to launch mission 5 1 -L might have been sub- 
jected to outside pressure to launch. Such rumors 
concerning unnamed persons, emanating from 
anonymous sources about events that may never 
have happened, are difficult to disprove and 
dispel. Yonetheless, during the Commission9s 
hearings all persons who played key roles in that 
decision were questioned. Each one attested, 
under oath, that there had been no outside in- 
tervention or pressure of any kind leading up ro 
the launch. 
There was a large number of other persons who 
were involved to a lesser extent in that decision, 
and they were questioned. All of those persons 
provided the Commission with sworn statements 
that they knew- of no outside pressure or 
intervention. 23 
The Commission and its staff also questioned 
a large number of other witnesses during the 
course of the investigation. No evidence was 
reported to the Commission which indicated that 
any attempt was ever made by anyone to apply 
pressure on those making the decision to launch 
the Challenger. 
Although there was total lack of evidence that 
any outside pressure was ever exerted on those 
who made the decision to launch 51-L, a few 
speculative reports persisted. 
One rumor was that plans had been made to 
have a live communication hookup with the 5 1 -L 
crew during the State of the union Message. 
Commission investigators interviewed d1 of the 
persons who would ha1.e been involved in a 
hookup if one had been planned, and all stated 
unequivocally that there was no such plan. Fur- 
thermore, to give the crew time to become 
oriented. NASA does not schedule a communica- 
tion for at least 48 hours after the launch and no 
such communication was scheduIed in the case 
of flight Sf -L. 
The Commission concluded that the decision 
to launch the Challenger was made solely by the  
appropriate NASA officials wirhcrur an!. outside 
intervention or pressure. 
Findings 
1. The capabilities of the system were stretched 
to the limit to support the flight rate in winter 
19851 1986. Projections into the spring and sum- 
mer of 1986 showed a clear trend; the system, 
as it existed, would have been unable to deliver 
crew training software for scheduled ISights by the 
designated dates. The result would hak~e been an 
unacceptable compression of the time available 
for the crews to accomplish their required 
training. 
- 
2. Spare parts are in criticalIy sborb supply. The 
Shuttle program made a conscious decision to 
- - 
postpone spare parts procurements in favor of' 
budget items of perceived higher priority. Lack 
of spare parts would likely have limited flight 
operations in 1986. 
3. Stated manifesting policies are not enforced. 
Numerous late manifest changes (after the cargo 
integration review) have been made to both ma- 
jor payloads and minor payloads throughout the 
Shuttle program. 
8 Late changes to major payloadmop pro- 
gram requirements can require extensive 
resources (money, manpower, facilities) 
to implement. 
If many late changes to "minor" payloads 
occur, resources are quicMy absorbed. 
m Payload specialists frequently were added 
to a flight well after announced deadlines. 
m Late changes to a mission adversely af- 
fect the training and development of pro- 
cedures for subsequent missions. 
4, The scheduled flight rate did not accurate- References 
. . 
%y reflect the capabilities and resources. 
m The flight rate was not reduced to accom- 
modare periods of adjustment in the 
capacity sf the work force. There was no 
m x g n  in the system to acssmmodate un- 
foreseen hardware problems. 
I Resources were primarily directed toward 
suppsning the flights and thus not 
enough were available to improve and ex- 
pand facilities needed to support a higher 
flight rate. 
5, Training simulators may be the limiting fac- 
car on the flight rate: the two current simulators 
cannot train crewys for more than 12- 15 flights per 
year. 
6 When flights come in rapid succession, cur- 
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Chapter I .  
Other Safety 
n the course of its investigation. the Com- 
mission became aware of a number of mat- 
ters that played no part in the mission 51-L 
accident but nonetheless hold a potential for 
safety problems in the future. 
Some of these matters, those involving opera- 
tional concerns, were brought directly to the 
Commission's attention by the NASA astronaut 
office. They were the subject of a special hearing. 
Other areas of concern came to light as the 
Commission pursued various lines of investiga- 
tion in its attempt to isolate the cause of the acci- 
dent. These inquiries examined such aspects as 
the development and operation of each of the 
elements of the Space Shuttle-the Orbiter, its 
main engines and the External Tank; the pro- 
cedures employed in the processing and assembly 
of 51-L, and launch damage. 
This chapter examines potential risks in two 
general areas. T h e  first embraces critical aspects 
of a Shuttle flight; for example, considerations 
related to a possible premature mission termina- 
tion during the ascent phase and the risk factors 
connected with the demanding approach and 
landing phase. The other focuses on testing, proc- 
essing and assembling the various elements of the 
Shuttle. 
Ascent: A Critical Phase 
The events of flight 51-L dramatically il- 
lustrated the dangers of the first stage of a Space 
Shuttle ascent, The accident also focused atten- 
tion on the issues of Orbiter abort capabilities and 
crew escape. Of particular concern to the Com- 
mission are the current abort capabilities,, options 
to improve those capabilities, options for crew 
escape and che performance of the range safety 
system. 
It is not the Commission's intent to second- 
guess the Space Shuttle design or try to depict 
escape provisions that might have saved the 5 1 -L 
crew. In fact, the events that led to destruction 
of the Challenger progressed very rapidly and 
without warning. Under those circumstances, the 
Commission believes it is highly unlikely that any 
of the systems discussed belotv. or my combina- 
tion of thosesystems, would have saved the flight 
51 -L crew. 
Abort Capabilities 
Various unexpected conditions during ascent 
can require premature termination of a Shuttle 
mission. The method of termination, or abort, 
depends upon the nature of the unexpected eon- 
dicion and when it occurs. 
The Space Shuttle is lifted to orbit by thrust 
from its two solid rockets and three main engnes. 
The design criteria for the Shuttle specify that, 
if a single main engine is lost at any time between 
lift off and normal main engine cut off9 the Shuttle: 
must be able to continue to orbit or to execute 
an intact abort, that is, make a survi\?able land- 
ing on a runway. That design requirement has 
been met. If a single main engine is lost early in 
ascent, the Shuttle can return to make an 
emergency landing at Kennedy (a retum-to- 
launch-site abort). If the failure occurs later, the 
Shuttle can make an emergency landing in Africa 
or Europe (a transatlantic abort landing). If the 
failure occurs during the last part of the ascent, 
the Shuttle can proceed around the Earth to a 
lawdlng in the continental United States (abort 
once around). or can continue to a lower-than- 
planned orbar (abort to orbit). Indeed, if the 
failure occurs late enough. the Shuttle will% achieve 
the intended orbital conditions. 
Return-to-Launch-Site Abort. If the termina- 
uon IS necessary because of Boss of a main engine 
dunng rhe first four minutes of flight, the Shut- 
tle has the capability to fly back to the launch site. 
11 continues downrange to burn excess propellant, 
and at the proper point it  turns back toward 
Florida, The computers shutdown the remaining 
~ W O  engines and separate the Orbiter from the 
External Tank, which falls into the Atlantic 
Ocean. The Orbiter then glides to a landing on 
the runway at the Shuttle Landing Facility at 
Kennedy. 
Transatlantic Abort. During ascent there 
comes a time when the Shuttle is too far 
downrange to fly back to Kennedy. If it suffers 
ana engine failure after that'point, but has not yet 
achieved enough energy to continue toward or- 
bit, it will have to ]land ow the other side of the 
Atlantic. It will continue on a special flight path 
until it achieves the energy necessary to glide to 
the landing sire. At that point the Shuttle com- 
puters will cut off the two remaining engines and 
separate the Orbiter from the External Tank. The 
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Shuttle will then re-enter the lower atmosphere 
much like a normal en ty .  The landing, however, 
will be at a pre-selected site in Africa or Europe. 
Design. The Shuttle design specifications do 
not require that the Orbiter be able to manage 
an intact abort (i.e., make it to a runway) if a 
second main engine should fail. If two (or all 
three) main engines fail within the first five to six 
minutes of the flight, the Space Shuttle will land 
in water. This maneuver is called a "contingen- 
cy abort" and is not believed to be survivable 
because of damage incurred at water impact. 
The Shuttle design requirements did not 
specify that the Shuttle should be able to survive 
a Solid Rocket Booster failure. The system has 
no way to identify when a booster is about to fail, 
and no way to get the Orbiter or the crew away 
from a failing Solid Rocket Booster. 
Crew survival during ascent rests on the follow- 
ing assumptions: 
1. The Solid'Rocket Boosters will work 
from ignition to planned separation. 
2. If more than one main engine fails, the 
crew must be able to survive a water landing. 
Shuttle Abort Enhancements 
Between 1973 and 1983, first stage abort pro- 
visions were assessed many times by all levels of 
NASA management. Many methods of saving 
the Orbiter andlor crew froG emergencies dur- 
ing first stage were considered. 
Ejection seats (which afforded only limited pro- 
tection during first stage) were provided for the 
two-man crews of the Orbital Flight Test program 
(the first four Shuttle flights). Other options for 
"operational" flights carrying crews of five or more 
astronauts were considered, but were not im- 
plemented because of limited utility, technical 
complexity and excessive cost in dollars, weight 
or schedule delays. 
Because of these factors, NASA adopted the 
philosophy that the reliability of first stage ascent 
must be assured, and that design and testing must 
preclude time critical failures that would require 
emergency action before normal Solid Rocket 
Booster burnout. That philosophy has been 
reviewed many times during the Space Shuttle 
program and is appropriately being reevaluated, 
as are all first stage abort options, in light of the 
5 % - L  accident. 
Early Orbiter Separation 
If a problem arose that required the Orbiter 
to get away from failing Solid Rocker Boosters, 
the separation would have to be performed ex- 
tremely quickly. Time would be of the essence 
for two reasons. First, as 51-L demonstrated, if 
a problem develops in a Solid Rocket Booster9 
it can escalate very rapidly. Second, the ascent 
trajectory is carefully designed to control the 
aerodynamic loads on the vehicle; very small 
deviation from the normal path will produce ex- 
cessive loads, so if the vehicle begins to diverge 
from its path there is very little time (seconds) 
before structural breakup will occur. 
The normal separation sequence 10 free the 
Shuttle from the rest of the system takes 18 
seconds, far too long to be of use during a first- 
stage contingency. "Fast-separation" was formally 
established by Review Item Discrepancy 
03.00.151, which stated the requirement to 
separate the Orbiter from the External Tank at 
any time. The sequence was referred to as fast- 
separation because delays required during nor- 
mal separation were bypassed or drastically 
shortened in order to achieve separation in ap- 
proximately three seconds. Some risk was ac- 
cepted to obtain this contingency capability. Fast- 
separation was incorporated into the flight soft- 
ware, so that technically this capability does exist. 
Unfortunately, analysis has shown that, if it is 
attempted while the Solid Rocket Boosters are still 
thrusting, the Orbiter will "hang up" on its aft 
attach points and pitch violently, with probable 
loss of the Orbiter and crew. 
In summary, as long as the Solid Rocker 
Boosters are still thrusting, fast-separation does 
not provide a way to escape. It would be useful 
during first stage only if Solid Rocket Booster 
thrust could first be terminated. 
The current concept of fast-separation does, 
however, have some use. Contingency aborts 
resulting from loss of two or three main engines 
early in ascent are time-critical, and every frac- 
tion of a second that can be trimmed from the 
separation sequence helps. These abort prs- 
cedures are executed after the Solid Rocker 
Boosters are expended, and fast-separation is used 
to reduce the time required for separation as she 
Shuttle must attain entry attitude very quickly. 
Unfortunately, all contingency aborts culnaiwa~e 
in water impact. 
Thrust Termination 
Thrust termination (or thrust neutralization) 
as origindfy proposed for the Space Shuttle was 
a concept conceived for the Titan 3-M booster 
intended for use in the Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory Program. The objective of thrust ter- 
mination is to either extinguish or reduce the 
thrust 0f the Solid Rocket Booster in an emergen- 
cy situation. With this thrust terminated, 
emergency options such as crew ejection or fast- 
separation might become feasible during the first 
rivo minutes of flighr. 
The principal dra\\.back is that thrust termina- 
lion itself introduces high dynamic loads that 
ehlrujd cause Shuttle structural components to fail. 
Ex ly  design reviews suggested that to strengthen 
the Orbiter ro withstand the stresses caused by 
rapid thrust termination would require an addi- 
trasnd, prohibitive 1 9,600 pounds. Thrust ter- 
mination was deleted from design consideration 
on April 24, 197'3, by Space Shuttie Directive 
SS00040, Key factors in the decision were that 
(1)  proper design would be stressed to prevent 
Solid Rocker Booster failure and (2) other first- 
stage ascent systems provided enough redundan- 
cy to allow delaying an abort until after the Solid 
Rocket Boosters burned out. 
The subject arose again in 1979 when Space 
Shuttle Directive S 13 14 1 required the system con- 
tractor ro determine the time over which thrust 
reduction must be spread so that the deceleration 
Roads would not destroy the Orbiter. Marshall 
analyzed the thrust decay curves submitted by 
the contractor and conc%uded that achieving the 
required thrust decay rates was impractical. 
On July 12, 1982; the Associate Administrator 
for Space Transportation Systems requested 
reconsideratiow of thrust termination. Gerald 
Griffin, director sf Johnson, responded to the re- 
quest in a letter dated September 9, 1982, as 
fo~~ows: 
""In our opinion, further study of a thrust 
termination system for the SRB [Solid 
Rocket Booster] would not be productive. 
The potential failure modes which could 
result in a set of conditions requiring SRB 
thrust ternination are either very remote or 
a result of primary structural failure. The 
srmctural failure risk would normally be ac- 
cepted as a part of the factor of safety 
verification by analysis or test. In addition, 
m y  thmst termination system is going to be 
extremely hea~ry, very costly and, at best. 
present some risk to the Orbiter and E T  [Ex- 
ternal Tank]. Venting of hot gases and the 
shock load or pressure spike, have the poten- 
tial for being as great a hazard as the prob- 
lem to be corrected. It does not appear that 
a practical approach exists for achieving the - 
desired pressure decay rate without a ma- 
jor redesign of the motor."% 
In retrospect, the possibility of Solid Rocker 
Booster failures was neither very remote nor 
limited to primary structural failure. 
Although it would not have helped on mission 
51-L, thrust termination is the key to any suc- 
cessful first-stage abort, and new. ideas and 
technologies should be examined. If a thrust ter- 
mination system is eventually deemed feasible 
(that is, the OrbiterIExternal Tank will still be 
intact after the rapid deceleration). it cannot have 
failure modes &at would cause an uncommanded 
neutrallization of the thrust of one or both of the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. If thrust termination were 
to be implemented, reliable detection mechanisms 
and reliable decision criteria would be 
mandatory. 
Ditching 
As previously discussed. most continsency 
aborts (those resulting from failure of two or three 
main engines during the first five to six minutes 
of flight) result in a water landing, or ditching. 
Pn addition, if the Space Shuttle did have a thrust 
termination capabi%ity to use with fast-separation 
to allow it to separate from failing solid rockets. 
the Orbiter would have to ditch in the water 
unless the failure occurred during a small win- 
douv 50-70 seconds after launch. Accordingly, 
whether the crew can survive a water impact is 
a critical question. 
In 1974 and 1975, ditching studies were con- 
ducted at Langley Research Center. Although 
test limitations precluded definitive conclusions. 
the studies suggested that the loads at water im- 
pact would be high. The deceleration would most 
probably cause stmcturd failure of the crew cabin 
support ties to the fuselage, which would impede 
crew egress and possibly flood the cabin. Funher- 
more, payloads in the cargo bay are not designed 
to withstand decelerations as high as those es- 
petted-2 and would very possibly break free and 
travel forward to the crew cabin. The Langley 
report does state that the Orbiter shape and mass 
properties are good for ditching, but given the 
structural problems and deceleration loads, that 
is little consolation. 
Orbiter ditching was discussed by the Crew 
Safety Panel and at Orbiter flight techniques 
meetings before the first Shuttle flight. The con- 
sensus of these groups was that (1) ditching is 
more hazardous than suggested by the early 
Langley tests! and (2) ditching is probably not 
suwivable. 
This view was reiterated in the September 9, 
1982, letter from Griffin to Abrahamson: 
%" also suggest no further effort be ex- 
pended to study bailout or ditching. There 
is considerable doubt that either case is 
technically feasible with the present Orbiter 
design. Even if a technical sollution can be 
found, the impact of providing either 
capability is so severe in terms of cost and 
schedule as to make them impractical." 
There is no evidence that a Shuttle crew would 
survive a water impact. Since all contingency 
aborts and all first stage abort capabilities that 
are being studied culminate in a water impact, 
an additional provision for crew escape before im- 
pact should also be considered. 
Astronaut Paul Weitz expressed this before the 
Commission on April 3,  1986: 
"My feeling is so strong that the Orbiter 
will not survive a ditching, and that includes 
land, water or any unprepared surface. . . . 
"I think if we put the crew in a position 
where they're going to be asked to do a con- 
tingency abort, then they need some means 
to get out of the vehiclle before it contacts 
earth, the surface of the earth."3 
Crew Escape Options 
In a study conducted before the Orbiter con- 
tract was awarded, Rockwell International 
evaluated a range of ejection systems (Wock~.pe%i 
International, Incorporated, Phase B Study, 
1971). The table shows the results comparing 
three systems: ejection seats, encapsulated ejec- 
tion seats and a separable crew compartment. 
The development costs are in 1197 f dollars, and 
the costs and weights cited were those required 
to incorporate these systems into the developing 
Orbiter design, not to modify an existing Orbiter 
The only system that could provide gsso~ertion 
for more than the two-man experimental Wighr 
crew was the separable crew companmens, which 
would add substantid weight and development 
cost. All of these systems had limitations sw shear 
ability to provide successful escape, and all! would 
require advance warning of an impending hazard 
from reliable data sources. 
The Request for Proposal, written in April, 
197 1 (reference paragraph 1.3 .6.2,11), states: "Pro- 
visions s M l  be made for rapid emergency egress 
of the crew during development test flights.99 Ejec- 
tion seats were selected as the emergency escape 
system. The objective was to offer the crew some 
protection, though limited, from risks of she test 
flights. The philosophy was that after the test 
flights, all unknowns would be resolved, and the 
vehicle would be certified for "operationd" flights, 
Conventional ejection seats similar 60 those Bn- 
stalled in the Lockheed F- 12/SR-7 1 were selected 
shortly after the Orbiter contract was awarded 
They were subsequently incorporated into Co- 
lumbia and were available for the first four flights. 
The ejection could be initiated by either crew 
member and would be used in the event of un- 
1971 Rockwell Data on Ejection Systems 
Altitude Velocity Weight Development 
Type (feet) (feetlsec) (pounds) Cost 
Open Ejection Seat e 60,000 < 2,000 1,760 $10,000,000 
B-70 Encapsulated Seat < 100,000 c 3,000 5,200 $7,00CB,Q>010 
Separable Crew < 100,000 8,000 14,000 $292,000,008 
Compartment or to 
more 17,000 
ceanarol8ed Wight, on-board fire or pending land- 
lngs on unprepared surfaces. The escape se- 
quence required approximately 15 seconds for the 
cre$aP to recognize pending disaster, initiate the 
sequence and get a safe distance away from the 
vehicle. 
Although the sears were originally intended for 
use during first-stage ascent or during gliding 
flight below 100,000 feet, analysis showed that 
the crew would be exposed to the Solid Rocket 
Booster and main engine exhaust plumes if they 
ejected during ascent. During descent, the seats 
provided good protection from about 100,000 feet' 
to landing. 
After the Space Shuttle completed the four test 
flights it was cenified for "operational" flights. But 
missions h r  the "operational" flights required 
more crew members, and there were no known 
ejeaion systems, other than an entire cabin 
escape module, that cou%d remove the entire crew 
within the vaecessay rime. The Orbiter configura- 
riion allowed room for only two ejection seats on 
the Wight deck, With alternative ejection concepts 
and redesip oi'the flight deck, this number might 
have been increased slightly, but not to the full 
crew size. Thus. because of limited utility dur- 
sng first-stage ascent and inability. to accom- 
maladate a full crew, the ejection seats were 
eliminated for operational flights. 
The present Shuttle has no means for crew 
escape, either during Grst-stage ascent or during 
gliding flight. Conventionall ejection seats do not 
appear to be viable Space Shuttle options because 
they ses~esely Sirnit the crew size and, therefore, 
prevent the Space Shuttle from accompiishlng its 
mission objectives. The remaining options fall in- 
to three categories: 
1. Escape ,Module. The entire crew compart- 
ment ~~oruld be separated from the Orbiter 
and descend by parachute. 
2, Rocker-assisted Extraction. Many military 
aircraft employ a system using a variety of 
small rocket-assisted devices to boost oc- 
cupants h m  the plane. Such a system 
could be used in the Orbiter. 
3. Bail-Out System. The crew can exit 
unassisted through a hatch during con- 
trolled, gliding flight. 
Only one of these. the escape module, offers 
the possibility of escape during first-stage ascent. 
Its use would probably be practical only after 
thrust termination. It should be noted that in all 
cases of crew escape, the Orbiter would be lost, 
but in cases of Solid Rocket Booster failure or Or- 
biter ditching the vehicle would be lost anyway. 
The utility and feasibility of each method are 
described bellow. 
An escape module can offer an opportunity for 
crew escape at a%% altitudes during a Grst-stage 
time-critical emergency if the escape system itself 
is not damaged to the point that it cannot func- 
tion. The module must be sufficiently far from 
the vehicle at the time of catastrophe that neither 
it nor its descent system is destroyed, Incorpora- 
tion of an escape module would require signifi- 
cant redesign of the Orbiter: some structural rein- 
forcement, pyrotechnic devices to sever the escape 
module from the rest of the Orbiter, modifica- 
tions to sever connections that supp%y power and 
ff uids, separation rockets and a parachute system. 
An additionall weight penalty would result from 
the requirement to add mass in the rear sf the 
Orbiter to compensate for the forward shift in the 
center of gravity. Recent estimates indicate this 
could add as much as 30,000 pounds to the weight 
of the Orbiters4 This increase in weight would 
reduce payload capacity considerably, perhaps 
unacceptably. There is no current estimate of the 
attendant cost. 
An escape m ~ d u l e  does theoretically offer the 
widest range of crew escape options. The other 
two options, rocket extraction and bail-out, are 
only practical. during gliding flight. Both methods 
would be ensefuli when the Orbiter could not reach 
a p r e p a ~ d  runway, for they would dillow the crew 
to escape before a very hazardous landing or a 
water ditching. Aerodynamic model tests showed 
that a crew member bailing out through either 
the side or overhead hatch would subsequently 
contact the wing, tail or orbital maneuvering 
system pod unless Re or she could exit with suffi- 
cient velocity (> 5 to 10 feet per second) to avoid 
these obstacles. Slides and pendant rocket systems 
were evaluated as means of providing this veloci- 
ty, beet a%l concepts of bail-out and rocket extrac- 
tion that were studied require many minutes to 
get the entire crew out and wouPd be practical 
only during controlled gliding flight. The results 
of these studies were presented at the Program 
Requirements Change Board session held on 
May 12,  1983, and subsequently to the NASA 
administrator, but none of the alternatives was 
implemented because of limited capability and 
resulting program impacts. 
There is much discussion and disagreement 
over which escape systems are feasible. or whether 
any provide protection against a significant 
number of failure modes. 
The astronauts testifying before the Commis- 
sion on April 3 ,  1986, agreed that it does not ap- 
pear practical to modify the Orbiter to incor- 
porate an escape module. The astronauts dis- 
agreed, however, about which of the other two 
systems would be preferable. As Astronaut Weitz 
testified : 
"John [Astronaut John Young] likes the 
rocket extraction system because it does 
cover a wider flight regime and allows you 
to get out perhaps with the vehicle only 
under partial control as opposed to complete 
control; however, any system that adds more 
parts like rockets gets more complex. . . . 
The only kind of a system that I think is even 
somehow feasible would be maybe some 
kind of a bail-out system that could be used 
subsonic ." 5 
T o  understand how the booster rockers were 
destroyed, one must understand the purpose of 
a range safety system, its functions, and the 
special considerations that apply to Shuttle 
launches. 
The Eastern Space and Missile Center operates 
a range safety system for all Department of 
Defense and NASA launch activities in the Cape 
Canaveral area. The primary responsibillry of the 
range safety system, run by the U.S. Air Force, 
is to protect people and property from abnormal 
vehicle flights during first stage ascent. 
T o  fulfill its range safety responsibilities, the 
Eastern Space and Missile Center staff supervises 
on-site launch preparations and tracks rockers and 
vehicles until they are far enough away Gsm 
populated areas to remove any danger. M'hew 
such a danger arises during the ascent stage of 
a launch, the vehicle may have to be destroyed 
to minimize harm to persons and property on the 
ground. Every major vehicle flown kom the Cape 
Canaveral area has carried an explosi~ye desrruce 
system that could be armed and fired by the range 
safety officer. 
'Range safety procedures in launch activities 
In its 1982 Annual Report, the Aerospace Safe- from ~ e n n e d y  are governed by Department of 
ty Advisory Panel listed "crew escape . . . at Defense and NASA documents. The  primary 
launch and prior to potential ditchingyy6 as a regulatory publication is DOD Document 
priority item that warranted further study. The 3200.1 1, Use, Management, and Operatiora. of 
Commission fully supports such studies. In par- DOD Major Ranges and Test Facilities. 
tisular, the Commission believes that the crew 
shauld have a means of escaping the Orbiter in 
controlled, gliding flight. The Commission thinks 
it crucial that the vehicle that will carry astronauts 
into orbit through this decade and the next in- 
corporate systems that provide some chance for 
crew survival in emergencies. It nonetheless ac- 
cepts the following point made by Astronaut 
Robert Crippen : 
"I don't know of an escape system that 
would have saved the crew from the par- 
ticular incident that we just went through 
[the Challenger accident] ." 
Range Safety 
Television coverage of the Challenger accident 
vividly showed the Solid Rocket Boosters emerg- 
ing from the ball of fire and smoke. The erratic 
m d  uncontrolled powered flight of such large 
components could have posed a potential danger 
to populated areas. The responsible official ac- 
cordingly destroyed the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Space Shuttle Range Safety System 
Both Space Shuttle Solid Rocker Boosters and 
the External Tank are fitted with expliosive 
charges. These can be detonated on the command 
of the range safety officer if the vehicle crosses 
the limits established by flight analysis before 
launch and the vehicle is no longer in conrroPled 
flight. The determination of con?trollabiliry i s  
made by the flight director in Mission Control, 
Houston, who is in communication with the 
range safety oficer. Following an encoded "arm"" 
command, the existing package on the Shuttle 
System is detonated by a subsequent encoded 
command. 
The range safety officer who sends the cam- 
mands is the key decision maker who is finally 
responsible for preventing loss of life and propel-ey 
that could result if the vehicle or components 
should fall in populated areas. The destruct 
criteria are agreed to by NASA and the Eastern 
Space and Missile Center. 
,A range safety system for the Shuttle launches 
q\xas appmved in concept in 1974. Under that con- 
cept, the capability to destroy the system in flight 
Bangc Safety System Gornponenos 
%a13 itnear Shaped Charges Command Antennas 
Drawing shows position of lineas shaped charges and range 
safety comrnawd antennas on Solid Rocket Bsosfers and Ex- 
ternal Tank. 
from the ground was to be installed in the form 
of radio detonated expllosive charges triggered by 
encoded s i p d s .  Such a range safety package ap- 
peared necessar). for a variety of reasons based 
upon the initial Shuttle design that included ejec- 
tion sears. Bf the {crew were to eject, the unmanned 
vehicle would be uncontrollllable and thus a much 
g z a ~ d d a n g e r  than a manned system, 
After the f i r s t  four test flights, however, the 
ejection seats were deactivated. Retaining the 
range sakry package when the crew could no 
longer escape was an emotional and controver- 
sial decision. In retrospect, however, the 
Chdlenger accident has demonstrated the need 
for some type of range safety measure. Since the 
current range safety system does not allow for 
selective destnnction of components, the Commis- 
sion believes that NASA and the Air Force should 
s ~ t i c d y  rc-exmine whether the destruct package 
an the External Tank might be removed. 
Range Safety Astjvities, January 28, 1986 
The range safety officer for the Challenger 
flight on J a n u a v  28 was Maj. Gerald F. 
Bieringer, U.S. Air Force. He reported that the 
mission was normal until about 76 seconds after 
launch. The following description is from Maj. 
Bieringer9s written statement prepared approx- 
imately two hours after the accident: 
"M'atching the IP [impact point] displays 
and optics I observed the primary and alrer- 
nate sources diverge significantly at about 
T + 76 [76 seconds into the flight]. At about 
the same time I hkard . . . [through 
monitored communications] the vehicle had 
exploded. Concurrent%y, I saw the explosion 
ow the video monitor on my right. A white 
cloud seemed to envelop the vehicle, small 
pieces exploded out of it. The IP displays 
PRI and ALT indications were jumping 
around wildly. I was about to recommend 
we do nothing as it appeared the entire vehi- 
cle had exploded when I observed what ap- 
peared to be an SRB [Solid Rocket Booster] 
stabilized and flying toward the upper left 
corner of the display. As it appeased stabil- 
ized I feh it might endanger land or ship- 
ping and as the ET  [External Tank] had ap- 
parently exploded I recommended to the 
SWSO [senior range safety officer] we send 
functions. I sent ARM, waited about 10 
seconds, and sent FIRE. . . . FIRE was sent 
at about 1 10 [seconds] ." 
During the flight and prior to the accident, 
tracking and control functions performed normal- 
ly. There were no communications problems 
throughout the range or with the NASA flight 
dynamics officer in Mission Control. Houston. 
Range safety data displays did not provide 
useful8 information immediately after the accident. 
The range safety officer depended upon the video 
displays for evidence concerning the performance 
of the Solid Rocket Boosters. Without that infor- 
mation, the range safety officer would not have 
sent the destruct signals. Detailed studies from 
Marshall had indicated that Solid Rocker 
Boosters would tumble if prematurely separated. 
That assumption made possible the prediction of 
impact points. When the Challenger Sollid Rocker 
Boosters separated after the expllosion, however, 
they continued powered, stabilized flight and did 
not tumble, contrary to the expectations upon 
which range safety rules had been based. Without 
the live television pictures, the range safety of- 
ficer would not have known about the unexpected 
performance of the boosters. 
The Eastern Space and hlissile Center and 
NASA have appropriately initiated a comprehen- 
sive review of the Shuttle range safety re- 
quirements and their implementation. The events 
of the Challenger accident demonstrate the need 
for a range safety package of some type on the 
Solid Rocket Boosters. However. the review 
should examine whether technology exists that 
would allow combining the range safety function " 
for the Solid Rocket Boosters with a thrust ter- 
mination system. and whether, if technically 
feasible, it would be desirable. 
Postflight Analysis 
The Mission Control Center in Houston had 
no more warning of the impending disaster than 
the range safety officer had. All information that 
might be useful in recognizing problems that the 
crew or the mission control flight team could do 
something about is available to flight controllers 
during the launch, but that information con- 
stitutes only a fraction of the electronic data being 
eelemetered from the Shuttle. T o  ensure that 
nothing was overliooked during the launch, 
Johnson flight controllers conducted a thorough 
analysis of the telemetry data on January 29 and 
30, 1986. 
Their review of the recorded events revealed 
that the chamber pressure inside the right Solid 
Rocket Booster began to differ from that of the 
left booster approximately 60 seconds after lift off. 
A sampling of that information is available to a 
flight controller during ascent, but the internal 
pressures of the boosters are normally not 
monitored during the first stage. The readings 
are used only to indicate whether the crew can 
expect an on-time or slightly delayed separation 
of the boosters from the Orbiter and External 
Tmk.  The difference in pressure during the brief 
ascent of Challenger was small, and pressures 
were within acceptable limits. 
The replay of the data also indicated that the 
vehicle flight control system was responding prop- 
erly to external forces and continued to control 
the Shuttle until the accident. No unusual mo- 
tion responses occurred, and inside the cockpit 
there were no alarms. There are no indications 
that the crew had any warning of a problem 
before the fire and the disintegration of the Space 
Shuttle. 
Findings 
1. The Space Shuttle System was nor desiped 
to survive a failure of the Solid Rocker Boosters. 
There are no corrective actions that can be taken 
if the boosters do not operate properly after 
ignition, i.e., there is no ability ta separate an 
Orbiter safely from thrusting boosters and no 
ability for the crew to escape the vehicle during 
first-stage ascent. 
w Neither the Mission Control Team nor the 
51-L crew had any warning sf impending 
disaster. 
w Even if there had been warning, there were 
no actions available to the crew or the Mis- 
sion Control Team to avert the disaster. 
Landing: Another Critical Phase 
The consequences of faulty perfomance in any 
dynamic and demanding flight environment can 
be catastrophic. The Commission was concerned 
that an insufficient safety margin may have ex- 
isted in areas other than Shuttle ascent, Entqr and 
landing of the Shuttle are dynamic and demand- 
ing with all the risks and complications inherent 
in flying a heavyweight glider with a very steep 
glide path. Since the Shuttle crew cannot diver1 
to any alternate landing site after entry, the land- 
ing decision must be both timely and accurate. 
In addition, the landing gear, which XncEudes 
wheels, tires and brakes, must function proper- 
ly. These considerations will be discussed for both 
normal and abort landings. 
Abort Site Weather 
The acceptability of the weather at abort land- 
ing sites, both inside and outside the conrinenea& 
United States, is a critical factor in the launch 
decision process. The local weather minima for 
the actual launch are necessarily restrictive. The 
minima for acceptably safe abort landings are 
even more restrictive. Of course, the wider the 
range of acceptable weather conditions, the 
greater the possibility of launch on any $ven day. 
As a result of past efforts to increase the likelihood 
of launch, abort landing weather c r i t e ~ a  re cur- 
rently less restrictive than the criteria far planned 
landings. 
The program also allows consideration of 
launching with a light rain shower over the Ken- 
nedy runway. Although engineering assessments 
indicate that the tile damage that would result 
would nor affect Shuttle controllability, it would 
be a serious setback to the program in terms of 
budget and schedule. This rule is designed to 
alijow the program to weigh the probability of a 
return-to-launch-site abort and decide whether 
i t  is wonhwhile to launch and accept the risk of 
a setback because of tile damage should a return- 
to-Paunch-site abort be required. This risk appears 
to be unnecessary. 
The programmaric decision to accept worse 
weather for an abort landing, in a situation where 
oeher conditions are also less than optimal, is not 
consistent with a conservative approach to flight 
sakty, The desire to launch is understandable, 
and abon Imdings are indeed improbable. 
However, if an abort is required, it is irrelevant 
that it -was unlikely. An emergency, the loss of 
a Space Shuttle Main Engine, has already oc- 
curred PO produce the necessity. Abort si~uations 
will require landing under emergency conditions 
on limited mnways with Orbiter weights higher 
than normal. The difficulties should not be 
compounded by high crosswinds or reduced 
visibi1ity. The Commission recommended that 
this subject be reviewed, and those reviews are 
cursentBy undernay. 
Orbites Tires and Brakes 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has 
shared NASA's concern over the Orbiter wheels, 
tires arad brakes since the beginning of the Shut- 
tle program. This is summarized in its I982 An- 
nual Report, 
"The landing gear including wheels, tires, 
and brakes is vital for safe completion of any 
mission. With the future flights going to 
higher weights and lower margins, possibly 
even negative margins, it is imperative that 
existing capabilities be fully explored, 
documented and improved where 
necessavon 
Orbiter Tires 
Orbiter tires are manufactured by B.F. 
Cocaelrich and are desigmed to support a Space 
Shuttle lad ing  up to 240,000 pounds at 225 knots 
with 20 knots of crosswind. The tires have a 
34-p1y raring using 16 cords. Though they have 
successfull8y passed testing programs, they ha\?e 
shown excessive wear during landings at Ken- 
nedy, especially when crosswinds were involved. 
The tires are rated as Criticality 1 because loss 
of a single tire could cause loss of control and 
subsequent loss of vehicle and crew. 
Based upon approach and landing test ex- 
perience, crosswind testing was added to the 
Space Shuttle tire certification resting. T o  date. 
Orbiters have landed with a maximum of 8 knots 
of crosswind at the Kennedy runway resulting in 
heavy tire wear: both spinup wear that occurs ini- 
tially at touchdown and crosswind wear induced 
by side forces and differential braking. While 
dynamometer tests indicated that these tires 
should withstand conditions well above the design 
specification, the tests have not been able to 
simulate runway surface effects accurately. A 
Langley Research Center test track has been used 
to give a partial simulation of the strains caused 
by a landing at Kennedy. This test apparatus will 
be upgraded for funher testing in the summer 
of 6986 in am attempt to include all the repre- 
sentative Wight %oads and conditions. 
The tires have undergone extensive testing to 
examine effects of vacuum exposure, temperature 
extremes, and cuts. They also have undergone 
leakage, side force, load, storage, and durability 
tests. The tires have qualified in dl these areas. 
To  date, tests using the simulated Kennedy 
runway at Langley indicate that spinup wear by 
itself will not lead to tire failure. Tests using the 
Kennedy test surface do indicate that spinup wear 
is worse if the tire is subjected to crosswind. For 
this reason, the crosswind dlowable for normal 
landings is limited to 10 knots. This restriction 
allso permits a safe stop if the nosewheel steering 
system fails, The limitation is being reviewed to 
see if it is too high for abort landings involving 
nosewheel steering failure. Testing has not been 
conducted to ensure that excessive crosswind wear 
will not be a hazard when landing on the various 
hard surface runways with maximum crosswinds 
and failed nosewheel steering. 
Main tire loads are increased substantially after 
nosewheel touc%ldown because of the large 
downward wing force at its negative angJe of ar- 
tack. The toed force on each side can be nearly 
200,000 pounds, which exceeds the capability of 
a single tire. In fact, the touchdown loads alone 
can exceed the load bearing ability of a single tire. 
The obvious result is that if a single tire fails 
before nosegear touchdown, the vehicle will havc 
serious if not catastropl? c directional control 
problems following the ex Jected failure of the ad- 
jacent tire. This failure case has led to a Criticality 
% rating on the tires. Before nosegear touchdown, 
control is maintained through the rudder. 
Mowever. it  loses effectiveness as the speedbrake 
is opened and the vehicle decelerates. After 
nosegear touchdown, simulations have shown 
that directional control is possible using the 
nosewheel steering system for most subsequent 
failures, but not for some cases in which 
crosswinds exceed the current flight rule limits. 
Because of the consequences of this failure, crew 
members strongly recommend that the nosewheel 
steering system be modified to achieve full 
redundancy. 
Tire side loads have been difficult to measure 
and subsequently model because of test facility 
limitations. Two mathematical models were 
developed from early dynamometer tests and ex- 
trapolation from nosewheel tire tests. New 
dynamic tests of main gear tires show a more flex- 
ible side response, which has been incorporated 
into the latest mathematical model. A reasonably 
accurate model is required both for nosewheel 
steering engineering studies and for crew train- 
ing simulators. 
The Orbiter tire in use meets specifications and 
has been certified through testing. However, 
testing has not reproduced results observed on 
Kennedy runwa~ls. T o  date, the only blown tire 
has been caused by a brake lockup and the 
resulting skid wear. 
Several improvements have been considered to 
increase protection against the high-speed blown- 
tire case. One would add a skid at the bottom 
ofthe main gear strut to take the peak load dur- 
ing nosegear touchdown; another would add a 
roll-on-rim capability to the main gear wheel. 
None of the possible improvements has been 
funded, however, nor has any been seriously 
studied. 
In summary, two blown tires before nosegear 
touchdown would likely be catastrophic, and the 
potential for that occurrence should be mini- 
mized. NASA has directed testing in the fall of 
1986 to examine actual tire, wheel, and strut 
failures to better understand this failure case. 
Orbiter Brakes 
The Orbiter brake design chosen in 1973 was 
based on the Orbiter's design weight. It used 
beryllium rotors and stators with carbon lining. 
However, as the actual Orbiter weight grew, the 
response from the 'Shuttle program management 
was not a redesign of the brakes, bur an exren- 
sion of required runway length from 10,000 to 
12,500 feet. Thus. the brakes for many years Pla1.e 
been known to have little or no margin, even i f  
they performed as originally designed. 
There are four brake assemblies, one for each 
main landing gear wheel. Each assembly uses 
four rotors and three stators, the stators being at- 
tached to a torque tube. Carbon pads me attached 
to provide the friction surface. The Orbiter brakes 
were designed to absorb 36.5 million foot-pounds 
of energy for normal stops and 55.5 million foot- 
pounds of energy for one emergency stop. The 
brakes were tested and qualified using standard 
dynamometer tests. 
Actual Bight experience has sho~ in  brake 
damage on most flights. The damage is c%assified 
by cause as either dynamic or thermal. The 
dynamic damage is usually characterized by 
damage ro rotors and carbon lining chipping, plus 
beryllium and pad retainer cracks. 0x1 the other 
hand, the thermal damage has been due to 
heating of the stator caused by e n e r v  abssrp- 
tion during braking. The beryllium becomes duc- 
tile and has a much reduced yield strength ar 
temperatures possible during braking. Both types 
of damage are typical of early brake deveBopmenr 
problems experienced in the aviation- industry. 
Brake damage has required that special cretv 
procedures be developed to assure suceessfui 
braking. T o  minimize dynamic damage and to 
keep any loose pans together, the crews are told 
to hold the brakes on constantly from the time 
of first application until their speed slows to about 
40 knots. For a normal landing, braking is ini- 
tiated at about 130 knots. For abort landings, 
braking would be initiated at about 150 knots. 
Braking speeds are established to avoid exceeding 
the temperature limits of the stator, The earlier 
the brakes are applied, the higher the heat rate. 
The longer the brakes are applied, the higher the 
temperature will be, no matter what the heat rare. 
To  minimize problems, the commander must get 
the brake energy into the brakes at just the right 
rate and just the right time- before the besylilium 
yields and causes a low-speed wheel lockup. 
At a Commission hearing on April 3,  1986, 
Astronaut John Young described the problem the 
Shuttle commander has with the s??stern: 
"It is very difficult to use precisely righe 
now. In fact, we're finding out we don't real- 
ly ha%-e a good technique for applying the 
brakes. . . . We don't believe that astronauts 
or pilots should be able to break the 
brakes." 10 
Missions 5, 5 l-D and 61 -C had forms of ther- 
mal stator damage. 'The mission 5%-D case 
resulted in a. low-speed wheel lockup and a subse- 
quent blown tire at Kennedy. The mission 61-C 
case did not progress to a lockup but came very 
close. The amount of brake energy that can be 
obtained using normal braking procedures is 
about 4-13 million foot-pounds before the first stator 
f i l s ,  The mission 6 1 -C damage occurred at 34 
million foot-pounds but had not progressed to the 
lockup condition. Inspection of failed stators 
clearly sAo\\*s the ductile failure response of the 
b e ~ i l i u m ,  and, hence. it appears that this failure 
mechanism cannot contribute to a high-speed 
lockup and subsequent tire failure. It should be 
noted ahat the brake specification called for a 
maimurn energy of 55 rni%%ion foot-pounds. 
Qualification resting of the abort braking profile 
showed ihar 55 million foot-pounds was the point 
of first stator failure. During qualification tests, 
the brakes continued eo operate until all stators 
fa~%ed, providing about another 5 million foot- 
pounds of  energld. Based upon the thermal 
response of beqllium under load, it appears that 
the early heavy braking required for transatlan- 
rac abort landings produces .more than the 40 
million foot-pounds that have resulted in thermal 
failure of the brakes during the normal braking 
profile, No numbers are certain, however, and 
elearly the gua%ification testing did not point out 
the current thermal problems. 
The assumed ndrmal and abort brake energy 
limits for the current design should be 
reinvestigated, The 6 1 -C damage resulted from 
only 34 millioni foot-pounds of energy. If this 
same brake desngn is to continue to fly, the mis- 
%Ion 61-C damage should be fully understood, 
and destnactive testing should be accomplished 
to establish the shosb runway (transatlantic abort 
landing) brake limit and appropriate abort land- 
ing planning factors. 
NASA is considering stator improvements, in- 
cluding steel or thicker beryllium stators, and has 
undertaken a carbon brake program that would 
provide a major margin improvement and less 
dynamic damage because of fewer parts. Addi- 
tional testing is currently underway, and more 
is planned, .to evaluate these brake modifications 
and to perform destructive testing. The testing 
results are expected to conform more closely to 
flight conditions because landing gear dynamics 
have been included. Early tests have confirmed 
the energy levels for the abort braking profile with 
a modified brake, and future tests may provide 
confidence in the normal 'braking profile. 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel recog- 
nized NASA's efforts in its f 985 Ann.ua% Reporr : 
"A carbon brake review was conducted by 
NASA in early December, 1985, and re- 
sulted in agreement to procure a carbon 
brake system for the Orbiter. . . . There is 
concern by the STS [Space Transportation 
System] management about the availabili- 
ty of resources to support the development 
of the carbon brakes given the many com- 
peting requirements and the projected con- 
strained budget during the 1986 period. The 
program management considers the de- 
velopment of the carbon brake system to be 
of the highest priority . . . and the Pane% sup- 
ports this position as it has in the past." I 1  
Because of the brake problems encountered in 
the program, two reviews have been conducted 
by NASA. The third review will take place dur- 
ing the summer of 1986. The review board 
members have studied d l  of the Orbiter brake 
data and have compared Orbiter problems to in- 
dustry problems. Improvements suggested have 
been implemented. It is the consensus of NASA 
and industry experts that high priority should be 
placed on correcting Orbiter brake problems, and 
that brake redesign should proceed with emphasis 
on developing higher energy and torque capacity. 
Concern within the program about the entire 
deceleration system (landing gear, wheels, tires, 
brakes and nosewheel steering) has been the sub- 
ject of numerous reviews, meetings and design 
efforts. These concerns continued to be expressed 
by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in 6.982: 
"Studies of Shuttle landings to date show 
that tire, wheel and brake stresses are ap- 
proaching limits." l2 
"Short runways, with inadequate over- 
runs, are cause for concern, for instance, a 
transatlantic abort to Dakar." l 3  
The issues are difficult, and the required 
technology is challenging, but most agree that it 
is appropriate and important that NASA resolve 
each of these problems. A conser\~ative approach 
to the landing phase of flight demands reliable 
performance by all critical systems. 
Kennedy Space Center Landings 
The original Space Shuttle plan called for 
routine landings at Kennedy to minimize turn- 
around time and cost per flight and to provide 
an efficient operation for both the Shuttle system 
and the cargo elements. While those considera- 
tions remain important, other concerns, such as 
the performance of the Orbiter tires and brakes, 
and the difficulty of accurate weather prediction 
in Florida, have called the plan into question. 
When the Shuttle lands at Edwards Air Force 
Base, California, approximately six days are 
added to the turnaround time compared with a 
landing at Kennedy. That is the time required 
ro load the Orbiter atop the Shuttle carrier air- 
craft, a specidly modified Boeing 747, and to 
ferry it back to Florida for processing. 
Returning the Orbiter to Kennedy from Ed- 
wards costs not only time but dso money: near- 
Iy $1,000,000, not including the cost of additional 
ground support equipment, extra security and 
other support requirements. Further, the people 
necessary to accomplish the turnaround tasks 
must be drawn from the staffs at Kennedy and 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. They are 
the same people needed for the preparation for 
subsequent flights. 
Returning the Orbiter also imposes an addi- 
tional handling risk to the vehicle in both the 
loading operation and the ferry flight itself. En- 
countering light precipitation during the ferry 
flight has caused substantial damage to the Or- 
biter thermal protection system, These costs and 
risks, however, are minimal when compared with 
those of a Space Shuttle mission. 
The Kennedy runway was built to Space Shut- 
tle design requirements that exceeded all Federal 
Aviation Administration requirements and was 
coordinated extensively with the Air Force, 
Dryden Flight Research Center, NASA Head- 
quarters, Johnson, Kennedy, Marshall and the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The result is a single 
concrete runway, 15,000 feet long and 300 feet 
wide. The grooved and coarse brushed surface 
and the high coefficient of friction provide an all- 
weather landing facility. 
The Kennedy runway easily meets the intent 
of most of the Air Force, Federal Aviation Ad- 
ministration and International Civil Aviation 
Organization specification requirements. Ascod- 
ing to NASA, it was the best runway that the 
world knew how to build when the final design 
was determined in 1973. 
In the past several years, quiestions about 
weather predictability and' Shuttle systems pers 
formance have influenced the Kennedy landing 
issue. Experience gained in the 24 Shuttle land- 
ings has raised concerns about the adequacy of 
the Shuttle landing and rollout systems: tires. 
brakes and nosewheel steering. Tires and brakes 
have been discussed earlier. The tires haape shcswtn 
excessive wear after Kennedy landings, where the 
rough runway is particularly hard on tires. Tire 
wear became a serious concern after the landing 
of mission 5 1 -D at Kennedy. Spinup wear was 
three cords deep, crosswind wear (in only an 
8-knot crosswind) was significant and one tire 
eventually failed as a result of brake Isck-up and 
skid. 
This excessive wear, coupled with brake 
failure, led NASA to schedule subsequent land- 
ings at Edwards while attempting to solwe these 
problems. At the Commission hearing on April 
3,  1986, Clifford Charleswonh, director of Space 
Operations at Johnson, stated his reactio~~ to the 
blown-tire incident: 
"Let me say that following 5 1.D . . . one 
of the first things I did was go t d k  to then 
program manager, Mr. Lunney, and say we 
don't want to try that again until we uncles- 
stand that, whicR he cornpllerely %geed wish, 
and we launched into this nosewheel steer- 
ing development ." '* 
There followed minor improvements ta the 
braking system. The nosewheel steering system 
was dso improved, so that it, rather thm diEeren- 
tial braking, could be used for directional con- 
trol to reduce tire wear. 
These improvements were made before mis- 
sion 61-C, and it was deemed safe for that mis- 
sion and subsequent missions to land at Kennedy. 
Bad weather in Florida required that 68 -C land 
at Edwards. There were again problems with the 
brakes, indicating that the Shuttle bralking system 
was still suspect. Mr. Charlesworth provided ahis 
assessment to the Commission: 
"Given the problem that has come up now 
with the brakes, I think that whale question 
still needs some more work before 1 would 
be satisfied that yes, we should go back and 
try to land at the Cape."l5 
The nosewheel steering, regarded as fail-safe, 
might better be described as fail-passive: at worst, 
a single failure wil% cause the nosewheel to castor. 
Thus, a single failure in nosewheel steering, 
coupled with filure conditions that require its 
use, could result in depaflure from the runway. 
There is a long-range program to improve the 
nosewheel steering so that a single failure will 
leave the system operational. 
Eight flights have been launched with plans to 
land in Florida. Of those, three have been 
divcntd to Cdifornia because of bad weather. 
hhreover, it is indicative of the dynamic weather 
environment in Florida that twice in the pro- 
earn's Kistosy flights have been waved off for one 
orbit to &law for weather conditions to improve 
enough to be acceptable fssr landing, Thus, even 
if NASA eventudy were to resume routine 
operations at Kennedy, expe~ence indicates the 
Orbiter will diven into Edwards more than 30 
percent of the time. NASA must therefore plan 
to use Edwards routinely. This requires reserv- 
ing six days in the post-landing processing 
schedule br the Orbiter's ferry trip back to 
Florida, Is &so requires redundancy in the ferry 
&reraft. The single Shuttle carrier aircraft, with 
some one-oGa-kind support items, is presently the 
o d y  way to get the Orbiter from California back 
to its launch site in Florida: 
Landing Si te  Changes 
Scheduled Actual 
Mission Wave-sffs Reason Landing Landing 
STO- 3 I Flooding Edwards Nonhmp 
Strip, 
(New 
Mexico) 
STS-7 2 Rainlceiling Kennedy Edwards 
STS 41-c 1 RainJceiling Kennedy Edwards 
STS 61.C 5 Rainlcciling Kennedy Edwards 
The most serious concern is not that the 
weather in Florida is bad, but that the at- 
mospheric conditions are frequently unpre- 
disable. Captain Robeh% Crii%>pen testified before 
the Commission on April 3, 1986: 
"I don't think the astronaut office would 
disaqee vMth the premise that you are much 
safer landing at Edwards. There are some 
things you could do, as was indicated, to 
make Kennedy better, but you're never 
going to overcome the weather unpre- 
dictability.Y6 
Once the Shuttle performs the deorbit burn, 
it is going to land approximately 60 minutes later; 
there is no way to return to orbit, and there is 
no option to select another landing site. This 
means that the weather forecaster must analyze 
the landing site weather nearly one and one-half 
hours in advance of lmding, and that the forecast 
must be accurate, Unfonunaely, the Florida 
weather is pmicularly difficult to forecast at cer- 
tain times of the year. In the spring m d  summer, 
thunderstorms build and dissipate quickly and 
unpredictably. Early morning fog also is very dif- 
ficult to predict if the forecast must be made in 
the hour before sunrise. 
In contrast, the stable weather patterns at Ed- 
wards make the forecaster's job much easier. 
Although NASA has a conservative philios- 
ophy, and applies consewative flight m%es in 
evduating end-of-mission weather, the decision 
always comes down to evduatiwg a weather 
forecast. There is a risk associated with that. If 
the program requirements put forecasters in the 
position of predicting weather when weather is 
unpredictable, it is ody  a matter of time before 
the crew is dowed to leave orbit and arrive in 
Florida to find thunderstorms or rapidly %om- 
ing ground fog. Either could be disastrous. 
The weather at Edwards, of course, is not 
always acceptable for landing either. In fact, only 
days prior to the launch of STS-3, NASA was 
forced to shift the wormd landing site from 
Edwards to Nolwhrup Strip, New Mexico, 
because of flooding of the Edwards lakebed, This 
points out the need to support fully both Ken- 
nedy and Edwards as potential end-of-mission 
landing sites. 
h swmnnq, although there are valid program- 
matic reasons to land routinely at Kennedy, there 
are concerns that suggest that this is not 
wise under the present circumstances. Whge 
planned landings at Edwards carry a cost in dollass 
a d  days, the realities of weather ot be 
ignored. Shuttle program officials must recognize 
that Edwards is a permanent, essentid part of the 
p r ~ g r m .  The cost associated with regb~lar, 
scheduled landing and turnaround operations at 
Edwards is thus a necessary program cost. 
Decisions governing Space Shuttle operations 
must be consistent with the philosophy that un- 
necessary risks have to be eliminated. Such deci- 
sions cannot be made \vithout a clear understand- 
ing of margins of safety in each part of the system. 
Unfortunately, margins of safety cannot be 
assured if performance characteristics are not 
thoroughly understood, nor can they be deduced 
from a previous flight9.s "success." 
The Shuttle Program cannot afford to operate 
outside its experience in the areas of tires, brakes, 
and weather, with the capabilities of the system 
today. Pending a clear understanding of all land- 
ing and deceleration systems. and a resolution of 
the problems encountered to date in Shuttle land- 
ings. the most conservative course must be fol- 
lowed in order to minimize risk during this 
dynamic phase of flight. 
Shuttle Elements 
The Space Shuttle Main Engine teams at Mar- 
shall and Rocketdyne have developed engines that 
have achieved their performance goals and have 
performed extremely well. Nevertheless the main 
engines continue to be highly complex and critical 
components of the Shuttle that involve an element 
of risk principally because important components 
of the engines degrade more rapidly with flight 
, use than anticipated. Both NASA and Rocket- 
dyne have taken steps to contain that risk. An 
important aspect of the main engine program has 
been the extensive "hot fire" ground tests. Un- 
fortunately. the vitality of the test program has 
been reduced because of budgetary constraints. 
The ability of the engine to achieve its pro- 
gramed design life is verified by two test 
engines. These "fleet leader" engines are test fired 
with sufficient frequency that they have twice as 
much operational experience as any flight engine. 
Fleet leader tests have demonstrated that most 
engine components ha\*e an equivalent 40-flight 
service life. As part of the engine test program, 
major components are inspected periodically and 
replaced if wear or damage warrants. Fleet 
leader tests have established that the low-pressure 
fuel turbopump and the low-pressure oxidizer 
pump have lives limited to the equivalent of 28 
and 22 flights, respectively. The high-pressure 
fuel turbopump is limited to six flights before 
overhaul; the high-pressure oxidizer pump is 
limited to less than six flights." An acti\ve pro- 
gram of flight engine inspection and component 
replacement has been effecti~~ely implemented by 
Rocketdyne, based on the results of the fleet 
leader engine test program. 
The life-limiting items on the high-pressure 
pumps are the turbine blades, impellers, seals and 
bearings. Rocketdyne has identified cracked rur- 
bine blades in the high-pressure pumps as a 
primary concern. The contiactor has been work- 
ing to improve the pumps' reliability by insreas- 
ing bearing and turbine blade life and improv- 
ing dynamic stability. While considerable 
progress has been made, the desired le.tv.9 of 
turbine blade life has not yet been acbie.a~ed. A 
number of improvements achieved as a result o.i 
the fleet leader program are now ready $'or In-  
corporation in the Space Shuttle Main Engines 
used in future flights, but have nor been Ern- 
plemented due to fiscal constraints. l a  Immediate 
implementation of these impro\~emenrs would 
aliow incorporation before the next Shuttle Wight. 
The number of engine test firings pe rnon th  
has decreased over the past two years. Yet ahls 
test program has not yet demonstrated the limits 
of engine operation parameters or included tests 
over the full operating envelope to show klH 
engine capability. In addition, tests halve nor yet 
been deliberately conducted to the ]point of failure 
to determine actual engine operating margins. 
The Orbiter has also performed tarell. Therc 
is, however, one serious potential failure mode: 
related to the disconnect valves between the Or- 
biter and the External Tank. The present design 
includes two 17-inch diameter valves. one con- 
trolling the oxygen flow, and the other the 
hydrogen flow from the rank to the Orbi~efs three 
engines. Each of the disconnect valves has P ~ V O  
flappers that close off the flow 06 the liquid 
hydrogen and oxygen when the External T a n k  
separates from the Orbiter. An inadvertent 
closure by any of the four flappers during nor- 
mal engine operation would cause a catastrophe. 
due to rupture of the supply line and/~jr  tank,  
New designs are under study, incorporating 
modifications to prevent inadvertent \-ai\*e 
closures. Redesigned valves could be qualified, 
certified and available for use on the Shuttle's ncsr 
flight. 
While the External Tank has periorrned tlaa% - 
iessly during all Shuttle flights, one area of con- 
cern pertains to the indicators for the r t ~ o  \ , a l \ * ~ b \  
ivhich \.ent the liquid hydrogc~n and licjund 0x1 - 
sen. These valves can indicate thcv arc closcrd 
when they might be partiall!. o p c n . ' ~ h i $  iont i i -  
riasn is potentially hazardous, since leaks of either 
gaseous oxygen or hydrogen prior to launch, or 
in flight, couid lead to fires. This could, in turn, 
lead to catasrroghic failure of the External Tank. 
XASX is currently studying design modifications 
lo the valve position indicators, This effort could 
be expedited and the redesigned indicators in- 
stalled behre the next flight of the Shuttle. 
Processing and Assembly 
Durins the processing and assembly of the 
elements of Waghe 51-L. various problems were 
seen in the Commission's review which could bear 
on the safety of future flights. 
Structural Inspections 
During the 5 1 -L processing, waivers were 
granted on 60 of 946 required Orbiter structural 
inspeaion" Seven of these waivers were second- 
time wai%?ers f inspections. 
A formal structural inspection plan for the 
Shuttle fleer had not been fully developed, and 
nor all of the 146 inspections had been scheduled 
for the 5 1 -& processing. In order to minimize the 
flight delay until the implementation plan could 
be fully developed, the waivers were documented, 
reqwseed and granted by Level I1 at Johnson. 
The structural inspection requirements are 
relatively new and not corinplletely mature. A 
warking group was formed in December 1985, 
to expedite a structural inspection plan. A plan 
now exlsts bsr future structural inspections. The 
Commission believes that these inspections should 
not be waived. The fleet of Orbiters has no coun- 
terpan anywhere in the world. There is no data 
base relaai\~e to reusable spacecraft. The Orbiter's 
operating en.rironment is totally different from 
thar of airliners, and the program must closely 
track the effects of the Orbiters' age and use.Ig 
Records 
Thr~aughout he Commission's review of the ac- 
cident, a large number of errors were noted in 
the papemcark for the Space Shuttle Main 
Engine/Main Propulsion System and for the Or- 
biter, The revie~r showed, however, that in the 
vast majority of cases the problem lay in the 
documentation itself and not in the work that was 
actually accomplished. The review led the Com- 
mission to conclude that the Operations and 
Maintenance Instructions are in need of an 
overall review and update, and the performance 
of Operations and Maintenance Instructions 
needs to be improved. 
Missed Requirements 
At the time of launch, all items called for by 
the Operational Maintenance Requirements and 
Specifications Document were to have been met, 
waived or excepted. The 51 -L audit review has 
revealed additional areas where such re- 
quirements were not met and were not formally 
waived or excepted: 
1. A formal post-flight inspection of the for- 
ward External Tank attach plate was nor 
documented. 
2. A forward avionics bay closeout panel was 
not verified as installed during Orbiter 
rollover/stacking operations (the area was 
properly configured prior to flight with in- 
staPPation of a locker). 
3. Flight 51-E was launched with only one of 
two crew hatch microswitches showing the 
proper indication. This condition was 
documented by a Problem Report and was 
deferred; no waiver was obtained, however. 
4. Post-flight hydraulic reservoir sampling was 
not performed prior to connection of 
ground hydraulic support equipment at 
Dryden Flight Research Facility, but was 
performed in the Orbiter Processing 
Facility. 
5. During Auxiliary Power Unit hypergolic 
loading operations, the Number 2 tank 
evacuation prior to loading was not main- 
tained above 20 inches of mercury for five 
minutes as required (19.8 inches main- 
tained for 2 hours). This incident was 
documented as an acceptable condition by 
Kennedy, Johnson and Launch Support 
Service, but no waiver was submitted. 
6. Landing gear voids were not replenished 
and crew module meters were not verified 
during find vehicle closeouts, The addi- 
tional requirement to replenish the landing 
gear voids during launch countdown was 
performed. z0 
Inspection by Proxy 
Another aspect of the processing activities thar 
warrants particular attention is the Shuttle Proc 
essing Contractor's poIicy of using "designated 
verifiers" to supplement the quality assurance 
force. A designated verifier is aseniir technician 
who is authoiized to inspect and approLVe his own 
and his fellow technicians' work in specific non- 
flight areas, instead of NAS.4 quality assurance 
personnel inspecting the work. The aviation in- 
dustry follows this practice in performing verifica- 
tions for the Federal Aviation Administration. 
The Shuttle Processing Contractor has about 770 
designated \verifiers (nearly 15 % of the work 
force).21 The NASA quality assurance inspection 
program no longer covers 100 percent of the in- 
spection areas. Due to reduced manpower, 
NASA personnel no\\. inspect only areas that are 
considered more critical. Thus the system of in- 
dependent checks that NASA maintained through 
several programs is declining in effectiveness. The 
effect of this change requires careful evaluation 
Bay NASA. 
Accidental Damage Reporting 
While not specifically related to the Challenger 
accident, a serious problem was identified dur- 
ing intenriews of technicians who work on the Or- 
biter. It had been their understanding at one time 
that employees would not be disciplined for ac- 
cidental damage done to the Orbiter, provided 
she damage was fully reported when it occurred. 
It was their opinion that this forgiveness policy 
was no longer being followed by the Shuttle Proc- 
essing Contractor. They cited examples of 
employees being punished after acknowledging 
they had accidentally caused damage. The techni- 
cians said that accidental damage is not con- 
sistently reported, when it occurs, because of lack 
of confidence in management's forgiveness policy 
and technicians9 consequent fear of losing their 
jobs. T%lis situation has obvious severe implica- 
tions if left uncorrected. 
Launch Pad 39B 
All launch damage and launch measurement 
data from Pad B ground systems anomaiies were 
considered to be normal or minor with three ex- 
ceptions: the loss of the springs and plungers on 
the booster hold-down posts; the failure of the 
gaseous hydrogen vent arm to latch; and the loss 
of bricks from the flame trench. These three items 
are treated in Appendix I. the NASA Pre-Launch 
Activities Team Report (May, 1986). None con- 
tributed to the accident. 
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Loss of bricks from the flame trench was also 
experienced during the launch of STS-P (April, 
198 1) and STS-2 (November, 198 1) from Pad A,  
though at locations closer to the cen~terline of the 
vehicle. Since the brick was blown out (3% the 
flame trench and away from the vehicle, there is 
no evidence to indicate that the loose brick might 
have endangered the 51-L vehicle, beat it may be 
possible for damage to occur if the condition re- 
mains uncorrected. The Pad B fire brick i s  to be 
replaced by refractory concrete, as was done on 
Pad A. 
Involvement of Development 
Contractors 
The Space Shuttle program, like i t s  
predecessors Mercury, Gemini, Apo]%o, Skylab 
and Apollo-Soyuz, is clearly a de\.e8opmentd pro- 
gram and must be treated as such by NASA. In- 
deed, the chief difference~ between the Shuttle 
and previous developmental programs are that 
the Shuttle is principally a transportation system 
and employs reusable hardware. Reusability im- 
plies a new set of functions such as logistics sup- 
port, maintenance, refurbishment, lifetime con- 
cerns and structural inspections that- must be 
addressed by the program. 
In order to enhance post-flight "turnaround'" 
schedule and efficiency, NASA is striving to im- 
plement processing p;ocedures accepted by the 
transponation industry. While this e f i n  is useful, 
there-is not an exact industry analow to the Or- 
biter vehicles' flight operations, because each 
successive Shuttle mission expands system and 
performance requirements. Consequently, the 
Shuttle configuration is evolving as design 
changes and improvements are inco~psrated, The 
demands of individual payloads can cause sipifi- 
cant additional developmental changes. 
These developmental aspects make significant 
demands, which can be met only by the fosallow- 
ing strategies: 
1. Maintain a significant enginee~ng des ip  
and development capability among the 
Shuttle contractors and an ongoing engi- 
neering capability within NASA, 
2. Maintain an active analytical capability 
so that the evolving capabilities of the 
Shuttle can be matched to the demands During External Tank propellant loading in 
on the Shuttle. preparation for launch, the liquid hydrogen 
The Shuttle's developmental status demands that 
both NAS,Lb and all its contractors maintain a 
high level of  in-house experience and technical 
ability. 
MI Shuttle contractors and their corresponding 
YASA project organizations expressed concern 
about the organization of contractor services. 
'Whew Shuttje operations were begun, the prime 
despelopmene contractors had total responsibility 
for a3111 Shutale activities. The concept of a single 
SRurtle Processing Prime Contractor was adopted 
as NASA policy in 198 1,  and implemented in 
1983 when a, team led by Lockheed Space Opera- 
tions was selected. The Lockheed team includes 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, respon- 
sible for processing the Orbiter; Grumman Aero- 
space Corporation. responsible for operation and 
maintenance of the launch processing system; 
Pan American World Airways, charged with in- 
troducing and maintaining airline methods and 
techniques in the processing system; Morton 
Thiiokol, Bnc., responsible for processing the Solid 
Rocket Boosters and External Tank; and Rocket- 
dyne, responsible for processing the Shuttle main 
engines. 
Lockheed's performance as Shuttle Processing 
Goneractor is ~udged  on the basis of a NASA 
grading system using agreed criteria. In 
September, 1984, the company was marked d ~ w n  
for fai%ure to form a csordinated contractor team, 
As a result of that grading, Lockheed earned for 
that period an award fee of about one-quarter of 
one percent of cost, on a maximum fee scale at 
that time of one percent of cost. Eockheed re- 
viewed the findings of NASA's grading and did 
not quarrel with its major thrust. 
The award fee presently is a composite of in- 
centives to be earned on mission success and cost 
control. It can vary along a scale of one to 14 per- 
cent sf cost, The Shuttle Processing Contractor 
was earning, at the time of the Challenger acci- 
dent, about six percent of cost, or nearly mid- 
point on the scale. 
17-inch disconnect valve was opened prior to 
reducing the pressure in the Orbiter liquid 
hydrogen manifold, through a procedural error 
by the console operator. The valve was opened 
with a six pounds per q u a r e  inch differentia%. 
This was contrary to the critical requirement that 
the differential be no greater than one pound per 
square inch. This pressure held the valve closed 
for approximately 18 seconds before it finally 
slammed open abruptly. These valves are ex- 
tremely critical and have very stringent tolerances 
to preclude inadvertent closure of the valve dur- 
ing mainstage thrusting. Accidental closing of a 
disconnect valve would mean catastrophic loss of 
Orbiter and crew. The slamming of this valve 
(which could have damaged it) was not reported 
by the operator and was not discovered until the 
post-accident data review. Although this incident 
did not contribute to the 51 -L incident, this type 
of error cannot 'be tolerated in future operations, 
and a policy of rigorous reporting of anomalies 
in processing must be strictly enforced. 
During the pre-launch processing and post- 
flight refurbishment of the Orbiter, Wockwel% - 
the development contractor - acts largely as an 
adviser to the Shuttle Processing Contractor. 
Martin Marietta has a similar role regarding the 
pre-launch processing of the External Tank. In 
contrast, NASA directed the Shuttle Processing 
Contractor to subcc~nsract with Rocketdyne and 
Thiokol for the processing and refurbishment of 
the main engines and the Solid Rocket Motors, 
respectively. If Rockwell and Martin Marietta, 
as the development contractor, had a similar 
direct involvement with their elements of the 
Shuttle system, the likelihood of difficulties caused 
by improper processing would probably be de- 
creased. Furthermore, all Shuttle elements would 
benefit from the advantages of beginning-to-end 
responsibility vested in individual contractors, 
each responsible for the design, development, 
manufacturing, operation, and refurbishment of 
their respective Shuttle elements. 
Although the performance of the Shuttle Proc- 
essing Contractor's team has improved con- 
siderably, serious processing problems have oc- 
curred, especially with respect t~ the Orbiter. An 
example is provided by the handling of the critical 
I %-inch disconnect valves during the 5 1 -L flight 
.$srepara"ons. 
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Recommendations 
he Commission has conducted an ex- The Commission urges that the Administrator 
tensave investigation of the Challen- of NASA submit, one year from now, a report 
ger accident to determine the prob- to the President on the progress that NASA has 
able cause and necessary corrective ' made in effecting the Commission's recommen- 
actions. Based on the findings and determinations dations set forth below: 
sf its investigation, the Commission has 
unanimousXy adopted recommendations PO help 
assure the return ro safe flight. 
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and . The certification of the new design should 
seal must be changed. This could be a new design include: 
eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current 
j o ~ n t  and seal, No design options should be -Tests which duplicate the actual launch con- figuration as closely as possible. prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost 
br reliance on existing hardware. All Solid Rocket -Tests over the full range of operating con- 
Wlstar joints should satisfy the foPlowing ditions, including temperature. 
requlremelaats: Full consideration should be given to conduct- 
mi The joints should be fully understood, tested ing static firings of the exact flight configura- 
and verified. tlon in a vertical attitude. 
m The integrity of the structure and of the seals Independent Oversight. The Administrator of' 
of all Joints should be not less than that of the NASA should request the National Research 
case walls throughout the design envelope. Council to form an independent Solid Rocker 
Motor design oversight committee to implement 
rn The integrity of the joints should be insensitive the Commission's design recommendations and 
to: oversee the design effort. This committee should: 
-Bimcnsionaii tolerances. 
-Transporeation and handling. 
-- Assembly procedures. 
-Inspection and test procedures. 
-Environmenta1 effects. 
- Internal case operating pressure. 
-Reco%~ery and reuse effects. 
- F%igRr and water impact loads. 
Review and evaluate certification require- 
meats. 
m Provide technical oversight of the design. test 
program and certification. 
Report to the Administrator of NASA on the 
adequacy of the design and make appropriate 
recommendations. 
Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle 
Program Structure should be reviewed. The proj- 
ect managers for the various elements of the Shut- 
tle program felt more -accountable to their center 
management than to the Shuttle program organi- 
zation. Shuttle element funding, work package 
definition, and vital program information fre- 
quently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Pro- 
grani Manager. 
A redefinition of the Program Manager's respon- 
sibiliry is essential. This redefinition should give 
the Program Manager the requisite authority for 
all ongoing STS operations. Program funding 
and all Shuttle Program work at the centers 
should be placed clearly under the Program 
Manager's authority. 
Astronauts in  Management. The Commission 
observes that there appears to be a departure from 
the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating 
to the use of astronauts in management positions. 
These individuals brought to their posiebns flight 
experience and a keen appreciation of operations 
and flight safety. , 
B NASA should encourage the transition of 
qualified astronauts into agency management 
positions. 
The function of the Flight Crew Operations 
director should be elevated in the NASA orga- 
nization structure. 
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an 
STS Safety Advisory Panell reporting to the S T S  
Program Manager. The charter of chas pane) 
should include Shuttle operational issues, launch 
commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and 
risk management. The panel shou%d include 
representation from the safety organization, mis- 
sion operations, and the astronaut officee. 
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. to flight to ensure mission success and Oig-hr safe- 
NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National 
should review all Criticality 1, l R ,  2, and 2R Research Council, should verify the. adequacy of 
items and hazard analyses. This review should the effort and report directly to the Adminlstramr 
identify those items that must be improved prior of NASA. 
Safety Organization. NASA should establish an The responsibilities of this office should include: 
Office of Safety 7 Re"abi"'~ and  qua'"^ a ~h~ safety, reliability and assurance Assurance to be headed by an Associate Ad- functions as they reIate to all NASA actix~iries 
ministrator, reporting directly to the NASA Ad- 
and programs. 
ministrator. It would have direct authority for 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance RI Direction of reporting and documentation of 
throughout the agency. The office should be problems, problem resolution and trends 
assigned the work force to ensure adequate over- associated with flight safety. 
sight of its functions and should be independent 
of other NASA functional and program 
responsibilities. 
Improved h6ommunications. The Commission ta A policy should be developed which governs 
found that hdarshall Space Flight Center project the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch 
managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to constraints. 
managemema isolation, failed to provide full and 
tlmeMy information bearing on the safety offlight ta Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 
51 -E rs orher viral elements of Shuttle program Management Team meetings should be 
management. recorded. 
esr: NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate 
this tendency at h1arshall Space Flight Center, 
avhether by changes of personnel, organiza- 
slon, indocrrlnation or all three. 
The flight crew commander, or a designated 
representative, should attend the Flight 
Readiness Review, participate in acceptance 
of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the 
crew is properly prepared for flight. 
Landing Safety, NASA must take actions to im- 
prove landing safety. 
rn The tire* brake and noseavheei steering systems 
must be impro~red. These systems do not Rave 
sufficienr safety margin, particularly at abort 
Banding sites. 
rn The specific conditions under which planned 
landings at Kennedy would be acceptable 
should be determined. Criteria must be 
established for tires, brakes and nosewheel 
steering. Until the systems meet those criteria 
in high fidelity testing that is verified at 
E d ~ ~ a r d s ,  landing at Kennedy should not be 
planned, 
Committing to a specific landing site requires 
that landing area weather be forecast more 
thaw an hour in advance. During unpredict- 
able weather periods at Kennedy, program of- 
ficials should plan on Edwards landings. In- 
creased landings at Edwards may necessitate 
a dual ferry capability. 
- VII - 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle 
progam management considered first-stage abon 
options and cre%cv escape options several times 
durnlng she hisrov of the program, but because 
of limited utility. technical infeasibility. or pro- 
gram cost and schedule, no systems were im- 
plemented. The Commission recommends that 
NASA: 
Make all efforts to provide a crew escape 
system for use during controlled gliding flight. 
Make every effort to increase the range of flight 
conditions under which an emergency runway 
landing can be successfullly conducted in the 
event that two or three main engines fail early 
in ascent. 
- VIII - 
Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shut- NASA must establish a flight rate that is consis- 
tle as its principal space launch capability created tent with its resources. A firm payload assignmebar 
a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the policy should be established. The policy should 
flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch include rigorous controls on cargo manifest 
capability should be avoided in the future. changes to limit the pressures such changes exerr 
on schedules and crew training. 
Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, and 
maintenance procedures must be especially 
rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated 
Criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of 
analyzing and reporting performance trends of 
such items. 
Maintenance procedures for such items should 
be specified in the Critical Items List, especidly 
for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines; 
which require unstinting maintenance and 
overhaul. 
With regard to the Orbiters. NASA should: 
m Develop and execute a comprehensi\ si. 
maintenance inspection p%arn. 
Perform periodic structural inspections tvhen 
scheduled and not permit them to be waived. 
m Restore and support the maintenance and 
spare pans programs, and stop the practice of 
removing parts from one Orbiter to supply 
another. 
- - 
Concluding ~ h o u ~ h t  
The Commission urges that ,\'ASA continue to receive The Commission applauds N A S A  's spec&cu/a~~.~ ach ~ P L ' P -  
the support of the Administration and the nation. The ments ofthe past and anticthates impressive ac.Ri~e*trsz~nt\ 
agency constitutes a national resource that plays a critical to come. The findings and recommendations pmelzbfd in 
role in space exploration and development. It also pro- this report are intended to contribule to the future UKC4SS4 
vides a symbol of national pride and technological successes that the nation both expects and requir~s  er.\ fhr' 
leadership. 21st centurf? approaches. 
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Appendix A 
Commission Activities 
President Reagan, seeking to ensure a 
thorough and unbiased investigation of the 
Challenger accident, announced the formation of 
the Commission on February 3, 1986. The man- 
date given by the President, contained in 
Executi%*e Order 12546, required Commission 
members to: 
Review the circumstances surrounding the 
accident to establish the probable cause or 
causes of the accident; and 
Develop recommendations for corrective 
or other action based upon the Commis- 
sion's findings and determinations, 
Following their swearing in by Chairman 
Rogers on Februasy. 6th, Commission members 
immediately began a series of hearings during 
which NASA officids outlined agency procedures 
C O V ~ ~ P B ~  the Shuttle program and the status of 
NASA's investigation of the accident. 
Shonly thereafter, on February loth, Dr. Alton 
6. Keel, Jr., Associate Director of the Of- 
fice of Management and Budget, was appointed 
Executive Director. Dr. Keel began gathering a 
staff sf 15 experienced investigators from various 
government agencies and the military servicesp 
and administrative personnel to support Commis- 
sion aeravities, 
Durnng a closed session on February 10. 1986, 
the Commission began to learn of the troubled 
history of the Solid Rocket Mczor joint and seals. 
Moreover. it discovered the first indication that 
the contractor, Morton Thiokol, initially recom- 
mended against launch on January 27, 1986, the 
wight before the launch of 5 1 -E, because of con- 
cerns regarding low temperature effects on the 
joint and seal. To  investigate this disturbing 
development, additional closed sessions were 
scheduled for February 13th and 14th at Men- 
nedy . The F e b m q  f 3, 1986, session was an ex- 
tensive presentation of film, video and telemetry 
data relating go the Challenger accident. It pro- 
vided the Commission the first evidence that the 
Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal may have 
malfunctioned, initiating the accident. 
The session ow February 14th included 
NASA and contractor participants involved in the 
discussion on January 27, 1986, not to launch 
51-L. After testimony was received, an executive 
session of the Commission was convened. The 
following statement was subsequently issued by 
the Chairman on February 15, 1986, reflecting 
the conclusion and view df the Commission: - 
"In recent days, the Commission has been 
investigating all aspects of the decision 
making process leading up to the launch of 
the Challenger and has found that the proc- 
ess may have been flawed. The President has 
been so advised. 
"Dr. William Graham, Acting Adminis- 
trator of NASA, has been asked not to in- 
clude on the internal investigating teams at 
NASA, persons involved in that process. 
"The Commission will, of course, continue 
its investigation and will make a full report 
to the President within 120 days." 
The role of the Commissioners thus changed 
from that of overseers to that of active in- 
vestigators and analysts of data presented by 
NASA and its contractors. 
The Commission itself divided into four in- 
vestigative panels: 
I .  Development and Production, responsi- 
ble for investigating the acquisition and 
test and evaluation processes for the 
Space Shuttle elements; 
2. Pre-Launch Activities, responsible for 
assessing the Shuttle system processing, 
launch readiness process and pre-launch 
security; 
3.  Mission Planning and Operations, 
responsible for investigating mission 
planning and operations, schedule 
pressures and crew safety areas; and 
4. Accident Analysis, charged with analyz- 
ing the accident data and developing both 
an anomaly tree and accident scenarios. 
By February 1 7th, the panel organization had 
been finalized and, on February 18th, Chairman 
Rogers described the Commission's new approach 
before Congress. Working groups were sent to 
Marshall, Kennedy and Thiokol to analyze data 
relating to the accident and to redirect efforts. 
NASA's investigation was also reorganized to 
reflect the structure of the ~ommiss idn~s  panels. 
A series of public hearings were planned on 
February 25th, 26th and 27th to assure an orderly 
and fair presentation of all the facts that the Com- 
mission had discovered concerning the launch 
decision making process for flight 5 1 -Lo At these 
hearings, additional information about the ]launch 
decision was obtained from the testimony of 
Thiokol, Rockwell and NASA officials. Details 
about the history of problems with the then 
suspect Solid Rocket Motor joints and seals allso 
began emerging and served to focus the Commis- 
sion's attention on a weed to document fully the 
extent of knowledge and awareness about the 
problems within both Thiokol and NASA. 
Following these hearings, a substantial portion 
of the investigative efforts of the Commission was 
conducted by the separate panels in parallel with 
full Commission hearings. 
The Accident Analysis Panel, chaired by Ma- 
jor General Donald Kutyna, made severd trips 
to both Kennedy and Marshall and traveled to 
Thiokol facilities in Utah to review photographic 
and telemetric evidence as well as the results of 
the salvage operation and to oversee the tests be- 
ing conducted by NASA and Thiokol engineers. 
The Accident Analysis Panel followed stand- 
ard investigative procedures. An extensive effort 
was needed to establish the design, manufaceur- 
ing and processing baseline configuration of the 
Shuttle vehicle for STS 51-L. A data base was 
established for the examination and analysis of 
information related to all flight elements and 
segments. From these data and a compilation of 
possible and observed deviations from the norm, 
scenarios that might have led to the accident were 
developed. Tests and analyses were thew per- 
formed to determine the specific scenarios most 
likely to have caused loss of Challenger. 
Early in March, at the request of the Chair- 
man, this group assembled and directed the Corn- 
mission's independent team of technicd observers 
with extensive experience in Solid Rocket h4orar 
technology and accident investigation BO validate 
and interpret the tests and analyses performed on 
the Thiokol motor by NASA and Thioko%. 
The Development and Produceion Panel, 
chaired by Joseph Sutter, centered i t s  investiga- 
tion on the production and testing activities of 
the Shuttle element contractors. Staning at 
Johnson, the panel and staff investigators looked 
at how these contractors and their NASA counter- 
parts interact. 
They next traveled to the Wasarch plant of 
Thiokol in Promontory, Utah. Thiokol perssn- 
riel-briefed the group on the details of the design, 
manufacturing, verification and cenification of 
the Solid Rocket Motors. Similar sesslons took 
place in Aprill in Downey, California, at the head- 
quarters of Rocketdyne, Inc., the Shuttle main 
engine contractor; in Canoga Park, California, 
at the facilities of RockweU. Intematiriond, the Or- 
biter contractor; in Michoud, Louisiana, at the 
plant of Martin Marietta, the Extend Tmk cow- 
tractor; and in Berea, Kentucky, at the facilities 
of Parker Seal Company, the manriaf"actenre~.s of 
the O-ring seals of the Thiokcsl Solid Rockel 
Motors. 
In addition, the panel traveled to Masshall to 
learn about Marshall's interaction with Thioko1 
and to discuss issues that had been raised during 
the visits to the contractors9 plants. 
The Pre-Launch Activities Panel, chaired by 
David Acheson, centered its investigatisn at Ken- 
nedy where the Shuttle elements are assembled 
and all other final launch preparations are com- 
pleted. This panel, in conjunction with the Mis- 
sion Planning and Operations Panel, chaired bv 
Dr. Sally Ride, met with its NASA counterparrs 
in early March. This series of meetings identified 
for the Commission the various a.specrs of she pse- 
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launch process that required thorough review, not 
only for the purpose of the Challenger accident 
an%pesrigataon but also to increase safety margins 
for the future. 
Later nn March the Pre-Launch Panel again 
met at Kennedy to receive the NASA Team's 
pre$imina%v repons and to focus on the spare 
parts issue and SsBid Rocket Booster assembly 
operations, Pane% members dso met wvith contrac- 
tor personnel invo%\?ed in Shuttle processing and 
Kennedy security work. 
After the joint meeting at Kennedy with the 
Pre-Launch Activities Panel, the Mission Plan- 
ning and Operations Panel traveled to Johnson 
ro begn working with its NASA counterparts and 
to initiate its owrl investigative efforts. A specific 
locus of %IS work was the mission planning and 
crew preparation for STS 51-L and details of 
NASA"s safetv, reliability and quality assurance 
programs. Later meetings at both Johnson and 
Marshdl dedt with range safety, weather criteria 
for launch, flight delays and hardware testing. 
While the work of the Individual panels and 
their investigative staffs was ongoing, a general 
invesrigatis9e staff began a series of individual in- 
eemiews to document fully the fasmd background 
of V ~ O " B Q U S  areas of the Commission's interest, in- 
cluding the telecon between NASA and Thiokol 
officials the night before the launch; the history 
ofjoint design and O-ring problems; NASA safe- 
ty, reliability and quality assurance functions; and 
the assembly of the right Solid Rocket Booster 
for STS 51-L. Subsequent investigative efforts by 
this group were directed in the area of the effec- 
tiveness of NASA's organizational structure, par- 
ticu%arly the Shuttle program structure, and 
allegations that there had been external pressure 
on NASA to launch on January 28th. 
More than 160 individua%s were interviewed 
and more than 35 formal panel investigative ses- 
sions were he$$ generating almost 12,000 pages 
of transcript (Table 1 and Table 2). Almost 6,300 
documents, totalling more than 122,000 pages. 
and hundreds of photographs were examined and 
made a part of the Commission's permanent data 
base and archives. These sessions and ail the data 
gathered added to the 2,800 pages of hearing 
transcript generated by the Commission in both 
closed and open sessions. 
In addition to the work of the Commission and 
the Commission staff? NASA personnel expended 
a vast effon in the investigation. More than 1,300 
employees from a91 NASA facilities were involved 
and were supported by more than 1,600 people 
from other government agencies and over 3,100 
from NASA's contractor organizations. Par- 
ticularly significant were the activities of the 
military, the Coast Guard and the NTSB in 
the salvage and analysis of the Shuttle wreckage. 
Table f 
Commission Investigative Interviews 
- 
Intemiews of January 27, 1986 
Teleconference (8: 15 PM EST) 
Participants 
Ben Powers 
Frank Adams 
Larw byear 
James Smith 
Boyd Brlntsn 
Robert Schwunghamer 
M'i%%iam Reihl 
Miayne Lirries 
John Q hliller 
John McCanv 
John Schell 
Keith Coares 
George Hardy 
Jud Lovingsod 
Jack Bmchanan 
Allan McDonald 
Carver Kennedy 
Cecil Houston 
Lawrence Mulloy 
Stanley Reinartz 
William Macbeth 
Brian Russell 
Jack Kapp 
Ron Ebeling 
Calvin Wiggins 
Larry Sayer 
Joel Maw 
Kyle Speas 
Jerry Burn 
Don Ketner 
Jerry E. Mason 
Robert Lund 
Joseph Kilminster 
Roger Boisjoly 
Arnold Thompson 
Jerry Peoples 
James Kingsbury 
Interviews of Personnel 
Involved in Stacking of 
of Right SRB for Flight 51-L 
Ho\r.ard Fichtl Ed O'Keal Mike Sestile Jim Gardner 
Jack Roberts Leslie Lake Granville Goad John Taris 
Curtis J .  Ne\vsome . Buddy Rogers David Mumpower Kenneth Koby 
h4ark \'igjl Mario Duran Robin Nix . Allen R .  Hyde 
Bob Heinbaugh Jim St. John Glenn Charron Jerry M'illkesson 
Howard Christy Billy Massey Stewart Dalton Alex h4cCool 
Jackie L%'alden Mike Sieglitz Sharron [Thitaker Charles D. if\;e\vman 
Alvie Hicks Jim Jordan 
Interviews on Ice on Pad 
Thomas hloser 
John Peller 
Interviews on Security 
Manin  Jones 
Herbert M9eisner 
IntemiewsA on History of SRB 
Joint Design and Problem 
Leon Ray Robert Lindstrom 
Alex McCool James Brier 
Jerry Peoples Jesse hloore 
Glenn Eudy Joseph Kilminster 
Ben Powers Arnold Thompson 
John h4iller Iming Davids 
Biil Rice .4rnold Aldrich 
Bill Horton Hans hlark 
Jer? Cox Glynn Lunney 
Bill Bush \.%'ah C.  Williams 
Paul Wetzel George Hardy 
David l%'interhalter Larry Mulloy 
William Hamby Fred Uptagrafft 
Michael Weeks Richard Cook 
Paul Herr \%-alter Dankhoff 
James Kingsbur? 
Sam Lowry 
Stanley Reinanz 
Calvin Wiggins 
Mark Salita 
Joe Pelham 
Phillip Dykstera 
Ed Dorsey 
Roger Boisjoly 
Brian Russel 
Jack Kemp 
Roben Lund 
Howard McIntosh 
Glenn Eudy 
Robert Gaffin 
Ben Powers 
Michael Mann 
Richard KoRrs 
hlaurice Parker 
Keith Coates 
John SchelI 
James [a'. Tho~nas 
Boyd B r i n r ~ n  
James AbraRamson 
Jerry Mason 
Jack Kapp 
Ronald Ebeliwg 
Arnold "4ldrich 
Hazel Saunders 
Interview on Launch Coverage 
Camera Failures 
Charles Alswonh 
Intentiews on Outside Pressure 
To Launch 
Michael Weeks Phil Culbenson Jerry E. Mason Karen Ehlers 
Jesse Moore George Hardy Arnold Aldrich George Johnson 
Charles Kupperman Larry Mulloy Lawrence Wear James Beggs 
Shirley Green Joseph Kiilminsrer John Q. Miller William R Graham 
Vera Herschberg Stanley Reinarrz James Smith Richard Cook 
Richard Smith Robert Lund Norman Terrell Ben Po\%.ees 
Interviews on Safety, Weliability and Quality Assurance 
Davad Brown Jackie C.  Walker Howard Girtens Wayne Frazier 
%%)chard h4 Henritze Benny Nunnelly Brian Russell Norman R. Schulze 
James 0 Baare George Butler Haggai Cohen Stanley Reinartz 
Anhug hi. Carr Henry P. Smith Harry Quong Milton Silveira 
\!"ilev C. Bunw Wesley Hawkins Dallas IN. Vickers 
David Austin John Maxson 
0 
Intemiews on Management Structure 
Dick Kohrs James Smith Jerry Cox Richard A. Coilonna 
Jesse hfoore Arnold Aldrich Jerry Griffin Walt C. Williams 
Dr Hans Mask John J. McCarry Stanley Reinartz George Bridwell 
i%"il%tam Hamby Scott Simpkinson James Kingsbury George Johnson 
haichael Weeks James Brier Thomas J.  Lee Richard Cook 
Eaw*sence %%'ear Jud A. Lovingood William F. Taylor Michael Mann 
John Q Miller Bill BusR 
i% illaarn Lucas 
Interviews on Human Factors 
LOUIS E Toole Jenny Howard Ray Ha$%ard Gregory Haywood Williams 
James B Hill Greg Oliver Ken McCrary Robert E. Brayant 
Leonard J Rsrhe Robert Yackovetsky Joe Kenneth Patterson Keith Coares 
Heather hl. h4itchell h4onon OqHare 
nterview on Wreckage Reconstruction 
Terry Armentrout 
Interview on Crew Activities 
George Abbe!. 
Table 2 
Commission Panel Sessions - 
Date Location Su bjecf 
Accident Analysis Panel 
March 3, 4, 5 
March 6 .  7 
March 11  
March 12, 13 
March 19 
March 26 
April 10, 11 
April 14. 15. 16, 17 
Marshall 
Kennedy 
Kennedy 
Marshall 
Thiokol -Utah 
Marshall 
Marshall 
Marshall 
Design, Development and Production Panel 
hlarch 5 
March 17 
March 18 
April 2 
April 3 
April 4 
April 7 
April 8.9 
April 11 
Johnson 
Thiokol - Utah 
Thiokol - Utah 
Rocketdyne -California 
Rocketdyne & Rockwell - California 
Rockwell - California 
Marshall 
Martin Marietta-Louisiana 
Parker Seal -Kentucky 
Accident Data Review, Fault Tree Analysis 
Film & Wreckage Review 
Coordination with NASA Task Force 
Accident Data Review, Fault Tree Analysis, Test 
Requirements 
Test Coordination 
Test Review 
Test Review 
Final Review 
Prelisninap Briefing 
Fact-Finding Session 
Design-Production 
Main Engines 
Development- Orbiter 
Orbiter 
Development and Production 
Development - External Tank 
O-rings 
Pre-Launch Activities Panel 
March 4, 5. 6 Kennedy 
March 17, 18, 19 Kennedy 
Mission Planning and Operations Panel 
March 4, 5 
March 11. 12 
March 20 
March 24, 25 
Rlarch 31, April 1 
April 7 
April 8. 9 
April 14, 15 
Kennedy 
.Johnson 
Johnson 
Johnson 
Johnson 
Marshall 
Johnson 
Johnson 
Training, Workload, Schedule, Spares, Pre-Launch 
Investigation Update, Security 
Manpower, Spare Parts, Shuttle Processing, Secusai? . 
Hold-down Post Spring 51-L, Boos.rer"Flo.s%o, 
Salvage Status, SRB Recovery. Launch Readiness 
Process 
Preliminary Briefing 
Crew Activity Planning, Training, Abort Modes. 
Safety, Manifesting 
Objectives Review 
Range Safety, Mission Operations, Landing Opera- 
tions, Weather, Tile Damage, Main Engines, 
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
Payload Safety, Hardware Testing, Training, 5 l -L 
Flight Design 
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
Workload, Software, Manifesting, Landing 
Considerations 
AscentIEntry Envelope, Abort Option History, 
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
Executive Order 12546, dated February 3, 1986, which establlished 
the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
EXECUTIVE ORDER I 
PRESIDENTIAL COMXXSSION ON TBE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CXAIAENGER ACCIDENT 
By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, 
including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended 
(5 U.S.C. App. I), and in order to establish a conmission of 
1 distinguished Americans to investigate the accident to the I 
Space Shuttle Challenger, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section P. Establishment, (a) There is established 
the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident. The Commission shall be composed of not more than 
20 members appointed or designated by the President, The 
members shall be drawn from among distinguished leaders of the 
government, and the scientific, technical, and management 
communities. 
(b) The President shall designate a Chaiman and a 
Vice Chairman from mong the members of the Commjission. 
Sec. 2. Functioma. (a1 The Commission shall investi- 
gate the accident to the Space Shuttle Challenger, which 
occurred on January 28, 1986, 
(b) The Commission shall: 
(1) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident 
to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident; and 
( 2 )  Develop recommendations for corrective or 
other action based upon the Cormnissiowss findings and 
determinations, 
(c) The Commission shall submit its final report to the 
President and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration within one hundred and twenty days of 
the date of this Order, 
Sec. 3. Administration. (a) The heads of ~xecutive 
departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by 
law, provide the Commission with such information as it may 
require for purposes of carrying out its functions, 
(b) Members of the Commission shall serve without 
compensation for their work on the Commission. However, 
members appointed from among private citizens of the 
United States may be allowed travel expenses, including 
per diem in lieu of subsistence, to the extent permitted 
by law for persons serving intermittently in the government 
service (5 U.S.C. 5701-S707), 
(c) TO the extent permitted by law, and subject to the 
availability of appropriations, the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall provide 
the Commission with such administrative services, funds, 
facilities, staff, and other support services as may be 
necessary for the performance of its functions. 
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other Becutive Order, the functions of 
the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act which 
are applicable to the Commission, except that of reporting 
annually to the Congress, shall be performed by the Adminis- 
trator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by 
the Administrator of General Services. 
(b) The Commission shall terminate 60 days after 
submitting its final report. 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
February 3 ,  1986. 
Commission 
Documentation System 
Overview 
One of the Commission's initial concerns was 
to make cenain that Commission members and 
staff would have ready access to the tens of 
housmds of pagemf technical infomation, hear- 
ing transcripts, witness interviews, and cor- 
respondence relating to the Challenger accident. 
Severd aspects of the investigation made gather- 
ing, controlling, and cataloging such information 
a fomidable task. Owe was the massive volume 
of' informatiion collected, In addition, the fairly 
shon response time required of the Commission 
made it imperative that d l  information be im- 
mediately &d completely accessible. Finally, the 
Commission needed to make sure that it could 
account for and retrieve every piece of infoma- 
tion that it collected and generated. 
To address those issues, the Commission 
enlisted the support of the Justice Department's 
Office of Lltigarion Support, Civil Division. 
With existing capabilities, the Office of Litiga- 
tion Suppon niounted a rigorous cataloging ef- 
fan, developed and implemented a document 
control system, created the automated data bases, 
a d  estabBSshed a Commission documents Sup- 
pon Center for document processing and research 
activities. 
The resulting system enabled the Commission 
to manage the volume and assortment of infor- 
mation received and generated in the course of 
the investigation, and provided Commission staff 
with sapid access to needed information. The 
system was designed to enable access to either 
hard copy or microfilm for future research after 
the Commission completed its work. 
The Commission was able to meet its commit- 
ment to ensuring the integrity of this extensive 
collection of information; all information pertain- 
ing to the investigation can be easily located and 
its origin readilly traced. 
The Commission Information 
Management System 
The Commission developed procedures to 
assure that it received d l  documents requested 
from NASA and other sources and that a11 
documents and other correspondence were prop- 
erly processed. 
Document Control 
The Commission had control procedures and 
systems to track types of documents relevant 
to the investigation. Specific procedures were 
used to process (1) Commission requests for in- 
formation from NASA, and NASA's responses; 
(2) NASA Task Force Reports; (3) other corre- 
spondence to and from the Commission; (4) other 
documents obtained by the Commission; and (5) 
reports and transcripts generated by the 
Commission. 
The document control system ensured that all 
requests, documents, transcript and interview 
tapes, and other source materials were properly 
accounted for, and became part of the Commis- 
sion's pemanent records and data base. 
Documents Requested from NASA 
Most documents relevant to the investigation 
came directly from NASA in response to Corn- 
mission requests. The Commission requested 
documents from NASA in writing or verbally at 
hearings. The Commission followed up verbal re- 
quests with written requests. 
To handle the flow of paper, the Commission 
assigned a staff member to be document coor- 
dinator. The document coordinator assigned 
every written request a unique control number. 
The number identified the date of the request and 
its order of occurrence on that date. 
NASA set up a complementary system. The 
NASA coordinator received and logged Commis- 
sion request letters, assigned unique NASA track- 
ing numbers to each item or group of documenrs 
requested, and followed up to ensure that NASA 
staff responded promptly and fully. 
When documents were received from NASA 
corresponding to each numbered request, one 
copy of each was sent to the Support Center for 
microfilming, analysis (coding), and inclusion in 
the computer data base. 
Costespondence 
Each individual piece of nonpersonal mail 
arriving at the Commission was assigned a cor- 
respondence control number. Technical staff 
evaluated correspondence for investigative value. 
On a microcomputer-based system, staff captured 
critical information about each correspondence 
item, including correspondence control number, 
date of receipt, addressee, author, type of cor- 
respondence, and response date and type. 
Other Documents 
The Commission also received many 
documents other than those requested from 
NASA. These included relevant materials that 
Commission members themselves had gathered 
or generated, those from NASA and from the 
v a ~ o u s  NASA contractors as a result of Com- 
mission investigative activities, and incoming sor- 
respondence that staff decided woulld be of use 
to the investigation. These documents were also 
entered into the Commission's data base, and 
relevant correspondence was also entered into the 
microcomputer tracking system. 
Transcripts and Commission-Generated 
Documents 
The Commission used a court reporting firm 
to transcribe hearings, interviews, and meetings. 
The firm created magnetic computer tapes with 
the full text of the transcripts and delivered the 
tapes to be loaded into the computer data base. 
The firm also provided hard copies of the 
transcripts to all participants of the hearing, in- 
terview, or meeting so chat they could conect any 
mistakes made in transcription. 
Quick entry of the transcripts into the data base 
allowed timely search of transcript records on a 
word-by-word basis. 
Processing of Documents and Tapes by 
the Support Center 
As described in the previous section on docu- 
ment control, the Commission fowarded most 
documents to the Support Center for anicrofi9m- 
ing, coding, inclusion in the computer data base, 
and filing in the library These documents includ- 
ed NASA reports and documents, selected cor- 
respondence, and other documents received by 
the Commission. 
Assignment of Control Numbers 
When the Support Center received a docu- 
ment, Center sta.fThmediate%y applied a unique 
preliminary control (PC) number to each page 
of the document. This number was a sequential 
number to indicate where the o r i ~ n d  copy of the 
document woulld be located in the librmy files, 
Microfiiming 
After control identifiers were assiped, Center 
staff microfdmed the document and placed the 
original hard copy in the librav. The Center 
made daily deliveries of completed mkrofdm reels 
to the microfilm processing facility, which pro- 
duced two copies of each reell. 
The Support Center maintained one copy in 
the microfilm library, and used it to respond to 
information requests from Commission members 
and staff. 
The second copy was used to produce hard 
copies of the documents for coding p u ~ o ~ e s .  
Coding and Data Entry of Microfilmed 
Documents 
The purpose of coding was to develop a com- 
prehensive computerized index of d naicrof"dmed 
documents. Using hard copies produced from 
microfilm, each document was reviewed and 
bibliographic, control, and subject matter inhr- 
mation was recorded on a coding form desiped 
specifically for the Commission investigation. 
The bibliographic informatiorb included items 
such as document title and date, and names and 
organizations of people mentioned in the 
documents. The control infomiation included the 
preliminaq control number, microfilm number 
and other information useful in identifying and 
locating documents. 
To capture information on subject matter, 
coders read each document and noted what sub- 
jects were mentioned. The coders used a list of 
L 6 s ~ b j e ~ t  developed specifically for Com- 
m~ssion puqoses. Each subject term had a unique 
six-character identifier. Every document was 
assigned at lease one such subject code. Docu- 
ments that covered many subjects were assigned 
multiple codes. 
Data entPy operators keyed the index informa- 
tion from the completed coding forms onto 
mapetic rape to be loaded into the computer data 
base. 
From the date a document was received, it was 
microfilmed, filed in the hard copy and microfilm 
libsa~es, coded, and enteked on the computer 
data base within one week. Throughout the pmc- 
ess, there were numerous quality checks to en- 
sure the readability of the microfilm, the accuracy 
of the document coding, and the overall integri- 
ty of the data base. 
Creation and Data Entry of Index Informa- 
tion from Transcripts and Commission 
Generated Documents 
For the Commission generated documents and 
the transcripts, index information was captured 
and entered into the computer. This information 
included date of the hearing or repon; names of 
dl attendees, Commission members or witnesses; 
and sther cross-reference data. 
The index information was added to the full- 
text versions on the magnetic computer tapes, and 
loaded into the computer data base. 
Creation of the Computer Data Base 
Th r~ugh  the processes described above, the 
Commission created two computer data bases. 
The first -called the document data base, named 
INQUIRE-contained the index (bibliographic, 
control, and subject matter information) of all 
microfilmed documents, representing more than 
100,000 pages, 
The second - called the full-text data base, 
named JUWIS-contained the full text of (1) 
sransc~pts of all Commission hearings, inter- 
views, and panel meetings; and (2) Commission 
reports. hearing digests, and affidavits. 
Libraries 
Documents and Microfilm 
As noted above, the Support Center main- 
tained libraries of Commission documents. 
One contained the microfilmed versions of the 
more than 122,000 pages of materials indexed on 
the document data base, The microfilm was filed 
by reel number and cross-referenced to the 
preliminary control number assigned to the 
original hard copy of each document. Micro- 
filmed documents could be quickly located 
through the computer search capability and hard 
copies printed, if desired. 
The second library contained hard copies of 
transcripts and other Commission generated 
documents (those documents stored in the full- 
text data base), plus the originals of the micro- 
filmed documents, which could be located by 
using the prelimiwafgv control number. 
Other Materials 
The Commission also maintained a library of 
video tapes of presentations, hearings, photo- 
graphic and film records relating to the accident 
itself? and the salvage operations. These tapes 
were filed chronologically by date received and 
labeled according to subject. Use of these 
materials was controlled through a library check- 
out system. 
Audio tapes of interviews were labeled and 
maintained at the Support Center, These were 
filed chron~logicdly by interview date and con- 
trolled through a library check-out system. 
Use of the Data Bases 
The Support Center provided personnel to per- 
form searches of both the document data base 
(INQUIRE) and the full-text data base (JUWIS). 
Access to INQUIRE and JURIS was gained 
from terminds at the Support Center and the 
Commission offices, 
Detaiied iwbmation on the use of these 
systems is available in the following OLS 
documentation: "INQUIRE Users Manual," 
"JURIS Users Manual," and "Challenger Data 
Bases - Sample Searches for JURIS and 
INQUIRE." 
The Document Data Base Accessible 
Through INQUIRE 
The INQUIRE system allowed rapid retrieval 
and review of the index information that con- 
stituted the document data base. 
Users who wanted to locate documents on a 
particular subject (suth as O-ring erosion) could 
search the document data base using the 
bibliographic information or subject codes cap- 
tured for each document. INQUIRE provided 
a listing of all documents matching the criteria 
specified in the search. The user could then decide 
which of the listed documents would be useful 
and, using the document number provided, ob- 
tain a copy of the document from the library. 
The user could ask INQUIRE to list a variety 
of information on selected documents, including 
the preliminary control number (used to locate 
the material in the library), date, title, and docu- 
ment type. INQUIRE could also print all the 
subject terms associated with each selected docu- 
ment (not just the subject term(s) that matched 
the search criteria), and all the names mentioned 
in the text. Users could also choose the order in 
which INQUIRE listed the documents (e.g., 
chronologically by document date, alphabetical- 
ly by author name, or numerically by document 
number). 
The Full-Text Data Base Accessible 
Through JURIS 
The Department of Justice developed JURIS 
specifically for retrieval of full-text information, 
and designed it for easy use by nontechnical per- 
sonnel. Users could ask JURIS to locate all 
documents containing specific words or phrases. 
Users could specify multiple words or phrases, 
and could include index information as one of the 
search criteria. Users could request that JUWIS 
print a list of documents that were selected, or 
print the full text of the documents. 
Final Disposition of Commission 
Report and Investigation-Related 
Materials 
The entire collection of documents and 
microfilm is permanently housed in the National 
Archives. In addition, several different indices 
and other supporting documentation were com- 
piled to assist historians and others in using and 
gaining access to this large and very important 
collection. 
These materials were providecl to the National 
Archives in accordance with the procedures 
described in FPMR 10 1 - 1 1.4, "Generd Records 
Schedules," published by ,the National Archives 
and Records Administration, and specificdly 
Schedule 24 which focuses on " T e m p o r a ~  Corn- 
missions, Committees, and Boards Records." 
Materials Provided 
The following materials were turned over to 
the Archives at the condusion of the hvestigataon. 
m The Commission's Repart, including ailid 
appendices; 
m All materials requested and received Ray 
the Commission from NASA and its con- 
tractors, including the N.ASA Task Force 
reports; 
All documents provided so the Gommis- 
sion and its staff at h e a ~ n g s ,  meetings, 
presentations, and interviews; 
m The entire microfilm collection contain- 
ing those materials (both in open-reel and 
cartridge format), as well as a file-letre1 
index to each reel; 
m AU transcripts of hearings, panel meetnngs 
and interviews; 
m Summaries of alI hearing transcripts and 
significant interview transcripts; 
Indices to the INQUIRE (document) 
data base, listing all of the documents by 
document number, date, and subject 
term; 
8 All correspondence and respective 
responses, as well as indices to the entire 
correspondence collection sorted bv 
author, correspondence type, and date sf 
receipt; 
8 Computer tapes containing the entire EiK- 
QUIRE data base prepared for and used 
by the Commission in the course of i t s  
investigation; 
Complete set of the request letters sent by 
the Commission to NASA, the resulting 
Action Item forms, and the responsive 
memoranda that closed out each of those 
Action Items; 
m All press releases produced by the 
Commission; 
m A%li video rand audio tapes received by the 
Commission, including indices to those 
two collections; and 
m All planning and instructional materials 
related to the creation and use of the IN- 
QUIRE and JURIS data bases. 
Public Access 
To gain access to the Commission's 
documents, requests can be made to: 
Office of the National Archives 
National Archives and Records 
Administration 
Washinkon, DC 26408 
Appendix C 
Observations Concerning the 
Processing and ~ssemblv of 
night 51-L . 
The following examples of Operational 
Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 
Document violations were noted during the Com- 
mission's inquiry: 
1. The  Operational Maintenance Re- 
quirements and Specifications Document 
indicated that the External Tank liquid 
hydrogen and liquid oxygen ullage 
pressure control and redundancy verifica- 
tion using simulated transducers was a re- 
quirement for this processing. However, 
the entire sequence was marked "not per- 
formed" in the documentation, indicating 
that it had not been completed. Missing 
any of these steps has implications for safe- 
ty of flight. 
2. The three requirements that verify the 
main engine pneumatic isolation valve ac- 
tuation were not met as specifically called 
for in the Operational Maintenance Re- 
quirements and Specifications Document. 
The intent of the requirement was met. 
3.  One requirement (main engine pneumatic 
isolation check valve individual flow- 
through test) was not met in the Opera- 
tions 8s Maintenance Instructions. The 
main engine flight readiness tests gave 
assurance that at least one of two check 
valves per system was working. 
4. A main engine pneumatic regulator func- 
tional test, which checks the redundancy 
of individual regulators, was not verified 
under flow conditions. 
5. The results of helium pneumatic low 
pressure system decay check (with closing 
solenoids energized) exceeded the 
allowable limit. The decay rare was 
recorded as 0.98 pounds per square inch 
per minute; however, a redcdaricsn of the 
data n e a l e d  that the decay rate was ac- 
tually 1.4 pounds per square inch per 
minute. The cdculated allowable decay 
rate was 1.35 pounds per s q u x e  inch per 
minute maximum. 
6. The leak check steps for test pon Number 
4, after installation of the pilug, were in- 
advertently omitted from the Operations 
& Maintenance Instructions. 
7.  Main engine protective covers were not 
installed at times required. A revision to 
the requirement is needed. 
8. Several requirements cannot be satisfied 
during a 24-hour launch scmb tumar6;"und 
due to lack of access. A revision to the re- 
quirement is needed. 
9. The humidity indicator inspection require- 
ment was not met because the: ewgner; 
were not in the controlled environment 
with a trickle purge on. The requirement 
needs to be updated. 
Representative samples were taken from the 
Orbiter processing paper. Of 12 1 Operations & 
Maintenance Instructions reviewed, 47 percent 
had paper errors, Incomplete, incorrect or miss- 
ing data recording points were found in about 13 
percent of the cases and 32 percent had Qualiirg. 
Control buy-off stamps missing. 
Also reviewed were 479 Work Authorization 
Documents in the Interim Problem Wepon. Prob- 
lem Report and Test Preparation Sheer 
categories. Of those documents, 70 percent had 
momdies, including inaccuratelinadequate level 
of detail (36 percent), missing stamps (24 per- 
cent), correct signatures not obtained (29 per- 
cent), and inaccurately detailed summary for 
closure or deferrd (20 percent). 
In addition to normd processing, there were 
22 Modification Change Requests applica$$e to 
Bight 5% -k. Those requests generated 51 Work 
Authorization Documents, d l  of which were 
mviewed as part of the post-accident study of 
fright 5 1 -L processing. Although not accident- 
related, 96 percent of the Work Authorization 
Documents were found to have errors of an ad- 
ministrative or format nature. Those examples 
led to the conclusion that there was a pervasive 
jack of discipline and lack of proper training with 
respect to how Work Authorization Documents 
arc wAtten and implemented.2 
The same lack of completeness and accuracy 
was discovered in review of nearly d types of 
papemork in the processing system. The mount  
of flawed paper work - approximately 50 
percent- is unacceptable. There are several con- 
tributing factors, among them signature re- 
quirements that are lengrhy and require people 
so aravd Isng distances to accomplish, excessively 
long times required to close out paper, as com- 
pared with doing the actual work; lack of 
understanding of the paper system; a complicated 
tiered control and status trail for Quality 
Assurance personnel; and the fact that no single 
orgmization has the responsibility for find review 
for closure. Basically, the system is not simplified 
for the originator, performer, or verifier. 
Therefore, it is not a useful tool, which would be 
the only reason for its existence. Rather, it is an 
~mpedimewt to good work and good records3 
The work control documentation system is 
cumbersaame and difficult to use. Consequently, 
the worlc force does not try very hard to use it. 
The result is %&sat the real-time execution of tasks 
a d  their subsequent traceability suffer. The 
system weeds to be simplified so that it becomes 
"user f~endly,"  Once it is, the work force should 
be tr&ned to use it and management should place 
proper emphasis on rigorous observance of the 
documentation requirements. 
Flight 5 1-L Booster Processing 
With Shuttle mission STS-6 in April 1983, 
NASA introduced the "lightweight" version of the 
Solid Rocket Booster, about 4,000 pounds lighter 
than its 185,000-pound (empty weight) prede- 
cessors. The weight reduction was achieved by 
shaving the thickness of each steel casing by two 
to four hundredths of an inch. On flight 51-L, 
d l  but the forward segments of the two boosters 
had lightweight casings. 
There are 11 separate case components in each 
Solid Rocket Booster. Only two of the 22 com- 
ponents in the 51-L stack were new. The remain- 
ing 20 components had been used a combined 
total of 29 times previously, in ground tests and 
in flight. 
The new components were the right forward 
center tang and the left forward dome. The right 
forward segment (Number 085) had been pan of 
the flight 51-C (January 24-27, 1985) left forward 
field joint that had experienced O-ring erosion 
and deposited soot behind the primary O-ring. 
None of the other 51-L case segments had ex- 
perienced O-ring problems on previous use, 
Segment L-68, the right aft center tang corn- 
ponent, had been flown on 41-D (August 
30- September 5, 1984) as the left forward center 
tang component. Segment L-06, the right aft 
clevis component, had been flown on 5 1 -@ as the 
left aft clevis member. Segment L-06 had 
undergone another burn in addition to 5 1 -@; it 
had been used as pars of the left aft segment in 
a static test firing.+ 
The first of the eight motor segments for flight 
5 I-& arrived by rail at Kennedy Space Center 
on October 1 1,1985. The ]last reached Kennedy 
ow November 4, The segments hi- 51-E were 
designated booster integration set BI026. 
Grain inspection and offloading began on Oc- 
tober 24. Stacking prelliminaries for the left 
booster got under way on October 28 with the 
mating of the aft segment to the skin that sur- 
rounds the nozzle. The stacking of the right 
booster began on December 4. During the stack- 
ing operation, which involves assembling the 
components of the Solid Rocket Booster one atop 
the other on the Mobae Launch Platifom (MLP), 
a number of minor deviations and a few unusual 
situaions were experienced. They were careful- 
ly reviewed by the NASA repon team and by the 
Commission. With one possible exception, ex- 
plained bellow, these incidents did not have 
significant impact on the performance of the Solid 
Rocket Boosters. 
Before stacking of the right hand booster, 
measurements of the right aft center tang and the 
right aft clevis diameters indicated a potential for 
Vehicle Assembly Building 
AFT Segment to AFT Center Segment Stack 
Transfer Aisle 
MOBllE LAUNCH PLATFORM 
Transport Segment Install Lifting 
to VAB Transfer Aisle Beam 
Lift off Pallet 
Clean 8 Inspect 
Lower End (Tang) 
Measure Diameters 
Li from Transfer 
Aisle to High 5ay 8 
Position Above 
AFT Segment 
Clean & Inspect Upper End 
(Clevis) of AFT Segment 
0 Measure Diameters 
Install Putty & Q-Rings 
Engage AFI Center Tang sn Clevis 
8 Install Pins 
Conduct Seal Leak Check 
lnstall Joint Retentloo & lnsulab~on 
Braw~ng deplcts steps in the stack~ng of the aft and aft center 
segments of the Solid Rocket Booster In the Veh~cle Assem- 
bly Buildtng (VAB). 
stacking interference. Taken across the 0- 180 
degree axis, the tang diameter measurement ex- 
ceeded the corresponding clevis dimension by 
+ .5%2 inch. The maximum allowable tang to 
clevis difference is + .250 inch. 
Norrnal Operations and Maintenance Instruc- 
tions procedures were followed for bringing the 
out-of-round segment into allowable tolerances. 
While the right aft center segment was hanging 
from four points on a lifting beam, the first step 
was to adju'st the lifting beam to create a two- 
point lift across the 90-270 degree axis. The 
weight of the segment itself would decrease the 
tang diameter across the 0- 180 degree axis. This 
process reduced the excess measurement to 
+ -33.9 inch, but it was still outside the allowable 
tolerance. 
The next step in the procedure was to install 
the circumferential alignment tool. It was in- 
stalled across the 16-196 degree =is and m a -  
imum allowable pressure of 1,200 pounds per 
square inch gauge was applied to the too%. This 
produced a further improvement, but again fell 
short of the measurement requirements. Addi- 
tional deflection was obtained by turning the Rex 
nut on the alignment tool. This caused the 
hydraulic pressure on the tool to increase to 
1,300-1,500 pounds per square inch gauge, which 
exceeded the limit on the tool. The procedure pro- 
duced a force of 3,254-3,766 pounds on she seg- 
Table I 
Right Aft Center Segment Tang 
to Aft S e p e n t  Clevis Diameter 
Measurement: Differentials Taken on December 7 ,  1985 
(Positive is Tang Larger) 
Inter- Alignment 
Initial mediate Final Tool Alignment 
4-Point 2-Point 2-Point 2-Point Installed Tool 
Circumferential Life Lift Lift Lift 16°/1960 Removed 
Location 0145 RPS 0305 hrs 0354 hrs 0415 hrs 0925 hrs 0945 Rrs 
NOTE: Measurements to nearest .001 inch are approximate 
rnent case, which was within manufacturer 
specifications, APthough this procedure was at 
that time authorized by the Operations and 
Maintenance Instruction, it has since been 
deleted because the application of increased 
pressure on the digmment tool risks damage to 
the tool, 
Following d of these procedures, measurement 
of the tang showed the differential between the 
tang and clevis along the 0-180 degree axis to be 
+ 638 inch, which was considered suitable for 
mate, The right aft center segment was hoisted 
from the transfer aisle and lowered into position 
above the aA segment in the Vehicle Assembly 
Building high bay. The alignment tool was 
removed and final tang measurements showed a 
differenrid asf + "2 16 inch, indicating mating was 
possible. Instdlation of both O-rings and suc- 
sesshl stacking of the segments then took place 
without incident. No funher problems were iden- 
tified during engagement of the two segments. 
Table I shows the measurements taken at various 
stages of the entire p roced~re .~  
The several sets sf tanglclevis diametric 
masurements jrefemed to in the foregoing discus- 
sion, m d  presented in Table 1, were reported by 
the stacking cre,ws at Kennedy. 
Two conspicuous aspects of the 51-L right aft 
Geld joint warrant comparison with joint history 
ofeadier flights. Those aspects are the use of the 
cimmferentid alignment tool. ant% the Barge tang-. 
to-clevis negative diameter difference of - -393 
inch along the 120-300-degree axis. However, the 
NASA Operations and Maintenance Instructions 
do not specify a limit to negative differences be- 
tween tang and clevis. 
The alignment tool had been used five times 
previously; its usage is shown in Table 2 . 6  
Table 2 
Ali,gnrnent Tool Use History 
Miss,, Field Joint 0-Ring Damage 
5 1 -I3 Left Aft None 
5 1 -IF Left Fwd None 
61-B Left Aft None 
61-C (2 joints) [ Left Aft Erosion Right Aft None 
Of the five field joints on which the alignment 
tool was used, one experienced erosion. 
There were 13 Solid Rocket Booster joints on 
missions 5 1 - 6  (January 1985) through 61-42 
(January 1986) that had negative differences 
greater than -.320 inch. Three of those joints had 
negative differences greater than the 51-L right 
aft field joint. None of those f 3 earlier joints ex- 
perienced O-ring damage. Table 3 indicates the 
joints and missions with negative differences 
greater than -.320 inch.' 
Table 3 
%egati\.e Diarnerer Differences Greater Than .320 
Inches for Field Joints: STS 51-C Through 61-C 
Mission Difference Location 
' (Inches) (Degrees) 
51 - @ Ricrht Fwd - .360 120 
5 1 - B ~ i i h t  Aft - .360 
- .372 
Right Fwd - .336 0 
51 - D Left Aft - -324 120 
Left Fwd - .372 120 
5 1 - 6  Right Aft - .354 120 
51 - F Right Center - .385 0 
- .433" 150 
5 - I Left Center - .335 0 
Right Aft - .325 30 
61 - B Left Center - .334 130 
Right Center - .473* 120 
6 1 - C Left Center - .355 150 
- .354 0 
Right Center - .394* 120 
"Negative diameter differences greater than 51-L. 
It was found that the negative dimension dif- 
ferences on 5 1 -L were not the most troublesome 
ever experienced and that a significant number 
of joints on other flights had initial negative dif- 
ferences in excess of the worst-case design 
clearance between the tang and the clevis. One 
significant uncertainty is the degree to which 
segments may tend to circularity after being 
mated. 
The procedures used in mating the right side 
aft and aft center segments were carefully exam- 
ined and appear normal, properly followed and 
executed by well-experienced personnel according 
to specifications. 
The 5 1 -L joint negative diameter difference has 
been examined for the light it may shed on 
whether this discrepancy may have contributed 
to the fatal booster joint failure. 
The large negative diameter difference in- 
dicates a potential for an interference between the 
tang and inner clevis leg that can lead to a flat 
on flat condition when the tang section is lowered 
into the clevis section on assembly. 
Subscale test on sectionsof the full scale joint 
cross section were performed which purposely 
produced a flat on flat condition as these sector 
sections were forced together. Test results showed 
that metal slivers were sheared from the flats, and 
that these slivers could be pulled into the O-ring 
region during assembly. 
However, a flat on flat condition probably did 
not exist on the STS 51-L lower joint. Past 
assembly practice has shown that if the diacfesence 
ofall diametrical readings of the mating halves 1s 
less than + .250 inches a flat on flat condition will 
not occur. Furthermore during the mating proc- 
ess the halves are brought slowly together with 
stacking personnel positioned around the joint. 
A potential for flat on flat is looked for during 
this critical period. It has been shown through 
experience that a flat on flat condition is readilj- 
apparent when viewing the mating section while 
the upper tang section is suspended just abolre 
the inner leg of the clevis. Thus both the physical 
measurements and assembly procedures make a 
flat on flat condition unlikely dukng assembly. 
While the tang of the 51-L right aft center seg- 
ment was burned through near she 300 degree 
arc point where the largest negative dimension 
occurred, this dimension was an assembly eon- 
dition only and it is not certain that it persisted 
until launch. Examination of the STS 61-E 
destacked segments subsequent to the 5 1 -L acch- 
dent indicated that their ovality had changed aker 
assembly while awaiting launch. 
If thevery tight tang-to-clevis assembly gap did 
persist to time of launch, it could haaye resulted 
in near maximum compression of the O-rings, 
Such compression, in conjunction with cold 
temperatures, joint dynamics, and the variable 
performance of the insulating putty has been 
shown to have detrimental influences on the 
joint's ability to seal. Several: joints on. STS 51-L, 
however, may have had areas where she O-ring 
was at near maximum compression. 
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Temperature Definitions 
as applicable to this report 
Parameter Definition 
Field joint (O-ring) Temperature A calculated temperature for the surface of the 'Solid Rocket Booster 
in the vicinity of the tanglclevis joint. The O-ring temperature is 
assumed to be the same. Calculations are based on a thermal model 
which includes ambient temperaeure among the variables. (See 
references 1 and 2.) 
Ambient Temperature (at launch) Measured atmospheric temperature at: (See reference 3) 
I Camera Site 3, approximately 1,000 feer, bearing 150 degrees from 
Launch Pad 39B (36 degrees Fahrenheit at launch). 
I At a weather observation site approximately 3,000 feer east of the 
Kennedy Shuttle Landing Facility; (reported minimum of 2% 
degrees Fahrenheit and maximum of 43 degrees Fahrenheit for 
January 28, 1986). 
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1. Report. "Accident Analysis Team Report, Solid Rocket 
Motor \%'orking Group. NASA. April 1986". pages B-105 through 
B-1 I + .  
2. Commission Panel Work Session (Solid Rocket Booster mat- 
ters) Design and Production Panel: Brigham City, Ctah. March 
18, 1986, pages 392 through 403. 
3. Report, "Accident Analysis Team Report, Space Shuttle 
Systems Working Group. NASA. April 1986", pages 18 through 
23. Tables B.l and B.2. 
Xote: A comparison of atmospheric environmental data (wind, 
temperature. precipitation) for Flights STS- I through STS 
61-C is included in Tables B.5 and B.6 of reference 3. 
Eady Marshd documents and memoranda raising design objections 
Sf@\ CLEVIS JOINT LEAKAGE STUDY 
DESIGN OPTIONS 
IN SEAL LEAKAGE, 
INCREASED ASSEMBLY TIME FOR SHIM INSTALLATlOtl AND JOINT 
D RESULT IN CALCULATING 
o SHltHS wlLL BE DlSCONTlNUED WHEN PRESEHT IMRDWARE IS PIiASED BUT. 
'"RSaa brtef~ng chafl IS the earliest known indlcatlon that tho jolnt 
des~gn was unacceptable. Leon Ray, n a 1977 brleflng on a 
planned Structural Test Article test ~ndicates that not chang~ng 
the deogn IS unacceptable slnce the tang can move outboard 
and cause excesrve p n t  clearance resultrng In s@al eakage. 
JBUV 9. 1971 
EESlRk. LUdy 
BIO) Ph/k. I(llrr 
WgCR L s U t m n t  of Posttlon ar SRR Clerls Jolnt  0 4 l n q  
l l w o t u K e  Cri ter ia .nd Clevis Jo in t  Shlm Uqu i -u  
(1) lncluslons - h v e  a11 visible tncllsions npardlels o f  
s lz r  o r  type o l  tncludcd m t @ r i a l .  7ha Included meterla1 cm IN *Cached 
?:-P+q L)-*I,I.J a:z019:t11)1 i r . 6  tisr. m c l t l n q  eer4% m d  ve%ble I-, 
P,:aIr  'i r t ? ~ t r r d  11 r i s u l t l q  -13 ax:n: 0.025 r e  l g a c u  by 
0,005 !nch deep. Oeever *Id¶ cnrca r g n a e  risk for lwL+w d e n  lor 
csssrezslon (exuotr: r vote .015 Inch c o q n s s l m  a f f e  
ay 5.5 yercrnt). 
t (2) mrr i h m t t  Cffwts. p+ts. a d  ~ 0 I d s  - bch dcfcct mat be 
t r r t t c d  accordlq to C f r C t  sMw. @8feCtl h r r i q  sharp eaqrs ~ n c u l d  be 
t r r r ted  as L 4 t c h  r m s t t t w  cut r d  noatred tha &fret exeo~ds 0.325 
Inch dlr.rter by 0.002 Inch dew. &fet¶ hart- l c o u t h  E ~ ( I @ I $  8hBwlg be 
n g a l r r d  ritMr the d l u t t r  w d n C k  uQ.h O.mS lnUl end O.mS limn, 
m w e c l r r l y .  
(1) Cuts - I r d t r l  cuts other UUn s u p t r f l d r i  cues (ma &ugh 
umt bc f r l  t r l t h  the Chubnail) are mt rllokd snd mst & PI($o$W 
ar  dlspestttonnl by rv l l c ln9  or  rt jectqm. The o r t m a t l 0 a  eff ~ a d l b l  wCS 8s 
such that strctCklng of the O - d q  C IR  O W C ' ~ U ~ P ~ . O ~ ( P ( O .  Cu(b PBPII(L&. 
to ?Jm O-ring l a n p f t u d l ~ l  U l S  Wb a u u d  0 . e  fncls arPP by 0,060 
(rick law. 
I (49 I m t r  L lmltr t lonr - TIN h.I(.(Uttbmt on aueiau: &fmf nlzr ~ c w t a b l e  for  rcvatr  sfauld b. br~srd on results o f  ThtatQIns -6 m g r m  p.? M-IIMY. &vlatlonr should b8 4EfWWlnd 4. -1. 
b. I*Iw I l l n i u  0-atnu Cwmssfen - Ma tc tk x 6 r ~ i e  (?fHr~g sf W-1 
I n  June m7. sat- m tn r ra l l rd  rn  the c l w l s  Joints te sbac sere Iacrbrgs? 
u u s d  BY Uno dlsOrclon. S h i a  of various Chiclmrrrra (0.010 rcr bn.1 
rrm via& a& b~ of um h.o#nu acmr~lnq  to PIP w ~ d m  avallabto 
(with SR n ~ w t l o n s ] .  10 leaks w n  a w r n n t  mnp the tne: h ~ m v r r .  
m e  u r l t y  p m r u r r  r a s u r r c n t  m c ic r is  l 0 I n t  *Ib.r 5 [&I wctos~we 4: 
511016 ~ u I 1 a r  Bahavlor (nqat1.o mnssun to *.I p l lp ) .  CslcnlaePm 
a d s - a  br nSFC am4 a a m d  ta b. ThIOknl ¶ham UUf dfsLOI-tion af 2h+. . - . . - . - - -, - - -. - - - - - - .
clavls jo tn t  U n g  fo r  & jotn t  crn b. ru f? le lmt  to uusc &&wpid&nnp 
sevaretion. L)Iu fu -1 SM*~ Ust th is  cM6lt4a a n  ba ~cI"IU?~ &y 
jo rn t  a m r n t  ( l u w r t n  of s v ~ o o t t  chaLs1 a d  &a fm W AgdW~rn~ 
h a t  rla m t u g  m d ~ e l w l ~  dn mt -In mhcfmrr(c dur tw pr r rsum 
ayclil*. 111 oteurtions chqch could c m t l  taw dtlrtnrblon r 
nor 11 tha mqnlMI 0s' m-L -, Iqrrdless of ehne 
then ProDosed LO use o S U n l r r l  0.020 Inch t h t c l  shW far 511 SR)(I elcabs 
j o ln ts  lncludlnp the ST&-1 w k i ~ I 8  (m mclOSuW 51. S u b s m e  t!a oPI.O'PIB 
of  m e  ST&-l'ahtclc st KFC. Strvstuns and Preoulsdon Labcret~q. wn ashrrc: 
to assus m e  ardCOwcy o f  th. 0.020 (neb %h+m *tch hcd M %RIU~!$& by 
ihlocol. Tho WEons8. doc-tad by I r p n m h m  EM1 (77-252) (rm mlasm 
5)  mcmmnw shim sizes rangin9 Pma 0.Dla In31 O C.?rb 
o m r r  to u t n U t n  em tndustry rrrrrmdM m l n t w  e l l p e r $  
Wrcmt. 6 t  ues. and s t l l l  Is. our 6..im LO 9116 r t t h  15 
sonDnssion s tma ehls v a t u  I s  tM 1Mustry rlb dnli.\lr? a 
the mini- mign v a l u  uscd by Thlakol prlor to c h ~  taw 
Amr lrs- of the S~MIIIII Cis Progulstw LbBcrrr 
:ions. *.I :51 C r i s l o n  us wade U us4 a 9.015 1-23 I R I P Z  :h# 
j o i n t  a t  51;-1 chlm r.w?U I n  r ~ i n t 7 o  en?:slcq . s;.o a 
5.5 pertant. l h l s  v a i n  .UM 4 c r y a s t e  rrr. us a 
th is ~ m w s a l  k . w e  it eYta Y U C S I W I a  r t s t s  .SI*eh 
Th~s memorandum, written by Leon Ray and signed by John 
Q. Millet, strongly urged that the clevis joint be redesigned. 
234 
;, , t er;detra by UIIS offlca Show that i n  sol.. ImUnces. 0 -dng 
~ , C I  on 3n 7 1 , q R t  vefiiL)e$ has tha Potenttal 01 belnp mc r t l v r  by 
I - P ~ ~  ;11.1, 1 r rereent, th*Sr cr lculr t lons included t h e k o l  O-vlnr 
>-&tn<; i e t  - Tht~k0l t U S t  rRD0tC dattQ b u l t  15. 1917. O t r  TW-11507; 
, v ,lg -(pa" rrsri l icatlon test plan' (see enclosure 7)  s h s  Lhrt the 
. ,,.rric-c-rtnp m t r r l r !  and !ivllce JotnU trhlbl ted m i l u  eDlpnrslon sets 
n t r d  7 0 a c r c r n l  ~OSDRC~IV~IY. Also. when considerlna that the SF34 
p W ; ~ ~ s - d & n s a r r c ~  SIWIRI O-rfnq suffrr@d I canpmsslon i o t  value o f  
c@pmalrrh91y 18.8 mscent, one W I I  treat these values 48 r t a l l s ~ l c  and 
Bng5vtPD tnetp @fleet$ shrR e ~ l c w l r t l n q  O-r(ng c m i m a t o n ,  t t  t s  n c 0 9 n i r c ~  
mar 0-dfigs wt10 Mrfernr @POD~)F~Y a0 lwr values than ek I S  t o  ZS m e  
pawgcp I P J C ~ W @ B " Q :  A~nt@u%s, Oh@ htghCr vI~ULI JR UIeQ dl$ (1 d*B%gD mUt.Bm 
QW@P to) dCCOuRe ~ Q P  ~%I%@S 8WCb 8% O - ~ b y  CDORSSqOR Pet 8Rd OW 
ww h a w r e  seoB%fi) norfacus m a  a-a(ags. OUF meonarondaCiona m mdegqga 
W..CO(I$A( h ~ w c p b ~  B R ~  gltn%~.l O h m  80eb dolnt  ( m t O  e ran 0) en p.deg9ng 
h8rPR11)~I 8 %  @da8PRBIICl 80 POW PF3 ~CPDBOP 1997. $ 8  8 g t l I  V a l 0 4  (OW OnClosu~) 8 )  
Bkr foilwrtng resasnurndect%rre and SuoePBluelons am benrtoemd u a * b e  ~ r a  
~ m v o b ) ~  8Qaqsat~ cleats  J@Bm& 5e0QOng on a!! S!4Rak), 
(2) O)rmlgn clurtci 9o(mts ern *I1 memil* hr-n a t  me wrl4rsg 
l l b ld l  olmlBr(tr bu #mi& ucl~cuptrble. hfph s?sk. @-ping mmsston 
~ 8 ,  BAda adOl rvmtvclty negate the use o f  Mtm, themby W t n g  
Iy ttm W psltrtngbing s h l r i n g  smra.  
(3) Cmtlm Po aau shim wtth satsttly & . ( ad  h a w = .  Shim 
s h a d  k g0  sufP9ctmt Diekrwsr en pmvlds a .Onlam O-ring -resslan 
or 8 %  gsaernt, T M s  value 4s used ad n c a n d l s  by Perter, Flnctslon, 
$$g { T t t a ~ ) ,  bsmgct, &nQ MSFC Selmcr and Onptmcdng LaboraDrlu. Y. lbrrr 
cff rn Bnrernec, drm 8-r rrlwl are n c o a n d r d .  
) 9 9 ~ ~ 9  one p~4or, contractor and boesUr J s S @ # l y  eontnctar t o  
the drsign r r p u $ r w n t r  01 15 l o  ZS pearng c w m s % l o n  WF cIw!s 
-gs. srs m a o l l d  nrson fo r  not deslgnlnp to ~ C U O W  rtuldrrd# 
In a i r r ~ q ,  wa rnrtervr e w e  :he frets p m r n W  I n  oh. 3rrc.cliq mnprrpslg 
E~MURQ ~(1c1Ive WP mat wrqint rttenclon. Froprr shim s t r lne  rmd htgh 
qwi318%1 0-rfwqs em auir8da98vy to grevrnt hoe ma% l m h s  and F t l ~ 1 # n 9  
c ~ t ~ l i t k ~ D b i s  B~Bluta, U atlB Ln plorred to pmvlde aSSlStmC8 cln any cry 
m~isnbua~. 
January 19,  1979 
Nat~onal Aeronautics and 
Space Admtntstrat~on 
George C. Marshall Space flighl Centor 
Marshall Space Fl~ghl Center, Alabama 
EE51 /Mr. Eudy 
EP25/Mr. Hi 1 l e r  
SUBJECT: Eva1 uation of SRM Clevis  J o i n t  Behavior 
As requested by your rr.emorondun, EE51 (79- lo) ,  Thiokol d o c w n t s  
TKR-12019 and l e t t e r  7000;EO-76-48? have been reva lua ted .  Ue f i nd  
the  Thiokol pos i t ion  regerding d e s ~ g n  adequacy of t h e  c l e v i s  j o i n t  
t o  be coi2pletely unacccptablo f o r  the  foliowing reasons: 
a .  The l a rge  sea l ing  sur face  gap c rea ted  by excess ive  tang/c lev is  
r e l a t i v e  movenent causes the  primary O-ring s e a l  t o  ex t rude  i n t o  the  
Gap, forc ing  t he  seal  t o  funct ion in  a way which violates indus t ry  and 
Governrent O-ring appl ica t ion  prac t ices .  
b. Excessive tang/clevis  movement as explained above a l s o  allows 
the seccndary O-ring seal  t o  become completely disengaged from i ts  
- sea l i ng  su r f s ce  on the tang. 
c. Contract  End I t en  Spec i f ica t ion ,  CPW1-25000, page 1-28, paragraph 
3.2.1.2 requi res  t h a t  the  i n t e g r i t y  of a l l  high p re s su re  case  s e a l s  be 
veri  f i ab ' i e ;  t he  c l ev i s  j o i n t  secondary O-ring s ea l  has been v e r i f i e d  
by t e s t s  t o  be unsa t i s fac tory .  
Quest ions o r  comen t s  concerning t h i s  memorandum should be r e f e r r ed  t o  
blr. :di 11 iam L. Ray, 3-0459. 
%il /l.lesss-r . HirdylRice 
EPZ2/:.1r. Bianca 
EP21 /ldr. Lombardo 
EP25/Mr. Powers 
This memorandum, also written by Leon Ray and signed by 
John 0. Miller, strongly questions the clevis joint des~gn. It is 
the earliest known official document which questions the 
redundancy of the seal. 
Narlonal Aer~nautics and 
Mminislratim 
Grssrpla 6. hnhsll Space Rlght Cenaw 
Marsbll Spee Flpht Center. Alabam 
3W82 
February 6 11 979 
FROM: EP25/Mr. Ray 
NMEt4: Vlsit t o  Brecisfon Rubber Products Corporation and 
Parker Seal Company 
The purpose of this memorandum is t o  document the  r e s u l t s  of a v i s i t  
t o  Precision Rubber Products Corporation, Lebanon, TN, By Mr. Eudy, EE51 and 
Hs, Ray, EP250 on February I ,  1979 and a l s o  t o  infenn you of t h e  v i s i t  
mde t o  Barker Seal tmpany, Lexington, KY on hbrwary 2, 1919 by Wr, Ray. 
The purpose of  the  rlasits was to present  the 0-~dng  s e a l  manufactusers 
w i a  data conctrn%ng the Osage 0-dng e x m i o w  gaps b&ng w p e r l l e x e d  on 
the Space Shu t t l e  S o l i d  b c k e t  Motor c%cvEs jss%nts and ta seek efgiatims 
mgasdfng peQntia1 r i s k s  $nvo%ved. 
The v f s i t  on February I ,  19'19, to Precbs$on Rubber Psoducts Corporat-ion 
by Mr. Eudy and HP. b y  was very we17 mcef ved. Company osff ic ia ls  , Mr. 
Hwsrd 697 I e t t e ,  Vice Bresldent f o r  Technical Dimctiow, Mr. John Hoover, 
V3 ce President f o r  Engi neeri  ng, and Mr. Gene Hale, Qesi gn Eng% neer  
a t t e d e d  'the meetfng and were presented with the SRM c l e v i s  j o i n t  sea l  
test data by Mr. Eudy and Mr, Ray. After  consi derable  discussion, 
cmpany sepresentat i  ves declined t o  make imnedd a t e  recomnendaei ons because 
of the need f o r  more time t o  study the  data. They did;  how eve^, voice 
concern f o r  the  design,s ta t ing t h a t  the  SRM O-ring extrusion gap was 
lasges than t h a t  covered by their.experience.. They a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  more 
bs% should be perfwmed with t h e  present design, Mr. Hoover promired 
t o  eowb%ac$ E F C  f o r  f u r t h e r  discwssiono w i  t h l n  a fe% days. Srfr,. Glllette 
pmvided Hr, Eudy and Hr, Ray with the  names of  Wo consu%tawb who my 
k able t o  help- We a r e  indebted t o  t h e  Pmefsion Rubber Pro(%uc% 
Ca4waratio~~ BOP the time and e f f o r t  being-expended by the9r  people %BB 
support @f  t h j s  ~VWbleiTir espec ia l ly  s ince  they have no connection w%M 
the psrc je~t .  
"be v i s i t  t o  the  Parker Seal Company on February 2, 1979, by Mr. Ray, 
EP25, was a l s o  we1 1 received; Parker Seal Company suppl ies  the O-rings 
used lin the SRM c l e v i s  j o j n t  design. Parker representat ives ,  lar. B d l l  
Colldws, Vlice President f o r  Sales,  Mr. W. 8. Green, Manager f o r  Technical 
Services Mr. J. W. Kosty, Chief Development Engineer f o r  R&Ds Mr. 
D, 8, Thalman, Terr i tory  Manager and Mr. Dbtch Haddock, Technical 
&r~ices ,  met with Mr. Ray, EP25, and were provided with the Iden t i ca l  
I 
page r 
Thss Leon Ray memorandum documents h~s VISI~S to two 
O-ring mawblfacaurers, both of whom expressed concern 
reSas!ve to the 0-rrng performing properly In the jo~nt desfgn. 
SRNi clevis jo in t  data as was presented t o  the Precision Rubber Products 
Cem~any on February 1, 1979, Reaction t o  the  data by Parker o f f i c i a l s  
was essent ial ly  the same as  tha t  by Precision; the SRM O-ring extrusion 
gap I s  larger than they have previously experienced. They a l so  expressed 
surprise tha t  the seal had performed so welF fn the present application. 
h t h i s  problem and t he i r  e f fo r t s  a r e  very much appreciated. 
Distribution: 
9 4 1  /Messrs . Hardy/Rf ce 
EPO1 /Mr. McCool 
Doernments relating to the change from Criticality 1R to 1, and the waiver of the 
redundancy requirements for the Solid Rocket Motor seal 
- Ear3 0-rlng of Vae rdundtn t  pair  I s  designed ta effect  a s e l l .  The d n f p n  I s  bsrd upon s i s l l a r  slngle 
seal $@tar% used )R @revtous large dlamrtero sepented m t a r  a s e s .  
A saall A m r r  Icadlng to the annular art.;). b e h t t n  the mdudant  s e a l s . p n n i t t  a teak check of the serlis 
fm&%at@By sf4er" godnlmg segnents, ;he $S plug, t m u d l e d  a f t e r  leak Orrt,  bar a aUlnCng prpove a d  
-sasslow free h r  fU O-ring seal. A mans tr, ru t  tbe ser t  of the t l a t l l l d  10 plug has not Bten aZablfrlN4. 
m"~essr+rcr! f4ndsh rqufnmcnt  f o r  the 0-dng yrwves I s  63 and ffnlsk of the br lng u n t r c t t n g  
WsPetcca o f  the $ m g l  whim s l l d u  across tbt 0-rfng durlng joint  u s e d l y ,  is 42. Tke jo in t  d u i g n  p r o r f d u  
an Oi3 for" DC Q-r$ng (rnsul l r t lon,  which f r c f l t t r t t s  r r t rnt ion during jofnt  assmbly. The entry -e lon  of 
%s u n g  omvlars 0.125-lncb standoff froar the 0-dngs contact p r t f o n  of the tang during joint assn81y. ihe  
dratalnlp speglflies O-ring l u b r i u n l  pr lor  to the t n s t l l l r t ~ o n .  B e  fac+oq rssrab\ed gotnts lUS176a) 
have BW 8 8 & l l t l @ ~ $ B  $@a1 gswlded by m e  subsquently aoglied t n t e n u l  c u e  1m~laoden.  
%o Blc1d rssae4led gelnos [fhq. OUSB747] and Campp rrnti&l& jotnet  [&go 9015146hlP bene%P$ BPPI) the (ns~c rsed  0-ewp m g m s t o n  resrdrlng f m  *a Cmterlng e 3 e c t  of sh fm @f .8jZ-A36 ln&es bowsor Oh@ 
an$ O,D, ernd sileatn B.D. s f  tbe case Jofnt. abueve~, redundancy s f  the secondary ftoldl jofnt seal cnnnot be 
v a r l f i t d  aftar mba~ ease pressurn reaches appror8mSely a(ro of XEGP. S t  Bp b m n  %at  $ojnt  meP%qom 
s~ezoPrdng ak prbssulg level w i t h  a r tsul t lng enlarged axC%slor sap eousu  the secondary 0-rtng) to Owe 
mpmsiow 88 8 ~188. -He f s  not knan  t f  +4e seeondrq 0-rlng muld  s u c c e s ~ f ~ 1 1 y  rt-seal f f  the  ear^ %ring 
$Muid fadl rdtrr pow? cur ~ r u s u f e  m e h u  n r  mere& (O: MOP. 
1 '3%~ 0-CIPI~  f a r  :he es ie  J d n t  md t e s t  oer. are cold fon*d of high t m p e r l a r r .  camrrrslon I r l  
mf%%nt, nu0r068W~n t l r s t m e r .  The design pern ib  f fve  scarf j o t n u  f o r  "he u s e  :oOnr seal. 3 e  ( 3 4 q  @lnt i m p m  r s r  q u a 1  o r  wet& LO: of the parent a t e r i a l  s n n g t h .  
$ f u l l  scale c lev is  fodnr t e s t  verlffed the s tntcturr l  s t r angd  of +4r u s e  md ¶ins (Tii-1CSi7). 1 
bpam8um",ldfa ~ y e l r  :es",TaP-11564) dammtre t td  ete  : r f a r y  seal" a b i l f t y  to dt!stSnd %r r?zts  2 e  
g4dpbt m u i r m c n c  of one pressuritatlon cycle and D e  s t w n d a v  se l l ' s  r b l l f t y  % unt lnue  3 ser i  m t e r  
msratre q e l l n g  ($4 cycles) rt"h 'She ~ r i r r y  seal ?r t l rd.  ;).r foinr  seats  u.I2Ss;o$a ol2:rn:r :r?sturr o f  
110, :sd Qurdnp ma :urrt :sstsB yielding r safety ?ICZJ~ af 1 . 3 .  fke Strwctural ,*st  Arf?e?r ?$?a-1) 
s t& f (c~  se r l s  eawbl l l ty  ur.er f l t s n t  leads ~ n d  *~r%?.er verifled t!!e nouncmcy af :!e sre:edaq 1)eal. 
fotnr sealr have y r f o m d  ~ u u u s h l l y  In lour t e v e l o = m r l  and 2tm ;wl??!u;?:. --%or i:a:?c 
This original GrjlicaO Items List entry for the Solid Rocket Motor 
a e  joint seals establishes them as Criticality 1 R (redundant). 
S R B  CRlTlCAL ITEMS LIST 
- RATIONALE FOR RETENTION fCONTCl 
a l i ~ h t u e i ~ k t  erse  jo int  ver i f lca t lon t e s t  (NU-!2€?O) has d c l l o n ~ t r ~ t ~ d  h e seconeary se t1  $ . r eomnee  
w i t h  a 3urposely c r e ~ f r ' l l e d  ~ r i m r y  O-ring and demnstr r ted  three pressure cycles on the p r i n r y  s e r l  with 
aze c/cIe t o  1.J0 :$me$ raulmus expected operrtlng pressure. 1 
;he s n g  -:- eta. rnd clevls -C- dia. a r t  measured md recorded. These d l u n c t c n  control 3% n d l l l  
soaeing be-esn tang rnd c levis .  The deoth. width md  surface f in l sh  of the 0-rlng grooves JR verified. 
The % @ p e n t  f i n i sh  of the tang Is  r l s o  ver i f ied .  The O-ring seal  m t l n g  surfaces of the  f o ~ e r 4  and a f t  
r egJenu  a r e  veHfied fo r  f la tness  and s u r f ~ c e  f ln i sh .  The following charrclerlst$CS a m  inspected on crch 
O-ring a assute  w n f o m n c e  to  *&a r tmdards .  
o Surface voids and l n c l u ~ l o n r  
o maid flashing 
/ o Scrrf ?eInt  mismtch o r  separat(on 
e tross s rc t<on  
o Cbr+?nfe?encc 
Eack asscvbled jornt  seal i s  nested per %M-2749 v i t  y e s s u r l t $ n g  the annular u v j t y  b e e n  sea l s  to 
50 2 5 prf and mnf to r ing  fo r  10 ~ n u t e s .  A SNI  seating pressure of 220 ps j ,  with re turn  to O wig. m y  
be sled g r io r  to the ".st. A pressure d c u y  of 1 pslg o r  grer tep $s noo accestable. F o l l d n $  sul v e r ~ f 9 u t 4 r ,  
3y Q6, eke leak zes t  port plug Is l n c a l l c d  vdtb QC v e r I f y ' ~ q  in s r r9 l a t lon  and m n g .  
XCI k m n  record of f a i l u r e  due t o  case j o i n t  sea1 leakage on segmented 856* st Y'lhas  IHPe m t ~ w .  
30 f a t lu re s  i n  3 s  four developmne and three guellfitrdon SW m t o r  test PlrlWs. 
mre: laatago of  om p r i m r y  0-rlng seal I s  classified as a single f r i l u n  m i n t  em eo p m r t b t l t t y  of loss of 
3 d n g  a t  gnc s r m e v  0 - r l q  bKluse of j o t n t  aotst lan a f t e r  mtor m s s u r l i u t t o n .  I 
RATIONALE FOR RETENTIORB 
C u e  PIP4 BUSQPZB , 1U5013P1 1U50130. 1V50185. 1UW715 PW716 I PUSOOlf J w a d  
A. ESf l  
Thsn $m Jo$w"beo$ ~ e n t e ~ l q  ePIlps ~ M g h  a m  
sere fo r  the less o f  eonc 
C 4  for  ease o f  8ssably. 
~mvB& mmlwey an# t c  w m t  a, Beak ehck, 
azt ses: as w m a t  e f  l n l t f a l  pm$~l)f~xatllOn. 
=tatten ee~wm 1% the prcssun rllses, opentn 
O-rjnq eo DmtPude into the gap. KhOs eonditlon Ru born s ~ a m  by tes t  to  & -11 op2h4n Ofwit m w I n 4  for  
safe pptnrr). 0-ring sealing. This g a ~  my ,  horcver. t n  s a  uses, fncrrrse ~ u f f l c l m t l y  t o  cruse tRr un- 
mrrglzrd $eCwrr)P O-ring seal to lose c~.grers lon.  ra ls ing question 8s te f t s  5 b f l l t y  to m e q l x r  m e  
seal 19 cslleB uwn to  do so by prl t iury seal fa l lurn.  S lna .  mder  -1s l a t t e r  c o n d i t l a  only thc slngle 
0-Pen$ 1% rer l ing.  r n t l o n a l e  t o r  n t m d o n  1% pmvqdrd fw thr s l a p l u  md. r h t r e  only one 0-rlnp f s  
bee* ng;. 
Prpr I M H ~ C ~  fBn(rR m u l r m m t  f o r  We 0-rtnp grooves I s  63 and the f fn l sk  of the 0-rlnp contacting pomlon 
a+ t h e  tang,  h l e k  $ l i d t s  acmss the O-rhg durlng j o h t  assmbly, t s  32. The Jofnt design p~ovldes an 00 
tev the O - ~ t n g  t nsea l l~ t ton .  which f a c i l l t a t t s  mtent fon durtng Jo int  ass.nbly. Kha uq has a large shal lor 
angle E ~ & ( ? P  an the t l p  t o  prevent m e  cut t ing of the O-ring a t  assmoly. Tht design 0rr r ine soec+firs 
soel te@t lm o f  0-rqng lubricant p r i o r  to thp clnstr l l r t lon. TRe factory assamoled jo ln ts  n r rs  IbR mbber 
cnrocnati rarlernlxrd across tRe l n t a m r l  Jo int  f ry ing surfrces as a part of thc c u e  I m a ?  Inur la t fon 
SMSgJtm. 
mall Ma por t  I r rd tng to  the annular u v l t y  between t h  rtdundmt sealis ~811llitS I teek check PI the seslr 
BmdUatb~lp: s f t w  Je$n?ng srgnnos. The 1*5 plus. clnstalled a f t e r  leek test, has a rcltalntnp $mere end 
wp)w~slrn 8 1 ~ 8  for a t %  O-~sncj seal. A mans 'a tes t  We %eel o f  me I ns ta l l ed  llS piup )us mb boon 
r$t&18shed, 
The Gr4-1 BQP the ease jo fnts  .am mold Bemad end gmund M 0-rlngs far the t es t  
wrt saw m i d  B o m d  t o  net d(mens$ons. Both 0-rhga a r e  w 4 e  BOP c~mpmsslon 9. 
flwmcoogen aPastmr.  lRe &slgn p r n l t s  f ive $car+ jo fnts  for t fw ease j o i n t  s r l  ~ t n g s .  tho O-ring 
Jo'ane Pjroasagrn aust oaual OP exceed 402 o f  th. p a n n t  m t e r l a l  strtngfh. 
8" RliRlM 
re4 a te ,  lrtgnt St@EIC f l r i n  s Jnd f tve f l i g h t s  nave resulted t n  180 (54 f i e l d  ma I26 factory) j o in ts  
castre attn m svldmce of feakaga. fhe ~ i t m  111 usfnq a s i m ~ t a r  Jo in t  csncwt M s  teste4 a t o t a l  
of 1076 J o l n s r  s ~ ~ e e s s f ~ l l  y. 
In late 1982, Marshall Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
eraglners reviewed lest and analys~s results and determined 
that the case joints should be reclassif~ed as Critlcaltty 1 (not 
r&erndanr) l h ~ s  form was slgned by Maurtce (Bud) Parker, a 
Iacal RhrokoI Welsab~lity engineer, beginning the process of 
management approval of the Cr~ttcal~ty change. 
cu 
t I 
Add 
8 Iotmretoty test prq lnm dmns t ra tad  the eb f l f t y  o f  the O - r i q - t o  ovarate s u c c r i s h l l y  rk.n extruded 
into 10% . r l l  over trio11 encountemd l a  thts O-ring rpvl lcat lon. Unl fom 91~1 of 1/8-tnch m d  aver (MI- 
nrw! r u e c r s s ~ u ~ ~ r  rf thstood pressures of 1600 p c ~ .  the MrUmbvnt ~ m p m  (NI-11664) bnd the s t ructura l  
l e s t  Progrm (Sf&-1) f o r  the SUndird r e f  h t  case ( M - l 2 O f t )  lnd tk Llgkt*r lght Case Jotnt Ce?tlffc8tl0n 
Test (m-lt(Lt9) 811 hare s k r m  m a t  h e  8-rlny a n  r f t M W  a W n t u  of t.ur - a l l l t l a n  ).hrr -I. 
to the ring e m  mmlt my Ieakrsa. 
further d w n r t r a t t o n  o f  ma crpabI!lty of j o tn t  sar l lng 11 found fn tha tty6ro-vrdof 'trrtf of MI, a d  7 r r f m f s h e 9  case $eg.mts. Orer 540 jo tn ts  Mve k e n  uporad ta llqufd p m s u r l z ~ t ~ o n s  #t m e l t  
exceadlnp =top eEW w i t h  no lerkagr expalencad # s t  the prlnrp 0-riq. lh m l y  oecaitom when le8tsga 
was exwr i rncrd was durl m h r b t r k l n t  of $15-1 rhwl tm s t l f f a w  (.cR) wm rarrrly dnw &rlq 
u+rq ml l rosa  at  artrrfrprct,  
A m e  &tat led d r rw lp t ton  o f  S A l  j o l n t  O s t l y  h t r M v  I1 o n u f n r l  (a Nil-93520. Ihvtltm 1. 
E. jRWEOI01 
The tang -A- dimrtcir m d  elevls -C- d t rs r te r  ere masumd and rrcordad. The d r ~ t h ,  width and surface 
f inlsh o f  the O-rings p o r e s  are verfffed. The surface f fn lsh o f  the e r n  I s  r lw  raltIed. O u n c t e r l r t f c i  
m (napecud on each O-rlnp LO r r s u m  c o n t o - r r  to tlu I- t. t r?uder  
0 Surfcln rondlnonl 
o Bold f lrshing 
o Sear? Jolnt mtmatd, 8 r  8.prrrt fon 
o Cross ract lon 
o : t m m l r m n u  
0 OumnUP 
tach ~srcnbled j o l n t  tra1 I t tested #or Sl'U%tll? v lo  p m w l l l t q  th. 8fIWlw mdtp hhm t e l l 1  te $0 t 
3 p s l  and m n t t o r l q  fo r  10 aInutes. A pressurn du:y of 1 p i t  or p e a t a r  1% not 8ce.ptabta. fol' latrrp 
trrl ~ r r l f t c r r t o n  by QC. the l e a l  uit prt p l y  11 I e s t e l l d  w i t h  #: rml fy tn )  Inst. t l8t lm and torr).tq. 
6. FAfLlUE MISTORY 
ECR ELSd-(81411- !s. wpreved wlth changes 
a, 'page A-&A'- A. DESIGN - %=word f f r s t  prrt of prrrgrrph 1 .  
b. base li;bA:- A. OLS0C.N - Brregraph 4 reworded. 
c m  page A-6A - I). TEST¶ W t  - Prr~grapb 1 reworded_ 
d,  BBgr A-8) .- I. TESTING - Paragraph % reworded 
a ,  ~ 4 g c  W-QB - C. axsPteTxom - rsrrgraph I rsnirordca 
f ,  P8g$ A-6@ m 0. &I@%% %ha UPS% @ra$raph r e l l ~ r d  Oh. sasonc 
prrgregh. 
58$$1/61. N. Str'lcklrrrd shll  trkr necessary a c t . 1 ~  to lnfora mi31 o h t  La ELSQ-0141 
trs approved wi0b rhovr chrnges. kn a t e :  r-8-IU. 
hrll suknllt Chrnse Notice No. 83 t o  PSFC-RPT-725 through EL$$/ 
Fe Ikposlitory. Dua Date: 2-8-89 
L$%;I/M, Xarewhlte sh01X pvepmra 8 Uv.8 1% dl and SCUG Action Raquest Ber oranrnicor l 
vre S&bO Be b w e L  PP ?RCO. Dus Dataa 2-8-83. 
On January 21, 1983, the Marshall Configuration Control 
Board, chatred by Lawrence Mulioy, approved the change 
from Cracalrty 1 W to Cr~ticallty 1 and approved I( for forward- 
!ng to Level ' I  
I t t * ~ 1 .  wet- I I met- ~ r t r r e  I I WslB110e 
I / / c?bl#W / I *...MIHI P I  
I / I *H. meti .  mla amm. I r m ~ r u e  o r *  ursrrrt. I r 8srrmtmsrrra i 
I r 8 tatmu lank / I xtn 
I 1x1 -IY w e t  u n o r  I I b.am 1 
After receiving wrmen concurrence from certain Johnson Glynn Lunney signed th~s request for Level t to approve for the 
organlzat~ons, Glynn Lunney, the Shuttle Program Manager, field jo~nt a walver of the "fall-safe requ~rement" for Shuttle corn- 
approved the Crltlcallty change, based on a telephone con- ponents, n that the joint had been reclass~f~ed as Cr~t~eisl~ty 1 
versatlon wlth Lawrence Mulloy, the Solid Rocket Booster (no redundancy). The walver was approved for Level I by b 
Project Manager Thls actlon was taken wlthout convening a M~chael Weeks on March 28. 1983 
meetlng of the Program Requirements Control Board. Thls ac- 
tlon authorized subm~ttal of a watver of the "faall-safe" design 
requ~rement to Level I. 
Memoranda written following the field joint O-ring erosion 
on STS 4 l-B (flight 10) 
Routing' Slip 
d ~ h e  recant  =per isnee  of two burned O-rings (noz r i e l case  
boar and faswaasd/fs~rwra~d c e n t e r  j o i n t )  Qw S%S-il coupled 
w i t h  the o"mnaia~lng ursyPO f%nding a t  dilsasecmbiy ~ a i s e  
consam w i t h  SfS-13 ,  
IgcelliessPLy ceehersa. is r a i s e d  about t h e  type  %I Randolph 
z inc ehramass pucsy (ZCP) s e n s i t i v i t y  eo humidity and 
gcaaparrtura. fhc t t iclwal des ign of rha SRM j o i n c s  depend 
oa thernral prc tae t lo ls  of t h e  O-ring by t h e  ZCP. LCP 
Ealbluee t e  provide a thermal b a r r i e r  can l ead  t o  burning 
berth B)-rfaags and subsequent c a t a s t r o p h i c  f a i l u r e .  Adhe- 
s i o n  iaemica- 1Pf c and s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  temperature and 
hualdiep of the type 1% ZCP must Be r eas ses sed  and ve r f -  
fie4 in e h r  light of r ec t .~e  experience.  The O-ring l e a k  
ehaek proeedurs and i ts  po tenc la l  e f f c e t  on t h e  ZCg 
b~sraPPacfon and gassfbPe displaecmcule is aPso an urgent  
I I 
concern which r e q u i r e s  expedfrion of previously  idenci- 
f l e d  f u l l s c a l e  t e s t s .  E f fec t  of c a v i t y  volume s i z e  
(cavi ty  between t h e  ZCP and primary O-ring) on O-ring 
damage s e v e r i t y  must a l s o  be assessed.  
Your eraRose i n  chis urgent  lacPeter i s  requested.  
f ,  Sol id  Motor Branch 
EF?S/Hessrs. ~ ~ r e r s / k ~  
Name Tel. No. for Cod./ & Eat. 
lh rs  (Paternal Marshall nole was written by John Q. Miller after 
the a-ring eros~on experience on STS 44-B (flight lo), in- 
dlcrjiPrng concern that the leak check procedures may displace 
puw rrblow-heles")eading to O-ring burn~ng ("eros~on"). STS 
44 -B was the first flrght for whlch a 200 psr leak check stabiliza- 
laon pressure was used. 
INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE 
To: Larry Mulloy 
Fm: George Moref iel d 
Sj: Zinc Chromate Putty in SRM Joints 
Dt: March 9, 1984 
NO : 6%-042-84 
F:)llowing is an ?laboration o f  my impromptu remarks 3n yesterday's FRR concerning 
burned primary pressure vessel "Ow-rings. 
I aliuded to the Titan 11% SRM history which is quite similar to the current STS 
SRM experience. Post-fire inspection of Tftan SRM static test motors showed that 
pressurization of the single "0"-rings in the pressure vessel routinely occurted 
via a single break-dcwr! peth across the joint putty. There was also evidence 
that some "0'-rings never see pressure in the Titan motor. The segment-to-segment 
case insulation desion results in a compression butt joint which apbhFent7y is-often 
sufficient to withstand PC. 
It should be pointed out that single point pressurization of a Titan "0"-ring 
annulus is a less severe event than on an STS SRM because, being a smaller diameter 
rotor, the Titat: "0"-ring plenum has less volume and comes to pressure equilibrium 
frster (less tine to melt the "0"-ring). 
The use of "lucky putty" has always been surrounded by controversy. Its use hirs 
become a given, although -no one rea:!y c l a i ~ r  ?t Sc FEY? of eitfier the incrr!rr.ior! 
system or the sealing system. In fact there i s  evidence that ft's use can cause 
~roble!?Is other than forcing single-point pressurization. On the few occasions 
wnen Titan motors were destacked it was founc: that the high hydraulic forces 
associated with joint mcting actually caused case insulation to peel away from the 
case. This is of course aggravated by the prpssure of the hydraulic wdiun, putty, 
which flows into the separation as well as the "0"-ring plenum. 
Ycur review showed 
the job. I'm sure 
"0"-ring will thsn 
concern remains. 
thct there was sufficient narpin of "0"-ring reaainfnp to do 
you have considered that if it does burn through, the seconeary 
be sirilarly pressurized through a single port. So, some 
In this memorandum to Lawrence Mulloy, George Morefield 
compares the Titan joint with the Shuttle joint and assesses a 
higher failure probability for the Shuttle joint, indicating con- 
cern that putty may cause "single point pressurization' of the 
primary O-ring. 
B?;e 2 
658t-082-84 
i recornend t h a t y o u  set up a panel t o  study the use o f  pu t t y  and consider 
same a1 ternst ives: 
I 1% 1% put ty  needed a t  a l l ?  I 
2 )  If the t r a d i t i o n  czn? be broken, can the pu t ty  be appl ied with 
mu l t ip le  (6 o r  8) pressurizat ion paths b u i l t  fn? 
I th ink that  the primary seal should be allowed t o  work I n  i t s  c lass ica l  design 
mde,  Both the T i tan  and STS SRM's have been designed f o r  t h i s  not t o  happen. 
T l t a w  has flown over a thousand pressure j o i n t s  w i th  no f a i l u re .  My opinion 
i s  t h a t  the poten t ia l  f o r  f a i l u r e  of the j o i n t  i s  higher f o r  the ST5 SRM, 
aopec%af l y  when oeeasionally the secondary seal may not  be t o t a l l y  ef fect ive. 
Chief Engtneer ' 
page 2 
Marshall urgent request for briefing aftei the STS 51-C mission (flight 15) 
OR 2LW EAST THE BRIX@.ZY ON THE SIC W E  JOImS. 
ALL THIS FORTODAY S PJOOLD EIXE TO SEE ZSE LBGXC 
Follswlng the d~scovery of the STS 51 -C (flight 15) O-ring ero- 
sfow and blow-by, Lawrence Mulloy sent th~s 'Certified Ur~ent' 
mesage %c the Sol~d Rocket Motor manager, Larry Wear. This 
mesage was passed on to Thiokol as d~rection to prepare a 
deaallecd brfellng on O-ring problems for the next Flight 
Readrness Rev~ew. 
Internal NASA Headquarters memorandum after visit to Marshall1 
It Is lm ortrnt to mete tbrt tbe couse and elfret rl the p u t t  
rrrles. {here rra ~ o m r  WStC ersennel ube err net ermllaerd tE.8 
the hole8 ln the potty are tte 8oarce ef the @rcblea but 8rr8 
tbrt It 8.7 be l revorre efloct La tbrt tbe Let @rrrl 8@ LI 
toeking through the real a d  umrtag the wka trreli ir elr pmttt. 
Cosrldorlng tho fact tbrt there doornet opperr tr Lo 8 tIlS(ot1d 
rorolutlon OD to tho effect of puttj. I o.uld earb~IaI1B qUOlbOe8 
tho riadm 18 r m r b m g  It r @4-S. 
UIIssecIote Admlnlettetor for Spree Flight There hsro been f t ~ e  ( S )  oecvrroneea durlag flight whear tbrns 
BIB: KPS/lrr Dorid@ 
SUN=: Crsr ta Coar omd loarls to Car* *O* Ling 8601 lraslon 
As e result of the problems belng Incurred durlng flight on both 
care to ease and norrle to cane "0" ring erosion Mr. Homb rmd I The problem utth the unseating of the secondar)r *B" r lo@ duriag 
slrlted USFC on July 11. 1@15, to dL#eurr thla i;sue with iocb jelnt rotrtlon bar been k n o m  lor ulto some time. 85 order Da 
project m d  SIE personnel. Follortm: ere r.rr Importrat factors rllmlnste thls roblom oa tbo FWE ?ield joinor r crprura ferrraca 
eoneornin: these probleas: rrr des1:ned rh!ch prevent1 the soeondrr, renl frrI Diftlal 
off. Durln oar dlscusrioas nt thlr Issue with MSFC, mw rct$cw 
uor rsrlgne~ for them to L1ratlfy the taming rrscciatr4 ~ 8 t h  rL@ 
unseating of the rrcondrrp *Q*"rl: and the srst8sp rf alr 
primary *0" ring durin rotrtloa. slow long IS trtsr t b a  
secondrry "0" rtng lo flit elf durfng rotstloo osd when B R  the 
irersure erelo It llftr 8.0 key foctora la ELI deara~lnrtlca of 
rs a A t l u l I ~ ,  
The present consonsus i s  thrt If the rlsarg *Ow rBn ser r l  
durln t:nltlon. and subsequently frlfr. the URIIIIO! 1 9 6 r n d l ~ ~  
?be prime rv~pect an the coulr for the rroslon on the prlmory "0" *'Q" ring rill not sorre Itr intended porpase r r  s ordwwdrnt 
z ina reallr Is the O n e  ef putty used. It 8s ThIokolgs poorlaln serP. slorerer, rodundanq does oxlrt lurlag PI@ B@alitBcara eyelo, 
thro during assembly, Peek cheek, or ignltlon, a Bole ern bo rhieh 81 tbo m a t  cr1ttc.l tlre. 
Boraed throw h tbo utty which Initlrtes "0" r l n ~  erosloa duo to 
a jettine effect. !t Is bmportrnt to note that after StS-lO, the It 9s recommended that re r n ~ n g e  far MSFC ocp pac~dBD #a @tors81 
ssoufscturer of the putty rent out of business and o new putty briefin: to ~ o u  00 the SIW RO'Qln:so Pneludlag ~ ~ D ~ u P I  ~ L I I ~ P ~ .  
mrnufreturer was contracted. Tbe sew putty :a bollered to be currmnt rtotur. omd optloma for corroctAa[ tile prrblrrn. 
more ourceptlble to enriranaratol offrets auch or ~oisturr uhlcb 
maker the putty more tacky. 
This memorandum to Level I describes a vlsit to Marshall by 
Irvlng Dav~ds of NASA Headquarters. Dav~ds' vls~t was 
prompted by the nozzle O-ring problems suffered on STS 
51-B (fl~ght 17). 
Thiskol letters and memoranda written after O-ring concern. escalates 
MORTON THIOI(OL INC COHPAm PRIVA'llt: 
Wasat& Division . -- -- 
-.- . - C '+ .--- y$ -4 ' -c .:j 
lntsao9%1ct Mema +- q+ .a! 
.- 
33 J u l y  1983 
2870::P"WfBla::%l73 
ra : R. K,  LIB^^ 
Vice President,  Engineering 
CC: B. C. Brinton, A. J. HcDoolld, %I. B,.Sayer, J. 8- k p p  
=OM: 8. X, Bois jo l r  
Applied Heebanlca - kt. 3525 
P mt lentcar %t wri t t en  t a  insure ~2~16 manageaient i s  fulfy aware of dBe rcsiausnesa of haae e a a e ] ~ ~  6-U.zag ercslrioa probLena, Brrn g%u% 58M jofnt+ g+om an / engineerbg sundpo io f*  
The metfstakedy aetepted pos i t i oa  o s  hhe $s fa t  w ~ U m  was t o  2 l y  u i f b a t  deaf 
o f  failure rod t o ,  run a s e r i e s  of design e v g w t i c ~ s l ~  which vould slltinratdy 
$cad fo 2 ~ o L u t i o a  o r  a t  l e a s t  a s ign l f i eau t  g e d ~ ~ t l o n  of the erosion probl- 
n l -s  pesitiorn is now drasci:ically cknged a s  o r e s u l t  of tBe SRM 16A nozzle 
j d y l i r n t  eraaicea which eroded a secondary O-Ring vfb the p-ary 0-a;ing srever 
32 the soace scenario s b o d d  occur i n  r f i e l d  j o i s t  ( a d  16 twld), *en 06 %s 
r $ w p  b U  as fa the satceesa o r  fPilrnre of the j o in t  because tBe accoadar~ .  
*Up; csruoot respond t o  the  c l ev i s  opening r a t e  and may wt be capable of 
~ a s s u x i r r t i c n .  -The r e s u l r  vould be a catastrophe o f  ehe highest order - 
loss of $wan life. 
maL(bieeU team (a mema defining 6he team and its purpose ws never 
ge;a"Uahedj Pr%tba Ieardcr was gowed, ea 19 J&y 1985 gnd w s  a s k e d  mlfh selving 
a far Boeh &e ahors and lorng term. m~affieIa% g t a s ~  is 
y aouleAstcnr a% this Wac. In my-oplinfon, rhc team must be 
gwcn t he  r e s p a ~ s i b U r y  and the authorfry t o  uccure +he work 
rer be doue OP a non-interference bas is  (fa the assignment unrll 
eompleerdl, 
Roger Borsloly's first anempt after STS 51 -8 (flight 17) to con- 
vince R s  management sf the seriousness of the O-ring erosion 
orobiem 
It is my honest and very r e d  fear that if we do not take &mediate action to 
dedicate a t n m  to rolve the problem w i t s  bht field joint h y i n g  the number 
one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a fUghg along with rlf the 
launch pad facilities. 
CUHPXlW PRIVATE 
M O ~ O N  THIOI<OL. I[NC - 
-- Waarch Division  -.-. -  
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Interall ice Memo 
%871:=86~%6% 
22 August 1985 
TO : S,R- S te in ,  
Pro jec t  Engineer 
CC : feW. Kapp, K.H. Sperry, B.G. Russel l ,  R.V. Ebeling, H.H. McIntosh, 
R.M. Boisjoly, H. S a f i t a  D.M. Kctncr 
=OH: A,B. Thompson, Supervisor 
S emactures Design 
SWJHCT: SE9 Fl ight  Seal  Recornmendation 
The *-.ring sea l  prebfem bas bateby become acute . SoPutionss both long and 
sharb-t tern arb beiag soughe, i n  the mean t i a e  f l i g h t s  axre continuing. %t is 
my reco~~snendatlon t h a t  a near term sofut ion be incorporated f o r  f l i g h t s  
foUevixlg SIS-27 which is erurentAy scheduled f o r  24 August 1985. The near  
tern salr%t%on uses the maximum possible shim thickness and a .292 +.005/-.003 
inch d i a  eL-ring. The r e s u l t s  of these tm changes are  shown in Tabfe 1.  A 
great dea l  o f  e f f o r t  wi3LP be reqrPired t o  inecorgorate these ebnges .  However, 
as 8B0m i n  the Tabfe the  O-ring squeeze is  nearby dotrgled f o r  the e-pfe 
(STS-27Al. A best  e f f o r t  sRoraPd be made t o  include a r~ax shim k i t  and t h e  
-292 dPa +ring as soon as is  pract ical .  Much of the i n i t i a l  blowby during 
+ring soalfng is control led by O-ring squeeze. ~ U s o  more s a c r i f i e i d  O-ring 
m a t e r i d  .is avslilabfe t o  protect  the sealed port ion of t he  O-ring. TRe added 
cross-reeeioml area  of the  .232 d i a  Q-ring wffP help t h e  f e s f l i ence  respouse 
by added pressure from the  groove s ide  wabb, 
Several long t e r n  sol%ut$oess look good; but,  r e v e r d  gears  a r e  required t o  
fneerpsarase: some of them, The simple shorr; tern measures shorPfd be eaken go 
redoe* f U g b t  risks. 
In this mem~landum to S.R. Stein, A.R. Thompson indicates 
the 0-ring seal problem is acute and short-term measures 
should be taken to reduce flight risk. 
Intefolllce Memo 
1 October 1985 
EISO/RVE46-47 
TO: A. J .  Rcoonald, Oirector 
Sol i d  Rocket Rotor Project 
Fm: Haneger, SRr Ipnl t ion Systa. F ln r t  Arsakly, Special 
Projects and Sround Test 
CC: I. RcDoug8ll. 8 .  Russell. J. IleClustey. 0. Cooper, 
J. Kflminrtcr. 8. I r inton. 1. O'Grady, I. NrcBeeh. 
J. Sutton, J .  Elwell. I. Idams. F. Ca11, J .  Lamere, 
P. Ross. 0. Futlmer. E. Ballry. 0. Smfth. L. h i l r y .  
8. Kucheh. 9. Eskalsen. P. Petty, J .  UcCa11 
IUIUECT: Yt@kly Aet iv%ty Report 
1 October U8S 
HELP! The seat t a s k  force 'Is corast8ntly Bcfng delayed by every porslble 
wens. People are quoting polDcy and systems w!thuuc work-around. HSFC 
i s  eorrect I n  stat ing that we do not trpr hor t o  run a developwnt 
, Progr'J=. 
SROUFID TEST 
1. The two (2)  6Tn center segments wn ncefved a t  T-21 l 8s t  week. 
Optlcal measurements are being taken, Slgntflcane w o r t  h8S t o  be done 
Po elcan up the jofnts. It should be noted t h a t  when necessary SICW 
bskes @r#or l  ty. 
2, The 1 - 6  test  r t pa r t  less comporlw section was released l a s t  rrek. 
Ls a mou l t  of the l r t e r t  engfneerfng malysfs of the V-1 case 1t 
oppcers that hfgh 'stress r isers to  the case rrr created by the Dhcnolic 
DFI  housfnps and fairings. As i t  presently stmds, these wt1\ prabebly 
have l o  be modified o r  removed 8nd i f  removed w i l l  have Oo b t  replaced. 
Thfs could have m Impact on the launch schedule. 
A. J. IlcDonrld. Director 
1 October 1985 
E1501RVE-86-47 
FIRAL ASSEHBLY 
One SRU 25 and two SRU 26 SegmntS along w i t h  two SFin 24 e x i t  con@% we?'@ 
completed during t h i s  perlod. Only three segments ore prcssnt ly f n  
work. A v r i l a ~ i l i t y  of i g n t t w  components. nozzles and systems Funnel 
tool ing m the present constraining factors I n  the fBnal roombly area, 
nwtrrlon s v s r ~  
1. Engineering i s  curreqt ly rewr i t ing  f gn i t e r  gask-o-sesl Coating 
nOufrements to  al low mtnor flaws m d  scratches. Bare meal area% w4ll 
be coated w i th  a t h i n  f i l m  of HD-2 grease. Approval 4 %  exwcted w l t h t n  
the week. 
2. Safe and Ann Device component del iver ies i s  begtnnqng t o  cause 
coneem. There are f i ve  SLA's a t  KSC on the shel f .  Procurment, 
Program Of f ice  npresent r t i ves  v i s i t ed  Consolidrtcd Controls t e  diecuss 
accelerr t ing scheduled deltvertes. CCC her promised 10 AW" and 30 
8-6's no l a t e r  than 31 October 1985. 
O-RINGS AN0 PUTll 
1. The sbnrt  stack f l n a l l y  went together a f t e r  repeated a%tcsPts, b u t  
w e  o f  the w r i n g s  was cut. E f fo r ts  t e  separate the g e i n t  were %topped 
kc ruse  %om@ do nag th ink  they w i l l  work* Engineering 1% bes1g~lng 
mls t o  separate the pieces. The p r i n t s  should be sklcreed tpmclrrow. 
2. The I n e r t  segments are a t  7-24 and are undergoing .Inspeetfon. 
3. The hot  flow t es t  r i g  t s  i n  design, which 4s prov%ng Po be 
d i f f i c u l t .  Engineering I s  plannlng release of these p r t n t s  BieFine~dsy or 
Thursday. 
4. Various potent ia l  f f l l e r  m t e r l a l s  are on order nueh 8% ~srbon,  
graphite. quartz, and s i l i c a  f i be r  brafds; m d  dl f ferene g.ar%%lcs. They 
w i l l  a11 be t r i e d  i n  ho t  f low tests m d  f u l l  scale asrm&ly tests. 
5. Thc allegiance t o  the 0-rfng investigation task force t $  very 
I im i ted  t o  J group o f  engimers nunbcring 8-10. Our assigned people I n  
~ n u f r c t u r i n g  and q v a l f t y  hrve the desire, but a r t  encumbered w i t h  other 
s i $n l f l c r n t  wrl. Others (n unufacturtng, qua l i ty ,  procurement who are 
not tnvolved d i rec t ly ,  bu t  whose help we need, are gcncrattng plenty 09 
resistance. Me are c res t ing  more ins t ruc t iona l  paper ehrn enganeerlng 
data. Ye wish we could get r c t l o n  by verbal request but such f s  net  the 
case. This i s  a red  flag. 
OR661NAb PAGE 19 
OF POOR QUALIW 
In this weekly activity report. Robert Ebeling attempts ("Help!") 
Po draw management attention to the difficulties experienced 
by the seal task force in getting adequate support, indicat~ng 
This is a red flag.' 
TO: R. t. Lurid. Vice Presfdent, Englneerlng 
A. d. RBenald .  O1mctor. Soace 8ooster Progrms 
I, C. Brineon, bnagep,  Project Engfner ing 
A. U. MeBeth, Wnager, Project Engineering 
&R$ng InvrsStga%lon Talk Force P(anD@rs 
$UJE%"S: Potency o f  Q-l%ng Onvesetgatlon fas t  Force 
VB1e task  f ~ r e o  t o r  Bnaestlgat4on of O-ring erosion and m l r t e d  Jo in t  problms 
has am exsBStad f o ~  mre bnan 8 mntn. Ye are finaPly gett ing enough people 
amam %f QUV tff0rt)r $0 that I n  oo~ne areas we are receiving f u l l  eoooerrtion. 
I n  CtRsr aredlf A&nrcv~r, (D Is t ~ l y  a s t ~ g g l e  t o  get work perfonned. The 
OM-5 f t r ing ,  VU-l launch, and safety o f  every other shut t le  launch are a l l  
d i ~ ~ t B y  mIa &eO t o  the wart current ly undeiury. Unless drast ic ilDorovancnts 
fn the mteney OB the task force arc Pealiaed, the tlm reoulred to c m l e ~ e  
ttw nwccrssrry Oorcstlgitlons, testing. ma r n r l y t i c r t  work w i l l  not supoort 
a 491rable schcdulb. 
'We rm c c ~ m t 1 p  betng hog-tied by p a o e n o ~  evefy t iae  r e  try 0 8  ucorpl tu ,  
crpythlapg. 1 undomtand that for  produetion programs, the proerwrk i s  
f ieces~ary~ ~ w v e r .  foe a pr40rlty, short  schedule t n v e s t i g a t i m ~  t e  makes 
8 ~ 1 / w l t $ m p i t  416 OUP goats I n  a t imely manner e x t r n v l y  difficult, I f  not j bmosraQliu?, we need phc Wehori ty to bypass o o m  of the orpcrnorh jungle. 
As s m~easeneatlre 6xamDOBe of firOb!~m~ and time mot could e ~ s t l y  be 
jelliauaatrd, ssrnstdrr a%rs&!y o r  dlrarrembly of tes t  hardmare by rnsnufleD~rin9 1 @rsrslnaael, 
1 GJ ~rewgly ea 610 mst be generated. wltPltch grlggem the wnufactur lng engineer 
, t o  ganaraaa drtaaled plann%ng. Once the u lmn ing  i s  mleased, w@ must go t o  
schcdv~ing, who p u t s  us on thr  l i s t  of p r lo r rey  work to do. Ye then wait 
wnftl CUP Joe, nacM?s em top of the I tre ,  and a crew begins the work. I f  
swy prabtsmr or l rc ,  oe get tangled i n  apre paperwrt. I n  Tiecent operations. 
ws Rave Rail f u l l  eoawratton from a11 fnvolved orr t les,  bu t  gett ing a l l  Ihr 
PR)CEdUm% l l ned  up trkclr too long. Yt need the r u t h o r l t y  to h d e  d 'Seaam 
tom$ &deb could *ncludc a Design Engineer, Lnufac tur ing  Enginen, Olul it1 
6nplnaer, Safety Engineer, and the Foranan. The cren $harld ~ e r f o r n  the work 
as ddrectcrd by &he team. P a p e ~ ~ r k  t o  describe each step I n  de ta i l  shouh' 
Im% be rneessavi. The OY engineers should be a I I . 1  Y €ake ms$onslbtL(O 
f o r  the wrk, 
DIstrPtlut~oP 
1 October 1985 
Page t*o 
I hnw the estrbllshed p a ~ e m ~ k  Dwcedures can be v lo latcd If Someone wf th 
enough author$ty dictates t t .  Ye d i d  tha t  w$th the OR s y r t n  the WC 
htrdrrre .Tiger Team" was ostabltshed. I f  changes are not nude to al lot l  
US to ~ c c m l  fsh wrk I n  a maronrbie m u n t  of time, then the 0-ring Inre=- 
t i g r t t o n  task force w d l l  nevep have the weemy nrcessarJ bc resolve the 
probbms 11 % OImdy arnner. 
7 
S.W Stern echoes the concerns about the seal task force not 
gening lull suppefl. 
ACTIVITY REPORT 
The team generally has been experiencing trouble from rhe business 
as usual attitude from supporting organizations. Part of this is due to 
lack of understanding of how important this task team activity is and 
the rest is due to uure operating procedure inertFa which prevents 
tirPely results to r specific request. 
The team met w i t h  Joe Kllrninster on 10/3/85 to discuss this 
problem. He wanted specific etamples which he was given and he sirnply 
conduded that -it was every team members responsibility TO flag problems 
that occurred to organizational aupervisioo and work to m e  the road 
block by getting the required support to aollre +he probUn, lCbc prohlen 
was further explained to require a3most full time nursing of each task 
to insure it i s  taken to completion By 8 suppon: group. Joe ~fmply 
agreed and said ve should then nurse every task we have. 
Be plain doesn't understand that there are not enough people to do 
that kind of nursing of each task, but he doesn't seem to nind directing 
ihat the task neverehe-less gets done. For example, the team just 
found out that uben we submit r request to purchase an it=, that it 
goes through agproxbatelg 6 to 8 people before a purchase order Ps 
vcitten and the item acnraSly ordered, 
The vendors we are working with on seals and spacer rings have 
responded to our requests in a timely-manner yet we (MI) uzzot get a 
purchase order to thun in a timely manner. Our l a b  has Been vaiting for 
a function generator since 9-25-85. The paperuork authorizing the 
purchrse was firtished by engineering on 9-24-85 a d  placed into the 
system. We have yet to recrive the requested item. lhis m e  of 
In *is activity report, Roger Boisjoly expresses his frustration 
with the slow progress of and lack of management attention to 
the seal task force. 
example is tt>qpicsl and resul ts  i n  . lost  r,csources tbat bad been planned 
1 t o  do t e a t  work fo r  us i n  a timely manner. 
i 
I for ormc resent working a t  fupf eapacitr arT week frmg and &en I 
being required ee support ac t iv i ty  on the verkend that  could have been 
acc~lmgLlshed during the week. f might ail4 tbat even HASA perceives that 
&e t e a 9  is  being blocked i n  i t s  engineering efforts  t o  accoapllsh its 
Qlssks* M A  is sending an engineering representative t o  8tay w i t h  US 
g Ocg 04th. We f e d  that a s  i s  the d i rec t  result of  rbelr 
! 
i f c c l b g  t k %  we (]MFf) a r e  no6 responding qu%ddr enough On ghE me& 1 problm. 
1 I o h o a d  erdd'ehat several of the team mabers nqaeseed &at  pc k 
given a s ~ ) e ~ l f i c  manufacturing engineer, qaaal i f~  mgfneer, safety 
engineer and 4 t o  6 t t c h n l c i a ~ ~  to  allow us t o  do our t e s t r  on a 
aom-.%ater$rrreasa Basis w%t$ fhe r e s t  of rh5 iystrm. m s  zequest was 
dcmed .go= zsaccssaq when Joe decided that  the nursbg e f  8br task I 
I A U g ,  the basic prob%ean boils  $0- to  the dacf thaz LI, 4222 
i problems kvc: 51 pr ior i ty  a d  e k t  upper managessent s g p a r a d y  leds 
*t the  Sm progrzn i s  ours fo r  sure and ehe eastopcr %be 
Marshan internal memorandum in the fall of 1985 
George C. Marshall Space Right Center 
Ma:sRal Smce Flight Center. AIzbama 
35812 
SEP 5 1985 
W W t A m d :  EAO l 
FROM: EAOl/J. E. Kingsbury 
SUBJECT: O-ring Joint Seals 
I am mos: anxious to be briefed on plans for improving the SRH 
O-ring seals. Specifically, I want to review pltns which lead 
to flight qualifications and the attgndant schedules. I have 
been apprisee of generel ongoing activities but these do not 
appear to czrry the priority which I attach to this situation. 
I consider tbe o-ring seal problem on the SRH to requise pri- 
ority attention of both Morton Zhiokol/Wasatch and MSFC. 
Please arrange such a briefing no later-than September 13, 
1 9 8 5 .  From.ny point of v iew,  this can be accomplished by 
telecon with Morton fhiokol. I would hope such a briefing 
could be done in two hours Or less. 
n 
Science and ~ngineering 
CC : SUS,"" C? 
SAO1 /Mr. Lfndstrom 
SAot /Dr ; Lovfngood' ~ i i e .  &za Copies a -Qb. 4& SAO1 /Mr. Hardy 
fSOI/Dr; Littles 
EElI/Mr; Hortcn - 
EPOl /Mr 6 McCool 
EHOI/Mr; Schwinghamer 
ec 
.-.. - 
_- _ --. -*. 
In thls memorandum. J E Klngsbury lnforms Lawrence 
Mulloy that he places n~gh prlorlty on the 0-ring seal problem 
and aeslres add~t~onal ~nformar~on on plans for lmprovlng the 
sItuatlon. 
